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ABSTRACT 
The adoption of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe heralded a new era with high 
expectations from ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe. Among other matters, the Constitution 
provides for a multilevel system of government with government organised at the national, 
provincial and local levels. The design of this system of government is linked to the need, 
inter alia, to realise development, build democracy and sustain peace in Zimbabwe. 
Provincial and local governments are expected to play a role in the realisation of these goals. 
The question is whether the law and policy governing provincial and local governments in 
Zimbabwe enables these governments to play that role. It will be argued that the law and 
policy hinders the role of provincial and local governments in realising development, 
building democracy and sustaining peace. The national government has excessive 
supervisory powers over provincial and local governments which limit the minimum level of 
local discretion required if these lower governments are to assist in realising development, 
building democracy and sustaining peace. Moreover, the legal and institutional design 
emphasises coordinative rather than cooperative relations among governments, thereby 
undermining opportunities for effective multilevel governance. It will be argued that the 2013 
Constitution, however, provides the foundation upon which an effective system of multilevel 
government can be built. Mere alignment of the legislative framework with the 2013 
Constitution is nevertheless unlikely to give full effect to the non-centralised system of 
government envisaged by this new Constitution. What is required is the development of a 
policy, institutional and legislative framework that gives effect to the constitutional spirit of 
devolution of power and cooperative governance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1. Background and problem statement of the study 
Zimbabwe felt the effects of the second wave of decentralisation that swept across Africa in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Having inherited a decentralised system of government from Britain, 
Zimbabwe implemented various legal and institutional reforms soon after independence. The 
main goals of these reforms were to democratise the decentralised system of government, 
enhance development, and secure peace and stability by improving the vast black majority‟s 
access to basic services. In the 1980s Zimbabwe had robust institutions of subnational 
government, but the powers and resources of these institutions have systematically degraded 
as a result of political and economic developments.
1
 Since the late 1990s, the country‟s 
political and economic climate has been unstable, and reached a point of crisis in 2007 and 
2008. According to estimates, in this period Zimbabwe‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
contracted by a cumulative 50.3 percent, official inflation rose to 231 million percent by July 
2008, and capacity utilisation in industry fell below 10 percent by January 2009. Poverty 
remained widespread, infrastructure deteriorated, the economy became more informalised, 
and the country experienced severe shortages of food and foreign currency.
2
 The political 
environment was characterised by polarisation, alleged abuses of human rights and breaches 
of the rule of law.
3
 The situation improved when a Government of National Unity comprising 
Zimbabwe‟s three major political parties was formed in 2009.4 
Subnational governments have not been immune to the effects of this harsh political and 
economic environment. Through legislative amendments, ministerial orders and other 
mechanisms, the national government increased its control over subnational governments and 
restricted local autonomy. Since the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) and its subsequent control of government at subnational level, central-local relations 
have been characterised by competition, antagonism and a lack of trust.
5
 Subnational 
governments are facing huge challenges such as inadequate financial resources, obsolete 
                                                 
1 Oluwu 2010: 118. 
2 United Nations 2010: 3. 
3 United Nations 2010: 3, 13. 
4 Article 1 Global Political Agreement (GPA). 
5 Jonga 2012: 122, Hammar 2005: 9. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
equipment and the lack of skilled manpower. This has been attributed in part to the lack of a 
decentralised system of government with appropriate local government structures equipped 
with adequate resources and autonomy.
6
 Against this background, the importance of 
reforming the decentralised system of government was widely acknowledged in the 
constitution review process, which started in 2009 and ended with the adoption of the 2013 
Constitution. Among other matters, the Constitution provides for a multilevel system of 
government with government organised at national, provincial and local levels.
7
 The 
Constitution requires devolution of power to the provincial and local levels to realise 
development, democracy and sustainable peace.
8
 The question is: are the challenges to 
development, democracy and sustainable peace going to be reduced under this multilevel 
system of government? 
2. Research question 
This study seeks to establish whether the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government has 
the potential to promote the roles of subnational governments in achieving development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. In answering this main question the study will address the 
following sub-questions: 
a) What are the key design features of a multilevel system of government which enables 
subnational governments to play a role in development, democracy and sustainable 
peace? 
b) How are provinces and local authorities established? 
c) Do the governance structures of provincial councils and local authorities position 
them as key players in development, democracy and sustainable peace? 
d) Which powers and functions do provinces and local authorities have? 
e) How do provinces and local authorities fund their activities? 
f) Does the national government have the necessary powers to supervise subnational 
governments which are exercised within limits? 
g) Does the legal and institutional framework provide for mechanisms for promoting 
intergovernmental cooperation? 
4. Argument 
The study argues that subnational governments play a role in realising development, building 
democracy and sustaining peace. It will examine the claim that the extent to which 
                                                 
6 Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa 2005: 23. 
7 See S 5 Constitution. 
8 See Preamble of Chapter 14, S 264(1) Constitution. 
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subnational governments play a role in development, democracy and sustainable peace 
depends on the design of the multilevel system of government. The study highlights which 
design features are necessary for promoting development, democracy and sustainable peace 
and conclude by asserting that Zimbabwe‟s multilevel system of government falls short of 
these vital design features. 
5. Limitations of the study 
The multilevel system of government will only be measured against key design features 
referred to above. The study reflects the legal and institutional position as of July 2014. The 
study acknowledges the existence of draft bills on provincial and local government which it 
could not examine as they were subject to change. Nonetheless, reference is made to the draft 
bills where they propose significant changes or maintain the status quo against the provisions 
of the 2013 Constitution. As at July 2014, provincial and metropolitan councils had not been 
established. Thus, the study includes an examination of the envisaged role of provincial and 
metropolitan councils and an assessment of the law under the Lancaster House Constitution 
as it relates to provincial councils. 
6. Methodology 
This is a desk-top study which reviews relevant international literature on decentralisation 
and multilevel governance. It uses the thematic comparison approach to identify key design 
features of an effective system of multilevel government. This involves comparison of certain 
themes rather than individual jurisdictions. The study explores the role which subnational 
governments can play in development, democracy and sustainable peace; examines the 
constitutional and legal framework for multilevel governance in Zimbabwe; reviews 
constitutional drafting materials to the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe; and looks closely at 
policy practice and the Lancaster House Constitution, with particular reference to provincial 
and local governments. Due to the secretive nature of government activities in Zimbabwe 
(which makes access to government policy documents difficult), the study significantly relies 
on informal sources such as newspaper articles in addition to formal sources. 
7. Organisation of the study 
Chapter Two examines the potential of a multilevel system of government to realise 
development, democracy and sustainable peace. It proposes design features of a multi-level 
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system of government that enables subnational governments to play a role in development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. Chapter Three discusses the Zimbabwean multilevel 
system of government from a historical perspective, while Chapter Four assesses the 
establishment of provinces and local authorities. Chapter Five discusses the governance 
structures at subnational level. Chapter Six offers an analysis of the powers and functions of 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. Chapter Seven discusses how the 
activities of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities are funded, while 
Chapter Eight examines the supervisory powers of the national government over provincial 
and metropolitan councils and local authorities. Chapter Nine addresses intergovernmental 
relations and Chapter Ten provides the concluding analysis and recommendations. 
8. Terminology 
There are different ways of distributing power and organising government in a state. Power-
sharing is the common theme of federalism, decentralisation, devolution, deconcentration and 
delegation, to different degrees. These terms are regularly used across the world and are 
given different meanings depending with the context in which they are applied. A distinction 
between federalism and devolution is particularly important as these terms tend to be used 
interchangeably. The section below provides working definitions for these modes of 
distributing power in a state. 
8.1. Subnational governments 
The term „subnational government‟ is used internationally to describe political systems of 
different types: unitary, federal and con-federal. Most scholars have not attempted to define 
the term, despite its widespread usage. Subnational government is defined as any form of 
government which is found at the subnational level of a country.
9
 This implies that any 
system of government obtaining in a country other than the national (or federal) government 
will fall within this classification.
10
 The word government indicates that the institution must 
reflect democratic representation and exercising some powers in a defined territorial area. 
States, provinces, counties, local authorities, and municipalities all fall in the category of 
subnational governments. For the purposes of this study, the term subnational government is 
used to describe a representative institution with powers decentralised to it by the national or 
                                                 
9 Selvakkumaran 1998: 194. 
10 Selvakkumaran 1998: 194. 
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regional government in respect of a restricted geographical area for which it is responsible 
within a nation or state.
11
 
8.2. Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is a generic term that covers most forms of governmental power distribution. 
Rondinelli defines the term as 
the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and 
allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field 
units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, 
semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or 
functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary 
organizations.
12
 
In its narrow sense, decentralisation is used to describe the transfer of authority within 
government bureaucracy. To fit the broader aspects of this study, decentralisation is defined 
as a purposeful process of diffusing authority, responsibility, power and resources within the 
bureaucracy of the national government or beyond it to lower-level autonomous or semi-
autonomous units. This distribution of power occurs in several forms and goes by different 
names, which in this work will be limited to devolution, deconcentration and delegation. The 
transfer of power to private actors is excluded for the purposes of this study as it involves the 
transfer of power outside the political system of government. 
8.3. Decentralisation to subnational governments 
Devolution, a more extensive form of decentralisation, disperses power territorially to sub-
national governments. It is defined as the diffusion of political, financial and administrative 
power to subnational units of government, whose activities are substantially beyond the direct 
control of the national government.
13
 A devolved unit of government usually enjoys 
substantial autonomy guaranteed by the constitution or legislation, but not enough to occupy 
a co-equal position with the national government. It is an elected body exercising legislative 
and executive powers over its jurisdiction. Judicial powers do not necessarily have to be 
diffused to subnational units, although this is sometimes the case. For the purposes of this 
                                                 
11 Vosloo et al 1974: 10. 
12 Rondinelli 1981a in Rondinelli & Nellis 1984: 9. Mawhood argues that a decentralised body should have its 
own budget, a separate legal existence, authority to allocate substantial resources on a range of functions and the 
decisions being made by representatives of the people. See Mawhood 1993: 9. 
13 Rondinelli & Cheema 1984: 19.  
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study, devolution is defined as a process whereby the national government, while retaining its 
authority to take back such powers, distributes some of its powers to subordinate elected units 
responsible for managing a localised geographical area.
14
 
8.4. Decentralisation within the national government 
Deconcentration disperses „authority and responsibility from one level of the national 
government to another while maintaining the same hierarchical level of accountability from 
the local units to the central government ministry or agency which has been decentralised‟.15 
It is the weakest form of decentralisation as it does not involve the transfer of authority to 
lower levels of government but merely reorganises national government responsibility. 
Bodies which enjoy deconcentrated authority are generally created by administrative 
decisions and not set up by any separate legislative measure, as is normally the case with 
devolved units. When it is more than mere reorganisation, deconcentration may allow field 
agents to exercise discretion in adapting central directives to local conditions within 
guidelines set by the national government.
16
 In this case, decision-making and administration 
are taken closer to the people, although to bodies which are not elected and accountable to the 
people. 
8.5. Decentralisation to autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies 
Compared to deconcentration, delegation gives more extensive authority to bodies which are 
subordinate to the national government. It is a process by which the national government 
„transfers responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to local 
governments or semi-autonomous organisations that are not wholly controlled by the national 
government but are ultimately accountable to it‟.17 Akin to a devolved body, a body which 
exercises delegated power territorially cannot be equal to the central authority. The national 
government may withdraw the delegation or transfer of power from the sub-national unit or 
                                                 
14 Selvakkumaran 1998: 187. The shift of power between tiers of government determines the extent to which 
there is fiscal, political and administrative decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation is concerned about who sets 
and collects what taxes, who undertakes which expenditures, and how any „vertical imbalance‟ is rectified. 
Political decentralisation refers to the extent to which political assumptions map the multiplicity of citizen 
interests onto policy decisions. Administrative decentralisation is concerned with how political institutions, once 
determined, turn policy decisions into allocative and distributive outcomes through fiscal and regulatory actions. 
See Litvack et al 1998: 6. 
15 UNDP 2000: 5-7. Mawhood states that „the officials who hold such authority do not acquire any “right” to it, 
they are merely doing their job in the organisation‟. Mawhood 1993: 1. 
16 Rondinelli & Cheema 1984: 10. 
17 Litvack et al 1998: 6. 
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semi-autonomous body without the latter‟s concurrence. Organisations or subnational units 
exercising delegated authority normally have wide discretion when exercising delegated 
powers. Delegation usually creates a principal-agent relationship, with the national 
government as the principal and the subnational government or autonomous body as the 
agent. While accountability may follow delegation, the rest of it remains vertical to the 
national government. 
8.6. Federalism 
Federalism is the fullest form of apportioning power according to the notion of shared rule 
within a state. It is defined as „constitutionalised power-sharing through systems that combine 
self-rule and shared rule‟.18 In a federal state, „government authority resides not at a single 
“centre” but at the “centre” and the “circumference”‟.19 The government authority over some 
matters resides at the centre and over others at the circumference. Unlike in a decentralised 
system of government, the federal units stand equal to the federal government and enjoy 
exclusive governmental power over certain specified matters.
20
 Federalism is more than 
simply a structural arrangement guided by the perpetuation of both the union and non-
centralisation. It is a special mode of „political and social behaviour as well, involving a 
commitment to partnership and active cooperation on the part of individuals and institutions 
that at the same time take pride in preserving their respective integrities‟.21 Power is 
dispersed to different centres, central or subnational, as a means of safeguarding individual 
and local liberties. 
8.7. Multilevel government 
The phrase multilevel system of government is relatively new in the discourse on state 
organisations. It has emerged as a neutral concept preferred to phrases such as federalism and 
devolution, which tend to be controversial. A multilevel system of government is used to 
describe various forms of government in which government is organised at more than one 
level. Under a multilevel system of government, government can be organised at two levels, 
                                                 
18 Elazar 1995: 1. 
19 Selvakkumaran 1998: 187. Disputes between the federal state and federating units, as well as among 
federating units, are referred to the courts for adjudication. In classical federations such as United States of 
America and Australia, local government is usually a competence of the federating units, with little or no direct 
relationship with the federal state. 
20 It is important to note that decentralisation may take place in federations. 
21 Elazar 1995: 2. 
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as is the case in Kenya, for example. Or it can be organised at three levels, as is the case in 
South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Government may also be organised at more than three 
levels, for example in Ethiopia. Thus federal, decentralised, devolved and confederal systems 
of government fall into the category of multilevel system of government. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The prospects of a multilevel system of government to realise 
development, democracy and sustainable peace: theory and lessons 
for institutional design 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the prospects of decentralisation for development, democracy and 
sustainable peace and the institutional arrangements of a multilevel system of government 
needed to achieve these ends. The chapter focuses on the design features of such an 
institutional arrangement as the basis for examining whether the multilevel system of 
government of Zimbabwe promotes or hinders the role of provincial and local governments 
in realising development, building democracy and sustaining peace. The chapter is divided 
into five sections. The first section explores the link between decentralisation and 
development. In the second section, the chapter examines the relationship between 
decentralisation and democracy. The link between decentralisation and sustainable peace is 
examined in the third section. The potential threat or dangers of decentralisation will be 
analysed in the fourth section, and the last section searches for an institutional arrangement 
that promotes democracy, development and sustainable peace while reducing or managing 
the threat of decentralisation. 
2. Multilevel government and development 
In this section, the relationship between decentralisation and development will be examined 
with the goal of assessing the capacity of a multilevel system of government to realise 
development. 
2.1 Defining development 
The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the modern view of development 
as synonymous with economic growth and thus measurable by indicators such as gross 
national and gross domestic product.
1
 This narrow view of development was redefined in the 
1970s after the realisation that economic growth does not necessarily result in the 
improvement of the welfare of ordinary citizens. Development should aim at the constant 
                                                 
1
 Todaro 1997: 14. 
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improvement of citizens‟ well-being.2 The recognition that development efforts ought to 
focus on current and future generations has seen the emergence of sustainable development 
as the new paradigm. Sustainable development is defined by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development as „development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs‟.3 Five goals of 
sustainable development can be identified: namely, reduction of inequalities, eradication of 
poverty, preservation of the environment, improvement of citizen access to the economy and 
universal access to basic public services. But the question is: does decentralisation foster the 
achievement of any of these objectives? 
2.2 The potential of a multilevel system of government to achieve development 
It will be argued in this section that a multilevel system of government has better potential to 
achieve development than a centralised system of government because it improves efficiency 
in public service provision, enhances the mobilisation of resources, provides a platform for 
innovation and experimentation, and makes development projects more sustainable. 
2.2.1 Improved efficiency 
Most countries have heterogeneous communities with distinct preferences for local public 
goods and services.
4
 Economic efficiency requires the provision of such goods and services 
according to these diverse needs and preferences. In his Decentralisation Theorem, Oates 
argues that „each public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the 
minimum geographic area that would internalise benefits and costs of such provision‟.5 
Subnational governments may promote local distribution of public services that closely 
match local preferences because they are physically closer to the citizens than the central 
government. The proximity to the citizens means that subnational governments are likely to 
have better access to local information than the central government. The provision of public 
services that closely match local preferences is likely to result in higher levels of efficiency 
than would occur under a centralised system of government. Efficiency in the provision of 
public services may also be attributed to horizontal fragmentation of the structure of 
                                                 
2
 Todaro defines development as a „multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, 
popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, reduction of 
inequality, and eradication of poverty‟. See Todaro 1997: 13.  
3
 World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). 
4
 Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006: 6. 
5
 Oates 1972: 55 cited in Shah 1994: 15. 
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subnational governments, which allows consumers of public services to emphasise their 
preferences by „voting with their feet‟ from one subnational government to another, looking 
for their preferred mix of taxes and services.
6
 In order to attract and retain mobile residents 
and businesses, each subnational government will have to ensure value for money in service 
provision, otherwise its beneficiaries will migrate to other subnational governments.
7
 
Competition among jurisdictions created by continual efforts to attract and retain tax payers 
and firms, is expected to result in higher levels of efficiency than under a centralised system 
of goods and service provision. 
The efficiency argument has been criticised for its reliance on a number of variables or 
assumptions which are unlikely to be found in most developing countries.
8
 For example, the 
argument relies on the voluntary mobility of public service consumers from one jurisdiction 
to another in search of their preferred „mix‟ of taxes and services. Conversely, Marsh and 
Kay argue that a substantial proportion of migrations from one jurisdiction to another are 
involuntary and have little to do with selection of tax-service bundles.
9
 However, there are 
further reasons for the local provision of services besides reaping efficiency benefits from 
competition between jurisdictions for tax-payers. Substantial spatial diversity in local 
environments and the existence of widely dispersed and poorly linked settlements may 
suggest the need for local provision of certain public services.
10
 Local communities not only 
vary in the mixture of their needs and thus the services they require, but there is often 
disagreement within the community as to what this mixture ought to be.
11
 It is not enough to 
be able to define objectively the characteristics of the locality. Consideration should also be 
given to the subjective views within the community as to what the objective facts imply in 
terms of needs. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the central government to reconcile these 
conflicts within each community.
12
 Subnational governments may be better positioned to 
reconcile conflicts within communities and deliver services that closely match local 
preferences. 
                                                 
6
 Boyne 1996: 709 in McKinlay 2006: 40.  
7
 Tiebout 1956: 416-24 in Smoke 2001: 6, Shah 1994: 17. 
8
 Bahl & Linn 1994 in Bird & Vaillancourt 1998: 2. The efficiency argument is criticised for negating 
economies of scale and spill-over effects in the provision of certain public goods and services, as well as for not 
considering a number of costs, such as the supply of jobs and the geographical accessibility of certain 
communities.  
9
 Marsh & Kay 2004 cited in McKinlay 2006: 43. 
10
 Smoke 2001: 8. 
11
 Sharpe 1970: 168. 
12
 Sharpe 1970: 168. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Chapter 2: The prospects of a multilevel system of government to realise development, democracy and 
sustainable peace 
2.2.2 Resource mobilisation through local resource-raising mechanisms 
Under a multilevel system of government, subnational governments can mobilise resources 
from revenue sources which the central government might have difficulties in reaching.
13
 
Central governments mainly make use of high tax instruments, such as personal taxes, 
company taxes and taxes on goods, to generate revenue. These taxes tend to target the formal 
sector because of the administrative procedures involved in collecting them. The informal 
sector is largely left out of the tax base contributing to diminished national resource 
mobilisation. Subnational governments, on the other hand, can mobilise resources through the 
use of tax instruments such as property rates, service charges and business licensing which 
are inclusive of both the formal and informal sectors.
14
 This section discusses the main tax 
instruments of mobilising revenue at local level. 
2.2.2.1 Property rates 
It is often argued that property rates are the most appropriate tax instrument for local 
government.
15
 In principle, property rates are difficult to evade because of the immovable and 
visible character of properties. Property rates, if well administered, can represent a non-
distortional and highly efficient fiscal tool for mobilising resources for development.
16
 
Resources generated from property rates can be allocated to the delivery of basic services to 
those who cannot afford to pay for services provided. This can be an effective way of 
ensuring that all the citizens have comparable access to basic services. Nevertheless, property 
rates have a much higher revenue mobilisation potential in urban jurisdictions than in rural 
jurisdictions. Hence, reliance on property rates to mobilise resources for development can 
result in inequity between urban and rural areas. 
2.2.2.2 Service charges 
Service charges on the supply of water and electricity and refuse removal play an important 
role in the mobilisation of resources at subnational level, provided that such functional areas 
are assigned to subnational governments.
17
 In economic terms, service charges are the best 
mechanism for matching demand and supply of public services as they provide a direct link 
                                                 
13
 Conyers 1986: 91. 
14
 See Bahl 1999: 2. 
15
 Fjeldstaad 2006: 6. 
16
 Fjeldstaad 2006: 6. 
17
 Bahl et al 2003: 76 cited in Fjeldstaad 2006: 12. 
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between citizens‟ contributions and service delivery. Further, service charges are an effective 
resource mobilisation tool that can recover cost from both the formal and informal sectors. 
Although the main economic rationale for service charges is to directly link supply and 
consumption, they can also generate additional revenues for development. Nonetheless, 
service charges can compromise the achievement of equity when a heavy burden is imposed 
on lower-income public service users, and when they exclude the poor segments of the 
society from receiving public services.
18
 Thus, it is important that the design of the payment 
structure takes into account the ability-to-pay principle.
19
 It is also vital that the payment of 
service charges is matched with quantity and quality of service provision that meets the 
expectations of those who pay.
20
 If not, evidence across the world suggests that some 
segments of the society may resist paying service charges, citing poor or erratic service 
delivery.
21
 
2.2.2.3 Business licencing 
In many countries, the standard mechanism for mobilising revenue from businesses has been 
through business licensing.
22
 If well implemented, local business licensing can generate 
substantial resources, in addition to serving its core regulatory purpose. However, local 
business licensing has been confronted with many challenges, including high compliance 
costs to businesses due to multiple licensing and complex procedures.
23
 These constraints 
have impeded the start-up and expansion of especially micro and small enterprises needed to 
widen opportunities for citizen access to the economy, as one of the components of 
development identified above.
24
 
                                                 
18
 McDonald & Pepe 2002 in Fjeldstaad 2006: 12. 
19
 According to the „ability-to-pay‟ principle, beneficiaries pay taxes according to their income-generating 
capacity so as to foster greater social equity. Tax structure should be progressive by ensuring that the poor pay 
less tax than the rich. See National Treasury 2011. 
20
 This has been termed the „benefit principle‟. This principle specifies that payments should be related to 
benefits. Consumers of services provided by local governments need to have the sense that they are getting 
„value for money‟ for the taxes and charges they pay. If they do not get value for money they are likely to resist 
paying. See National Treasury, Government of South Africa 2011: 39. 
21
 Fjeldstaad 2004 cited in Fjeldstaad 2006: 6. For example, some municipalities in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
have encountered resistance from the citizens to pay for service provided due to perceived poor performance. 
Such resistance to pay is commonly referred to as „rates boycotts‟. See De Visser & Powell 2012; Crook & 
Manor 2000: 18. 
22
 Fjeldstaad 2006: 10. 
23
 Devas & Kelly 2001: 385 cited in Fjeldstaad 2006: 10. 
24
 Devas & Kelly 2001 cited in Fjeldstaad 2006: 6. 
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2.2.3 Innovation and experimentation 
A centralised system of government is unlikely to implement several and varying policies 
across the country.
25
 This limits the possibilities to uncover best practices to realise 
development goals such as preservation of the environment and eradication of poverty. In 
contrast, a decentralised system of government can encourage experimentation and 
innovation as individual jurisdictions are free to adopt new approaches to public policy.
26
 The 
advantage of decentralising policy choice to subnational governments is that several different 
policies can be considered simultaneously, in the process uncovering superior new policy 
choices.
27
 Superior new policies can accelerate the realisation of development goals. 
2.2.4 Improving sustainability of development projects 
It is argued that the decentralisation of power and resources to subnational governments 
brings government closer to the people and creates more opportunities for citizen 
participation in development projects than under a centralised form of government.
28
 The 
involvement of citizens in the identification, prioritisation, design and implementation of 
development projects can promote a greater sense of project ownership and responsibility by 
citizens.
29
 Increased commitment to development projects provides greater incentives to 
ensure proper operation, maintenance and sustainability of development projects.
30
 
3. Multilevel government and democracy 
This section examines the relationship between a multilevel system of government and 
democracy. Countries which have recently adopted multilevel systems of government, such 
as South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, have done so to foster democracy, among other 
objectives.
31
 The question at issue here is: does a multilevel system of government have 
greater potential to realise democracy than a centralised system of government? The section 
begins by defining democracy, briefly discusses some of its core principles, and goes on to 
examine the potential of a multilevel system of government to realise democratic goals. 
                                                 
25
 Bryce 1888 cited in Oates 1997: 89. 
26
 Oates 2006: 21, De Visser 2005: 24. 
27
 Strumpf 2000: 1. 
28
 Manor 1999: 91. 
29
 Kalin 1999: 49. 
30
 United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) 1999: 202-3. 
31
 See Chapter 14, Constitution; Article 174(a)(c)(d), Constitution of Kenya; Preamble Constitution of South 
Africa. 
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3.1 Democracy defined 
As an outcome, democracy aims to preserve and promote the dignity and fundamental rights 
of the individual, attain social justice, foster the economic and social development of the 
community, reinforce the cohesion of society and maintain national peace.
32
 Democracy can 
be practised in many ways and at different levels. It can be practised directly through public 
decision-making processes.
33
 But the most common form of democracy is practised indirectly 
when citizens elect representatives to make political decisions on their behalf. Participatory 
democracy is a variation of democracy in which citizens participate in decision-making 
through participatory structures. The Universal Declaration on Democracy of 1997 
recognises that democracy „is both an ideal to be pursued and a mode of government to be 
applied according to modalities which reflect the diversity of experiences and cultural 
particularities without derogating from internationally recognised principles, norms and 
standards‟.34 Some of the internationally recognised principles of democracy include respect 
for human rights, rule of law, political participation, accountability, separation of powers, 
equality, transparency and democratic pluralism. 
3.2 The potential of a multilevel system of government to promote democracy 
This section examines the potential of a multilevel system of government to promote 
democracy. It however does not exhaust all the principles of democracy mentioned above but 
is limited to discussing political participation, accountability and democratic pluralism given 
that a multilevel system of government has more direct relationship with these principles. 
3.2.1 Political participation 
Democracy is founded on the right of every citizen to take part in the management of public 
affairs and in activities which affect one‟s life.35 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights recognises that every citizen has the right and the opportunity, without 
unreasonable restrictions, to take part in the conduct of public affairs directly or through 
                                                 
32
 Principle 3, Universal Declaration on Democracy 1997. 
33
 This kind of democracy usually takes the form of referenda and is most practical with relatively small 
numbers of people in a community organisation, tribal council, or the local unit of a labour union where citizens 
arrive at a decision by majority vote or consensus. See Cincotta 2007: 6. 
34
 Principle 2, Universal Declaration on Democracy 1997. 
35
 Universal Declaration on Democracy 1997: 2. 
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elected representatives.
36
 Participation in the public realm is not only an important right for 
citizens in a democratic state but also a key responsibility of every citizen. Political 
participation may be carried out in a number of ways, not limited to: standing for election, 
debating issues, attending civic meetings and voting in elections.
37
 Multilevel systems of 
government have been adopted in many countries because of their potential to widen 
opportunities for political participation.
38
 John Stuart Mill argues in favour of a multilevel 
system of government by stating that subnational governments are a fundamental element of 
a democratic system because they widen opportunities for political participation
39
 
Participation may take place through elections or through participatory structures and 
mechanisms 
3.2.1.1 Elections 
Local elections provide additional opportunities for political participation for citizens who 
otherwise would have few chances to hold their leaders accountable between national 
elections.
40
 Elections at local level expand the number of opportunities in which citizens can 
practice democratic citizenship and participation. Nonetheless, effective participation through 
local elections is likely to be undermined in circumstances where there is no close link 
between the voter and elected representatives.
 41
 In such cases, it may be naive to imagine 
that simply introducing elections for local offices will promote political participation.
42
 
Elections at local level may also foster political participation by expanding the cadre of 
leaders who may be elected for political positions at local and higher levels of government.
43
 
At subnational level, political leaders are exposed to the functioning of legislative and 
executive arms before they assume positions at national level. However, while subnational 
governments may provide a valuable platform for gaining political experience, the value of 
local councils for national legislatures should not be exaggerated. Subnational governments 
may provide experience of party systems, legislative roles, methods of policy formulation and 
                                                 
36
 Article 25(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
37
 Citizens have to be empowered in order to meaningfully exercise their participatory rights. Empowerment 
denotes the „development of conditions to the genuine exercise of participatory rights, while also eliminating 
obstacles that prevent or inhibit their exercise‟, Universal Declaration on Democracy 1997: 3. 
38
 Brinkerhoff & Azfa 2010: 85. 
39
 Mill 1911: 2357 cited by Andrew & Goldsmith 1998: 107; Manor 1999: 37. 
40
 Mill 1911 cited in Smith 1985: 22, Manor 1999: 37. 
41
 Smith 2007: 27. 
42
 Crook & Sverrisson 2001 cited in Smith 2007: 114. 
43
 USAID 2009: 23, Smith 1998: 86, Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2010: 85. 
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legislative-executive-administration relationships that are different from what is found at 
national level.
44
 
3.2.1.2 Citizen participation 
Decentralisation may provide a conducive environment for citizen participation at 
subnational level, given the small physical size of local governments. Political participation 
may be promoted by creating representative government at different levels in the hierarchy of 
a subnational area.
45
 Subnational governments may increase the proportion of the community 
that will participate in a more active sense than just voting.
46
 Lower structures of 
participation established at subnational levels may act as the vehicle of communication 
between citizens, especially marginalised groups and local councils. Decentralisation may 
also promote political participation by providing an environment where citizens can be 
consulted on matters which affect their lives. Consultations of the citizens may be easily 
carried out at subnational levels as subnational governments are physically closer to the 
citizens than under centralised administration. Consultations can be in the form of structures 
and events that systematically consult with affected constituencies, together or separately, on 
matters that affect them.
47
 Community budgeting, for example, is a consultation mechanism 
in which the community defines and sets budget priorities. While budgets are often seen as 
technical documents that are best handled by local officials, citizen involvement in the 
budgeting process is an essential way of promoting political participation.
48
 
3.2.2 Accountability 
In a democratic state all public officials, whether elected or appointed, as well as bodies 
exercising public authority, have to be accountable to the citizens. Accountability is a 
„relationship where one party has the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions or 
actions posed by another party, and the accountable party is subject to sanctions for failure or 
transgressions‟.49 There are many forms of accountability, including horizontal and vertical 
accountability. Horizontal accountability concerns the „classic separation of powers‟, 
including the role of oversight entities such as audit offices, ombudsmen, public protectors, 
                                                 
44
 Smith 1985: 23. 
45
 Smith 2007: 156. 
46
 Smith 2007: 156. 
47
 Sisks 2001: 155, Smith 2007: 152. 
48
 Smith 2007: 152. 
49
 Schedler 1999 cited in Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2010: 89. See also Smith 2007: 202. 
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courts of accounts and electoral commissions; while vertical accountability signifies actors 
located outside the state that play a role in holding state actors accountable.
50
 In a democratic 
society citizens should have the means, freedom and institutions to scrutinise the conduct of 
public officials and respond to their underperformance.
51
 Public officials may be held 
accountable via multiple mechanisms, including electoral processes, legal recourse, 
participatory processes, public reporting and third-party monitoring.
52
 They are likely to be 
easily held accountable when government is physically „closer‟ to the people. Electoral and 
intergovernmental accountability will be examined in this section as the other forms of 
accountability will be discussed in other parts of this chapter. 
3.2.2.1 Accountability through elections 
The main form of accountability in a multilevel system of government is likely to be 
accountability through elections. Elected representatives may be voted out of office during 
elections because of their poor performance.
53
 It is argued that, unlike national elections, 
local elections allow voters to more easily evaluate local leaders on their performance given 
that what they deliver is likely to be more visible than that of their counterparts at national 
level.
54
 For example, local citizens can easily identify what their councillor delivered in their 
ward as opposed to what a Member of Parliament did in the constituency. Thus, electoral 
accountability is likely to be stronger at subnational than national level. 
3.2.2.2 Intergovernmental accountability 
Decentralisation creates vertical checks and balances that can constrain the central and 
subnational governments‟ attempts to overstep or abuse its powers.55 Besides being 
accountable to the citizens, subnational governments are accountable for their actions to the 
central government. The central government has the responsibility to monitor subnational 
governments and react to underperformance. On the other hand, subnational governments, as 
centres of authority and power, may monitor and control the activities of the central 
government, especially in cases where the interests of the citizens are in jeopardy. A 
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combined voice of subnational governments may be sufficient to discourage the central 
government from abusing power or implementing an unpopular policy. Hence, a multilevel 
system of government constitutes a specific and extended expression of the basic principle of 
separation of powers, which strengthens the accountability of one level of government to 
another.
56
 
3.2.3 Democratic pluralism 
Democratic states are characterised by a diversity of state and non-state organisations, which 
can be of a political, economic, religious, ethnic or other nature. Democratic pluralism 
assumes that these many interest groups and institutions do not depend on government for 
their existence, legitimacy or authority.
57
 Democracy thrives on the creation, development 
and promotion of civic and political groups which champion diverse interests. The 
decentralisation of power and resources to subnational governments may promote the 
emergence and development of these groups. The following section discusses the potential of 
decentralisation to foster democratic pluralism. 
3.2.3.1 Emergence and development of political parties 
Political parties are at the centre of democratic pluralism.
58
 A multilevel form of government 
may provide a conducive environment for the emergence of new political parties and the 
development of small political parties. New political parties and individuals, who often have 
a difficult time competing successfully in national elections, can use the local level entry-
point to participate in the political system, since the cost of political mobilisation is relatively 
low compared to the national level.
59
 However, as will be argued below, decentralisation may 
encourage the formation of political parties on ethnic and regional lines, which may pose a 
threat to the unity of the nation state.
60
 
3.2.3.2 Promotion of the formation and development of civic groups 
By shifting important decision-making powers away from the national government, a 
multilevel system may create incentives for the proliferation of civic groups at subnational 
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level.
61
 Subnational governments may be better positioned to mobilise resources and 
structures for the participation of civic groups in the public realm. Their proximity to the 
citizens allows them to partner with civic groups to deliver public services for the benefit of 
the citizens. 
4. Multilevel government and sustainable peace 
This section examines the potential of a multilevel system of government to prevent, manage 
and resolve internal conflicts and thus achieve sustainable peace. 
4.1 Defining sustainable peace 
Peace is a widely used term, commonly understood as the absence of war or violence. In this 
negative form, peace is a „state requiring a set of social structures that provide security and 
protection from acts of direct physical violence committed by individuals, groups or 
nations‟.62 Positive peace, on the other hand, „involves the search for positive conditions 
which can resolve the underlying causes of conflict that produce violence‟.63 It entails a 
culture of cooperation and integration among diverse groups of people, as well as a system of 
governance where there are no winners and losers.
64
 The underlying concepts in positive 
peace are justice, accommodation, social equality and non-violent forms of interaction. In this 
chapter, sustainable peace is construed to mean positive peace in current and future 
generations. This requires mechanisms and institutional arrangements that can prevent, 
manage, and resolve conflicts.
65
 
4.2 The potential of decentralisation to build sustainable peace 
Conflict is an agent of change which is natural and inevitable and occurs at all levels of 
interaction.
66
 The major question confronting most countries is how to ensure peaceful 
change. A multilevel system of government may provide a conducive environment for 
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peaceful transformation.
67
 By being an instrument of sharing power and responsibilities, a 
multilevel system of government can minimise the risks of violent change. This section 
explores the ways in which a multilevel government can promote peaceful change. 
4.2.1 Responsive service delivery as a vehicle for sustainable peace 
It was contended in paragraph 2.2.1 that a multilevel system of government has the potential 
to improve the responsiveness of government to the needs and preferences of the people. 
Responsive service delivery, particularly basic services, can prevent conflicting groups from 
resorting to violence. The reason is that there is little impetus for armed conflict in situations 
where citizens believe government is concerned about and responsive to their needs.
68
 
Responsive service delivery is likely to improve the living conditions of the citizens and 
reduce the risk of conflict. In post-conflict or transitional environments the delivery of basic 
services is essential to discourage the renewal of armed conflict.
69
 Subnational governments 
can be a vehicle for simultaneously re-establishing the presence of the state and for 
demilitarising politics in divided societies.
70
 On the other hand, failure to meet service 
delivery promises may ignite violence in post-conflict and peaceful environments.
71
 
4.2.2 Platform for self-determination 
A multilevel system of government provides opportunities for minority groups, which are 
unlikely to influence politics at national level, to exercise a degree of political authority in 
local and regional jurisdictions.
72
 Self-rule allows groups to exercise self-determination: „the 
power to determine the fundamental character, membership, and future course of their 
political society‟.73 The political space which decentralisation provides for the practice of 
local customs and religious beliefs, without fear of persecution, reduces the risk of intergroup 
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strife in ethnically diverse societies.
74
 The self-rule offered to minorities at subnational level 
can enhance national cohesion and may undermine feelings of neglect among ethnic groups. 
The role of a multilevel system of government as a tool of building sustainable peace is more 
appealing in multi-ethnic countries. In these countries, a multilevel system of government can 
accommodate diversity by giving officials at subnational level power and resources to offer 
differentiated programs that respect diversity and cultural preferences.
75
 The inclusion of 
minority groups in local affairs can reduce feelings of marginalisation which is a recipe for 
violent conflict especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
76
 Minority groups can use the formal 
subnational structures to promote and protect their interests without recourse to violence or 
seceding as they are represented and recognised politically.
77
 Nevertheless, for a multilevel 
system of government to effectively promote peace by accommodating diversity ethnic 
groups have to be territorially concentrated. In the absence of territorial concentration of 
ethnic groups, the legal and institutional design of a multilevel system of government has to 
guarantee and promote individual rights as well as representation of these groups in decision-
making structures at various levels. 
4.2.3. Enhanced conflict management capacity 
Subnational governments can act as platforms for non-violent group discussion relating to 
local issues and allocation of resources.
78
 They may encourage groups at subnational level to 
develop conflict resolution mechanisms, such as community forums, which can resolve 
disputes between groups before they escalate into violence. A multilevel system of 
government affords a „political arrangement for ensuring that conflicts concerning a 
territorially delineated community are resolved solely by those affected by the conflict‟.79 
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Accordingly, decentralisation offers the opportunity to de-scale and handle conflicts at the 
very local level from which in many cases they originate.
80
 
4.2.4 Multiple centres of decision-making 
The sharing of power and resources between the central government and subnational 
governments promotes a process of continuous negotiation between the centre and 
subnational groupings.
 81
 Under a multilevel system of government, joint decision-making by 
governments placed at different levels is widely viewed as a viable alternative to the „winner-
takes-all‟ approach in which the winner at the ballot box alone controls the reins of authority 
at the central level.
82
 Joint decision-making limits the ability for abrupt changes and 
strengthens a bargaining environment which has the potential to discourage subnational 
groupings from resorting to violence against the national government.
83
 Thus, 
decentralisation may represent a valuable and effective concession to minority groups and 
can be an instrument for brokering peace with regional or local parties and minority groups.
84
 
In post-conflict environments, the creation of a multilevel system of government enables the 
accommodation of ex-combatants and subnational or local groups that might be unwilling to 
put down arms if they are not offered positions of influence. Since decentralisation multiplies 
the number of elected offices, it can be an „effective response to demobilising groups who 
believe they would have a difficult time in successfully competing for national offices‟.85 The 
presence of power at subnational level can „lower the importance and desirability of holding 
the highest-level national offices, competition over which may have fuelled conflict in the 
past.
86
 For example, the settlement of civil war in Mozambique which involved a „radical 
decentralisation programme helped motivate the rebels to accept defeat in the first ever 
elections, with the implicit promises that power-sharing could take place within the new 
democratic institutions at the local level‟.87 Thus a multilevel government can entice ex-
combatants to lay down arms and run for subnational posts, and form an important part of the 
conflict resolution strategy and sustainable peace in the long run. 
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The above foregoing discussion has established that subnational governments may play a role 
in realising development, building democracy and sustaining peace. The following section 
discusses the potential threat of a multilevel system of government to these goals. 
5 Potential threat of a multilevel system of government to development, 
democracy and sustainable peace 
Multilevel systems of government have not always promoted development, democracy and 
sustainable peace. In some cases, multilevel systems of government hindered the 
achievement of development, democracy and sustainable peace due to their legal and 
institutional design. This section examines the threat of corruption, inequalities, macro-
economic stability, secessions and ethnic conflict; under a multilevel system of government. 
5.1 Corruption 
Corruption is defined as the „exercise of official powers against public interest or the abuse of 
public office for private gain‟.88 It manifests in many forms, including petty corruption, grand 
corruption, state capture and patronage. A multilevel system of government creates a sizeable 
number of subnational governments, each having powers to tax, spend and regulate. The 
exercise of such powers at subnational level may „increase the motivation for corruption 
among public officials by creating an impression that they are subject to lower monitoring, 
control and supervision‟.89 Prud‟homme argues that corruption is likely to be rampant at the 
local levels since local officials usually have more discretionary powers than officials at the 
centre, which makes it easier to establish unethical relationships.
90
 Subnational governments 
may be prone to the capturing of power by elites, due to the increased cohesiveness of 
interest groups. Local officials may abuse their office to satisfy the pressing demands by 
these interest groups or elites, whose money and votes count in matters such as taxation and 
authorisations.
91
 
Corruption undermines the realisation of development, democracy and sustainable peace. It 
reduces or eliminates efficiency benefits associated with a multilevel system of government 
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as it raises the cost of goods and services. It increases the costs in terms of allocative 
efficiency, because it leads to the supply of services for which the levels of kickbacks are 
higher, rather than those for which there is a demand.
92
 Corruption undermines the 
distribution of public services in many countries and can make it more difficult for vulnerable 
groups to benefit from poverty alleviation programmes.
93
 It is thus a significant hindrance to 
the fight against poverty.
94
 Corruption also reduces the responsiveness of subnational 
governments since public resources are diverted for the benefit of a few. In situations where 
decentralisation gives elites power and resources, it may exacerbate conflict and threaten 
sustainable peace.
95
 
5.2 Inequalities 
Inequalities can be described as existing differences in income, assets and wealth between 
individuals, groups or jurisdictions.
96
 Inequalities between jurisdictions are due to differences 
in resources, population sizes, and economic activity, among other factors.
97
 A multilevel 
system of government can increase inequalities among jurisdictions and adversely affect 
equity.
98
 Even if subnational governments have the same taxing and expenditure powers, 
service provision is highly unlikely to be the same. It has also been argued that a multilevel 
system of government may exacerbate disparities between regions as resource-poor 
jurisdictions will find it difficult to raise as much revenue as richer jurisdictions.
99
 
Differences in the capacity to mobilise resources also means differences in service delivery 
levels and economic and social development across regions, thereby threatening equity. 
It is also argued that a multilevel system of government usually contracts the equalisation role 
of the central government by reducing the revenue mobilisation potential of the centre.
100
 The 
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reduction in the importance of national budgets relative to those at the subnational level 
increases inter-jurisdictional inequalities by reducing the impact of national policies designed 
to correct subnational inequalities.
101
 If not addressed, inequalities in wealth and resources 
among regions within a nation state are likely to have a corrosive effect on internal cohesion 
and consequently threaten sustainable peace.
102
 
5.3 Macro-economic stability 
Macro-economic stability is concerned with „sound macro-economic frameworks‟ 
characterised by price stability, sound fiscal policies, the well-functioning economy, 
sustainable debt ratios, and healthy public and private sector balance sheets.
103
 Under a 
multilevel system of government, the decentralisation of fiscal powers to subnational 
governments may undermine macro-economic stability. Fiscal decentralisation tends to limit 
the power of the central government to use monetary and fiscal policies to create a stable 
macro-economic environment.
104
 The total revenues and taxes at hand may be insufficient for 
the central government to implement stabilisation policies under circumstances of 
overspending.
105
 Such a scenario may result in high inflation and poor macro-economic 
management which undermines macro-economic stability. Development goals such as the 
eradication of poverty, reduction of inequalities and universal access to basic services are 
unlikely to be achieved in an unstable macro-economic environment. An unstable macro-
economic environment also has negative consequences for sustainable peace. 
A multilevel system of government may threaten the achievement of macro-economic 
stability as the autonomy enjoyed by subnational governments has the potential to raise 
incentives for opportunistic behaviour among subnational governments, which may then try 
to shift their expenditure burdens onto the nation as a whole.
106
 Excessive bailing out of 
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subnational governments funded by tax revenues raised from other communities within the 
nation or from external sources can increase inflation, which has negative effects on macro-
economic stability and development.
107
 
Fiscal powers which subnational governments enjoy under a multilevel system of 
government may encourage subnational governments to compete for investment and tax- 
payers among themselves. It is argued that extreme competition among subnational 
governments, seeking to retain and attract tax-payers, may become unproductive by distorting 
business costs and free domestic trade.
108
 This will have negative implications for macro-
economic stability. In contrast, Smoke argues that the threat of subnational governments to 
macro-economic stability through competition is greatly overstated. He is of the view that 
there may be some inter-jurisdictional tax competition among subnational governments in 
decentralised countries, but it is generally unlikely to be a major problem to macro-economic 
stability.
109
 Nonetheless, the potential of inter-jurisdictional competition for investment and 
tax should not be ignored. 
5.4 Secession and ethnic conflict 
A multilevel system of government may promote secession and ethnic conflict.
110
 The 
decentralisation of powers and resources to subnational governments may weaken national 
unity, strengthen existing divisions and diminish the loyalty of subnational governments to 
the nation state.
111
 It risks increasing inter-jurisdictional conflict when, for example, the 
reallocation of resources between jurisdictions precipitates demands in resource-rich 
jurisdictions for secession. For instance, conflicts in the resource-rich Niger Delta of Nigeria, 
where local people are engaging in armed confrontation with oil companies and the national 
government, are linked to inequitable resource distribution.
112
 
Siegle and O‟Mahony argue that a multilevel system of government may incentivise richer 
jurisdictions to break away from the state as they seek total independence which will 
guarantee total benefit of their resources.
113
 Decentralisation of fiscal powers may trigger 
competition between the centre and subnational government(s) for resources. Such 
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competition can ignite greater demands for autonomy and secession by subnational 
government(s), motivated to have full control over resources.
114
 In the long term, tensions 
between the national government driving national unity and a subnational government 
seeking independence may degenerate into armed conflict. The threat of secession is high if 
the jurisdictions are delineated primarily on ethnic lines or if there is a strong geographic 
concentration of ethnic groups on international borders.
115
 
It is also argued that a multilevel system of government may promote secession because it 
encourages the development of political parties which have an ethnic and regional 
orientation.
116
 An ethno-regional political party with outright regional support can be 
incentivised by decentralisation of powers and resources to secede from the state. Potential 
tensions and conflicts are likely to occur especially when an ethno-regional political party 
commanding majority in a local jurisdiction differs from the ethnic group or political party 
commanding majority at the national level.
117
 The regional political party is likely to demand 
political, fiscal and administrative autonomy over decision-making or even total 
independence, which the national government is unlikely to grant easily. The hostile 
relationship between the national and subnational government can develop into an armed 
confrontation and threaten sustainable peace.
118
 
The shifting of power from national to subnational governments may go far in legitimising 
certain ethnic identities and subsequently accentuates intergroup differences and inter-
communal strife.
119
 Ethnic conflict may erupt when ethnic groups use various means such as 
legislation and public resources to protect and promote their interests at the expense of other 
groups or citizens. Discriminatory policies and legislation can incite conflict between 
minority and majority ethnic groups and prompt demands by the former for autonomy or 
independence.
120
 The threat of ethnic conflict at local level may be high in jurisdictions 
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where no single ethnic group commands a majority or where decentralisation creates 
minorities within minorities, spurring further conflicts.
121
 
In this section it has been contended that a multilevel system of government can undermine 
the achievement of democracy, development and sustainable peace.
122
 The argument is that it 
provides an environment which may promote corruption, reinforcement of disparities, macro-
economic instability, secession and ethnic conflict. It is submitted, however, that the potential 
threat of a multilevel system of government ought not to be the sole reason for centralising 
power as the benefits of such a system outweigh its potential drawbacks. Moreover, there are 
certain features which, if incorporated in the institutional design, may maximise the benefits 
and reduce the risks associated with a multilevel system of government. The relevant 
institutional design features are explored in the following section. 
6. Towards an institutional design for development, democracy and sustainable 
peace 
As argued above, a multilevel system of government may be better organised to realise 
development, democracy and sustainable peace relative to a centralised system of 
government. It is submitted that it is not just any multilevel system of government which can 
achieve these goals. The design of a multilevel system of government is crucial. While 
acknowledging the importance of contextual particularities, literature on multilevel systems 
of government and international practice suggests that there are certain design features which  
may enhance the potential of a multilevel system of government to contribute towards 
realising development, democracy and sustainable peace.
123
 These key features, as captured 
in Figure 1 below, will be discussed in this section. 
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Figure 1: Design features of a multilevel system of government that can realise development, 
democracy and sustainable peace 
 
6.1 Political autonomy 
A multilevel system of government ought to promote political autonomy at subnational level 
if it is to realise development, democracy and sustainable peace.
124
 Political autonomy 
requires that subnational governments should be recognised in national legislation and, where 
possible, in the Constitution as autonomous subnational units.
125
 In addition, the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government suggests that national legislation and ideally the 
Constitution should determine the manner in which subnational governments are established, 
the nature of their powers, the scope of their authority, and their functions.
126
 The various 
aspects of political autonomy are examined below. 
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6.1.1 Elected subnational governments 
6.1.1.1 How are local leaders to be elected? 
The direct election of local leaders by the citizens is an important element of self-rule, which 
is crucial for building sustainable peace and democracy.
127
 The Commonwealth Principles on 
Good Practice for Local Democracy and Good Governance‟ (hereafter referred to as the 
Aberdeen Principles) suggest that subnational governments should be composed of leaders 
who are directly elected by the voters under an electoral system which guarantees regular, 
free, fair and inclusive elections.
128
 The electoral system should require a minimum level of 
qualifications for one to be elected into office so that capable individuals are elected into 
office.
129
 If officials at subnational level are appointed by higher tiers of government, their 
accountability will be upwards and not downwards to the local people, with the result that the 
efficiency gains discussed in paragraph 2.2.1 above will not be achieved.
 130
 Inter alia, free 
and fair elections mean that all political parties and independent candidates are allowed to 
participate in elections without any impediments, including equal access to the media.
131
 The 
participation of a variety of political formations will nurture democratic pluralism, which is 
an important aspect of any democratic state. Free and fair elections also mean that elections 
are administered by independent and impartial institutions. Regular, free and fair local 
elections foster the accountability of locally elected leaders to the local citizenry.
132
 It should 
be noted however that democratic elections are a vital but not a sufficient condition for 
political autonomy.
133
 
6.1.1.2 Avoid harmonising national and local elections 
To be politically significant and to allow local concerns to dominate the local electoral cycle, 
national and local elections should be separated. Sufficient separation of local and national 
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elections raises the profile of subnational governments and allows local leadership to function 
more independently of higher authorities.
134
 If local elections are held at the same time as 
national elections, national factors will influence local voting behaviour. During concurrent 
elections voters are likely to respond to the performance of the political party rather than that 
of individuals.
135
 The implication of this is that electoral accountability, which is key for 
responsive local government, will be undermined. 
6.1.1.3 No arbitrary removal of local leaders 
Once officials at subnational level have been elected into office, higher levels of government 
should not be empowered to arbitrarily remove locally elected officials.
136
 Elected officials 
should be removed from office by senior governments only after following due process of the 
law or through democratic means such as elections. It follows from this argument that rules 
and procedures which give officials of senior governments the discretion to remove locally 
elected officials from office, without any form of public scrutiny, should not be allowed to 
exist. Such discretion can be used solely to settle political scores and not to serve the local 
public interests given that subnational institutions are prone to high levels of politicisation.
137
 
However, this should not be interpreted to mean that corrupt and incompetent officials should 
not be removed from their positions. Rather, as discussed in paragraph 6.6.3 below, there 
should be checks and balances in the exercises of the power to remove locally elected 
officials from office. Local officials should also be given the opportunity to debate the merits 
and demerits of issues without fear of being held liable for their contributions or opinions.
138
 
It is also submitted that the term of office of locally elected leaders should be limited to 
reduce chances of local authoritarianism.
139
 
6.1.2 Inclusive subnational governments 
Decision-making structures at all levels of government should be as inclusive as possible.
140
 
Marginalised groups, including minority groups, women and persons with disabilities, ought 
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to have representation in various decision-making structures. These groups are usually too 
weak to organise themselves to compete for political positions. As a result, they usually lack 
representation in governmental decision-making structures. Inclusive decision-making 
structures are important for building sustainable peace. In a number of countries such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Central African Republic and Rwanda; violent 
conflict has been attributed in part to non-inclusive decision-making structures at various 
levels, which lead to inequitable distribution of resources. Thus, it is important that decision-
making structures at all levels of government are as inclusive as possible.
141
 The electoral 
system can be an effective mechanism for guaranteeing the representation of marginalised 
groups.
142
 
6.1.3 Decentralising powers and functions to subnational governments 
Political autonomy also entails giving subnational governments distinct powers and 
functions.
143
 As will be argued, such powers and functions should be original, relevant, 
clearly demarcated and differentiated. Subnational governments should have the power to 
make final decisions on their functions. 
6.1.3.1 Original 
Subnational governments are more likely to play a key role in realising the goals of 
development and sustainable peace if they have original powers. Original powers are those 
which are assigned to a particular level of government directly by the Constitution. These 
powers may not be altered by national legislation but only by an amendment to the 
Constitution itself.
144
 Constitutional recognition of powers, arguably, is the „most critical and 
fundamental feature of the integrity‟ of subnational governments.145 It provides the highest 
form of assurance to subnational governments that decentralised functions will not be 
arbitrarily assumed by the national government.
146
 This provides predictability which is 
essential to ensure that subnational governments concentrate on delivering on their 
obligations, unlike under a system of delegated authority to subnational governments where 
the national government may recentralise powers and functions easily. 
                                                 
141
 The Aberdeen Principles 2005: 6. 
142
 See Bockenforde 2011: 16. 
143
 Fessha & Kirkby 2012: 255. 
144
 Steytler & De Visser 2011: 22-47. See also De Visser 2005: 79. 
145
 De Visser 2005: 79. 
146
 See De Visser 2005: 79. 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Chapter 2: The prospects of a multilevel system of government to realise development, democracy and 
sustainable peace 
6.1.3.2 Relevant 
The powers and functions of subnational governments ought to be relevant for development. 
The World Bank put it succinctly that what subnational governments can achieve depends on 
the responsibilities they are granted.
147
 As such, it is important that subnational governments 
are allocated a variety of powers and functions and not, for example, merely function of 
refuse removal. Subnational governments ought to have significant expenditure 
responsibilities that are relevant to local voters to strengthen the accountability of local 
officials to the citizens, among other objectives.
148
 The literature on fiscal decentralisation 
(and federalism) suggests that the assignment of responsibilities in a multilevel system of 
government should be informed by the subsidiarity principle.
149
 The principle states that 
„public service responsibilities must be exercised by the lowest level of government unless a 
convincing case can be made for higher level assignment‟.150 This would mean that the 
national government should have expenditure responsibilities that include: 
 functions to preserve national efficiency objectives such as maintenance of the 
internal common market and provision or financing of public goods and services 
whose benefits transcend subnational boundaries;
151
 
 those functions needed to safeguard national equity objectives such as vertical equity 
based on incomes and other criteria, and horizontal and vertical equity across regions; 
and 
 stabilisation programmes.152 
Conceptually, responsibilities for other functions may be best exercised by regional and local 
governments. As will be argued in paragraph 6.6.1 and 6.2.5 below, the national government 
can ensure attainment of minimum standards of public services through regulatory oversight 
and use of conditional grants, respectively.
153
 The assignment of responsibilities between 
provincial (regional) and local governments requires taking into account factors such as 
economies of scale, economies of scope (the bundling of local public services to improve 
efficiency), cost/benefit spill-overs, proximity to beneficiaries, consumer preferences and 
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culture.
154
 Functions with a local benefit zone such as refuse removal, cemetery, street 
lighting, parks or local roads should be assigned to local government, since their delivery 
benefits the residents of a local area.
155
 For the purposes of peace-building, there may be need 
to decentralise administrative authority over basic education, language and culture 
particularly in societies with substantial linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity.
156
 This 
will allow local communities to protect and promote their linguistic, religious and cultural 
interests. 
6.1.3.3 Clearly demarcated 
The effective performance of decentralised functions by subnational governments requires 
clear demarcation of powers and functions of each level of government, especially under a 
system of concurrent distribution of functions.
157
 The World Bank states that the clear 
demarcation of powers helps governments at various levels to identify functions they are 
responsible for, reduce the number of areas of potential conflict and avoid confusion in the 
performance of a function(s).
158
 Further, clear demarcation of powers does not only avoid 
resource wastage through duplication of functions but also has the potential to enhance 
political accountability. Accountability is enhanced as members of the public can identify the 
level(s) of government to hold accountable for the delivery of certain public services.
159
 Clear 
demarcation of powers is also important for the assignment of revenue-raising powers to tiers 
of government. If powers and functions of the various tiers of government are poorly defined, 
then the resources will also be inadequately defined in regard to both the amounts needed to 
finance spending and in regard to their nature.
160
 Thus, it is important that the allocation of 
powers and functions across tiers of government is as clear as possible. In cases where 
powers and functions are shared among different tiers of government, these should not lead to 
a „diminution of local autonomy or prevent the development of subnational governments as 
full partners‟.161 The role of each tier of government on the concurrent list of functions should 
be clarified whenever possible. 
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6.1.3.4 Final decision-making over decentralised functions 
The potential of subnational government to deliver services that closely match local 
preferences depends, in part, on the power of subnational governments to make final 
decisions on their functions. As argued in paragraph 6.6.1 below, when functions have been 
decentralised, the role of senior levels of government should be limited to setting the 
regulatory framework within which the functions can be carried out. Further, senior 
governments should make decisions on those functions only in cases were a subnational 
government will have failed to deliver on those functions.
162
 Article 4(4) of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government states that decentralised powers and functions should 
ideally be „full and exclusive‟ and not undermined by any senior government except as 
provided for by the law.
163
 Significant involvement of officials of higher governments in 
local decision-making processes constrains the overall process of decentralisation and 
consequently reduces the benefits a multilevel system of government can offer. 
6.1.3.5 Asymmetric distribution of powers and functions 
Subnational governments are unlikely to have equal capabilities to deliver and finance 
services. Moreover, subnational jurisdictions are endowed with different levels of wealth and 
are characterised by varying demographic composition. Thus, a „one-size-fits-all‟ approach 
when decentralising powers and functions may not be appropriate for a coherent multilevel 
system of government.
164
 It is submitted that a multilevel system of government should be 
sensitive to these differences at subnational level. This may involve the diffusion of 
differentiated powers and functions to subnational governments depending on factors such as 
administrative capacity and economic, demographic and geographical conditions of the 
locality.
165
 The explicit recognition of differences between jurisdictions requires a clear set of 
rules about when a subnational government graduates from one status to another to take into 
account changing circumstances.
166
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6.1.4 Security of existence 
Subnational governments are unlikely to perform properly if their existence is in constant 
jeopardy by the ability of authorities on higher levels of government to dissolve them easily 
at any time.
167
 If the autonomy of subnational governments is to be secure, it may not be 
enough to rely on the good faith of the senior governments.
168
 The protection of such 
autonomy through a constitutional and statutory entrenchment of subnational government as 
an order or tier of government is vital.
169
 Such entrenchment is important to protect the status 
of individual subnational governments, including their names, institutional structure and 
boundaries. Constitutional protection of the autonomy of subnational governments can serve 
as a deterrent to the invasion of subnational powers by the central government and provide a 
basis for judicial enforcement of constitutional limits.
170
 
6.1.5 Citizen participation 
As highlighted above, a multilevel system of government provides more opportunities for 
citizen participation by bringing government physically closer to the citizens. It is important 
that citizens participate actively in the local democratic processes, including budget-making, 
planning, the establishment of new local governments and the alteration of local government 
boundaries.
171
 To realise this goal, the legal framework should provide for the establishment 
of participatory structures and mechanisms. It should require subnational governments to 
consult the citizens on important governance issues. It is also important that institutions and 
mechanisms of governance at local level be strengthened to prevent or reduce elite capture of 
political power, which discourages citizens from making use of participatory structures and 
mechanisms.
172
 
6.1.6 Accountability 
Accountability is the cornerstone of democracy and a prerequisite for responsive 
governance.
173
 Thus, when designing a multilevel system of government is it vital to ensure 
that there are specific rules, mechanisms and institutions to promote the accountability of 
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various governments to the citizens as well as to other governments placed at different 
levels.
174
 Some have already been discussed above and include direct election of leaders by 
citizens and citizen participation in local decision-making processes. In addition to these, the 
institutional design must enable or facilitate mechanisms through which local assemblies can 
hold the local executive to account.
175
 Such mechanisms may take the form of oversight 
committees and reporting systems. Moreover robust, independent bodies need to be put in 
place to guard against corruption, mismanagement and the inappropriate use of resources by 
subnational governments, politicians, and officials.
176
 
Accountability requires that decision-making processes of government at all levels be open 
and transparent.
177
 Timeous and easy access to information is crucial for the citizens to hold 
local officials accountable for their actions or lack thereof.
178
 It is also important for citizen 
participation since citizens can only participate meaningfully in governance processes if they 
are well informed.
179
 Thus, the institutional design should include mechanisms that foster 
transparency, including opening the meetings of legislative assemblies and their committees 
to the public and media.
180
 The legal and institutional design should ensure the accountability 
of local administrative officials to local elected officials. This is important for effective policy 
implementation at subnational level. Some of the mechanisms of fostering accountability 
include requiring regular reporting by the administrative arm to the executive and legislative 
arms.
181
 
6.2 Fiscal and budget autonomy 
The UN-Habitat claims that the decentralisation of powers and functions is likely not to be 
enough for subnational governments to play a role in development and building sustainable 
peace if not accompanied by fiscal autonomy.
182
 Fiscal autonomy entails the ability of a 
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subnational government to obtain through its own means the financial resources it needs 
without recourse to or dependence on other governments situated at a higher levels or within 
the same level.
183
 Thus subnational governments should have resource-raising powers which 
allow them to raise sufficient revenue to meet their obligations and development needs. Only 
when they have independent sources of financial resources are local governments likely to 
make choices in response to local preferences.
184
 Hence, fiscal autonomy is crucial for the 
role of subnational governments in development. The various aspects and importance of 
fiscal and budget autonomy are examined in this section. 
6.2.1 Resource-raising powers 
Subnational governments should be given the power to mobilise sufficient revenue to finance 
their expenditure and development needs.
185
 Revenue can be mobilised through various ways, 
including imposing various taxes. It can also be mobilised through borrowing. These two 
ways of mobilising revenue are discussed in this section. 
6.2.1.1 Taxing powers 
The guiding principle when designing a fiscal system is that „finance follows function‟ so that 
subnational governments are in charge of taxing powers that can raise financial resources that 
are commensurate with their responsibilities.
186
 This will allow subnational governments to 
raise significant financial resources from their own revenue sources. Bahl argues that „voters 
will hold their elected officials more accountable if local public services are financed to a 
significant extent from locally imposed taxes, as opposed to the case where financing is 
primarily by central government transfers‟.187 Thus, the devolution of weak sources of 
revenue undermines the ability of subnational governments to take on decentralised 
responsibilities. 
Some of the taxes which may be appropriate for subnational government include motor 
vehicle licensing, tolls, parking taxes, motor fuels tax, property tax and user charges.
188
 When 
designing a local taxation system it is important to ensure that resource mobilisation goals are 
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not pursued at the expense of equity by allowing the tax burden to fall more on the poor than 
on the relatively better-off members of the community. A service charge system reflecting 
differences in ability to pay by incorporating sliding scales for the type of user or the amount 
of usage aligns with the equity goal.
189
 In addition, the local taxation system should also be 
designed so that local taxes do not constrain the start-up of new and small enterprises and 
subsequently inhibit economic growth.
190
 
6.2.1.2 Borrowing 
Subnational governments which have the capacity to repay loans should be authorised to 
raise revenue through borrowing.
191
 This may free resources available to the national 
government to assist smaller subnational governments which usually face difficulties in 
raising sufficient revenue to meet their obligations and development needs. However, 
evidence from Brazil and Argentina suggests that extreme caution should be taken when 
designing the fiscal aspects of a multilevel system of government as borrowing by 
subnational governments may have negative implications for macro-economic stability.
192
 To 
minimise macro fiscal risk, a multilevel system of government should allow the national 
government to keep a sufficient share of taxes and expenditures to enable the use of fiscal 
policies to affect overall demand.
193
 Moreover, the national government should implement a 
hard budget constraint policy to keep subnational spending in check.
194
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6.2.2 Right to set tax rates 
Effective revenue mobilisation requires that subnational governments have some control over 
tax rates or user tariffs or the definition of those revenues.
195
 Subnational governments should 
be allowed to set tax rates and alter tariffs for user charges without seeking approval from the 
central government.
196
 The right to set tax rates creates flexibility by enabling subnational 
governments to adjust tax rates to suit their budgetary requirements or as economic 
circumstances require. Thus, the right to set tax rates is not only important to mobilise 
revenue but also to influence behaviour in their respective jurisdictions. 
6.2.3 ‘Real’ tax base 
The decentralisation of taxing powers is likely to be ineffective if local tax bases are not 
real.
197
 A real tax base means that a subnational government can raise significant revenue in 
its jurisdiction with little reliance on the national government to finance its operations.
198
 It is 
of particular concern in Africa where subnational governments historically developed along 
colonial lines. This development has caused the concentration of resources in areas which 
where of interest to colonial authorities. In Zimbabwe, for example, most urban local 
authorities mobilise significant revenue than rural local authorities because of the 
concentration of economic activities in urban areas. Thus, when determining the size of local 
jurisdictions and allocating taxing powers it is important to address this skewed distribution 
of resources. 
6.2.4 Budget autonomy 
Budget autonomy means that subnational governments have a certain measure of discretion 
to determine expenditure choices.
199
 The degree to which subnational governments have 
control over their own revenues and intergovernmental grants is important for development 
and, in particular, for adjusting the mixture of services to closely match local preferences.
200
 
Subnational budgets should not be subjected to the approval of higher levels of government 
before they are considered final. The threat of rejection of local budgets diminishes budget 
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autonomy of local decision-makers.
201
 Budget autonomy may be enhanced if a significant 
amount of transfers from higher levels of government is unconditional, although the 
achievement of certain national goals such as equity may require substantial conditional 
transfers.
202
 
6.2.5 Equalisation and redistribution 
Under a multilevel system of government, the sharing of taxing powers across tiers of 
government is unlikely to result in subnational governments raising enough revenue to fund 
their operations.
203
 The national government will mobilise significant revenue as it usually 
controls high yielding taxes. Moreover, subnational governments are unlikely to raise an 
equal amount of financial resources due to varying levels of fiscal capacity and efficiency, 
among other reasons.
204
 A balanced system of intergovernmental transfers to complement 
local revenue-raising efforts is therefore required for a number of reasons, namely to: 
 equalise; 
 ensure financial sustainability at subnational level; 
 influence local priorities in areas of high national but low local prioritisation; 
 compensate benefit spill-overs;205 and 
 address equity concerns, especially for poor jurisdictions.206 
An intergovernmental fiscal system has two dimensions: namely, vertical and horizontal. 
According to Shah the vertical dimension (division) seeks to reduce the vertical fiscal 
imbalance likely to result after the assignment of revenue-raising mechanisms and 
expenditure obligations at national and subnational levels.
207
 The horizontal dimension, on 
the other hand, seeks to reduce the horizontal imbalance caused by inconsistency between 
revenue-raising ability and fiscal needs of governments at the same level.
208
 The equalisation 
and redistributive potential of an intergovernmental fiscal system is likely to be enhanced if 
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certain principles inform the design of the intergovernmental fiscal system. These principles 
will be examined below. 
6.2.5.1 Transparency 
The manner in which fiscal resources are shared and distributed vertically and horizontally 
should be and should be seen to be transparent.
209
 Transparency in financial equalisation may 
be promoted by creating simple predetermined rules of sharing resources across and within 
levels of government.
210
 Formula-based allocations both for the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions are often regarded as the most appropriate component of a transparent 
intergovernmental fiscal system. 
6.2.5.2 Predictability 
A sound system of intergovernmental relations requires that intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers, especially unconditional grants, be predictable.
211
 Conditional grants should be kept 
reasonably stable from year to year so that subnational governments can properly plan their 
budgets. Another method of ensuring predictability of subnational governments' shares is by 
publishing multi-year projections of funding availability.
212
 
6.2.5.3 Equity 
The design of the intergovernmental grants should ensure that funds which are allocated and 
distributed to subnational governments vary directly with fiscal need factors and inversely 
with the taxable capacity of each jurisdiction to advance equity.
213
 This will result in poor 
jurisdictions receiving more discretion to spend intergovernmental grants relative to rich 
jurisdictions. However, equitable sharing of revenue among subnational governments might 
not be sensible in all circumstances and contexts. Some rich subnational governments may 
resist the equity notion in the horizontal sharing of fiscal resources.
214
 In such cases the use of 
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the „derivation or origin principle‟215 may be the solution to manage conflict that may arise 
among governments. This allows regions or jurisdictions to retain some of locally generated 
revenue or benefits from local resources and consequently promote national integration. 
6.2.5.4 Flexibility 
It is necessary to balance the competing principles of transparency, predictability, simplicity 
and equitability, on the one hand, and flexibility, on the other.
216
 An intergovernmental fiscal 
system ought to be flexible to accommodate changes in the political and socio-economic 
environment.
217
 Conversely, creating a completely ad hoc system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations undermines transparency. Flexibility may be achieved if basic components of the 
intergovernmental system as opposed to the actual division of revenue are constitutionally 
recognised. Detailed provisions relating to actual division of revenue should be captured in 
ordinary legislation.
218
 
6.2.5.5 Participation of subnational governments 
The sharing of revenue between the national and subnational governments as well as amongst 
subnational governments themselves has significant implications for subnational 
governments. Therefore, the question of how much scope subnational governments have to 
influence revenue sharing is vital.
219
 The UN-Habitat suggests that national legislation and, 
where possible, the constitution, should guarantee the participation of subnational 
governments in framing the rules governing the general sharing of nationally generated 
financial resources, including vertical and horizontal equalisation.
220
 This allows subnational 
governments to influence the vertical and horizontal sharing of financial resources.
221
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Without the involvement of subnational governments in the executive processes that 
determine revenue sharing, the interests of subnational governments are likely to be alienated 
or receive secondary attention.
222
 As discussed in paragraph 6.5.2.3 below, subnational 
governments may influence revenue sharing if they are represented in executive 
intergovernmental structures that determine revenue sharing or in the legislative arm which 
passes the revenue and expenditure bills, or both structures. 
6.3 Administrative autonomy 
Administrative autonomy plays a complementary role to the realisation of political and fiscal 
autonomy.
223
 Administrative autonomy entails the discretion to appoint, remunerate, 
discipline and dismiss staff, as well as set internal administrative procedures. Fessha & 
Kirkby argue that administrative autonomy frees subnational governments from reliance on 
the national government and its bureaucracies to implement their local policy decisions.
224
 It 
further ensures that implementation of local policies is locally directed and driven by 
promoting the accountability of local administrative officials to subnational governments and 
not to the national government. The various aspects of administrative autonomy are examined 
below. 
6.3.1 Authority over personnel issues 
Subnational governments are unlikely to effectively deliver on their mandate by using public 
sector employees whom they do not have control over. Responsive service delivery may be 
promoted if subnational governments have some control over their personnel.
225
 Thus, 
subnational governments ought to have authority over the appointment, disciplining and 
dismissal of local administrative officials.
226
 The decentralisation of administrative authority 
should take into account the capacity of individual subnational governments to attract 
qualified and skilled personnel.
227
 Large subnational governments with the capacity to attract 
and retain skilled and qualified personnel should ideally have full competency over personnel 
issues exercised within the national framework. For smaller or low level subnational 
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governments, which might experience difficulties in attracting and retaining skilled 
manpower, it may be necessary to establish a deployment system where the national 
government deploys some of its skilled employees to these subnational governments. Once 
subnational governments have established their personnel structures, they should have a code 
of good conduct that requires public officials to act with integrity and avoid situations that 
may lead to a conflict of interests.
228
 
6.3.2 Authority to determine salaries of employees 
Administrative autonomy also means that subnational governments have the authority to 
determine salary levels of local employees to allow the establishment of salary schemes 
which attract and retain professionals.
229
 For example, a subnational government can vary 
salary levels on the basis of performance, profession and scarcity of particular skills. 
However, the discretion to set salary scales at subnational level should not be exercised 
without boundaries as it may breed corruption and resource wastage.
230
 Thus, as argued in 
paragraph 6.6.1 below, it is important that the national government sets the framework within 
which subnational governments may determine salary levels for their employees. 
6.3.3 Authority over the setting of internal procedures 
The UN-Habitat contends that subnational governments may respond better to the demands 
of the localities if they are authorised to determine their own internal procedures as far as 
possible.
231
 Such authority will allow subnational governments to adapt internal procedures to 
local needs and ensure effective management.
232
 This is particularly necessary in countries 
where there is asymmetric decentralisation giving rise to different structures of subnational 
governments. It is however submitted that internal structures should be established within a 
framework set by the national government which should recognise different categories of 
subnational governments. 
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6.4 Supervision 
Under a multilevel system of government, the decentralisation of powers and functions to 
subnational governments should not be interpreted to mean that subnational governments 
operate as independent entities or governments. While exercising a certain measure of 
autonomy, subnational governments must remain accountable to senior government. Senior 
governments have a duty and obligation to supervise subnational governments. In this study 
supervision is understood to mean regulation, monitoring, support and intervention.
233
 One of 
the most contested issues in countries with more than two levels of government is which level 
of government should have the responsibility to supervise local government. 
In Ethiopia, the United States of America and Australia, local governments are an exclusive 
competency of the states or regional governments.
234
 On the other hand, in Germany and 
South Africa, local governments are supervised by both the national and provincial 
governments.
235
 Despite these differences, what seems to be clear is that the effective 
functioning of a multilevel system of government depends in part on the extent to which the 
institutional design balances the requirement for supervision with the need for local 
discretion. Further, Article 8(1) of the European Charter of Local Self-Government states that 
supervision should only be exercised in accordance with such procedures and in cases as 
provided for by the legal framework, which respects local autonomy.
236
 The capacity of 
higher levels of government to supervise is as important as the capacity of subnational 
governments to deliver on their mandate. The various forms of supervision are discussed 
below. 
6.4.1 Regulation 
6.4.1.1 General regulation 
The institutional design should allow the national government to regulate the activities of 
subnational governments by, among other ways, setting national standards.
237
 National 
standard setting entails the degree to which the performance of subnational governments is 
supervised as opposed to controlled by higher levels of government. National standard setting 
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is justifiable on a number of grounds, including equity concerns. The notion of equity among 
citizens requires the national government to set minimum standards on the quantity and/or 
quality of local public services.
238
 In setting up national standards on the provision of goods 
and services, it is argued that the national government should strive not to endanger the 
minimum level of local autonomy which is necessary to reap the benefits of a multilevel 
system of government.
239
 Regulation should be limited to framework legislation and policies. 
National standards can also be set on personnel issues involving qualification requirements 
for key positions, salary scales and financial issues involving uniform accounting and 
auditing practices, financial disclosure, budgetary processes and borrowing.
240
 Some of these 
national standards are necessary to combat or prevent corruption and maladministration. The 
guiding principles when setting standards are transparency, fairness, predictability, and 
explicit recognition of differences between subnational governments. When setting national 
standards it is also important to consider the costs associated with complying with the set 
standards, especially for smaller or poor subnational governments. Thus, national standards 
should be set that recognise asymmetric arrangements so that unrealistic targets are not set for 
poor or low level subnational governments.
241
 As far as possible, when determining national 
standards of local service provision, the national government should take into account the 
principle of subsidiarity and consult subnational governments and their associations.
242
 
6.4.1.2 Financial regulation 
The decentralisation of fiscal resources should be carried out simultaneously with measures 
to promote better financial management at subnational level to safeguard and ensure effective 
use of public finances.
243
 The effective use of public resources does not only promote a stable 
macro-economic environment but also the achievement of other aspects of development and 
sustainable peace. Failure to put in place measures to promote financial management at 
subnational level may encourage corruption and wastage of resources.
244
 Thus, the national 
government should regulate the financial affairs of subnational government in order to 
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promote sound financial management, transparency and accountability at subnational levels. 
The regulation should include imposition of a uniform system of financial accounts, audit 
rules, regular financial reporting, performance evaluation and transparency. Uniformity in 
financial accounts is necessary to create an integrated financial management system which, 
among other advantages, allows senior governments to easily carry out their supervisory role. 
6.4.2 Monitoring and support 
The institutional design of a multilevel system of government should enable higher levels of 
government to monitor and support subnational governments. As argued above, support is 
particularly required for smaller or low level subnational governments which often lack the 
capacity to raise revenue and administer programmes. Institutions established at the national 
level should be authorised and given the capacity to monitor and support the activities of 
subnational governments.
245
 National government systems of monitoring and evaluating local 
affairs should be able to detect gaps or capacity constraints at subnational level that may 
undermine the performance of subnational governments. De Visser argues that monitoring is 
important to ensure compliance with the regulatory framework, including financial rules.
246
 
Financial rules may take the form of a requirement for submitting financial statements for 
auditing by an independent institution. Effective monitoring of the finances of subnational 
governments may require a regularly updated and comprehensive data system to detail the 
finances of subnational governments and allow quantitative monitoring and evaluation.
247
 
Financial information should be publicised to enable citizens to participate in local decision-
making processes and hold public officials accountable. 
The decentralisation of functions to subnational governments should be accompanied by 
measures to build the capacity of subnational governments to exercise decentralised 
functions.
248
 The national government should provide support in the form of technical 
assistance, especially to smaller subnational governments, so that they are able to abide by 
the regulatory framework, including accounting, auditing, performance and reporting 
standards.
249
 It is also important to strengthen and build the capacity of councillors, 
administrative officials and governance institutions so that local governments can deliver 
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quality services to their communities. Once functions have been decentralised, it may be 
necessary to compel the national government to support subnational governments before it 
can exercise its powers to intervene, as will be discussed in detail below.
250
 
6.4.3 Intervention 
If the monitoring and support mechanisms suggest persistent problems at subnational level 
that threaten the attainment of national and/or local goals, it may be necessary for the national 
government to intervene at subnational level. This means that the national government ought 
to have the right to intervene in subnational affairs to protect local and national interests. 
These goals may include delivery of equitable quality and quantity of public services across 
the entire country. International literature suggests that the national government should only 
intervene in local affairs after it has provided the required support and after a subnational 
government has failed to deliver on its obligations despite the support which senior 
governments might have rendered.
251
 Thus, interventions should be taken in the last resort. 
To protect the autonomy and institutional integrity of subnational governments a number of 
requirements should be stipulated in the legal and, where possible, constitutional framework. 
6.4.3.1 Explicit legal recognition of the conditions under which senior 
government may intervene 
To guard against arbitrary interventions, the law should specify the conditions under which a 
senior government may intervene in subnational affairs.
252
 In the event that there is a need to 
suspend or dissolve a local elected body, it is submitted that the exercise of such 
interventionary powers should be carried out by due legal process.
253
 The burden of justifying 
such an intervention should rest with the senior government.
254
 
6.4.3.2 Oversight of the exercise of interventionary powers 
An intervention into subnational affairs ought to be subjected to oversight mechanisms for 
checks and balances.
255
 For example, an intervention into subnational affairs can be subjected 
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to intergovernmental approvals by institutions such as parliament and the courts, as in the 
case in Uganda.
256
 The President of Uganda (heading the executive) may only assume the 
executive and legislative powers of the districts (local governments) after securing the 
approval of two-thirds of Parliament. Such oversight mechanisms may be effective in 
protecting the autonomy of subnational governments. 
6.4.3.3 Intervention measures and resumption of duty by a subnational 
government 
The power to intervene should be „exercised in such a way as to ensure that the intervention 
of the senior government is kept in proportion to the importance of the interests which it is 
intended to protect.
257
 Further, following the suspension or dissolution of a local elected body 
or local executives, the law should determine the resumption of their duties in as short a 
period of time as possible.
258
 The same should apply in cases where a senior government has 
assumed a local function or responsibility. The guiding principle of intervention into local 
affairs is that interventions must be constructive and not be driven by the motive to penalise 
or score political goals.
259
 
6.5 Intergovernmental cooperation 
In a multilevel system of government various institutions are established at different levels of 
government to deliver goods and services to the people. In delivering goods and services, 
these institutions are usually involved in their own and in combined efforts with institutions 
within the same and different levels of government. Intergovernmental relations originate 
from these relationships between and across government actors.
260
 If there are no sound 
intergovernmental relations, effective functioning of a multilevel system of government is 
likely to be compromised. Inter-institutional harmony can be achieved if governments within 
and at various levels cooperate with one another instead of competing. There is therefore the 
need to establish mechanisms to ensure that there is regular dialogue and cooperation 
between different tiers of government.
261
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Cooperation should be distinguished from supervision, which denotes a relationship of 
hierarchy where senior governments make binding decisions on junior governments. 
Conversely, cooperation refers to „a relationship of equality where the actors in 
intergovernmental relations operate as equal partners‟.262 De Visser argues that such a 
relationship of equality to a large extent will depend on political maturity, the quality of 
human interaction and genuine interests in the realisation of national and local goals.
263
 In 
addition, international practice underscores the importance of an enabling legal and 
institutional framework.
264
 When designing a framework of intergovernmental relations, it is 
also important to ensure that the integrated structure of intergovernmental relations does not 
undermine the democratic accountability of each level of government to its own electorate.
265
 
Hence, measures should be put in place to ensure that each level of government remains 
accountable to its electorate while requiring intergovernmental structures to account to 
governments at the relevant level. 
6.5.1 Enabling legal environment 
A major issue when designing a multilevel system of government is whether 
intergovernmental relations should be constitutionally prescribed, established by ordinary 
legislation or left to be developed in practice.
266
 Intergovernmental cooperation does not 
necessarily have to be legislated. Watts argues that the best practice may be to allow a 
general political culture of cooperation and mutual respect to develop over time so as to 
create flexibility and innovation.
267
 However, written rules of engagement in the constitution 
or legislation can provide a foundation for nurturing a culture of cooperation in countries 
which have recently adopted multilevel systems of government (such as Zimbabwe) where 
such a culture might not exist because of a history of domination by the centre.
268
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6.5.2 Enabling institutional environment 
Countries with multilevel systems of government are often faced with the question of 
whether the development of constructive relations across tiers of government requires 
establishment of institutions for that purpose. It has been submitted that the development of 
constructive relations among tiers of government requires a degree of institutionalisation of 
vertical and horizontal integration.
269
 Institutionalisation involves designing appropriate 
institutional arrangements to channel the participation of various tiers of governments in 
decision-making processes and defining the procedures through which such involvement is 
structured.
270
 It provides the platform for cooperation and coordination likely to be required 
in any multilevel system of government.
271
 While acknowledging the need for these 
institutions to promote coordinated implementation of national laws, the Aberdeen Principles 
suggest that there is need for a viable mechanism which ensures that the interests of 
subnational governments are protected in the decision-making processes of the national 
government.
272
 These mechanisms are explored below. 
6.5.2.1 Subnational interests and national law-making  
Subnational governments should be given the platform to participate in the national 
legislative processes. The participation of subnational governments in the national law-
making process is very important to avoid the alienation of interests of subnational 
governments. Some countries which adopted multilevel systems of government have adopted 
bicameral parliaments with the upper house charged with protecting the interests of 
subnational government.
273
 Even countries without bicameral parliaments have put in place 
mechanisms to ensure the representation of subnational governments in the legislative 
process at the national level. Such mechanisms include giving subnational governments a 
certain number of seats in parliament. Another mechanism includes the requirement that the 
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national government must consult subnational governments on any constitutional and 
legislative changes which affect the status and interests of subnational governments.
274
 For 
instance in Uganda, Parliament may only amend certain provisions of the Constitution that 
affect local government after two-thirds of all the districts ratify the proposed amendment.
275
 
Such requirements may be effective in ensuring that subnational governments are not 
marginalised and their interests protected in the national legislative processes. 
6.5.2.2 Subnational governments and national policy-making 
Subnational governments are not only affected by legislation enacted by senior governments 
but also by policies of these governments. As such, subnational governments should have 
mechanisms to influence policy formulation at the national level. Such platforms may take 
the form of executive intergovernmental structures where levels of government can interact 
and consult each other on matters of common interest. These intergovernmental structures are 
vital for coordination which is desirable to „improve the information base and quality of 
information analysis available to national, provincial and local governments, thus facilitating 
better decision-making and reconciling policy differences‟.276 Intergovernmental cooperation 
in policy issues can be promoted by establishing formal intergovernmental agreements which 
may be binding or non-binding.
277
 
6.5.2.3 Subnational governments and fiscal control 
The extent to which subnational governments have an influence on the distribution of 
nationally mobilised revenue is important for multilevel governance, particularly for the 
purpose of correcting fiscal imbalances. Subnational governments should have the means of 
influencing the distribution of financial resources across and within levels of governments.
278
 
The creation of intergovernmental structures where different tiers of government can discuss 
the sharing of nationally raised revenue and other financial matters may enable lower tiers of 
government to influence fiscal decisions at the national level. 
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6.5.3 Nurturing a culture of cooperation 
Even if the legal and institutional environment is conducive to intergovernmental 
cooperation, in practice, effective intergovernmental relations require considerable time, 
effort and will.
279
 Effective intergovernmental relations are directly influenced by the 
interactive behaviour of participating institutions of government and individuals (role-
players).
280
 A political culture of mutual respect, tolerance and equality among tiers of 
government is vital for nurturing constructive relations.
281
 Watts argues that such a culture 
calls for „tolerance towards diversity and autonomous experimentation‟, trust [and] … 
recognition of the need for regular consultation and interaction with a sense of political 
partnership‟.282 Besides a culture of respect, tolerance and equality, intergovernmental 
cooperation may also be engendered if all levels of government are empowered to engage 
with other levels of government.
283
 It is therefore crucial to ensure that all levels of 
government, particularly local government, are well resourced and have adequate skilled 
manpower to support intergovernmental cooperation.
284
 
6.5.4 Recognition of the role of organised local government 
Local governments may not be in a better position to engage meaningfully with senior 
governments as separate units.
285
 The exception is large local units such as metropolitan cities 
which may have the capacity to engage with senior government.
286
 For effective engagement 
with senior government it may be necessary to recognise the role of organised local 
government to promote and protect local interests.
287
 The European Charter of Local Self-
Government provides that the law should compel senior government to consult local 
governments and their associations when preparing, or amending policies and legislation 
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affecting local governments.
288
 Such policies and legislation include those providing for the 
establishment, boundaries,
289
 powers and functions of subnational governments.
290
 To 
effectively represent and promote interests of their members, organised local government will 
not only require legal recognition but also adequate and sustainable financial resources. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that by sharing power and resources across many actors and levels of 
government, a multilevel system of government may promote development, democracy and 
sustainable peace. Equally, a multilevel system of government may undermine development, 
democracy and sustainable peace if measures are not put in place to reduce corruption, 
inequalities and the risk of secession. The important lesson for institutional design is that a 
multilevel system of government which seeks to realise development, democracy and 
sustainable peace should have an appropriate mixture of political, administrative and fiscal 
instruments. While acknowledging the importance of political will for the effective 
functioning of any system of government, it is submitted that at minimum the legal and 
institutional architecture should guarantee political, fiscal and administrative autonomy at 
subnational level. Furthermore, the legal and institutional design should have mechanisms 
through which senior governments may supervise junior governments to deal with problems 
such as corruption. Last, the chapter identified intergovernmental cooperation as a critical 
design feature of a multilevel system of government for realising development, democracy 
and sustainable peace. 
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Chapter 3 
The Zimbabwean multilevel system of government: a historical 
perspective 
1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government from a historical 
perspective covering both the pre and post-colonial eras. The chapter begins by providing a 
general overview of Zimbabwe. It then discusses the colonial local government system giving 
particular attention to the powers and functions of local government units. A similar 
discussion is provided for the post-independence system of local government. Attention is 
given to the policy and legislative reforms which were crafted with specific reference to the 
multilevel system government to advance development, democracy and sustainable peace. 
Such reforms include the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe which has brought about 
significant changes to the multilevel system of government. The chapter will also provide a 
brief overview of the constitutional review process and the nature of the system of 
government which has been adopted. 
2. General overview of Zimbabwe 
2.1 Geography 
Zimbabwe is located in Southern Africa, where it borders Mozambique to the east, Zambia to 
the north, Namibia to the northwest, Botswana to the southwest and South Africa to the 
south. It has a land area measuring about 390 757 square kilometres.
1
 As shown in Figure 2 
below, the country is divided into ten provinces, namely Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland 
East, Mashonaland West, Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, Midlands, Masvingo, 
Manicaland, Harare and Bulawayo. Provinces are further divided into districts for 
administrative convenience.
2
 Harare and Bulawayo provinces are wholly urban while the 
other eight provinces are composed of both urban and rural areas.
3
 As shown in the map 
below, the provinces of Harare and Bulawayo are the smallest in size. Harare is the capital 
city of Zimbabwe and where the national government administration is based. 
                                                 
1
 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) 2012: 13. 
2
 ZimStat 2012. As discussed in Chapter Four, the boundaries of rural local authorities usually coincides with 
those of administrative districts in rural areas. 
3
 See Zimstat 2012: 11. 
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Figure 2: Map of Zimbabwe 
 
2.2 Demographics 
Zimbabwe is home to the descendants of various Mashona tribes, the Ndebele ethnic group, 
and other small ethnic groups such as Kalanga and Tonga. It is also home to a small group of 
Indian descent, coloureds and white Africans. The Census of 2012 carried out by the 
Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZimStat) estimated the total population of Zimbabwe 
to be just over 13 million.
4
 Of the 13 million, 99.7 per cent are of African origin while only 
0.3 percent is from European, Asiatic and mixed origin.
5
 About 2 million Zimbabweans are 
reported to have migrated to other countries, mainly neighbouring South Africa, due to the 
political and economic hardships which the country has been experiencing since the late 
1990s and which worsened after 2005.
6
 As shown in Figure 3 below, the majority of the 
                                                 
4
 ZimStat 2012: 11. 
5
 Zimstat 2012: 13, 26. 
6
 The political and economic hardships were characterised by alleged abuse of human rights, high inflation, 
increasing poverty, high unemployment rate and poor delivery of public services. See Bland 2010: 2; the Centre 
for Peace Initiatives in Africa 2005: 16, Muchadenyika 2014: 128. 
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population in Zimbabwe resides in rural areas. Relative to other provinces, Harare 
Metropolitan Province has the largest population, about 16 per cent of the total population of 
Zimbabwe.
7
 The total urban population of Harare Metropolitan Province of over 2 million is 
47 per cent of the total population of people residing in urban areas in the whole of 
Zimbabwe.
8
 The majority of the people who reside in urban areas reside in the two cities of 
Harare and Bulawayo and the town of Chitungwiza. 
Figure 3: Population distribution between urban and rural areas 
 
Source: Zimstat 2012: 25 
2.3 Constitution 
2.3.1 Constitutional review in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution
9
 in 2013 after a constitution review process dating 
back to the 1990s. Before the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, Zimbabwe was governed by 
the Lancaster House Constitution which was adopted at the Lancaster House Conference held 
in Britain in 1979. The Lancaster House Constitution was negotiated between the British 
government, Rhodesian government and the liberation movements led by Zimbabwe African 
                                                 
7
 ZimStat 2012: 25. 
8
 ZimStat 2012: 25. This explains why there is heavy demand for public infrastructure in this province compared 
to other provinces. 
9
 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act, 2013.  
33% 
67% 
Urban areas
Rural areas
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National Unity (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People‟s Unity (ZAPU).10 This constitution 
was regarded as a transitional document which later proved to be inadequate to deal with 
some of the challenges which Zimbabwe faced after independence, including growing 
poverty, unequal access to basic services and skewed resource distribution.
11
 Efforts by the 
government, political parties and civic groups in reviewing the Lancaster House Constitution 
culminated in various draft constitutions, including the Constitutional Commission Draft 
Constitution of 2000,
12
 National Constitutional Assembly Draft Constitution of 2001, Kariba 
Draft Constitution of 2007 and Law Society of Zimbabwe Model Constitution of 2010.
13
 All 
of these draft constitutions did not get enough support to be adopted as the supreme law of 
Zimbabwe. 
2.3.2 The making of the 2013 Constitution 
Following the disputed Presidential Elections of 2008, the three major political parties
14
 in 
Zimbabwe entered into a peace agreement in which they agreed to share power in a 
government of national unity.
15
 The agreement, also known as the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA), was brokered under the auspices of the former South African President, 
Mr Thabo Mbeki. Under the agreement, the three major political parties agreed to restore 
political and economic stability in Zimbabwe.
16
 Article VI of the GPA required the 
government of national unity to spearhead efforts to come up with a new Constitution 
through an inclusive and people-driven process.
17
 The time period for the constitution-
making process was limited to not more than two years after the inception of the GPA. The 
constitution-review process began in 2009 under the leadership of a parliamentary body, the 
Constitution Selection Committee (COPAC), as required by Article VI of the GPA.
18
 The 
committee was composed of members selected from the three political parties as well as 
representatives of civil society.
19
 As highlighted above, the GPA set aside a time period of 
not more than two years for the adoption of a new constitution. In practice, the constitution-
                                                 
10
 See Dzinesa 2012: 1. 
11
 Article IV, GPA. When the 2013 Constitution was adopted, the Lancaster House Constitution had been 
amended 19 times. 
12
 The Commission, chaired by the Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku, was appointed by the President. 
13
 Dzinesa 2012: 2-5, Muchadenyika 2014: 30. See also Sims 2013: 11. 
14
 Zimbabwe African National Unity-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai 
(MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 
15
 Article 1, XX, XXV GPA.   
16
 Article II, III, X, XI, XII, XIII, XVIII, XXIII GPA. 
17
 See Constitution Select Committee (COPAC) 2013: 7.  
18
 See art. VI, GPA. 
19
 These included ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC. 
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making process took not less than four years as the major political parties failed to agree on a 
number of issues. Some of the contested issues included land ownership, citizenship, 
homosexuality, executive powers, the role of the liberation struggle, the role of the National 
Prosecuting Authority versus the Attorney General, and devolution.
20
 
2.3.3 Controversies surrounding devolution or form of government 
On the issue of devolution, which is more relevant for the purposes of this study, there were 
disagreements amongst the three main political parties with ZANU-PF opposing it and the 
two MDC formations advocating for it.
21
 ZANU-PF was against a fully devolved form of 
government, citing its potential to promote secession and undermine national unity.
22
 It 
further argued that that a fully devolved form of government was inappropriate for Zimbabwe 
because the country is small in size and population.
23
 Moreover, ZANU-PF contended that 
that a devolved form of government would weaken the ability of the state to execute its core 
functions, namely security and defence, redistribution and macro-economic stabilisation.
24
 
Such an argument was rejected by a number of scholars who contended that the size and 
population of Zimbabwe cannot be a justifiable basis for rejecting a devolved form of 
government.
25
 It was argued that there are a number of countries which have adopted a 
devolved system of government and, in some cases, even federal arrangements to exploit 
benefits associated with multilevel systems of government, despite being small in size and 
population.
26
 
The two MDC political formations, on the other hand, advocated for a devolved form of 
government as a potential answer to a number of challenges which Zimbabwe was 
                                                 
20
 COPAC 2013: 58. 
21
 See COPAC 2013: 55, 57; Moyo 2013: 146; Masunungure & Ndoma 2013: 1; Muchadenyika 2014: 132-3; 
Dzinesa 2012: 12; Human Rights Bulletin 2012: 3-4. 
22
 COPAC 2013: 57, Sims 2013: 12, Moyo 2013: 150. 
23
 The leader of ZANU-PF, President Robert Mugabe, publicly denounced the adoption of a fully-fledged 
devolved system of government in Zimbabwe, citing its potential threat to national integration. In an interview 
with the public broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, the President argued that devolution is done 
in big countries and not in small countries such as Zimbabwe. He also stated that Zimbabwe once had a federal 
system of government which included Malawi and Zambia. The federation failed to work, thus providing 
lessons against adopting a similar form of government such as a devolved one. See The New Zimbabwe 
„Devolution of power: What they said‟, „President Robert Mugabe – ZBC‟ 2012. See also Human Rights 
Bulletin 2012: 4. 
24
 See The New Zimbabwe „Devolution of power: What they said‟, Masunungure &Ndoma 2013: 1. 
25
 Conyers 2010, Bloch 2012, Madhuku 2012. See The New Zimbabwe „Devolution of power: What they said‟. 
26
 Chigwata 2012: 11. See also Muchadenyika 2014: 127, 133. 
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experiencing, including perceived unfair development in some provinces.
27
 The MDC, led by 
Professor Welshman Ncube, strongly advocated for a fully devolved form of government, 
citing potential benefits such as development, democracy and peace.
28
 These wide divisions 
between the political parties which characterised the constitution-making process may 
explain why a majority of constitutional provisions relating to devolution in the adopted 2013 
Constitution are ambiguous. For instance, section 264(1) of the Constitution provides that 
„whenever appropriate, governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities which are competent to carry out 
those responsibilities efficiently and effectively‟. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, the 
exact meaning of this provision is unclear.
29
 
As will be observed throughout this study, the 2013 Constitution and in particular its Chapter 
14, which governs provincial and local governments, reveals „fudged‟ devolution. It presents 
a compromise between those who were for a centralised system of government and those who 
were for a much more decentralised system of government.
30
 Chapter 14 is the only chapter 
in the 2013 Constitution which has a preamble of its own. The preamble reads: 
Whereas it is desirable to ensure: (a) the preservation of national unity in 
Zimbabwe and the prevention of all forms of disunity and secessionism; (b) 
the democratic participation in government by all citizens and communities 
of Zimbabwe; and (c) the equitable allocation of national resources and the 
participation of local communities in the determination of development 
priorities within their areas; there must be devolution of power and 
responsibilities to lower tiers of government in Zimbabwe. 
The preamble of Chapter 14 strives to protect the interest of both those who were (are) for a 
devolved system of government and those who were (are) anti-devolution.
31
 For those who 
were for devolution, the preamble guarantees that there „must‟ be devolution of power to 
achieve a number of goals. On the other hand, the anti-devolution group have been given the 
assurance that there is not going to be „blanket‟ devolution. Devolution will be embarked on 
to achieve certain goals, under certain conditions and controlled by the national government. 
                                                 
27
 COPAC 2013: 57, Afrobarometer 2012: 2, Masunungure & Ndoma 2013: 1, Sims 2013: 12, Moyo 2013: 148-
9. The National Constitutional Assembly of Zimbabwe and Law Society of Zimbabwe advocated for a devolved 
system of government. See Chapter 13 and 14 of the National Constitutional Assembly Draft Constitution, and 
Chapter 14 and 15 of the Law Society of Zimbabwe Draft Constitution. 
28
 See The New Zimbabwe „Devolution of power: What they said‟, Muchadenyika 2014: 133. 
29
 See Muchadenyika 2014: 137. 
30
 See Musekiwa and Mandiyanike 2013: 7. 
31
 Musekiwa and Mandiyanike 2013: 7. 
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2.3.4 Adoption of the 2013 Constitution 
Due to the political bickering witnessed in the constitution-making process as well as 
financial and administrative challenges, it took COPAC nearly 48 months instead of the 
initially planned 18 months to produce a draft constitution accepted by a majority of 
Zimbabweans.
32
 The final draft constitution received resounding support from the people of 
Zimbabwe through a referendum organised on 16 March 2013.
33
 As shown in the table 
below, over 93% of Zimbabweans who participated in the referendum voted in support of the 
draft constitution. 
Table 1: 2013 national referendum results on the draft constitution 
Yes vote 
 
No vote Total rejected 
votes 
Total votes cast Total yes 
vote 
percentage 
3 079 964 179 487 55 799 3 312 907 93% + 
Source: COPCA 2013: 69. 
Following the referendum, a Constitutional Bill was gazetted on 29 March 2013 and adopted 
by the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament on 8 and 14 May 2013, respectively.
34
 The 
President signed the Bill into law on 22 May 2013, making it the supreme law of 
Zimbabwe.
35
 The 2013 Constitution is founded on a number of important values and 
principles, including supremacy of the Constitution, rule of law, good governance, multi-
party democracy, observance of the principle of separation of powers, and devolution.
36
 It 
establishes three arms of government, provides an extensive Bill of Rights and makes 
provision for a multilevel system of government. A brief discussion of these three important 
aspects of the 2013 Constitution is provided below. 
                                                 
32
 See Muchadenyika 2014: 134, Masunungure & Ndoma 2013: 2, Dzinesa 2012: 6. 
33
 See COPAC 2013: 69. 
34
 See COPAC 2013: 70. 
35
 See COPAC 2013: 71. 
36
 See s 3 Constitution. 
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2.3.5 2013 Constitution in brief 
2.3.5.1 Arms of government 
Like many other modern constitutions, the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for the 
establishment of the three arms of government, namely the Executive, Parliament and the 
Judiciary. As shown in Figure 4 below, the three arms of government are independent and 
also interdependent in that they share governmental power which cannot be exercised in 
isolation. 
Figure 4: Arms of government 
 
As shown in the diagram above, the Executive is led by the President who is directly elected 
by the citizens for a term of five years.
37
 The President is the head of state and government 
with powers to appoint and chair cabinet.
38
 Parliament is bicameral, consisting of the 
National Assembly (Lower House) and the Senate (Upper House).
39
 The Senate is composed 
of six members from each of the ten provinces who are elected under a party-list system of 
                                                 
37
 S 92(3) Constitution. 
38
 S 89 Constitution. 
39
 S 118 Constitution. 
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proportional representation.
40
 In addition, the Senate has a total of 18 chiefs and two 
members appointed to represent persons with disabilities.
41
 The National Assembly on the 
other hand is composed of 210 directly elected members and 60 female members who are 
elected under a party-list system of proportional representation.
42
 Thus, unlike the Lancaster 
House Constitution, the 2013 Constitution actively seeks to promote the representation of 
marginalised groups such as women and people with disabilities, which is necessary in any 
democratic society. 
In addition to bringing about changes to Parliament, the 2013 Constitution revamped the 
Judiciary. The most notable change was the establishment of a new Constitutional Court in 
addition to the Supreme Court, High Court, Labour Court and other lower courts.
43
 The 
Constitutional Court is now the apex court led by the Chief Justice. It is the highest court of 
appeal on all constitutional matters and its decisions on those matters overrule all other 
courts.
44
 As highlighted above, constitutional provisions relating to devolution are 
ambiguous.
45
 The implication of this is that the Constitutional Court is likely to be called 
upon to provide guidance on the meaning of these provisions. The Court has a key role to 
play in protecting and promoting a non-centralised system of government in Zimbabwe. 
Lessons from Kenya, which has also adopted a devolved form of government, are useful in 
interpreting the 2013 Constitution. The Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Kenya noted that 
constitution-making requires compromises which can occasionally lead to 
contradictions; and that the political and social demands of compromise that 
mark constitutional moments, fertilises vagueness in phraseology and 
draftsmanship. It is to the Courts that the country turns, in order to resolve 
these contradictions; clarify draftsmanship-gaps; and settle constitutional 
disputes. In other words, constitution-making does not end with its 
promulgation; it continues with its interpretation. It is the duty of the Courts 
to illuminate legal penumbras that constitutions borne out of long drawn 
compromises … tend to create. The constitutional text and letter may not 
properly express the minds of the framers, and the mind and hands of the 
                                                 
40
 S 120(1)(2) Constitution. The party-list system of proportion representation is based on votes cast for 
candidates representing political parties in each province in the general election for Members of the National 
Assembly in which male and female candidates are listed alternatively, every list being headed by a female 
candidate. 
41
 See s 120(1)(b)(c)(d) Constitution. 
42
 S 124(1) Constitution. The Constitution requires the election of six female members from each province for 
the life of the first two Parliaments after the adoption of the new Constitution. 
43
 S 162 Constitution. 
44
 S 167(1)(a) Constitution. 
45
 See Sims 2013: 13 
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framers may also fail to properly mine the aspirations of the people. The 
limitation of mind and hand should not defeat the aspirations of the people. It 
is in this context that the spirit of the Constitution has to be invoked by the 
Court as the searching for the illumination and elimination of these legal 
penumbras.
46
 
It is submitted that the interpretation given by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
although referring to the Kenyan situation, is applicable in Zimbabwe. The Constitutional 
Court of Zimbabwe should consider adopting such a purposive approach of interpreting a 
constitution so as to give effect to a non-centralised system of government as expressed by 
majority of Zimbabweans during the constitution-review process.
47
 Results of the 
Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey carried during the period of the constitution-review process 
revealed that 62% of Zimbabweans supported a devolved form of government.
48
 Detailed 
results of the survey are presented below. 
Figure 5: Results of the Afrobarometer survey on people's views on devolution 
 
Source: Graph reworked from Afrobaromter 2012: 2 
                                                 
46
 Speaker of the Senate and another v Hon. Attorney-General and others [2013] eKLR. The concurring opinion 
of the Chief Justice Mutunga W, para 156. 
47
 See Masunungure & Ndoma 2013: 1-6, Moyo 2013: 154. 
48
 Afrobarometer 2012: 2. The survey was carried out by the Mass Public Opinion Institute in July 2012. It 
interviewed 2400 adult Zimbabweans to evaluate whether they supported or opposed a devolved form of 
government, respondents were asked the following question: „Do you agree or disagree with the proposed 
constitutional provision to devolve power, from the central government to governments at a sub-national level, 
such as a local or provincial government, or haven‟t you heard enough to say?‟ 
Strongly
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The result of the Afrobarometer survey also revealed that seven out of the ten provinces 
wanted a devolved form of government.
49
 As shown in Table 2 below, Bulawayo 
Metropolitan Province was the highest, with 93% of those interviewed „strongly‟ supporting 
a devolved form of government. Only three of the ten provinces had less than 50% of people 
who supported devolution. 
Table 2: Support for devolution by province 
Province Agree/Strongly 
agree (%) 
Disagree/Strongly 
disagree (%) 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(%) 
Don’t know 
(%) 
Bulawayo 94 1 3 3 
Harare 83 11 5 2 
Matabeleland 
North 
75 8 9 9 
Mashonaland 
West 
71 12 16 1 
Mashonaland 
East 
69 19 7 5 
Matabeleland 
South 
69 23 3 4 
Midlands 57 13 14 16 
Mashonaland 
Central 
47 37 3 13 
Manicaland 37 49 6 8 
Masvingo 26 29 7 38 
Source: Afrobarometer 2012: 3. 
Therefore, irrespective of the way devolution has been recognised in the 2013 Constitution, it 
is submitted that the courts, Parliament and other institutions have a role to ensure that the 
new multilevel system of government is implemented to promote the development of a non-
centralised system of government.
50
 
                                                 
49
 Afrobarometer 2012: 2. 
50
 See Moyo 2013: 154, Masunungure & Ndoma 2013: 5, Sims 2013: 24. 
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2.3.5.2 Bill of Rights 
Zimbabwe has perhaps the most expansive Bill of Rights in the modern world. Chapter 4 of 
the 2013 Constitution, titled „Declaration of Rights‟, is the longest chapter of the 2013 
Constitution, with 43 provisions guaranteeing various rights. The chapter provides for 
political, socio-economic, environmental, individual and group rights in conformity with the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
51
 Among other rights, the Constitution 
guarantees the right to equality and non-discrimination, access to information, freedom of 
assembly and association, language and culture, education and health care. The Constitution 
imposes an obligation on the state, every person and every institution and agency of 
government at every level to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and freedoms set 
out in Chapter 4.
52
 This means that even lower tiers of government and their agencies have 
equal responsibility. 
2.3.5.3 System of government 
Zimbabwe has adopted a unitary form of government but with government organised at 
multiple levels.
53
 As shown in Figure 6 below, at the national level, there is the national 
government while the middle tier of government is made up of provincial and metropolitan 
councils.
54
 Urban and rural local authorities (local governments) make up the lowest tier.
55
 
While the powers and functions of provincial and metropolitan councils are enumerated in 
the Constitution, the Constitution does not do the same for the national and local tiers of 
government.
56
 It only provides that subject to the Constitution and any legislation a local 
authority has a „right to govern on its own initiative, the local affairs of the people within the 
area for which it has been established, and has all the powers necessary for it to do so‟.57 The 
exact meaning of this provision is unclear.
58
 It is however clear that unlike the Lancaster 
House Constitution, the 2013 Constitution requires the national government to devolve 
                                                 
51
 See chap 4 Constitution. 
52
 S 44 Constitution. 
53
 See s 1 Constitution. 
54
 S 5 Constitution.  
55
 S 5 Constitution.  
56
 See s 270(1) Constitution. 
57
 S 276(1) Constitution. 
58
 See Muchadenyika 2014: 137, Sims 2013: 13. 
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powers and functions to provincial and local tiers of government.
59
 Whether the national 
government will comply with this constitutional directive remains to be seen. 
For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe, the 2013 Constitution provides for the equitable 
sharing of nationally raised revenue among the three tiers of government.
60
 As discussed in 
detail in paragraph 4 of Chapter Seven, provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities are entitled to not less than five per cent of nationally raised revenue in each 
financial year.
61
 The Constitution also provides various principles to promote better public 
financial management at all levels of government.
62
 It requires transparency, accountability, 
responsible financial management, clear fiscal reporting, and prudent and effective spending 
of public funds.
63
 This means that the national government should develop the necessary laws 
and policies to give effect to these principles. 
Figure 6: Nature of the multilevel system of government 
 
 
                                                 
59
 See Preamble of chap 14, s 264(1) Constitution. 
60
 See s 298(1)(b)(ii) Constitution. 
61
 See s 301(3) Constitution. 
62
 See s 298(1) Constitution. 
63
 See s 298(1) Constitution. 
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Having provided a general overview of Zimbabwe and the constitutional background, this 
chapter will discusses the development of the Zimbabwean decentralised system of 
government. Attention is given to key legal and institutional changes and their impact on 
development, democracy and sustainable peace. The discussion is divided into the pre-
colonial and post-colonial periods. 
3. Pre-colonial system of government 
3.1 System of government at the national level 
Colonial rule in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia or Southern Rhodesia), like elsewhere in 
Africa, destroyed the pre-colonial system of governance through war and imposing a 
repressive modern administration on the indigenous people.
64
 In Zimbabwe, various forms of 
government have been established over a century of colonisation period, beginning in 1890 
and ending in 1980. Between 1890 and 1923, Southern Rhodesia was under company rule of 
the British South Africa Company (BSAC). After the end of company rule, Southern 
Rhodesia was declared a British colony with a certain measure of self-government. In 1953, 
Southern Rhodesia joined Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to form a federation, which 
broke down in 1963. Following the dissolution of the federation, Southern Rhodesia reverted 
to a British colony. After several failed efforts to gain independence from Britain, in 1965, 
Southern Rhodesia declared itself an independent state with a government which effectively 
governed Zimbabwe until majority rule was attained in 1980. These various governments are 
briefly discussed below. 
3.1.1 Company government (1890-1923) 
In 1890, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) was given permission by the British 
Government to occupy and govern the land now referred to as Zimbabwe.
65
 The company 
dismantled the „well-organised‟ traditional governance structures of the Matabele and 
Mashona kingdoms and replaced these with institutions which matched those in conventional 
colonies of Britain.
66 
The only difference was that the BSAC rather than the Colonial Office 
in Britain directly controlled the Executive Council, Legislative Council and Administration, 
                                                 
64
 Keulder 1998: 201. 
65
 Palley 1966: 215, Keulder 1998: 201. 
66
 Keulder 1998: 201. 
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which exercised governance powers in Southern Rhodesia.
67
 The BSAC was however 
subordinate to the British High Commissioner in South Africa and the Colonial Office in 
Britain. Through its governance structures, the BSAC implemented various policies which 
sought to advance its interests, including expropriation of land and minerals at the expense of 
the black majority. 
3.1.2 Self-government as a British colony (1923-1953) 
Company rule lasted until 1923 when Southern Rhodesia was declared a British colony after 
a referendum in which a majority of white settlers voted against joining the Union of South 
Africa.
68
 A constitution drafted for Southern Rhodesia in 1923 provided for some form of 
self-government subject to supervision by the British government.
69
 Provision was made for 
the establishment of the Legislative Council,
70
 Executive Council and Administration. 
Among other supervisory powers, the British government retained the power to legislate, 
appoint the governor and give him instructions, to supervise the local organs of government, 
and for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of Britain to hear appeals by special 
leave from courts in Southern Rhodesia.
71
 This system of government was undemocratic in 
that it disenfranchised the black population. For example, blacks lacked representation in the 
Legislative and Executive Councils. Among other reasons, it is this lack of representation in 
decision-making structures that increased black resistance against minority rule. 
3.1.3 Federal government (1953-1963) 
In 1954 Southern Rhodesia combined with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland 
(now Malawi) to form the Federation of Rhodesia-Nyasaland. All three territories were 
colonised by Britain. A number of factors influenced the formation of the federation. The 
British government supported the formation of the federation to create a liberal British 
counterpoint to white Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa.
72
 Further, it saw a federation as 
an opportunity to establish a „multi-racial society interposed between white racialism of 
                                                 
67
 Murray 1970: 1. 
68
 Murray 1970: 1. 
69
 Palley 1966: 215. 
70
 The council which exercised legislative powers had no competence to legislate over certain areas, including 
the native administration. A bill passed by the council required assent of the British Crown. 
71
 Murray 1970: 2. 
72
 Palley 1966: 323. 
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South Africa and the black nationalism of the rest of the African continent‟.73 Palley 
highlights that it was even thought that a federation would afford Southern Rhodesian 
Africans opportunities for political participation which otherwise would not have been 
available to them.
74
 Besides these political arguments, the formation of the federation was 
also justified on economic grounds. These included: the need to maximise economies of 
scale; the creation of a common market and powerful credit-worthy central government; 
economies of administration; and the complementary nature of the three territories.
75
 The 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Federation) Act was enacted in 1953 by the British Parliament to 
establish the Federation. 
A new Constitution was drafted which provided for the formation of the federation by the 
three territories under the leadership of a Governor-General, while the territories were led by 
a Governor.
76
 The Constitution provided for the creation of a federal legislature which was to 
be composed of a specified number of European and African members drawn from the three 
territories, and certain members of any race elected by and allocated to the territories.
77
 The 
Constitution enumerated the powers and functions of the Federal Government and those of 
the Territories under an asymmetric arrangement.
78
 Some powers were concurrent, others 
exclusive to the Federation and others exclusive to the Territories.
79
 The Constitution 
provided no right of secession and the only way secession could be effected was through an 
Act of British Parliament. The federation broke up in 1963, among other reasons due to 
divergent interests of whites and blacks which could not be reconciled under the federal 
arrangement. Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland wanted to form their own 
independent states under black majority rule, whereas „whites‟ from Southern Rhodesia 
wanted minority rule to continue.
80
 
                                                 
73
 Palley 1966: 323. From the British point of view there was need to create an influential state in Africa where 
colour or race was to become of no account, unlike in South Africa were apartheid was the mode of governance. 
According to Palley (1966: 124), the other decisive factor was Britain‟s fear that Southern Rhodesia would join 
the Union of South Africa, a fear that was accentuated by the relatively high proportion of Afrikaners in 
Southern Rhodesia in 1954. 
74
 Palley 1966: 323. 
75
 Palley 1966: 323. 
76
 Palley 1966: 343-4 
77
 Palley 1966: 347. 
78
 The two Territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland enjoyed more autonomy than Southern Rhodesia. 
79
 As a norm in federations, the Federal government was given exclusive responsibility over economic 
regulation. Powers and functions which related to services which had a specifically close relation to the day-to-
day life of Africans remained the responsibility of Territories. For example, chiefs were to be appointed by the 
Territories. 
80
 Palley 1966: 677-9. 
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3.1.4 Independent unitary government (1965-1980) 
After the dissolution of the federation, Southern Rhodesia reverted to its status as a British 
colony with some measure of self-government. The period between 1963 and 1965 were 
characterised by intense negotiations between the Southern Rhodesian and British 
governments, with the former advocating full self-rule. The British government was not 
satisfied that the government of Southern Rhodesian had met the prerequisites necessary for 
it to grant Southern Rhodesian independence.
81
 When the negotiations for independence 
reached a deadlock, Southern Rhodesia declared itself an independent state in a proclamation 
commonly known as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 1965.
82
 Under the 
UDI, Southern Rhodesia came up with a new constitution in which it granted itself total 
independence, including changing its name to Rhodesia. It is this government which 
governed Zimbabwe until black majority rule was attained in 1980. The government strongly 
resisted attempts to have majority rule in Zimbabwe. Armed confrontation broke out between 
the nationalist movements and the government which eventually led to independence in 1980. 
Peace was restored in Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House talks in which the Rhodesian and 
British governments and nationalist movements agreed to have a majority-led government 
elected under the terms of an agreed constitution, the Lancaster House Constitution. 
3.2 Local government 
3.2.1 Origins of a system of local government 
The origins of the system of local government in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the 
eighteenth century where the Mashona and Ndebele inhabitants had local government in the 
form of traditional structures of kings, chiefs, headmen and village heads.
83
 The modern form 
of local government emerged soon after the occupation of Zimbabwe by the BSAC in 1890. 
The immediate priority of the BSAC was settling and developing the occupied territory. This 
objective was pursued by establishing strong central control; little attention was paid to the 
                                                 
81
 The prerequisites for the granting of independence were that „there should be unimpeded progress to majority 
rule, that guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution would be given, that there should be 
immediate improvement in the political progress towards ending racial discrimination and that they should be 
satisfied that the suggested basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia 
as a whole‟ (Palley 1966: 745). 
82
 Palley 1966: 745, 751. 
83
 Marsh et al 1974: 184, Ministry of Local Government 2013: 8. The Mashona tribe was comprised of the 
Hera, Rozwi, Njanja, Dzete and Ndobvu tribes. The Ndebele tribe on the other hand was Nguni speaking group 
which had fled wars in the south during the wars of mfecane to settle in the land now referred to as 
Matabeleland in Zimbabwe. See Keulder 1998: 142. 
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establishment of local structures of administration.
84
 The BSAC nevertheless realised the 
need to establish some form of local structures to provide services to the white inhabitants 
who resided in the emerging town of Salisbury. Within a year of occupation, the BSAC 
established a board of management for this purpose. 
The board of management failed to effectively execute its functions and was subsequently 
succeeded by the Salisbury Sanitary Board in 1891.
85
 The Salisbury Sanitary Board was 
better resourced and enjoyed a wider range of functions than the board of management. 
Following the passage of the Town Management Ordinance in 1894, more sanitary boards 
were established in Bulawayo, Umtali and Gwelo. The Municipal Ordinance of 1897 
converted the Salisbury and Bulawayo sanitary boards into municipalities with wholly 
elected councils.
86
 Various forms of local government structures were also established in 
small towns and mining areas to cater for the interests of the white Africans. This marked the 
emergence of a modern system of local government in Zimbabwe. The form of local 
government which developed was modeled on the British system of local government but 
was later influenced by South African ideas.
87
 The main local structures were urban councils, 
rural councils, African Advisory Boards, African (native) councils and the institution of 
traditional leadership. 
3.2.2 Nature of local government system 
The system of local government which developed was racist, discriminatory and based on 
ethnic division. In areas which were dominated by blacks, local government structures were 
designed to control the black population and implement colonial policies. As will be 
discussed later in the chapter, it is the impact of this form of local government that the post-
independent reforms sought to address. 
                                                 
84
 March et al 1974: 184. 
85
 Jordan 1984: 7, Keulder 1998: 147. 
86
 Palley 1966: 643; Jordan 1982: 8, 17. The Municipal Ordinance was based on the Cape Municipal Act which 
reflected the basic form of English local government. Subsequent legislation in Rhodesia, and then Zimbabwe, 
has continued to follow this pattern, in which local authorities are statutory corporations formed by Acts of 
Parliament. 
87
 Jordan 1984: 8. 
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3.2.2.1 Racist 
The system of local government which evolved was based on the principle of „separate 
development‟ of races, with a sharp division between „white‟ and „black‟ areas.88 To serve 
the purpose of racial segregation and „apartheid‟, separate local government systems were 
created, with urban and rural councils serving areas reserved for white Africans, while Native 
(African) Councils, African Advisory boards and African Town Boards were responsible for 
areas reserved for black Africans.
89
 Local government legislation provided for racially 
divided urban and rural areas, both in spatial and institutional form.
90
 This system of local 
government did not accord black Africans the right to participate in the running of their own 
affairs. Even at the national level, Africans lacked democratic representation despite the fact 
that they were the majority. 
When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1953 a general shift in 
colonial thinking towards Africans occurred, with an emphasis on the inclusion of Africans in 
decision-making structures. In line with this new thinking Africans were admitted to 
parliament and segregation legislation affecting mostly urban Africans was relaxed.
91
 It has 
been argued that to a large extent the shift was a response to the threat of an African 
nationalist movement that had been growing since the 1920s.
92
 Thus, democratic 
representation of blacks and the relaxation of segregation legislation was seen as a strategy to 
build peace. These strategies proved to be ineffective in the late 1960s and 1970s as the 
confrontation between the colonial government and nationalist movements turned violent, 
resulting in a significant number of people losing their lives. 
                                                 
88
 The Ministry of Local Government 2013: 8; Makumbe 1998: 19. 
89
 The Ministry of Local government and Town Planning supervised urban and rural councils while the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs supervised Native Councils, African Advisory Boards, African Town Boards and traditional 
leaders.  
90
 Chatiza 2010: 4. 
91
 Keulder 1998: 157. The 1969 Constitution provided for a House of Assembly composed of 50 European and 
16 African members. Of the 16, eight were elected and the other eight were chiefs nominated and approved by a 
body of chiefs, headmen and rural councillors. Shona and Ndebele chiefs were equally represented. The Senate 
consisted of ten Europeans, ten African chiefs and three members nominated by the head of the state. What is 
significant about the membership of chiefs in Parliament is that traditional leaders became politicians. Keulder 
states that this did little to improve the popularity of legitimacy of the white-dominated system. See Keulder 
1998: 165. 
92
 Keulder 1998: 157. 
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3.2.2.2 Residential segregation 
The system of local government was also based on the principle of residential segregation. In 
the early years of occupation, a tradition developed of setting aside land in or near European 
settlements for residential purposes in which black employees in urban areas could reside.
93
 It 
was designed to conform to a racially-based system of land apportionment and alienation.
94
 
In terms of this system, land ownership was based on race with white Africans being given 
preference over black Africans. The Town Management Ordinance No. 2 of 1894 legalised 
this tradition of setting aside land for African employees by empowering urban councils 
(UCs) to control and manage the land allocated to Africans. This marked the beginning of 
residential segregation or the „twin-city concept‟, with certain urban areas reserved for white 
settlers and other areas for black employees.
95
 The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the 
Consolidated Land Apportionment Act of 1941 retained the basic principles of territorial 
segregation, with the latter giving UCs increased powers over the setting aside of land for the 
development of African townships.
96
 
3.2.2.3 Tool of local administration 
In communal areas which were inhabited by a majority of black Africans, local government 
was not created to enhance democratic participation and representation.
97
 Unlike UCs and 
rural councils (RCs), which were established to provide services to the white population, 
local government in communal areas was not designed to cater for the needs of Africans. The 
key theme was control of the black population through local government structures such as 
district commissioners, traditional leaders and African Councils.
98
 These structures were used 
by the central government to implement its policies. In these areas, local government was the 
main tool of controlling and checking the rising resistance from blacks to colonial 
                                                 
93
 Marsh et al 1974: 208. 
94
 Jordan 1984: 15, Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991: 394, De Valk & Wekwete 1990: 88. By 1894, the British South 
Africa Company had disposed of 80 percent of the land and alienated it to mines, farms and companies 
(Wekwete 1990: 39). Some other land was set aside for the use of the native population (Jordan 1984: 9). The 
system of apportionment of land by race was reinforced by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and 
consolidated by the Land Tenure Act of 1969. 
95
 Makumbe 1998: 19.  
96
 As a result, white Africans owned vast amount of land which was conducive for agriculture, while black 
Africans owned a marginal proportion of land situated in areas with bad soil and climatic conditions. This 
skewed distribution of land is one of the main reasons why black Africans took up arms to fight the white-
minority government. See Mutizwa-Mangiza and Helmsing 1991: 5, Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991: 394, Makumbe 
1998: 19. 
97
 Wekwete 1990: 40. 
98
 See Keulder 1998: 141. 
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administration.
99
 This is one reason Africans rejected local government structures that were 
functional in their areas.
100
 
3.2.2.4 Ethnic division 
Decentralisation in the colonial era was implemented by colonial regimes not only along 
racial but ethnic lines. The boundaries of administrative provinces and districts were drawn 
along ethnic lines. Most of the names of the administrative provinces and districts in the 
colonial era were indicative of the ethnic groups which were residing in those areas. In the 
post-independence era, some of these names have since been changed but the majority of 
names of provinces, such as Mashonaland, Manicaland and Matabeleland are still in use. 
However, the ethnic factor does not seem to have caused any significant political challenges 
among black Africans in the colonial era, although the threat of ethnic conflict has been high 
in the post-independence era.
101
 
The diagram below represents the major institutions of the colonial system of local 
government. These structures and the relationships among them are examined in the 
following section. 
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Figure 7: Structure of the local government system 
 
3.2.3 Institutions of local government 
3.2.3.1 Urban Councils  
UCs were creatures of statutes and in many ways extensions or agents of the central 
government.
102
 As described above, the BSAC and successive colonial governments 
developed urban areas for whites, with black Africans who were residing in these urban areas 
regarded as temporary migrant workers. UCs were created to serve the interests of whites in 
these urban areas.
103
 A sizeable number of UCs were also established to serve the white 
community which resided in mining regions. Black Africans were not represented in the 
structures of UCs and only those fully employed were considered to be „legal‟ residents.104 
There were three main forms of UCs: namely, municipalities, town councils and local boards, 
as provided by the Urban Councils Act of 1973, which replaced the Municipal Act of 1930. 
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 Marsh et al 1974: 203. As shall be discussed in the coming chapters, local governments are still creatures of 
statutes. 
103
 See Ministry of Local Government 2013: 8. 
104
 Wekwete 1990: 40, Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991: 395. 
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UCs consisted of no less than six councillors, determined in each case by the President.
105
 
The Minister responsible for local government determined the time frames of elections and 
suffrage was limited to owners or occupiers of immovable property who were over 21 years 
of age.
106
 UCs enjoyed a wide range of powers and functions, including the generation and 
supply of electricity, municipal planning, water supply, housing, recreation, parking, public 
transport and policing.
107
 They could make laws which took the form of by-laws.
108
 UCs 
funded their activities from various sources, including property rates, service charges, motor 
vehicle taxes, grants from the national government and through borrowing.
109
 Thus, UCs had 
sound resource-raising powers. The Local Government Association of Rhodesia was 
established to represent UCs and engaged with the central government on various policy, 
legislative and other matters.
110
 
3.2.3.2 Native Advisory Boards 
After the occupation of Zimbabwe a significant number of blacks migrated to urban centers 
to provide labour. In the areas (widely known as African townships) which were inhabited by 
blacks there were no traditional authorities or local structures to provide some form of 
government.
111
 Instead, these areas were placed under the direct management of the central 
government or municipalities and town management boards (councils) which had established 
the African townships.
112
 Thus, the urban local government system which developed in the 
colonial era excluded Africans from urban local governance. The first local government 
institutions where Africans had representation in urban areas, African Advisory Boards, were 
established more than 40 years after the emergence of the modern local government 
                                                 
105
 Marsh et al 1974: 198.  
106
 Marsh et al 1974: 198. Companies, associations or any other bodies who owned or occupied land were 
entitled to vote through a representative. Any person who qualified to vote was eligible to be elected as a 
councillor. 
107
 Urban Councils Act of 1973, Marsh et al 1974: 200. 
108
 Marsh et al 1974: 200. A by-law required the approval of the Minister, who could also make model by-laws 
or direct a council to make by-laws on any matter. 
109
 Marsh et al 1974: 200, 201. 
110
 Marsh et al 1974: 208. 
111
 Palley 1966: 667. 
112
 The African Councils were however considered to fall outside municipal boundaries although they were 
subject to the control of these municipalities. 
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system.
113
 These boards were merely informal channels of communication of grievances and 
thus cannot be considered „real‟ local government structures.114 
The Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act of 1946 compelled UCs to 
set aside a native urban area for the establishment of African townships. The Act also 
established Native Advisory Boards to enable Africans who resided in African townships to 
influence the running of their affairs by UCs. This was to be made possible through 
democratic representation on the council, where three native residents had membership in 
addition to the chairman of the council who could be white or black.
115
 The Act, however, 
required the establishment of Native Advisory Boards only in African residential areas under 
the management of UCs. African townships which were directly administered by the central 
government were still without any form of local government available to their inhabitants as 
of 1964. In areas in which they were established, Native Advisory Boards lacked executive 
powers to influence the running of African affairs in native townships.
116
 They served as 
mere advisors to UCs on matters affecting Africans, such as the impact of by-laws. As a 
result, they failed to meet the need for local government in African townships and by 1964 
out of 13 boards in six municipalities, only seven were operational.
117
 
3.2.3.3 African Town Boards 
Since the colonisation of Zimbabwe in 1890, black Africans were never given the opportunity 
to elect their own local governments with a direct influence on the running of African 
townships. Following a series of inquiries into African affairs, the Town Board of St 
Mary‟s118 was established in 1971 as the first African urban local government unit, in which 
elected African representatives had executive authority.
119
 The board was established to offer 
democratic representation to Africans in local structures. This was seen as a mechanism 
which could discourage Africans from actively supporting the violent resistance against 
minority rule which was beginning to gather momentum. 
                                                 
113
 Chakaipa 2010: 35. African advisory boards remained as the only local government units for many Africans 
until the municipal elections of 1980/81. 
114
 See Palley 1966: 688. 
115
 Palley 1966: 668. 
116
 Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991: 394.  
117
 Palley 1966: 670. 
118
 St Mary‟s is a shadow town of the capital city, Harare (formerly Salisbury). The town has recently developed 
into a large dormitory town named Chitungwiza. 
119
 Section 66 D Local Government Act [Chapter 124]. 
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The Town Board of St Mary‟s was governed by a constitution approved by the Minister 
responsible for local government (the Minister). It comprised of members who were directly 
elected by the citizens, others nominated by the Minister and some designated by the Greater 
Salisbury Authority (now City of Harare).
120
 It had corporate legal status with authority to 
hire its own staff, competence over education and the power to make by-laws. The board had 
resource-raising, executive and legislative powers. Most of the functions which the board 
carried out were subject to the approval of the Greater Salisbury Authority (an UC in charge 
of the City of Salisbury).
121
 Hence, it is submitted that the board had very limited autonomy. 
In 1978, the board was combined with the neighboring industrial areas of Zengeza and Seki 
to form Chitungwiza Urban Council (which has since graduated to a status of a municipal 
council).
122
 
3.2.3.4 Rural Councils  
Rural Areas which were inhabited by commercial white farmers were without any particular 
form of local government for more than 30 years after the establishment of the first modern 
local government structure in 1890. Road Committees and Intensive Conservation 
Committees were established in the 1930s as the first local government units in rural areas 
inhabited by whites. The main function of Road Committees was to provide public 
infrastructure in large-scale commercial farming and mining areas which were outside urban 
areas.
123
 Intensive Conservation Committees were established to promote „good land 
management‟ and conservation of natural resources in rural areas.124 The Rural Councils Act 
of 1966 transformed the Road Committees into Rural Councils (RCs), with Intensive 
Conservation Committees serving as sub-committees of RCs. The first RC was established in 
1967 and, by July 1971, 43 RCs had been created, covering all rural areas occupied by white 
Africans. Thus, RCs were the product of statutes.
125
 
Like UCs, RCs were established by the President and were administered by councils that 
consisted of a number of councillors (not less than six) determined by the Minister.
126
 The 
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 Marsh et al 1974: 215. 
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 Marsh et al 1974: 215. 
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 Jordan 1984: 11. 
123
 Palley 1966: 658; Rambanapasi 1992: 1501. 
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 Rambanapasi 1992: 1498, Wekwete 1990: 40, Marsh et al 1974: 190. Road committees were chaired by 
district commissioners. 
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voting qualifications which applied in UCs also applied in RCs, except that in the case of 
voters resident within the designated RC area, voting was by post. Councillors were directly 
elected on a ward basis but the Minister could appoint individuals to the council to represent 
special interests.
127
 Although RCs had councils which were democratically elected, they 
„lacked mechanisms of effectively representing the thousands of African farm labourers who 
resided in their areas‟.128 As shall be discussed later, the lack of representation of African 
labourers on RCs is one of the democratic challenges which the post-independent government 
sought to rectify. 
RCs could carry out functions such as water supply, health services, roads and bridges, 
prevention and control of animal diseases and the establishment of markets and slaughter 
houses.
129
 They had the power to make by-laws which had to be approved by the Minister 
before they could be binding.
130
 The Minister could also authorise RCs to carry out other 
functions in addition to those enabled by the Act.
131
 RCs financed their activities from 
property rates, motor vehicle taxes, borrowing and taxes on business activities.
132
 These 
councils had sound resource-raising powers which were complemented by grants from the 
national government. A variety of revenue sources enabled RCs to fund their activities and 
deliver quality services. An Association of Rural Councils was established to represent RCs 
and engage the national government on various policy, legislative and other matters.
133
 
3.2.3.5 Native Boards and African (Native) Councils 
Unlike in urban areas and in large-scale farming and mining areas, local government in 
communal areas (also known as Tribal Trust Land), which had been set aside for the 
inhabitation of the majority of black Africans, evolved rather slowly.
134
 Although the 1923 
Constitution (section 47) had made provision for the establishment of Native Councils to 
administer communal areas (native reserves) which were inhabited by blacks, such structures 
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 Marsh et al 1974: 191. The system of allowing the Minister to appoint a certain number of councillors 
continued in the post-independence era and is one of the most contentious issues in the current system of local 
government, as shall be discussed in later chapters. 
128
 Makumbe 1998: 20. 
129
 See Mutizwa-Mangiza & Helmsing 1991: 5. 
130
 As shall be discussed later in the chapter, in the post-independence era, all by-laws are subject to ministerial 
approval. 
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 Marsh et al 1974: 193. 
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 Marsh et al 1974: 208. 
134
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were not established at that time. The first local government units in communal areas, Native 
Boards, were established seven years later in 1931.
135
 Native Boards were composed of 
African representatives, with chiefs and headmen serving as ex officio members. They served 
as mere advisors to agencies of the national government over the management of highly 
fragmented communal lands.
136
 In 1937, more formal councils were created when the Native 
Boards were transformed into African (Native) Councils, which were chaired by native 
commissioners. African Councils were established by the Minister responsible for internal 
affairs upon the recommendation of the district commissioner. An African Councils Board 
was established in 1957 to supervise African Councils and advise the Minister responsible for 
internal affairs on matters relating to African councils.
137
 
African councils were composed of a majority of members who were elected by local tax-
payers, with chiefs and headmen as ex officio members.
138
 The district commissioner
139
 was 
the president of the council; a councillor could not be elected as the president of the 
council.
140
 The Minister of Internal Affairs could suspend the entire council if the council 
failed to carry out its obligations.
141
 Powers and functions of African Councils were greater 
than those of Native Boards. African Councils were charged with the provision and control of 
essential services to „blacks‟, the development of the democratic inclinations of „blacks‟, and 
the economic advancement of the areas under their jurisdiction.
142
 They could make by-laws 
but such laws were only binding after approval by the Minister of Internal Affairs. 
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 Palley 1966: 660. 
136
 RTI and Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe 2010: 18; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991: 5, 54. In the 
view of the Rhodesian government the purpose of Native Boards was „to “meet the legitimate desire for the 
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cited in Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991: 54). 
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 African Councils Act No. 57/1971, Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991: 54. 
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 Every chief who was a member of the council was also a vice-president of the council. This position was of 
status and did not confer specific powers on the chiefs. See Department of Internal Affairs, Circular Letter No. 
280/1958 cited in Marsh et al 1974: 217. 
139
 The commissioner also controlled the occupation, settlement, and cultivation of land, the holding of public 
meetings in their districts and exercised jurisdiction over disputes between black Africans. Further, native 
commissioners managed museums and archives, voter‟s rolls and elections, libraries and the processing of 
identity documents. Chapter 63 General Administration Act. See also Marsh et al 1974: 227. 
140
 See Ministry of Local Government 2013: 8. The colonial regimes feared that they would lose control over the 
native population if a councillor was to lead an African council. Hence, they relied on appointed officials, 
district commissioners, to maintain control over the native population. 
141
 De Valk & Wekwete 1990: 89, Marsh et al 1974: 222. 
142
 Marsh et al 1974: 221. African councils could provide schools, clinics, roads, dip tanks and beer halls. 
Powers of councils were derived from the African Councils Act of 1957 and various council warrants which 
were issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs. 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Chapter 3: The Zimbabwean multilevel system of government 
The source of revenue of African Councils included grants from the national government, 
user charges, property rates, licenses, motor vehicle taxes and borrowing from the national 
government.
143
 Although African councils enjoyed various taxing powers, the absence of a 
viable resource base and poor flow of resources from national government undermined the 
delivery of public services to the native population.
144
 They were ineffectual in practice and 
were viewed by many black Africans as colonial structures.
145
 As a result, they were 
unpopular among the black population.
146
 Although the African Councils Act of 1957 had 
decentralised more powers and functions to these councils, service provision remained poor 
and opportunities for participation and democracy at the local level were limited. However, 
African Councils remained an effective tool in the hands of the colonial government to 
control the African population and counteract independent political organisation among the 
native population.
147
 As of 1979, a total of 220 African Councils had been established in 
communal areas. By 1980 (when independence was attained) the majority of African councils 
had collapsed under the combined pressure of financial insufficiency and war, and were 
under the administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
148
 
3.2.3.6 Institution of traditional leadership 
The institution of traditional leadership, in the form of chiefs and headmen, played a central 
role in most communal institutions of local government and administration.
149
 During the 
period of company rule by the BSAC (1890-1923), rural governance was left to traditional 
leaders. When Rhodesia was declared a British colony in 1923, with its own government, the 
institution of traditional leadership continued to play a central role in rural governance. 
However, interference by the colonial government in the operation of institutions of 
traditional leadership increased. Traditional tribes were amalgamated, the number of 
traditional leaders was reduced, and chiefs and headmen became government-appointed and -
salaried officials.
150
 Some of the powers of traditional leaders were abolished. The colonial 
government had very little if any respect for native culture, traditions and customs in the 
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amalgamation of tribes and appointment of traditional leaders.
151
 This did not last for long, as 
the colonial government realised that they could not implement their policies without the 
assistance of traditional leaders. The government sought measures to „reinvent‟ the very 
traditions and customs they wanted to destroy. It embarked on legislative reforms and 
restored some of the powers of traditional leaders.
152
 As shall be discussed later in the 
chapter, such a change in stance towards traditional leaders by the government was replicated 
in the post-independence era. 
The African Affairs Act of 1927 made provision for the recognition and appointment of 
traditional leaders. Chiefs were given power to chair Tribal Land Authorities which 
controlled the use and occupation of tribal (communal) land.
153
 Traditional leaders exercised 
limited criminal jurisdiction, solved disputes between black Africans and collected taxes on 
behalf of the national government.
154
 Facing wide resistance from the native population, the 
colonial administration tried to legitimise its authority by using chiefs and headmen to control 
the black population and implement its policies.
155
 Traditional authority was perverted to 
serve the interests of the colonial government. With rising African nationalism in the late 
1950s and 1960s, the colonial government galvanised support for white rule from among 
African traditional leaders. Traditional structures were seen as potential allies of the colonial 
government against the nationalists and could be effective instruments for curbing the growth 
of nationalist movements in rural areas.
156
 Like its post-independence successor, the colonial 
government used both the „carrot and stick‟ methods to garner support from traditional 
leaders. Traditional leaders who were reluctant to implement colonial policies were removed 
from their positions.
157
 Keulder succinctly notes how „good behavior and fitness‟ decided the 
term of office of a traditional leader.
 158
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The Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 restored land allocation powers to traditional leaders in 
order to garner their support for the UDI of 1965.
159
 After the UDI, the colonial government 
increasingly involved the traditional authorities in national politics and relied significantly on 
them to implement its policies and thwart growing African nationalism.
160
 Traditional leaders 
were given more autonomy, including executive and administrative power over their 
councils, the authority to preside over local community courts and the responsibility for land 
conservation.
161
 The status of chiefs was improved as black African resistance against 
minority-rule intensified. Chiefs gained the status of Senators in 1969 and, in 1973, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that the „chief embodied local government as well as the 
development authority for the whole African areas [sic]‟.162 In the 1970s, when armed 
resistance by black Africans was at its peak, close to 50 per cent of the established African 
councils were composed of appointed councillors who were nominated by the chiefs.
163
 
Provincial Assemblies of chiefs and the Council of Chiefs was established to provide a 
platform where the national government could engage with chiefs on a variety of matters 
regarding the interests of black Africans.
164
 The Regional Authorities Act of 1973 established 
(African) regional structures consisting almost entirely of chiefs and headmen.
165
 Makumbe 
argues that the elevation of the status and role of traditional leaders was not only undertaken 
to thwart African nationalism but also intended by the colonial government as a way of 
divesting itself of development responsibilities in African rural areas.
166
 As a result of the 
nature of traditional authority, by independence in 1980 many black Africans had lost faith in 
the institution of traditional leadership.
167
 
3.2.4 Supervision of local government 
As observed above, the colonial system of local government was drawn along racial lines. At 
the national level, two institutions were established to oversee the activities of local 
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government.
168
 The Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for supervising local 
government structures in communal areas and African Townships (Native Purchase Areas) 
and the Tribal Trust Land. The Ministry of Local Government was charged with the 
supervision of local government structures in urban areas, whether for blacks or whites.
169
 
These ministries, especially the Ministry of Local Government, gave technical advice to local 
governments. The ministries supervised matters such as drawing of estimates and application 
of borrowing powers. However, the supervisory powers of the national government were 
somehow limited. For example, the national government could not dismiss town clerks and 
other senior officials. These senior officials could only be dismissed on a majority of vote by 
all the councillors at a meeting convened for that purpose.
170
 It is argued that the Ministry of 
Local Government always adopted the principle of consultation rather than the coercive 
approach mostly favoured by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
171
 For example, the Ministry 
consulted UCs and RCs in any particular matter but on policy matters it dealt with the Local 
Government Association, which represented all elected local governments.
172
 
As discussed above, local government in the colonial era developed and was organised 
according to the principle of „separate development‟. UCs and RCs, which were operational 
in areas inhabited by whites, enjoyed sound autonomy. In contrast, African Councils, Native 
Boards and African Advisory Boards, which were responsible for areas inhabited by blacks, 
had limited powers.
173
 Consequently, different levels of service were provided in areas 
reserved for whites and areas inhabited by black Africans, with the former benefitting more 
than the latter. Chatiza argues that local government served little purpose in African areas 
mainly because it failed to provide vital public services or act as a platform for popular 
participation.
174
 As a result of the racist character of local government, the local government 
system was hated by many Africans and genuine popular participation in the system by the 
black population was never achieved.
175
 The colonial regime successfully managed to 
alienate the black population from their traditional leaders and local government. 
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4. The emergence of the post-colonial system of government 
At independence, the ZANU-PF-led government inherited a tripartite system of local 
government of UCs, RCs and African Councils.
176
 As noted above, this system was intended 
to further the exploitation and marginalisation of black Africans for the benefit of white 
Africans. Local government was racist, exploitative and subservient in character. Against this 
background, it was not only logical but justified for the black majority government to 
immediately after independence introduce reforms to correct the racially based system of 
government.
177
 There was an urgent need to create local government structures which were 
more reflective of the new multi-racial society of independent Zimbabwe. Soon after 
independence in 1980, the black-led government declared its intention to promote national 
integration, decentralisation and participation.
178
 In practice this took three forms. 
First, new ministries of the national government were created and others were deconcentrated 
to the provincial and district levels. Among the newly created ministries was the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing which took over the control of African councils from the 
former Ministry of Internal Affairs, and UCs and RCs from the Ministry of Local 
Government and Town Planning.
179
 Second, a series of legislative enactments and directives 
were issued to democratise and strengthen the system of local government.
180
 Participatory 
structures were also established to promote citizen participation in development and planning. 
The major policy and legislative reforms which are of interest to this study are captured in 
Figure 8 below. These legislative enactments and policy directives have shaped the status and 
development of the system of government. The adoption of the 2013 Constitution means that 
the nature of the system of government has also changed, requiring reforms to a number of 
pieces of legislation and policies on local government and other sectors. 
Figure 8: Post-colonial reforms of the Zimbabwean decentralised system of government 
1. Amendments to the District Councils Act (1980, 81 and 82) 
2. Amendments to the Urban Councils Act 
3. The Prime Minister‟s Directives on Decentralisation of 1984-85 
4. The Rural District Councils Act of 1988 
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5. The thirteen principles of decentralisation of 1996 
6. The Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, 2000 
7. Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 
4.1 District Councils Act (1980) 
The African Councils Act was amended into the District Councils Act in 1980 (and again in 
1981 and 1982), establishing District Councils governing the former Tribal Trust Lands and 
African purchase lands. The immediate aim of the reforms to the African Councils Act was to 
promote the reconstruction and rehabilitation of rural areas after the destructive effects of the 
liberation war. These reforms consolidated the previously fragmented authorities from over 
220 to 55 administratively more viable District Councils (DCs).
181
 The Act also aimed to 
promote democratic representation and participation and rural development by rationalising 
and strengthening the role of the District Council as an elected body.
182
 To achieve this 
objective a wide range of powers and functions were transferred to DCs through individual 
warrants for each council. 
The District Councils Act limited the role of traditional leaders by transferring land allocation 
and taxing powers from chiefs and headmen to elected DCs. In addition, the Act stripped the 
authority of traditional leaders to preside over village civil cases and established a new 
system of community courts under the Ministry of Justice.
183
 Traditional leaders were 
stripped of their powers because they were considered to have supported the exploitation of 
black Africans by the white minority regimes in the colonial era. Although the reduction of 
the powers of traditional leaders was initially implemented as a form of retribution for their 
past collusion with the colonialists, it also signaled the intention of the post-independence 
government of promoting democratic governance at local level.
184
 The District Councils Act 
also required DCs to be composed by a majority of elected members on the basis of one 
councillor per ward, with chiefs and headmen serving as ex officio members. The district 
administrator, formerly district commissioner, was made the chief executive officer of the 
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council and stripped of the chairmanship role over DCs, with the position being filled by an 
elected member.
185
 
4.2 Reforms to the Urban Councils Act 
4.2.1 1980 Reforms 
The Urban Councils Act of 1973 (hereafter referred to as the UCA) was amended in 1980 to 
remove racial discrimination pertaining to representation in UCs and tenure in urban areas.
186
 
The „twin-city system‟187 was abandoned, with former African Townships and local 
government areas incorporated into UCs under a single tax-base. Rent-paying lodgers who 
were disenfranchised under the colonial urban local government system were allowed to vote 
in municipal elections.
188
 The reforms also sought to redress the imbalances in economic 
development which were part of the local government system, including unequal access to 
public services by different races. 
4.2.2 1996 and 2008 Reforms 
At independence, UCs were led by ceremonial mayors who were elected by councillors from 
amongst the membership of the council.
189
 In 1996, the UCA was amended to establish the 
post of an executive mayor directly elected by the citizens. The direct election of the 
executive mayor by the citizens was a mechanism designed to strengthen representative 
democracy and enforce local accountability.
190
 The post of an executive mayor was later 
abolished in 2008 through the Local Government Amendment Act of 2008, which 
reintroduced ceremonial mayors in UCs. The central government cited abuse of power by 
executive mayors as the main reason behind its decision to reintroduce ceremonial mayors. 
Against this, it is argued that the abolition of executive mayors was a political move aimed at 
reducing the power of the MDC which commanded majority support in almost all urban 
areas.
191
 At that time, the MDC had the highest number of officials occupying the post of an 
executive mayor relative to ZANU-PF. The Local Government Amendment Act also gave the 
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Minister the power to appoint a certain number of councillors to represent special interests on 
the council in urban areas.
192
 As shall be discussed later, the appointment of special interest 
councillors was contentious and posed a great challenge to local democracy. 
Similar to many African governments after gaining independence, Zimbabwe‟s majority-led 
government immediately recentralised administrative, political and financial powers. While 
achieving integration, the 1980 UCA Amendments eroded the autonomy of UCs by 
increasing both administrative and political control and oversight by the central 
government.
193
 The reforms to the UCA emphasised the role of the Minister in relation to 
elections, borrowing powers, and financing and auditing of UCs. Although the viability of 
UCs was improved, the amendments had a double-edged impact since they tightened central 
government control over UCs.
194
 The appointment of special interest councillors and the 
abolition of the post of executive mayor had the same effect of centralising power and 
undermining local democracy. 
4.3 The Prime Minister’s Directives on Decentralisation of 1984 and 1985 
As highlighted above, at independence the government declared its intention to promote 
decentralisation and participation.
195
 Four years later, the government through the Prime 
Minister issued a series of directives in pursuit of this objective. The directives came to be 
known as the Prime Minister‟s Directives on Decentralisation and in 1985 they received legal 
recognition through the Provincial Councils and Administration Act.
196
 As shown in Figure 9 
diagram below, the directives provided for the creation of 6000 Village Development 
Committees (VIDCOs), 1000 Ward Development Committees and 55 rural districts in the 
former eight administrative provinces of Zimbabwe.
197
 Further, the directives established 
District Development Committees, Provincial Councils, Provincial Development Committees 
and the office of a Provincial Governor. They perhaps brought about the most significant 
changes to the post-independence system of local government in Zimbabwe prior to the 
adoption of the 2013 Constitution. 
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Figure 9: Structures established by the Prime Minister's Directives on Decentralisation of 1984 and 
1985 
 
 
The directives aimed to democratise the local government system particularly in the 
communal areas of Zimbabwe which lacked „genuine‟ representative local structures in the 
colonial era.
198
 This included promoting bottom-up governance by providing for the 
establishment of a hierarchy of representative bodies at the village, ward, district and 
provincial levels.
199
 The directives also sought to provide a framework for coordinating 
government institutions in order to achieve participatory development.
200
 Ideally, 
development planning was to start at the grassroots level (the village level) and feed into 
higher level structures. Structures such as District Development Committees, Provincial 
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Councils, Provincial Development Committees and Provincial Governors were also given the 
task of coordinating government activities in their areas of jurisdiction. 
In practice, the structures created by the directives failed to deliver on their mandate of 
facilitating participatory development, partly because they lacked financial resources and 
democratic representation.
201
 For example, only four of the six members of the VIDCO were 
directly elected by the villagers. The other two members of the VIDCO were representatives 
of the women‟s and the youth leagues of ZANU-PF. The same applied to the ward level. 
Makumbe claims that the assumption was clear that „every villager was a member of the 
ruling party, or that other parties or minority groups than those of the ruling ZANU-PF 
should not be expected to participate in the local government system‟.202 This is partly the 
reason why some scholars argue that the post-independence decentralised system of 
government was deliberately modeled on the structure of ZANU-PF with the primary 
objective of creating a one-party state in Zimbabwe.
203
 
4.4 Rural District Councils Act (1988)  
As discussed above, the colonial government created two separate local government 
institutions in rural areas, RCs for Europeans and African (Native) Councils for blacks. At 
independence, the government adopted this dual system of local government in rural areas. 
The system was abolished eight years after independence through the Rural District Councils 
Act of 1988 (hereafter referred to as the RDCA),
204
 which created a unified system of local 
government in rural areas. The previous RCs and DCs were amalgamated into 55 Rural 
District Councils with re-organised functions.
205
 The amalgamation was a way of doing away 
with the colonial legacy of „separate development‟ based on race and to promote equitable 
distribution of public services and resources across the rural population.
206
 Besides 
amalgamating RCs and DCs, the Act also introduced the special interests clause which 
allowed the Minister to appoint interest group councillors to accommodate European 
commercial farmers who would otherwise lose to the African majority in an open vote. The 
clause was also meant to accommodate farm and mine workers who were potentially 
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excluded from being councillors, since a councillor had to be a rate- or rent-payer and these 
workers were unlikely to be such.
207
 
Although the government argued that amalgamation was there to do away with the colonial 
legacy of „separate development‟, some scholars believe that there were other motives behind 
it.
208
 Rambanapasi claims that amalgamation was advanced with the „desire to tap the local 
sources of finance inherent in colonial rural councils‟ unit land tax levied on European 
commercial farmers‟.209 Makumbe argues that amalgamation was advanced by the central 
government to resist the proposal to share revenue with local authorities, especially DCs 
which had no viable resource base and had to rely on central government grants for their 
operations.
210
 Although there may have been a hidden agenda behind the amalgamation of 
RCs and DCs, it is submitted that amalgamation was necessary in view of development and 
equity concerns. 
4.5 Thirteen Principles of Decentralisation (1996) 
In 1991, the central government adopted and implemented the Economic Adjustment 
Programme, which focused on the creation of an enabling environment for greater economic 
growth through deregulation of the economy and decentralisation of local functions to local 
governments, among other measures. This was followed in 1996 by the adoption of Thirteen 
Principles of Decentralisation to guide the decentralisation of powers and functions to local 
authorities, in particular, rural district councils (rural local authorities). The principles 
covered a variety of areas including decentralisation of responsibilities and fiscal powers, 
capacity building and coordination of government activities, as captured in Figure 10 below. 
Figure 10: Thirteen Principles of Decentralisation of 1996
211
 
1. That decentralisation is necessary and desirable based on the clear understanding that it 
promotes and strengthens democracy and civic responsibility as citizens participate in their 
governance and development. 
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2. That decentralisation be defined and understood to mean the legislated transfer of 
functions and authority from central government to local authorities such as the rural 
district councils on a permanent basis. 
3. There is need for all Ministries to use the same local institutions for the implementation 
and management of decentralised functions and not to create parallel or separate 
institutions. 
4. That decentralisation is a process and not an event and, as such, it should be 
implemented cautiously and progressively, having regard to the human, financial and 
material capacities of the local authorities to whom the transfers would be made. 
5. That in respect of all those activities and projects to be undertaken by local authorities, 
sector ministries retain the power and authority to set standards, monitor performance and 
consistency of national policies and standards, and intervene appropriately to ensure 
compliance. 
6. That an inter-ministerial committee to manage decentralisation and capacity building be 
established. 
7. That central government, in implementing decentralisation, shall strengthen financial, 
human and material resource capacities of rural district councils so as to make them 
effective institutions in the provision of the social and infrastructural services needed for 
suitable local development. 
8. That central government will continue to be responsible for the provision of trunk 
services which impact upon more than one local authority area or are of a national 
character. 
9. That the transfer of powers and functions by line Ministries to rural district councils be 
done by the line ministry concerned and that the Ministry of Local Government Rural and 
Urban Development will coordinate and facilitate this effort. 
10. That all monies for recurrent and capital expenditure sourced by line ministries and 
earmarked for rural district councils be disbursed to the rural district councils soon after the 
promulgation of the Appropriation Act. 
11. That all loans to rural district councils should be channelled through the Ministry of 
Local Government: Rural and National Housing. 
12. That in Zimbabwe there be only two levels which collect taxes, levies and other user 
charges, namely central government and local authorities. 
13. That the Public Service commission will manage the transfer of personnel from central 
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government to rural district councils where this happens as part of decentralisation. 
 
It is submitted that, as far as decentralisation is concerned, the principles were void of 
substance. They did not signal any stronger intent towards decentralisation of „real‟ powers to 
lower governments. This is supported by the fact that although the principles were adopted as 
government policy, they did not receive legal recognition. Consequently, most ministries and 
agencies of the national government withheld powers and responsibilities which were 
supposed to be decentralised to local authorities. Further, there is little if any evidence to 
suggest that policies of ministries and agencies of the national government were guided by 
the principles after 1996. The other challenge was that the principles emphasised the 
decentralisation of functions with little attention to decentralising adequate resources.
212
 Even 
after the adoption and implementation of the principles, rural district councils still lacked the 
necessary powers to generate adequate revenue to meet their obligations. 
4.6 Traditional Leaders Act 1998 and 2002 
At independence, the administrative and judicial functions of traditional leaders were 
transferred to DCs and community courts, respectively.
213
 In the 1980 and 1990s, traditional 
leaders continued to lobby the national government for the restoration of their powers. 
Although traditional leaders lost significant powers, they retained significant influence in 
communal areas, which created „operational anxieties‟ for rural local government structures 
and processes.
214
 Their potential to destabilise rural governance was therefore high. The 
combined effect of these two factors resulted in a major policy shift in the way the national 
government treated traditional leaders.
215
 Through the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 
traditional leadership was recognised as an important institution of rural governance by 
restoring powers to allocate rural land and to try civil and criminal cases in rural areas, 
among other local governance obligations.
216
 The Act also provided for the establishment of 
the Council of Chiefs and Provincial Assemblies of Chiefs, platforms where the national 
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government would consult with chiefs on issues affecting the institution of traditional leadership 
and inhabitants of communal areas.
217
 
The Act was amended in 2002 and further provided for the establishment of village and ward 
assemblies which were composed of elected officials and traditional leaders.
218
 The 
membership of the assemblies combined the previous VIDCOs and WADCOs with 
traditional leaders at the village and ward levels. The assemblies were charged with 
facilitating participatory development and the general governance of areas within their 
jurisdictions, such as cultural and land matters.
219
 In a nutshell, the Act recognised the dual 
importance of election-based structures and traditional authority for rural governance. As 
shall be discussed in Chapter Five, the structures created by the Traditional Leaders Act are 
inclusive and participatory on paper but in practice traditional leaders as individuals dominate 
decision-making at ward and village levels.
220
 Further, the assemblies are not participatory 
but merely a communication medium for government policy. This has had the effect of 
undermining local democracy. 
4.7 Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 
The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe has undoubtedly brought about significant reforms to the 
decentralised system of government in the post-independence era even though, at the time of 
writing, the new multilevel system of government has yet to be implemented. The 
Constitution has created a multilevel system of government to realise various national and 
local goals, including development, democracy and sustainable peace.
221
 This section will not 
discuss in detail the reforms brought about by the 2013 Constitution as these will be 
discussed in the succeeding chapters. It is submitted that the adoption of the 2013 
Constitution has also meant that legislation governing the decentralised system of 
government has to be aligned with the new constitutional order.
222
 The main pieces of 
legislation which require alignment with the Constitution include the Urban Councils Act, 
Rural District Councils Act and Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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5. The current multilevel system of government 
As highlighted above, Zimbabwe has adopted a unitary form of government with authority 
vested at three levels.
223
 As shown in Figure 5 above, government is organised at the national, 
provincial and local levels. Section 5 of the Constitution provides that the tiers of government 
in Zimbabwe are the national government, provincial and metropolitan councils, and local 
authorities. This section will provide a brief overview of this new multilevel system of 
government. 
5.1 National government 
At the national level, governmental power is exercised by the executive, judicial and 
parliamentary arms of government. The executive arm exercises its powers through various 
ministries and agencies of the national government. The responsibilities of these agencies and 
ministries include the supervision of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities.
224
 Ministries and agencies of the national government which are critical to the 
functioning of the multilevel system of government include the Ministry of Local 
Government, the Presidency, the National Treasury and the Local Government Board. Other 
institutions which supervise or have a direct relationship with lower tiers of government are 
the Office of the Auditor-General,
225
 the District Development Fund, and the Independent 
Tribunal(s).
226
 Figure 11 below shows the various institutions that have a direct relationship 
with provinces and local authorities. 
                                                 
223
 See s 1 Constitution. 
224
 See Ministry of Local government 2013: 10. 
225
 See s 309(2) Constitution. 
226
 See s 278(2) Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
Chapter 3: The Zimbabwean multilevel system of government 
Figure 11: Institutions with a direct relationship with provinces and local authorities 
 
 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight, the national government exercises control 
over local authorities, mainly and directly through the Ministry of Local Government.
227
 The 
Ministry provides the legislative and policy framework that governs the activities of 
provinces and local authorities. It is charged with the supervision of provincial and local 
governments as well as traditional leaders.
228
 The Ministry has a mandate to create an 
enabling environment to enhance the capacity and capability of local authorities to deliver on 
their obligations.
229
 Moreover, the Ministry is charged with leading the development and 
management of the local government sector, and representing the interest of local authorities 
at national and subnational levels.
230
 Among other powers, the Minister has the power to 
direct certain policy and regulatory actions, approve or refuse to approve specific actions or 
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 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 13. See also Jonga 2012: 126.  
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projects, approve the use of borrowing powers, and intervene at subnational levels.
231
 As will 
be observed in the following chapters, the use of these supervisory powers has been 
controversial and a significant challenge to local autonomy. Besides the formal control, the 
Ministry of Local Government acts in a coordinating capacity, establishing norms for service 
levels and urban development.
232
 The Minister is required to report to Parliament on all 
matters relating to provinces and local authorities.
233
 
As shall be discussed in Chapter Nine, the Ministry has offices at national, provincial and 
district levels which coordinate the activities of the national government, provincial 
governments and those of local authorities.
234
 The deconcentrated offices of the Ministry also 
assume certain functions in cases where a local authority does not have competence in a 
particular area. For example, physical planning and civil protection competencies are not 
available in RDCs and therefore are provided by the national government through the 
Ministry of Local Government.
235
 In cases of national disasters, the Ministry has a mandate to 
oversee disaster management in any local authority. 
The Ministry also engages local authorities both formally and informally at political and 
administrative levels on matters affecting local authorities.
236
 Some of the institutions which 
facilitate engagement between the national government and local authorities are the 
Association of Urban Councils (representing UCs) and Association of Rural District Councils 
(representing RDCs). In 2011, these two associations merged to form the Zimbabwe Local 
Government Association (ZILGA). The rationale for the merger was to enhance the capacity 
of organised local government to engage with the national government by representing local 
authorities as one combined voice. However, at the time of writing, the two associations had 
not yet fully merged and continue to operate semi-independently. 
The central-local relations have not been constructive, especially since 2000 when a strong 
opposition party, MDC, emerged.
237
 The situation has been precarious whenever a political 
party which controls the centre is different from the one controlling at the local level.
238
 The 
Minister, equipped with unlimited powers bestowed on him under various Acts of Parliament, 
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 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 10, Chakaipa 2010: 33. 
232
 Jordan 1984: 83, Ndoro 2010: 329. See also the Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 5. 
233
 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 10. 
234
 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 10. 
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 Chakaipa 2010: 34. 
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 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 14, Jordan 1984: 83. 
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 See Jonga 2012: 117, 131; Muchadenyika 2014: 125. 
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has in certain cases overruled local authorities, raising concerns among scholars of local 
autonomy.
239
 Some scholars argue that the Minister has used these powers to dismiss and 
suspend councillors aligned to MDC to settle political scores.
240
 Between 2000 and 2014, the 
majority of councillors who were suspended or dismissed were aligned to MDC and in MDC-
led councils. The appointment of a commissioners or caretakers to run local authorities by the 
Minister has also been controversial and political. As of July 2014, more than six mayors in 
UCs, mostly those aligned to the opposition political party, have been dismissed by the 
Minister.
241
 The animosity which characterises central-local relationships between some local 
authorities (mostly those administered by MDC-led councils) and the national government is 
partly the reason why the decentralised system of government has failed to achieve national 
and local goals, for instance the delivery of basic services. It is therefore important to reform 
the central-local relationships which the 2013 Constitution has attempted to do, albeit with 
limited success to date. 
5.2 Provincial governments 
The 2013 Constitution requires that provinces of Zimbabwe be administered by Provincial 
and Metropolitan Councils, which make up the second tier of government.
242
 At the time of 
writing, these councils have not been established.
243
 The ZANU-PF-led government has not 
yet implemented the new multilevel system of government fully, among other reasons 
because of a lack of financial resources and political will. As shall be discussed in Chapter 
Five, provincial and metropolitan councils are composed of a combination of directly and 
indirectly elected and appointed officials.
244
 All local authorities within a province are 
represented in the membership of the provincial or metropolitan council of that province.
245
 
Under the Lancaster House Constitution, provinces were governed by provincial councils 
chaired by provincial governors. Provincial governors were appointed by the President and 
represented the President at the provincial level. Provincial councils were largely 
coordinative structures of the national government at the provincial level with no „real‟ 
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powers and functions.
246
 In addition to this coordinative role, the 2013 Constitution requires 
these councils to carry out socio-economic development in their respective provinces.
247
 
5.3 Local Authorities 
As highlighted above, the lowest tier of government is made up of urban and rural local 
authorities established to represent and manage the affairs of people living in urban and rural 
areas.
248
 Local authorities together administer almost all of Zimbabwe‟s 390 757 square 
kilometres.
249
 Rural local authorities (also known as rural district councils) administer the 
affairs of people in rural areas alongside the traditional leadership of chiefs and headmen.
250
 
There are a total of 92 local authorities broken down into various categories, as described 
below. While local authorities have constitutional recognition, they largely exercise powers 
delegated to them through various Acts of Parliament.
251
 
5.3.1 Urban local authorities 
The Urban Councils Act
252
 is the principal act governing urban local government. The Act 
provides for the establishment, powers, functions and categories of urban local authorities 
(UCs). UCs are established by the President, who also determines their boundaries. The 
powers and functions of UCs can be categorised as permissive, those which local authorities 
may undertake; and mandatory, those that they have an obligation to undertake. There are 
four classes of UCs: namely, city councils, municipal councils, town councils and local 
boards (presented in descending order of status, powers, resources and functions).
253
 As 
shown in the Table 3 below, there are 31 UCs, divided into four local boards, eleven town 
councils, nine municipal councils and seven city councils.
254
 The status of an UC is determined 
by the national government. It is dependent on various factors, including size, population, 
infrastructure, services offered, economic status and social development.
255
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Table 3: Categories of urban local authorities 
City Councils Municipal 
Councils 
Town Councils Local Boards Total 
Harare 
Bulawayo 
Gweru 
Kadoma 
Kwekwe 
Mutare 
Masvingo 
Chinhoyi 
Chitungwiza 
Chegutu 
Bindura 
Gwanda 
Kariba 
Marondera 
Redcliff 
Victoria falls 
 
Chiredzi 
Chipinge 
Beitbridge 
Gokwe 
Norton 
Karoi 
Lupane 
Rusape 
Shurugwi 
Plum Tree 
Zvishavane 
Epworth 
Hwange 
Chirundu 
Ruwa 
 
Total 7 9 11 4 31 
Source: Combined Harare Residents Association 2014: 15. 
At the time of writing, UCs are led by a ceremonial mayor (or chairperson) who is elected 
from the members of the council.
256
 The 2013 Constitution allows these councils to be led by 
an executive mayor provided that the mayor is directly elected by the citizens.
257
 The 
administrative arm of UCs is led by a town clerk, in respect of city and municipal councils, or 
secretary in the case of town councils and local boards. The town clerk or secretary is 
supported by a team of departmental heads who are all appointed by the council with the 
consent of the Local Government Board. The main sources of revenue of UCs include 
charges for water services, refuse removal and sewerage; property rates; and fees on the 
processing of licenses, certificates and permits.
258
 They also receive grants and can borrow 
money from the national government. UCs have not been able to generate sufficient revenue 
from these sources mainly due to the economic meltdown experienced in Zimbabwe and the 
fact that the taxes at their disposal tend to have weak resource-raising potential. As argued in 
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Chapter Seven, the absence of adequate financial resources has had an adverse impact on 
their ability to provide basic services and to meet their development obligations.
259
 
5.3.2 Rural local authorities 
There are 60 rural local authorities (rural district councils) whose jurisdiction covers rural 
areas and service centres except military, mining areas, game reserves and national parks.
260
 
As discussed in paragraph 4.4 above, rural district councils (RDCs) were formed when RCs 
and DCs were amalgamated in 1988. The Rural District Councils Act (RDCA)
261
 is the 
principal Act which governs the activities of RDCs. Unlike in UCs, there is only one category 
of RDCs. The list of all RDCs is provided in the Table 4 below.
262
 RDCs are led by a 
chairperson who is elected from the membership of the elected council.
263
 The administrative 
arm of an RDC is led by a chief executive officer who is appointed by the council with the 
consent of the Minister.
264
 The chief executive officer is supported by a team of departmental 
heads, who are called officers.
265
 
Table 4: List of rural local authorities 
Beitbridge, Bikita, Bindura, Binga, Bubi, Buhera, Bulilima, Chamunika, Chegutu, 
Chikomba, Chimanimani, Chipinge, Chirumanzu, Chiredzi, Chivi, Gokwe North, 
Gokwe South, Goromonzi, Guruve, Gwanda, Gutu, Hurungwe, Hwange, Hwedza, 
Insiza, Kadoma, Kusil, Makonde, Makoni, Manyame, Marondera, Masvingo, 
Mazowe, Mbire, Mhondoro, Mberengwa, Mudzi, Murewa, Mutare, Mutasa, Mutoko, 
Muzarabani, Mwenezi, Ngezi, Nkayi, Nyaminyami, Nyanga, Pfura, Runde, Rushinga, 
Sanyati, Tongogara, Tsholotsho, Umguza, Umzingwane, Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe, 
Vungu, Zaka, Zivagwe and Zvimba 
Source: Combined Harare Residents Association 2014: 15. 
Unlike  UCs, where municipal councils, town councils and local boards exercise different 
powers, RDCs have uniform powers and functions. These powers and functions are listed in 
                                                 
259
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the first schedule of the RDCA.
266
 RDCs finance their activities from revenue sources that 
include levies, user charges, property rates and intergovernmental transfers.
267
 They raise 15 
per cent of their revenue from their own sources and the remainder comes in the form of 
conditional grants from the central government.
268
 The extent to which RDCs can function 
autonomously is limited by their heavy dependency on the central government for financial 
support. On paper, RDCs exercise a degree of devolved power, but in practice „virtually all 
they seek to do has to be approved by the central government through the Minister‟.269 Most 
of the functions of RDCs reflect the areas of operations of deconcentrated agencies of the 
central government. Most RDCs are reluctant to carry out all of their functions due to limited 
resources and thus allow central government agencies to carry out those tasks.
270
 The superior 
position of agencies of the central government, relative to RDCs, allows these agencies to 
dominate the delivery of services in rural areas. 
5.3.3 The institution of traditional leadership 
As discussed above, traditional leaders have had a role in rural local governance before 
independence and the post-colonial government has also aligned rural local government with 
chiefs, headmen and village heads.
271
 A total of 269 chieftainships are recognised in 
Zimbabwe.
272
 Chiefs are appointed by the President to preside over communities inhabiting 
communal and resettlement areas which are also governed by RDCs.
273
 As will be discussed 
in Chapter Five, the harmonisation of the institution of traditional leadership and local elected 
structures has resulted in conflicts between traditional leaders and elected officials.
274
As 
highlighted above, the colonial government made use of traditional leaders to implement its 
policies and to control the black population in communal areas. Some scholars argue that the 
ZANU-PF led government has also „sought the assistance of traditional leaders to influence 
both electoral and governance processes‟.275 In recent years, the ZANU-PF government 
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sponsored the purchase of cars and construction of modern houses, with electricity and water, 
for chiefs. Although it is stated that the allocation of cars and construction of houses was to 
improve the well-being of chiefs, it is claimed that the real objective was to entice chiefs to 
organise support for the government and, in particular, ZANU-PF.
276
 It is argued that Chiefs 
have made it extremely difficult for the MDC to operate in rural areas by threatening and 
punishing people who are seen to sympathise with political parties other than ZANU-PF.
277
 
Makumbe states that those few chiefs who have allowed the MDC to organise politically in 
their areas have been victimised by state agencies and threatened with withdrawal of 
government support.
278
 Thus the argument that „the institution of traditional leadership in 
Zimbabwe has gone through colonial and post-colonial acceptance, usage and political 
corruption‟ may be appropriate.279 
Traditional leaders nonetheless still play an important role in facilitating the participation of 
citizens in development planning and implementation. Traditional leaders are an effective 
tool of communication due to the hierarchical organisation of traditional authority: chiefs, 
headmen and village heads.
280
 It is therefore submitted that any effort to ignore traditional 
authority in rural governance is unconstructive and unsustainable as traditional leaders 
command considerably more support and respect in rural areas than elected officials. 
However, the major challenge remains of how to strike an appropriate balance between 
democratic governance and traditional authority in communal areas. 
6. Conclusion 
The origins of the decentralised system of government in Zimbabwe can be traced back as far 
as 1890 when the first modern system of local government was established. This system of 
local government was designed by the colonial government to serve the white population at 
the expense of blacks. It was racist, exploitative, fragmented and was used as a tool for 
colonial administration and ethnic division. As a result, many blacks hated local government 
in all its manifestations. Having adopted a decentralised system of government from the 
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colonial regime which favoured whites at the expense of blacks, in 1980 the black-led 
government implemented reforms to democratise the system of local government and realise 
development. The national government decentralised more powers and functions to local 
authorities, especially rural local authorities. It has also re-centralised some of these powers 
particularly after the formation of the MDC. It is this „discordant‟ decentralised system of 
government, which gives with one hand and takes with the other, that the 2013 Constitution 
in many respects reflects. The only difference is that unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, 
the 2013 Constitution mandates the national government to devolve powers and functions to 
provincial and local governments.
281
 The requirement for devolution necessitates a review of 
the statutory and institutional framework governing the multilevel system of government. It 
will mostly require a change of culture and tradition in the way in which the national 
government treats provincial and local governments. This argument is elaborated in the 
following chapters. 
 
                                                 
281
 See Preamble of chap 14 Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Chapter 4: Establishment of provinces and local authorities 
Chapter 4 
Establishment of provinces and local authorities 
1. Introduction 
As highlighted in the preceding chapter, Zimbabwe is divided into ten provinces which are 
administered by provincial and metropolitan councils. The provinces are further divided into 
municipal areas administered by a total of 92 local authorities. The manner in which 
provinces and municipal areas are established have consequences for development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. The same applies to the (re)determination of provincial and 
local boundaries. This chapter examines the establishment, dissolution and naming of 
provinces and local authorities in Zimbabwe. It critically assesses the (re)determination of 
provincial and local boundaries and wards. The chapter will discuss procedures applicable to 
provinces before examining those applicable to local authorities. In the last section, the 
chapter will discuss the legal nature of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities. 
2. Provinces 
2.1 Establishment 
In Chapter Two it was contended that a multilevel system of government allows political 
groups which are unlikely to influence politics at national level to take part in politics and 
exercise a degree of political authority at subnational level while influencing decision-making 
at national level.
1
 The positive effect of this arrangement is that sustainable peace is 
promoted by accommodating diversity and counteracting regional or ethnic marginalisation, 
which may threaten peace. As highlighted above, the nature in which provinces are 
established has significant implications on the extent to which a multilevel system of 
government can foster sustainable peace, democracy and development. Zimbabwe has joined 
the family of nations which have recognised provinces or regions in their respective 
constitutions.
2
 
                                                 
1
 Jackson & Scott 2007: 5, 6; Braathen & Hellevik 2008: 7; and Sisk 2001: 74. 
2
 These countries include South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Schedule 1A of the Constitution of South Africa 
provides the names of the nine provinces, the First Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya provides the names of 
the 47 counties, and Article 47(1) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia recognises the names of the 
nine states. 
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Section 267(1) of the 2013 Constitution provides that the provinces into which Zimbabwe is 
divided are: 
a) Bulawayo Metropolitan Province 
b) Harare Metropolitan Province 
c) Manicaland Province 
d) Mashonaland Central Province 
e) Mashonaland East Province 
f) Mashonaland West Province 
g) Masvingo Province 
h) Matabeleland North Province 
i) Matabeleland South Province, and 
j) Midlands Province3 
The recognition of these ten provinces in the 2013 Constitution was one of the heavily 
contested issues in the constitution-making process.
4
 As discussed below, such recognition is 
significant for the extent to which the multilevel system of government can realise 
sustainable peace, development and democracy. 
2.1.1 Controversy surrounding the names and numbers of provinces 
In the outreach consultative programme carried out by COPAC for the formation of the 
Constitution, people expressed divergent views on the number and names of provinces 
Zimbabwe should have. Some proposed that Zimbabwe be divided into five provinces 
whereas others wanted the number of provinces to remain ten.
5
 Others proposed different 
numbers all together. Those who proposed five provinces pushed for the demarcation of 
provincial boundaries largely on ethnic lines to create Mashonaland, Matabeleland, 
Manicaland, Midlands and Masvingo provinces.
6
 The drawing of provincial boundaries 
mainly on ethnic lines could have potentially reinforced ethnic mobilisation and encouraged 
secession.
7
 The names of provinces were also controversial. Some advocated for the naming 
of provinces after the dominant ethnic group in each province, natural monuments and natural 
resources in the province concerned and after cardinal points.
8
 Others preferred to retain the 
                                                 
3
 S 267(1) Constitution.  
4
 Constitution Select Committee (COPAC) 2012: 32. 
5
 See COPAC 2012: 36. 
6
 See COPAC 2012: 36. 
7
 Brancati 2009: 10, 12; Siegle & O‟Mahony 2010: 138. 
8
 See COPAC 2012: 37. 
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names of provinces which were in use under the Lancaster House Constitution.
9 
The three 
major parties comprising COPAC negotiated these controversial issues and resolved to retain 
the number and names of provinces which existed under the Lancaster House Constitution.
10
 
Five of the ten provinces, namely, Mashonaland Central, East and West, Matabeleland North, 
and South provinces, are named after the dominant ethnic group in that province.
11
 Retaining 
old provinces may have served as a peace-building measure as it was likely to be met with 
less resistance. 
2.1.2 Significance of constitutional recognition of provinces 
The recognition of the provinces in the Constitution is significant for a number of reasons. It 
means that the numbers and names of provinces may not be changed without amending the 
Constitution, thus providing a security for their existence. As argued in Chapter Two, security 
of existence forms a critical component of political autonomy.
12
 In this regard, the 
Constitution represents a radical shift from the Lancaster House Constitution where 
recognition of provinces was provided by an ordinary Act of Parliament.
13
 The President 
could establish, assign a name and abolish a province at any time.
14
 The existence of 
provinces was not guaranteed. It is submitted that section 3 of the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act, which empowers the President to establish and abolish provinces, is 
inconsistent with the 2013 Constitution since the President no longer has such powers. This 
section must be repealed. 
2.2 Demarcation of boundaries 
The demarcation of internal boundaries in a state is often a contentious issue that has to be 
considered when designing a multilevel system of government.
15
 The main reason is that 
internal boundaries have implications for, among other things, access to resources, viability 
of provinces, group identities, national integration, and efficiency.
16
 The demarcation of 
provincial boundaries mainly revolves around two, usually contrasting issues. On the one 
                                                 
9
 See COPAC 2012: 37. 
10
 See Number 5 Sixth Schedule, Constitution. 
11
 Mashonaland and Matabeleland provinces are named after the Shona and Ndebele speaking people, 
respectively. 
12
 See para 6.1.4. See also Kalin 1998: 1, Tarr 2011: 172-3, Steytler 2009: 410. 
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hand, there is the argument for functionality, usually associated with efficiency and 
economies of scale, and, on the other hand, the preservation of group identities.
17
 
International literature is inconclusive with regard to the demarcation of provincial 
boundaries. However, it can be deduced from the literature that the weight given to either 
functionality or preservation of group identities should be informed by the local environment, 
including historical factors.
18
 A common feature worldwide is that demarcation of provincial 
boundaries is usually carried out by an independent body or Parliament following 
constitutionally or legally recognised set criteria.
19
 Moreover, there is usually a legal 
requirement for the participation of citizens in any boundary (re)demarcation process.
20
 In 
Zimbabwe, the (re)demarcation of provincial and district boundaries is a responsibility given 
to Parliament undertaken after consulting the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and 
people of the provinces or districts concerned.
21
 The roles of Parliament, ZEC and citizens 
are examined below. 
2.2.1 Role of Parliament 
As highlighted above, the old provinces and their boundaries were retained under the 2013 
Constitution.
22
 The Constitution directs Parliament to enact legislation fixing boundaries of 
provinces.
23
 This means that the powers to (re)demarcate provincial boundaries may not be 
delegated to any other body as it is Parliament‟s primary law-making power.24 Like the 
establishment of provinces, the determination of provincial boundaries under the 2013 
Constitution marks a significant departure from the Lancaster House Constitutional order, 
where boundaries of provinces and districts were determined by the President.
25
 The 
President could alter provincial boundaries at any time. The danger with that system was that 
                                                 
17
 De Visser et al 2013: 267. See also Baraki 2013: 32 and Fessha 2010: 111. Functionality refers to „practical 
effects including the level of interconnectedness within a territory, indicated by the movement of people and 
goods, an integrated transport system, topographical features and economic coherence‟.  
18
 Baraki 2013: 233, De Visser et al 2013: 267. Ethiopia, for example, has adopted ethnicity as the primary base 
for organising the state. Similarly, regions in Belgium and Quebec in Canada are delineated on an ethnic base 
for historical and political reasons. South Africa, on the other hand, advances functionality as the basis for 
demarcating provincial boundaries although „silently‟ preserving group identities. See De Visser et al 2013: 
276-80 and Baraki 2013: 233. 
19
 See Singiza & De Visser 2011: 33. In South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia the (re)demarcation of provincial 
boundaries is carried out by Parliament. 
20
 See De Visser et al 2013: 277. 
21
 S 267 Constitution. 
22
 See Number 5 Sixth Schedule, Constitution. 
23
 S 267(1) Constitution. 
24
 See s 134(a) Constitution. This means that the Provincial and Metropolitan Councils Draft Bill (August 2014), 
which purports to delegate the responsibility of establishing provincial boundaries, is unconstitutional. 
25
 S 3(1) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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there was no oversight of the powers to establish or abolish provinces. The President, as 
leader of a political party, could abolish a province to achieve political goals. Provincial 
boundaries could be manipulated in order to reduce the electoral power of opposition political 
parties (gerrymandering).
26
 The removal of powers, from the President to Parliament, to 
determine the boundaries of provinces is commendable in the light of democracy since 
Parliament is a representative body.
27
 It is submitted that section 3(1) of the Provincial 
Councils and Administration Act, which gives the President the power to determine and alter 
provincial boundaries, is unconstitutional. Hence, the section must be repealed. 
It is argued, however, that the vesting of powers in Parliament to determine provincial 
boundaries may undermine the political autonomy of provinces. Although the existence of 
each province as a unit is guaranteed in the Constitution,
28
 the boundaries of each province 
are not guaranteed. The national government, through Parliament, can redefine the size of 
provinces at any time. Thus, the size of each province will largely be determined by the 
ruling party or coalition of parties at national level. Such an arrangement may undermine 
stability at provincial level since the size of each province can be redefined each time there is 
a new ruling party or coalition of parties at the national level. Such action has an adverse 
impact on the autonomy of a province given that the size of the territory of a province is a 
significant indicator of its autonomy.
29
 A preferable scenario would have been for the 
boundaries to be determined by an independent body, as suggested by a section of the public 
during the constitution outreach programme carried by COPAC.
30
 Independent, non-political 
bodies are more likely to base decisions on the merits of proposed boundary proposals rather 
than on political or „parochial‟ considerations.31 They also have the advantage of providing 
balanced representation and development of institutional expertise and memory, which 
political bodies such as parliament may not adequately provide.
32
 
                                                 
26
 See Meligrana & Razin 2004: 237, Cameron 2004: 209. 
27
 See Lindsey 2004: 61. 
28
 See s 267(1) Constitution.  
29
 See Paddison 2004: 22-5. 
30
 COPAC 2012: 37. 
31
 Lindsey 2004: 60. See also Singiza & De Visser 2011: 33. 
32
 See Lindsey 2004: 60, Meligrana & Razin 2004: 234. 
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2.2.2 Role of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. 
When (re)demarcating provincial and district boundaries, Parliament is required to consult 
the ZEC.
33
 The ZEC is an independent institution established by the Constitution to 
administer elections and delimit constituencies and wards.
34
 The rationale behind this 
constitutional requirement is that any (re)demarcation exercise on provincial and district 
boundaries has an impact on the administration of elections and delimitation of constituencies 
and wards. As such, the ZEC has to be given an opportunity to make representation on the 
proposed boundary changes. 
2.2.3 Role of citizens 
When dividing provinces into districts Parliament is required to consult citizens of the 
provinces and districts concerned.
35
 Equal obligation is placed on Parliament when altering 
the boundaries of any district or province.
36
 This constitutional requirement is commendable 
in the light of democratic aims as it ensures that citizens affected by any proposed 
(re)demarcation exercise have an opportunity to influence decisions relating to the 
(re)demarcation process.
37
 The significance of such citizen involvement is that boundaries are 
fundamental to placed identities and can be used to preserve or break territorial attachments 
citizens may have.
38
 It is submitted that the ability of the citizens to influence the 
(re)demarcation process largely depends on the methods of consultation and the time period 
given to the citizens to participate.
39
 Thus, it is important that the legislation providing for 
(re)demarcation of provinces and districts involves appropriate mechanisms for consulting 
citizens and a „reasonable‟ time period of such consultation. It is however submitted that the 
need for consultation should be balanced with costs and time considerations so that alteration 
of provincial and district boundaries does not become an unaffordable exercise.
40
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2.2.4 Towards criteria for (re)demarcation of provincial boundaries 
As highlighted above, the Constitution, while giving Parliament the power to (re)demarcate 
provincial and district boundaries, does not provide specific procedures to be followed when 
(re)demarcating provincial and district boundaries.
41
 This means that Parliament has the 
discretion to decide the substantive criteria to guide the (re)demarcation process. In this 
section the chapter will discuss some of the factors which may be considered when 
(re)demarcating provincial and district boundaries. 
2.2.4.1 Procedural criteria 
It is argued that the process of (re)demarcation of boundaries should be transparent and 
participatory.
42
 This means that there is a clear procedure to be followed requiring citizen 
participation. Participation can take the form of public hearings, referendums and 
opportunities for citizens and other interested stakeholders to put forward objections so that 
their interests and concerns are taken into account when (re)demarcating boundaries.
43
 The 
procedural criteria should also require the consultation of any provincial or metropolitan 
council whose boundaries will be affected by any (re)demarcation exercise. This requirement, 
while not providing complete assurance to provinces that their interests as distinct units will 
not be vulnerable to action by the national government, at least gives them the chance to 
influence the demarcation exercise.
44
 It is also an extension of cooperative governance 
required by the 2013 Constitution (as discussed in detail in Chapter Nine).
45
 
2.2.4.2 Substantive criteria 
As discussed above, the debate on determination of provincial boundaries revolves around 
functionality and the accommodation of group identity.
46
 It is contended that the weight given 
to any of the two should be guided by the local environment. Since the Constitution is silent 
with respect to the substantive criteria for (re)demarcating provincial and district boundaries, 
it may be useful to refer to the Constitution Drafting Principles. The principles suggest that 
factors such as geography, economic factors, population, ethnicity, local language and 
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 Singiza & De Visser 2011: 33. 
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cultural values could be considered when (re)demarcating provincial and district 
boundaries.
47
 The principles however do not provide guidance on the weight to be attached to 
any of these factors.
48
 It is submitted that all the factors listed above should be considered 
when (re)demarcating provincial boundaries. The weight given to economic factors, 
preservation of group identities, demography and geographical factors should depend on 
whether the province is wholly urban or a combination of urban and rural areas. In the case of 
Harare and Bulawayo provinces, which are wholly urban, there may be no value in giving 
prime consideration to preservation of group identity factors such as culture, language and 
ethnicity. These metropolitan provinces are made up by a diversity of groups even though 
they are primarily Shona and Ndebele, respectively. They are the economic hub of the 
country, and so urbanisation and development pressures will likely require (re)adjustment of 
the boundaries of these provinces into neighbouring provinces whenever efficiency or/and 
economies of scale demand it. 
As for the other eight provinces, which are partially urban and rural, while consideration of 
economic, geographical and demographical factors is necessary they may be need to give 
prime consideration to preservation of group identity. If followed, this proposal will likely 
result in the adoption of more or less the same provincial boundaries, which are largely 
ethnic-based.
49
 Although the current demarcation of provincial boundaries is not solely based 
on the „principle of ethnic exclusivity,‟50 each ethnic group has a province in which it is the 
majority where is can advance its interests.
51
 This does not mean however that Zimbabwe 
should follow the example of Ethiopia where the boundaries of the nine states are exclusively 
demarcated along linguistic and ethnic lines.
52
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 COPAC 2012: 37. 
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 For example, the three Mashonaland provinces are named after the Mashona ethnic group which are dominant 
ethnic group in those provinces. The two Matabeleland provinces are named after the Ndebele ethnic group, 
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 See Fessha 2010: 114. 
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3. Local authorities 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the local tier of government is made up of urban and 
rural local authorities.
53
 The creation of different structures at the local level reflects 
asymmetric decentralisation, which is a major characteristic of the Zimbabwean multilevel 
system of government. Asymmetric decentralisation has been adopted as a response to the 
different environmental contexts that exist in urban and rural areas that may not be effectively 
managed by a uniform set of local structures with equal powers.
54
 In this section, the chapter 
will examine the establishment of local authorities and the determination of boundaries and 
wards. As per the norm in this study, the discussion is divided into urban and rural local 
authorities. 
3.1 Establishment of urban local authorities 
The Constitution requires the establishment of urban local authorities to „represent and 
manage‟ the affairs of people in urban areas.55 It further permits the establishment of different 
classes of urban local authorities for different urban areas.
56
 This is an extended form of 
asymmetric decentralisation since different structures are not only established for rural and 
urban areas but also within urban areas. The Constitution does not provide for how different 
classes of urban local authorities are to be established. Thus, Parliament has the discretion to 
determine the establishment of urban local authorities. The UCA makes provision for various 
classes of urban local authorities. In order of hierarchy, there are city councils, municipal 
councils, town councils and local boards.
57
 The ranking reflects the status in terms of powers 
and functions, fiscal and administrative capacity, number of councillors and level of 
remuneration offered to council officials.
58
 The discussion in this section is divided according 
to the different classes of urban local authorities. 
3.1.1 City, municipal and town councils 
The establishment of local authorities has implications on local democracy. Thus, it is 
important that citizens affected by any proposal to establish a new local authority are given 
                                                 
53
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an opportunity to make representations on such a proposal given that it has significant 
consequences on their daily lives.
59
 As will be discussed in Chapter Nine, cooperative 
governance also requires that governance decisions such as those relating to establishment of 
new local authorities should be made after all affected governments have been consulted. 
Such consultation is necessary to allow any affected government to make representations 
before decisions are taken that may impact on their institutional status, powers and 
functions.
60
 In Zimbabwe, the establishment of municipal and town councils is an exercise 
undertaken by the President in consultation with the local authority concerned. It is important 
to note that there is no provision for the establishment of city councils. Legally, city councils 
are classified as municipal councils. 
3.1.1.1 Role of the President in establishing municipal and town councils 
The President has the power to establish a municipality or town.
61
 Following the 
establishment of a municipality or town, the President may establish and assign a name to a 
municipal or town council to administer that municipality or town, respectively.
62
 The actual 
establishment of a municipality, town, or of a council for a municipality or town occurs when 
the President issues the proclamation to that effect in the government gazette.
63
 At any time 
after the establishment of a council, the President may alter its name. The President may also 
abolish that municipality or town council by merging it with another council or divide it to 
create more than one local authority.
64
 Thus, the President has unfettered power to determine 
when to establish or abolish a municipal or town council.
65
 When excessing the power to 
                                                 
59
 See the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 7. 
60
 About the importance of intergovernmental consultation before establishment of a new subnational 
government, See Watts 2001: 39. 
61
 S 4(1) UCA. 
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64
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65
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[2013] ZWSC 5(22 May 2013). Despite the court dismissal, the introduction of the bill shows at least that there 
is recognition that the powers of the national government over local government are too excessive and have to 
be reduced. 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
Chapter 4: Establishment of provinces and local authorities 
establish, assign a name or abolish a municipality or town the President is however required 
to consult any local authority concerned.
66
 This requirement is discussed below. 
3.1.1.2 Legal requirement to consult concerned local authority(s) 
It was argued in Chapter Two that local governments are unlikely to perform effectively if 
their existence is in constant jeopardy by authorities on higher levels of government who may 
dissolve them at any time.
67
 The question is whether the legal framework in Zimbabwe grants 
local authorities the opportunity to defend their existence. Before the President may establish 
a new municipality or town, he or she is required to consult any local authority(s) affected by 
the establishment of that municipality or town.
68
 As argued above, such consultation is 
necessary to enable any concerned local authority to make representation on the proposed 
establishment of a new municipal or town council. It thus promotes cooperative government 
by preventing the national government from making decisions which materially affect a 
particular local authority without giving that local authority an opportunity to defend and 
advance its interests.
69
 However, such a consultation requirement does not apply in relation to 
abolition of local authorities. This means that the UCA does not afford municipal and town 
councils an opportunity or right to defend their existence. To provide security of existence to 
each municipal and town councils, it is submitted that it is necessary to obtain the consent of 
the affected local authority before it can be abolished or have part of its area altered.
70
 
3.1.1.3 Absence of a legal requirement for involvement of citizens 
While the President is required to consult any local authority affected by the establishment or 
abolishment of a municipal or town council, the UCA does not require the President to 
consult citizens of the area concerned. Further, there is no obligation on the President to 
consult the citizens of the area concerned when naming or renaming a municipal or town 
council. The absence of such a requirement presents a challenge for local democracy given 
that the establishment, (re)naming or abolition of a municipal or town council directly affects 
the citizens.
71
 It has implications for access to public services and accommodation of local 
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identities, among other important local issues. With regard to the naming of local government 
units, „there can be little doubt that a municipality‟s name is a significant expression of local 
identity and therefore local autonomy‟.72 Failure to consult citizens and communities on 
matters which affect their local identity is a danger to sustainable peace since it may be met 
with resistance. It is proposed that citizens of the area concerned should be consulted when 
establishing or abolishing a new local authority.
73
 Similar requirements should apply to the 
(re)naming of a local authority.
74
 
3.1.2 Local Boards 
As mentioned in paragraph 3.1 above, local boards are the lowest category of urban local 
authorities, enjoying less autonomy than municipal and town councils. The UCA assigns to 
the President the power to establish local boards to administer local government areas.
75
 
Local government areas are those which are deemed unsuitable to be administered by an 
elected council because they lack the potential to raise revenue to sustain an elected body. 
They are indirectly administered by the national government through a board appointed by 
the Minister. The President also assigns and alters the name of a local board or local 
government area.
76
 The actual establishment of a local board occurs when the President 
issues a proclamation to that effect in the Gazette. The President is required to consult any 
local authority concerned when exercising the power to establish and name a local 
government area and respective local board.
77
 There is no equal obligation to consult citizens 
of the area concerned. The argument raised in paragraph 3.1.1.3 above with respect to the 
need to consult citizens when establishing local authorities also applies here.
78
 
While the President has the power to alter the name of a local government area or local board, 
he or she may not exercise such powers without the consent of the relevant local board.
79
 The 
same requirement applies to the abolition of a local board.
80
 It is argued that these legal 
requirements provide some form of security of existence of each local board or local 
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government area. They provide safeguards against arbitrary abolition of local boards by the 
national government.
81
 The question is why are such requirements providing some form of 
security of existence of local boards not applicable to municipal and town councils, which are 
high level local authorities? It may be necessary to give all local authorities this kind of 
security.
82
 
3.1.3 Extended systems of local government 
As argued above, local governments are unlikely to perform properly if their existence is in 
constant jeopardy by senior governments.
83
 It was therefore argued in paragraph 6.1.4 of 
Chapter Two that the existence of each local unit should be guaranteed preferably in the 
Constitution or, failing which, in national legislation.
84
 As observed below, the 2013 
Constitution does not guarantee the existence of each local unity. It has recognised the 
extended systems of local government which existed in both the pre- and post-independence 
eras. In section 274(3) the Constitution states that „two or more different urban areas may be 
placed under the management of a single local authority‟.85 The Constitution, however, does 
not provide clarification on how such a system of local government should be developed. 
Thus, Parliament has the discretion to determine the nature and procedure of establishing 
extended systems of local government. In terms of the UCA, extended systems of local 
government take three forms, namely: 
 a system of local government between several local authorities,86 
 a system of local government involving the exercise of the functions of a council in 
relation to one or more areas outside the council area,
87
 or 
 a system of local government combining elements of both systems.88 
Extended systems of local government can be an effective way of dealing with different local 
environments in Zimbabwe. Such mechanisms may be useful, for example, in cases where it 
does not make economic sense to establish a local authority due to the absence of a „real‟ tax 
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base.
89
 In such cases it may be rational to place two or more urban areas under the 
administration of one local authority to enhance revenue-raising potential and maximise 
economies of scale. For example, in the 1970s, the City of Salisbury (Harare) was given 
authority to administer the satellite urban area of St Marys before an independent council 
(Chitungwiza) was established for the area. In the post-independence era, the City of Harare 
has administered urban areas outside its boundaries, such as Epworth, Norton and Ruwa. 
Norton has since graduated to the status of a town council. 
Section 5(1) of the UCA assigns to the President the power to establish extended systems of 
local government.
90
 When establishing extended systems of local government, the President 
may remove and allocate powers from one local authority to another, determine the nature of 
representation on the council of the concerned local authority(s), and issue additional 
directives to give effect to the extended system of local government.
91
 The President is 
required to consult any local authority affected by the establishment of an extended system of 
local government.
92
 It is submitted that the powers of the President to remove and allocate 
powers from one local authority to another threaten the institutional integrity of local 
authorities. The power to determine the nature of representation on the council allows the 
President to tamper with democratic representation at the local level, contrary to the 2013 
Constitution which seeks to promote local democracy.
93
 
While the Constitution provides that two or more urban areas may be placed under the 
administration of a single local authority, it is argued that this does not mean that an elected 
council may be placed under the administration of another local authority.
94
 This implies that 
a local authority may administer an area outside its boundaries which does not have an 
elected council. For example, a local government area can be placed under the administration 
of another local authority as it does not have an elected council. In such a case, the consent of 
the local authority which is to assume the management of the concerned urban area should be 
sought so that it has an opportunity to promote and defend its interests.
95
 Thus, it is submitted 
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that the powers to remove and allocate powers from one local authority to another and to 
determine the nature of representation on the council of the concerned local authority(s) 
should be reformed. 
3.2 Establishment of rural local authorities 
This section examines the establishment of rural local authorities (rural district councils). 
Rural local authorities are established to „represent and manage‟ the affairs of people in rural 
areas.
96
 There are a total of 58 rural local authorities whose boundaries coincide with the 
boundaries of administrative districts in rural areas. While recognising the role of rural local 
authorities, the Constitution does not provide guidance on how these authorities should be 
established. It leaves it to Parliament to determine their establishment.
97
 As in urban local 
authorities, the Constitution allows the establishment of different classes of rural local 
authorities and the administration of two or more rural areas by a single rural local 
authority.
98
 In its current form, the RDCA, which governs the activities of rural local 
authorities, only makes provision for one category of rural local authority. Hence, it is 
submitted that the RDCA may be inconsistent with the 2013 Constitution in this respect. 
3.2.1 Role of the President to establish rural local authorities 
The RDCA assigns to the President the power to establish rural local authorities.
99
 As 
provided in the RDCA, the process of establishing a rural local authority begins with the 
President declaring any area within a province to be a district.
100
 After creating a district, the 
President may establish a rural local authority for that district.
101
 The President may also 
assign a name to that rural local authority.
102
 At any time after declaring an area to be district, 
the President may abolish such a district.
103
 It is argued that the provisions of the RDCA 
which give the President power to establish and abolish a district are inconsistent with the 
2013 Constitution. As discussed in paragraph 2.2 above, the Constitution grants Parliament 
                                                 
96
 S 275(1) Constitution. 
97
 See s 275(2) Constitution. 
98
 S 275(3) Constitution. 
99
 S 8(1)(a) RDCA. 
100
 S 6(a) RDCA. 
101
 S 8(1)(a) RDCA. 
102
 S 8(1)(b) RDCA. The actual establishment of a rural district council for a district occurs when the President 
issues a proclamation, to that effect, in the Government Gazette. A rural local authority will come into existence 
in at least 60 days after the publication of the proclamation. 
103
 S 6(c) RDCA. 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
Chapter 4: Establishment of provinces and local authorities 
the responsibility of (re)demarcating district boundaries.
104
 It is submitted therefore that 
section 6(c) and section 8(1)(a) of the RDCA, which gives the President power to demarcate 
district boundaries, have to be aligned with the Constitution. 
3.2.2 Legal requirement for citizen participation 
The importance of citizen participation in the establishment of local authorities and the 
(re)demarcation of local boundaries was underscored above.
105
 The RDCA requires the 
consultation of citizens of the area concerned before the President may exercise the power to 
establish a rural local authority.
106
 As highlighted above, such consultation requirements are 
not applicable in urban areas. The RDCA makes provision for two consultation mechanisms. 
The Minister may establish a commission composed of residents of the area concerned to 
make recommendations to the Minister.
107
 Alternatively, the Minister may take „such steps 
which are reasonably necessary to give residents of the district notice of the proposal‟ to 
establish a rural local authority.
108
 These two consultation procedures are examined below. 
3.2.2.1 Establishment of a commission  
The Minister may appoint a commission from residents of the district concerned to solicit 
their views on the proposed establishment of a rural local authority to administer that 
district.
109
 Once established, the commission is required within six months (or a period 
determined by the Minister) to make recommendations to the Minister on the: 
a) potentiality of the district for local government; 
b) the extent of the proposed council area, in particular, whether or not it should extend 
to the whole district; 
c) the ward boundaries within the proposed council area; 
d)  the number of councillors to be elected or appointed; 
e) the need for area committees110 for any area within the proposed council area; 
f) the name of the proposed council area; 
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g) the headquarters of the proposed council and the number and location of, or need for, 
sub-offices within the proposed council area; 
h) the staff required to carry out the functions of the proposed council; 
i) where it is proposed to include within the proposed council area the whole or part of 
that area of any local authority, the allocation or apportionment of the assets, 
liabilities and staff of such a local authority; 
j) any other matters relevant to the establishment of the proposed council.111 
It is submitted that the establishment of a commission may enable citizens to influence the 
establishment of a local authority. However, the effectiveness of the commission, as a citizen 
consultation mechanism, may be undermined by a number of challenges. First, the factors to 
be considered when establishing a local authority are not coherent and do not present a 
rational foundation for the establishment of local authorities. The factors fall into three broad 
categories, namely those that relate to boundaries, names and wards; democratic 
representation on the council; and administrative requirements. While citizens may be 
consulted on the first category, there is no need to solicit their views on the last two groups, 
especially administrative requirements. Citizens are unlikely to be able to make sound 
proposals as the factors are too technical. For example, an ordinary citizen is unlikely to have 
the knowledge to ascertain how many employees a new local authority requires. On the other 
hand, citizens are able to present their views on issues such as names and boundaries of the 
new local authority. Hence, more coherent substantive criteria needs to be developed, which 
this chapter will attempt to do in paragraph 3.3.3 below. 
The other challenge is the appointment of the commission from the residents of the district 
concerned. The question is whether ordinary citizens appointed by the Minister to form the 
commission will possess the technical knowledge to conceptualise complex issues associated 
with establishment of a new local authority. Can such a commission for example be able to 
make reasonable proposals about the transfer of assets between the „old‟ local authority and 
the newly established one? It is suggested that the commission does not necessarily have to 
be appointed from citizens of the area concerned. Rather, the commission must be composed 
of experts in areas such as land-use planning, economics, finance and law. In practice, the 
Minister has „rightly‟ appointed experts in these areas to determine the possibility of 
establishing a new local authority. 
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Third, as highlighted above, members of the commission are appointed by the Minister. The 
appointment by the Minister means that the commission might lack the necessary 
independence required to carry out its duties effectively. It is argued that establishment of 
local authorities should be an independent process insulated from political influence.
112
 The 
absence of such independence may compromise the objectivity of the commission and its 
ability to represent views from the citizens.
113
 As proposed below, Parliament should 
consider giving an independent body the responsibility to explore the possibility of 
establishing a new local authority and soliciting citizens‟ views. This will give the process of 
establishing local authorities the necessary independence.
114
 
3.2.2.2 Other consultation mechanisms 
If the Minister does not appoint the commission discussed above, the RDCA requires the 
Minister is to take „such steps which are reasonably necessary to give residents of the district 
concerned notice of the proposal‟ to establish and assign a name to a rural local authority.115 
Furthermore, the Minister is required to cause a notice to be published in at least three issues 
of a newspaper stating the proposal of the President to establish a local authority and inviting 
any objections to that proposal for not less than 30 days.
116
 If any objections are raised with 
respect to the proposal to establish a new rural local authority, the President is obliged to 
consider them.
117
 It is argued that this requirement strengthens local democracy since the 
President may not ignore any objections raised by the citizens. The use of newspaper as a 
communication medium may present challenges for effective citizen participation. A 
significant number of the rural populace is likely to have difficulties in accessing newspapers 
due to limited circulation in rural areas or inability to afford them.
118
 Thus, broad-based 
citizen participation may not be achieved in such cases. It is suggested that in addition to 
newspapers, communication mediums such as radios and public consultation meetings should 
be utilised to solicit views of the citizens as they allow broad-based public consultation. 
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However, it should be appreciated that such participatory processes may present significant 
financial and time costs for the government which it might not be able to afford.
119
 Thus, a 
balance should be struck between the need for citizen participation and costs of resources. 
3.3 Demarcation of boundaries 
Local government boundaries are usually changed to respond to economic and political 
changes.
120
 Further, local boundaries may be changed to maximise on administrative 
efficiency and to improve the responsiveness of local governments to needs of their 
constituents as well as to global changes.
121
 The determination of local government 
boundaries usually revolves around a number of factors, including preservation of local or 
group identity, local democracy, functionality, efficiency and maximisation of economies of 
scale.
122
 International „best‟ practice suggests that the delimitation of local boundaries should 
be undertaken by an independent body. The rationale for independent authority was found by 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa to guard against political interference in the 
delimitation process.
123
 The court argued that political interference in the delimitation of local 
boundaries can undermine any multi-party system of democratic government.
124
 This is 
significant given that the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe seeks to promote the development 
of a multi-party democratic political system where different political parties are likely to be in 
charge of governments at various levels.
125
 As argued above, independent non-political 
bodies are likely to take a more impartial approach to boundary reform than political bodies 
such as the executive or parliament.
126
 
In paragraph 6.1.5 of Chapter Two an argument was made for the participation of citizens in 
the demarcation of local boundaries.
127
 The argument is that local boundaries define the 
territory which provides space for everyday practice, but, critically, boundaries are also a 
vital component of self-identity.
128
 The requirement that citizens should participate in any 
demarcation process may serve as a check on actions by „aggressive‟ governments, whether 
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local, provincial or national.
129
 Failure to involve the citizens in boundary demarcation does 
not only present a challenge to local democracy but may be met with resistance from the 
citizens, thereby undermining sustainable peace.
130
 The same requirement should apply to 
local authorities affected by any demarcation exercise, given that any changes to local 
territory diminishes or increases territorial control, a vital sign of local autonomy.
131
 It may 
be useful to legally recognise both the procedural and substantive criteria of (re)demarcating 
local boundaries to promote transparency and to guard against any uncertainties surrounding 
an ad hoc system of demarcating boundaries.
132
 Even though local autonomy is never 
absolute, the criteria should ensure that demarcation of local boundaries is fairer to the citizen 
and local authorities who are usually less powerful than senior governments.
133
 To what 
extent does the (re)demarcation of local boundaries in Zimbabwe conform to this normative 
framework? The discussion that follows is divided into urban and rural local authorities. 
3.3.1 Urban local authorities 
The Constitution does not provide for the demarcation of local boundaries even though it 
recognises the role of urban local authorities.
134
 This means that Parliament has the discretion 
to determine the procedure to be followed when (re)demarcating boundaries of urban local 
authorities. Parliament is not entirely free when determining factors to be considered when 
delimiting boundaries of urban local authorities. It is submitted that any delimitation of local 
boundaries should seek to advance objectives of devolution and principles of local 
government enshrined in the Constitution.
135
 The relevant objectives and principles include: 
a) to promote democratic, effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government 
in Zimbabwe as a whole; 
b) to preserve and foster peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe; 
c) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and further their 
development; 
d) to ensure the equitable sharing of local and national resources; 
                                                 
129
 Lindsey 2004: 57. 
130
 For example; in 2013, the merging of municipalities in the Free State province of South Africa was met with 
violent protest on issues relating to boundaries and merging of local government. See also Merafong 
Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/07) [2008] 
ZACC 10; 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC); 2008 (10) BCLR 968 (CC) (13 June 2008). 
131
 Paddison 2004: 24. See also Skaburskis 2004: 39-41, Meligrana & Razin 2004: 230. 
132
 See Singiza & De Visser 2011: 33. 
133
 See Paddison 2004: 26. 
134
 See Part 3, Chapter 14 Constitution. 
135
 See s 264(2) and s 265(1) Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
Chapter 4: Establishment of provinces and local authorities 
e) to ensure good governance by being effective, transparent, accountable and 
institutionally coherent; 
f) secure public welfare; and 
g) ensure the fair and equitable representation of people within their areas of 
jurisdiction.136 
This means that the statutory framework providing for boundary demarcation should require 
demarcation of boundaries to advance these principles. 
As at July 2014 the UCA had not been aligned with the 2013 Constitution. The Act provides 
for powers of the President to delimit the boundaries of municipal and town councils.
137
 After 
(re)demarcating the boundaries of a municipal or town council, the President has the power to 
alter the boundaries of that municipal or town council.
138
 As mentioned above, the President 
is also charged with the demarcation of boundaries of local government areas which are 
administered by local boards.
139
 After delimiting boundaries of a local government area, the 
President may alter the boundaries of the area.
140
 Thus, the (re)demarcation of boundaries of 
urban local authorities is an activity solely carried out by the President. While the President is 
an elected representative accountable both to the people and Parliament, partisanships may 
play a role in the final decision-making stage of the demarcation exercise given that the 
President is a political competitor aligned to a certain political party.
141
 The threat of 
gerrymandering is high in cases where political office holders are involved in the 
(re)demarcation of local boundaries.
142
 It is submitted that the principles and objectives of 
devolution and local government highlighted above are likely to be undermined under such a 
system.
143
 
The role of the President in the demarcation process may present a danger to democratic 
governance, especially to a multi-party system.
144
 For this reason, it is suggested that 
Parliament should consider giving the role of (re)demarcating local boundaries to an 
independent body with final decision-making powers, as is the case in South Africa.
145
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Giving such a responsibility to an independent body does not only insulate the demarcation 
exercise from partisan influence but ensures that experts in boundary demarcation make 
rational demarcation decisions.
146
 The role of an independent body in the determination of 
local boundaries nevertheless is not enough to guarantee the above-mentioned principles and 
objectives of devolution and local governance if not accompanied by „appropriate‟ procedural 
and substantive criteria of (re)demarcating local boundaries. These criteria are explored 
below. 
3.3.1.1 Procedural criteria 
When (re)demarcating boundaries of a new urban local authority, the President is required to 
consult any local authority concerned and the ZEC.
147
 Consultation with the ZEC is meant to 
allow the electoral body to make representations since any changes to local boundaries have 
implications on the administration of elections. As highlighted above, when altering 
boundaries of a local government area, the UCA requires the President to seek the consent of 
the relevant local board.
148
 This requirement presents an element of federal theory where 
constituent units have to consent to any changes to their boundaries.
149
 It is submitted that 
legislation should provide for consultation and not consent of local authorities, irrespective of 
category, in cases involving boundary (re)demarcation, given that Zimbabwe does not have a 
federal arrangement. The consultation is not only necessary to promote constructive relations 
among governments but also to allow local authorities to make representations on the 
proposed (re)determination of local boundaries. 
It was stated above that while giving ZEC and any concerned local authority the opportunity 
to make representations, the President is not obliged to consult citizens of the area concerned 
when (re)demarcating local boundaries of municipal and town councils. The absence of such 
an obligation presents a challenge to local democracy since determination of local boundaries 
directly impacts on the lives of the citizens in the area(s) concerned.
150
 Citizens or 
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communities living close to local boundaries may be included or excluded from the 
jurisdiction of a local authority and their access to public services affected.
151
 Such an impact 
justifies the argument that boundary (re)demarcation should not be left to be determined 
alone by officials of senior and junior governments or independent bodies.
152
 Citizens and 
communities who are ultimately affected by demarcation decisions should also be 
involved.
153
 
3.3.1.2 Substantive criteria 
The UCA does not provide the substantive criteria for (re)demarcation of boundaries of urban 
local authorities except for factors to be considered for city status, as will be discussed in 
paragraph 4 below.
154
 Thus, the President has wide discretion to determine the substantive 
criteria to guide the establishment of urban local authorities. It is submitted that the absence 
of such criteria is likely to reduce opportunities for the establishment of the „appropriate‟ size 
of a local authority. Such a size is significant because it usually affects the range of functions 
that a local authority has the capacity to perform.
155
 The absence of criteria brings into 
question the transparency of the process of (re)demarcating local boundaries in urban areas. It 
is therefore difficult for the public to hold public officials accountable for any decisions they 
make relating to local boundaries. As argued below, Parliament should establish substantive 
criteria for local boundary (re)demarcation. 
3.3.2 Rural local authorities 
As highlighted in paragraph 2.2 above, the boundaries of administrative districts are 
determined by Parliament after consultation with the ZEC.
156
 In terms of section 6 of the 
RDCA, the President is responsible for establishing and assigning a name to a district as well 
as demarcating and altering the boundaries of a district. As argued above, this provision is 
inconsistent with the Constitution since Parliament is now charged with the division of 
provinces into districts. While the Constitution provides for the role of Parliament to 
determine the boundaries of districts, it does not prescribe how district boundaries are to be 
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(re)demarcated. Hence, Parliament has the discretion to determine how boundaries of districts 
should be delimited. The RDCA provides the procedural and substantive criteria to guide the 
establishment of districts, including their boundaries. In this section, the chapter will not 
discuss the criteria, as these have already been examined in paragraph 3.2.2.1.
157
 The chapter 
however maintains that there is need to develop coherent substantive criteria for demarcating 
local boundaries. 
3.3.3 Towards a substantive criteria of (re)demarcating local boundaries 
As stated above, the UCA does not provide substantive criteria to guide the delimitation of 
boundaries of urban local authorities. It is submitted that the criteria is not only important in 
light of transparency and fairness but as a vital tool for creating the „optimal‟ size of local 
authorities, that is, those that can deliver on their obligations efficiently and effectively.
158
 
Even though the RDCA provides substantive criteria for (re)demarcating boundaries of 
districts which are administered by rural local authorities, it was argued that the criteria fall 
short in a number of respects. It is against this background that this chapter proposes model 
criteria which can be considered when enacting legislation providing for the delimitation of 
local boundaries both in urban and rural areas. Legally recognising such criteria can ease the 
contentiousness usually associated with boundary demarcation and increase the objectivity of 
the process.
159
 It is submitted that the procedural criteria should require the consultation of 
any local government unit directly affected by the establishment of a new local government 
unit or by any (re)demarcation process. As argued above, these requirements will provide 
some form of assurance to local authorities that their interests as distinct units will not be 
vulnerable to action by senior governments.
160
 Further, the right of citizens and any other 
interested stakeholders to participate in the (re)demarcation process should be guaranteed so 
that their interests can be heard before boundaries are (re)demarcated.
161
 A highlighted in 
paragraph 3.3.1 above, the (re)demarcation of local boundaries should seek to advance 
objectives and principles of devolution and local government.
162 
In addition, establishing 
viable local authorities should involve considering a number of factors on the model of the 
                                                 
157
 See S 7(1) RDCA. 
158
 See Watts 2008: 72, Paddison 2004: 31, Skaburskis 2004: 39. 
159
 See Skaburskis 2004: 52. See also Singiza & De Visser 2011: 33.  
160
 See Watts 2008: 78. 
161
 See Singiza & De Visser 2011: 25, 33. 
162
 S 264(2) read together with s 265(1) Constitution 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
Chapter 4: Establishment of provinces and local authorities 
Municipal Demarcation Act of South Africa.
163
 The Act provides for the consideration of the 
following factors: 
 the nature of local functions; 
 the financial viability and administrative capacity of a local authority to perform its 
functions efficiently and effectively; 
 topographical factors; 
 the interdependence of people, communities and economies as indicated by existing 
and expected patterns of human settlement and migration, employment, the use of 
amenities, recreational facilities and infrastructure; 
 the administrative consequences of proposed boundary demarcation on municipal 
credit worthiness, existing local authorities (including their council members and 
staff) and any other relevant factors; 
 provincial and municipal boundaries; 
 existing land-use, social, economic and transport planning; 
 the need for coordinated delivery of services under a multilevel system of 
government; and 
 traditional practices and customs.164 
It is also submitted that when delimiting urban boundaries more weight should be put on 
functionality, efficiency and maximisation of economies of scale relative to preservation of 
local or group identities. Such distinct identities are likely to be weak in urban areas and the 
opposite is true for rural areas. Boundaries of traditional authorities should be considered 
when (re)demarcating boundaries of rural local authorities, given the strong relevance of 
traditional authority in rural governance in Zimbabwe.
165
 
3.4 Delimitation of wards 
It is argued that the delimitation of wards may be effectively carried out by an independent 
body (as opposed to a political body) relying on legally recognised criteria.
166
 This has been 
recognised in the 2013 Constitution. The Constitution provides for the delimitation of wards 
by an independent body, the ZEC.
167
 As highlighted above, the ZEC is established to 
administer elections and delimit wards and constituency boundaries, among other 
responsibilities.
168
 In terms of the UCA and RDCA, the President is charged with the 
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delimitation of wards as well as alteration of the number of wards in an area of a local 
authority.
169
 It is argued that the powers of the President to delimit wards are inconsistent 
with the 2013 Constitution, which gives the ZEC that responsibility. Thus, the provisions of 
the UCA and RDCA, which give the President power to delimit wards, should be repealed. 
The ZEC is required to abide by the criteria set in the Constitution when delimiting wards. In 
the following section, the chapter examines these criteria. 
3.4.1 Procedural criteria 
The ZEC undertakes the delimitation of wards and constituencies and submits the preliminary 
delimitation report to the President who must lay the report before Parliament within seven 
days.
170
 Within 14 days after the report has been tabled before Parliament, the President, 
Lower House or Upper House may refer the report back to the ZEC for further consideration 
of any matter or issue.
171
 Where a preliminary delimitation report has been referred back to 
the ZEC, the ZEC is required to give further consideration to the matter or issue raised.
172
 
The decision of the ZEC on the matter or issue is final. Therefore, although Parliament and 
the President have a role to play in the delimitation of wards, the ultimate responsibility and 
decision-making powers with regard to delimitation of wards rest with the ZEC. 
Entrusting the ZEC with final decision-making power over the delimitation of wards goes a 
long way in ensuring that the delimitation process is insulated from political influences. After 
deciding on the matter, the ZEC must submit a final delimitation report to the President as 
soon as possible.
173
 Within 14 days after receiving the final report of the ZEC, the President 
is required to publish a proclamation in the Gazette declaring the names and boundaries of 
wards and constituencies.
174
 The involvement of a number of institutions in the delimitation 
of wards provides sufficient oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse of power. As argued in 
Chapter Eight, such oversight mechanisms should also be provided with respect to the use of 
supervisory powers over provincial and local government by the national executive. 
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3.4.2 Substantive criteria 
The Constitution provides the substantive criteria for the delimitation of wards. Section 
161(3) of the Constitution states that „the boundaries of wards must be such that, so far as 
possible, at the time of delimitation equal number of voters are registered in each ward‟ of 
every local authority. When determining wards, the ZEC must ensure that „no ward is divided 
between two or more local authority areas‟, or between two or more constituencies.175 The 
ZEC is required, in respect of any area, to give due consideration to: 
a) its physical features, 
b) the means of communication within the area, 
c) the geographical distribution of registered voters, 
d) any community of interest between registered voters, 
e) in the case of any delimitation after the first delimitation, existing electoral 
boundaries, and 
f) its population.176 
To give effect to the criteria, the ZEC may depart from the requirement that wards must have 
equal numbers of voters provided that no constituency or ward of a local authority has more 
than 20 per cent or fewer registered voters than other wards.
177
 Thus, it is unconstitutional for 
a ward, at the time of delimitation, to have more than 20 per cent more or fewer registered 
voters than other wards in the same local authority. After delimiting wards, the ZEC must 
submit to the President a preliminary delimitation report who then tables it before Parliament 
within seven days.
178
 The President or House of Parliament may refer the preliminary 
delimitation report back to the ZEC for further consideration, whose decision on the report is 
final. The ZEC must submit the final delimitation report to the President who (within 14 
days) is required to publish a proclamation in the Gazette declaring the names and boundaries 
of the wards as finally determined by the Commission.
179
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It is submitted that the 20 per cent requirement ensures that there is comparable 
representation of citizens in councils by ensuring that the councillor-voter ratio does not vary 
significantly across the country. However, while there is need to maintain a comparable 
councillor-voter ratio such a requirement in certain cases may have negative implications on 
democratic representation on the council.
180
 In sparsely populated areas, some councillors 
may represent physically large wards which may undermine effective representation of the 
whole ward on the council. Direct citizen participation, through mechanisms such as ward 
committees, is also likely to be difficult due to the practicalities of organising meetings, and 
this raises the question of how representative the committee can be for the entire ward area.
181
 
Nevertheless, the provision of criteria for the delimitation of wards in the Constitution is 
commendable. The advantage of recognising delimitation criteria in the Constitution is that 
the criteria may not be amended arbitrarily to suit political interests. 
4. Change of local authority status 
In paragraph 6.1.3.5 of Chapter Two it was contended that the role of local government in 
development and sustainable peace may be enhanced if the decentralisation of powers and 
resources to these lower governments takes into account the differences in environments and 
level of capacities at local level.
182
 Such considerations will give rise to asymmetric 
decentralisation. It was also argued that asymmetric decentralisation should be accompanied 
by a system where local governments can „graduate‟ from one category to another.183 Further, 
the determination of such „graduation‟ should be based on set criteria and carried out by an 
independent body, with citizens being given the opportunity to influence the process.
184
 The 
graduation of local authorities from one category to another is a key feature of the 
Zimbabwean multilevel system of government. The 2013 Constitution does not provide 
guidance on any procedural and substantive criteria of change of local authority. As stated in 
paragraph 3.3.1 above, the Constitution however provides general principles of local 
government and objectives of devolution.
185
 It is submitted that these principles and 
objectives should also guide the development of legislation providing for procedural and 
substantive criteria of change of local authority status. 
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In terms of the UCA, local authority may „graduate‟ from one category to another or from 
one class to another within the same category.
186
 This means that a rural local authority can 
„graduate‟ to a status of an urban local authority and local boards, municipal councils and 
town councils may „graduate‟ to another class of urban local authority. In general, the change 
of local authority category improves the potential of a local authority to attract investment 
and raise revenue. Change of category or class also generally means that a local authority can 
appoint more workers, provide improved remuneration for both councillors and 
administrative officials, and assume more powers and functions.
187
 In practice, change of 
local authority status has been initiated by local authorities, residents and the national 
government. As will be shown below, the ultimate decision on change of status rests with the 
national government irrespective of who requested it. 
Since independence in 1980, only the municipal councils of Kwekwe and Masvingo have 
graduated from the category of municipal councils to city councils. Some rural local 
authorities have graduated to the status of urban local authorities, while within the urban 
category, town councils have graduated to municipal councils. Recently, Mpundawana 
Growth Point, which was part of Gutu Rural District Council, is reported to have been 
granted town status.
188
 The request for the upgrade of Mpundawana Growth Point to a town 
council is reported to have been made by the Gutu Residents and Ratepayers Association. It 
is reported that the request was motivated by the need to attract investment, setting of modern 
facilities and raising of significant revenue which a town offers relative to a rural district 
council.
189
 Following the requests, the national government set up a commission of inquiry to 
study the feasibility of the change of local authority status. The commission is reported to 
have recommended the upgrade and proposed boundaries for the new town.
190
 The following 
section examines the procedural and substantive criteria for the upgrade of local authority 
status. 
                                                 
186
 See s 14 UCA. 
187
 See Ministry of Local Government 2000: 19. 
188
 The Herald „Mupandawana granted town status‟ (2014). 
189
 The Herald „Mupandawana granted town status‟ (2014).  
190
 The Herald „Mupandawana granted town status‟ (2014).  
 
 
 
 
161 
 
Chapter 4: Establishment of provinces and local authorities 
4.1 Procedural criteria 
In terms of the UCA, the process of changing local authority status begins with a local 
authority submitting an application to the Minister.
191
 Upon receipt of the application, the 
Minister is required to appoint a commission of inquiry to determine the application and 
make recommendations on the change of council status.
192
After the commission has 
determined the application on the basis of relevant factors (detailed below), the Minister is 
required to table before Parliament the report of the commission of inquiry, on the basis of 
which Parliament makes the decision whether to grant the change of status.
193
 If Parliament 
approves, the President „may‟ accord change of local authority status.194 The word „may‟ 
suggests that the President has the discretion to change the status of a local authority or not 
to. It is submitted that the President should not have any discretion once Parliament has 
passed a resolution on the change of status. 
The role of Parliament in change of local authority status can also be criticised on the grounds 
that it political survival rather than the best interests of local democracy usually takes 
precedence. Therefore, to guard against political interference, it is suggested that the 
responsibility to decide on any change of local authority status should be given to an 
independent body.
195
 Such an independent body could take the model of the ZEC and be 
assigned responsibility over the establishment of local authorities and determination of their 
boundaries, as argued above. This proposal will reduce opportunities where local authorities 
which do not qualify for a change of status can have such an upgrade not for the benefit of 
the local people but for mere political reasons. 
4.2 Substantive criteria 
The commission of inquiry appointed to make recommendations on change of local authority 
status is required to consider matters listed in the First Schedule of the UCA, titled „Matters 
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to be considered for city status‟.196 In practice, the factors listed in the First Schedule have 
been considered for change of local authority status between categories or classes of local 
authorities. Besides matters listed in the First Schedule, the Commission may consider any 
other issues that it considers relevant.
197
 For example, the Chakaipa Commission, which was 
appointed in 2000 to explore the possibility of granting city status to Masvingo Municipal 
Council, considered the ability of the council to comply with rules of financial management 
and service loans in addition to matters listed in the First Schedule.
198
 The matters listed in 
the First Schedule can be grouped into three categories, namely, economic activity, public 
services, inherent features and demography. 
4.2.1 Economic Activity 
The examination of economic activities is an integral part of the process of assessing an 
application for change of local authority status. The commission of inquiry is required to 
consider: 
 the extent of the influence of the local authority as a national centre for commercial, 
industrial, mining, agricultural, administrative and financial purposes;
199
 
 the standard of marketing and shopping facilities and the range of specialist, 
professional, banking and other financial services provided in the area concerned;
200
 
 the total value of property as shown in the valuation role and the ratios of the values 
of industrial, commercial and residential property;
201
 
 the growth rate of the municipality with reference to valuation of buildings, 
commercial and industrial facilities; and 
202
 
 the extent to which the municipality provides employment opportunities for 
inhabitants of the area and the range and variety of employment opportunities 
provided.
203
 
Economic activities in the relevant local authority area have a bearing on the fiscal capacity 
of the relevant local authority to finance its obligations.
204
 As argued in paragraph 6.2.1.1 of 
Chapter Two, the ability of a local government unit to raise its own revenue to finance 
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service delivery is important to promote local accountability.
205
 Matters under the economic 
category cover a range of economic activity in the concerned local authority area. These 
factors are relevant to assess the adequacy of the tax base and fiscal capacity of the local 
authority.
206
 An assessment of these factors will show whether the tax base will grow at the 
rate of growth of services needs or not.
207
 Further, the examination of commercial, industrial, 
mining, agricultural, administrative and financial activities is particularly crucial to establish 
the diversity of the local economy, which is important for local revenue-raising. Creating 
fiscally sound local governments tends to favour larger units with more diverse economies.
208
 
This is significant because the 2013 Constitution requires each local authority to have a sound 
financial base.
209
 
4.2.2 Public services 
The public services category covers the range of local services which a local authority 
provides to cater for the requirements of the community.
210
 In this category, attention is given 
to the level of performance when delivering local services such as fire-fighting, ambulances 
and public parking. The assessment criteria encompass an examination of the extent, quality 
and variety of educational amenities, educational facilities and recreational facilities.
211
 The 
level of performance when delivering public services is a rational basis for deciding whether 
a local authority deserves to have its status upgraded. The major question is whether the local 
authority has the capacity to govern the area by delivering on its service delivery mandate 
and development obligations.
212
 Are there spillovers in the delivery of certain local services? 
Are there economies of scale to maximise on? Satisfactory delivery of public services, among 
other factors, may be an indication that a local authority has the capacity to deliver and, thus, 
deserves an upgrade. The opposite may also be true. 
4.2.3 Inherent features 
The commission of inquiry is required to consider inherent features such as historical 
associations, religious significance, length of existence of the area and geographical 
                                                 
205
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importance of the area.
213
 The significance of some of these factors for a change of local 
authority status is questionable. For example, how does the consideration of the religious 
significance of an area or its length of existence assist in coming up with a rational decision 
of whether to grant change of local authority status? On the other hand, it is pertinent to 
consider the geographical significance of an area since it tends to have implications for 
economic development, including flow of economic activities. For example, local authorities 
which are geographically located close to border stations, such as Beitbridge, Chirundi and 
Plumtree, have had their status upgraded as the areas which they administer are important for 
the economy of the country. 
The commission is further required to consider the extent to which the municipality is a 
centre for state services;
214
 road, rail and air communication; postal and telecommunication 
services; the dissemination of information;
215
 and tourism and tourist facilities.
216
 These 
factors are crucial to determine whether a local authority qualifies for an upgrade of its status. 
The absence or presence of these factors is an important determinant for change of local 
authority status. For example, road and railway systems serve as important communication 
channels which a local authority requires for the purposes of delivering on its mandate and 
engaging with other governments. It is submitted that tourism and related facilities reflects 
the significance of the area, but it is not a primary determinant that should be considered on 
its own. Rather it should be examined as part of the economic activities in the area concerned. 
4.2.4 Demographic factors 
The commission of inquiry is required to examine the demographic composition of the 
concerned local authority area. When making recommendations on the proposed change of 
local authority status, the commission must consider the size and density of the population of 
the area concerned.
217
 In particular, the commission must take into account the proportion of 
the population living in flats, private homes and other residential structures.
218
 The 
commission of inquiry is also required to consider population growth rate in the area 
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concerned.
219
 The size and density of the population are relevant factors in determining 
whether to grant a local authority change of status. The more populated a local authority area 
is the more likely it is to require a higher category local authority to meet the increasing 
demand for public services. 
As highlighted above, the commission of inquiry may consider other factors it considers 
relevant in addition to those discussed above.
220
 It is submitted that the matters to be 
considered for change of local authority status listed in the First Schedule of the UCA form a 
rational base for determining an application for change of local authority status. If followed, 
the criteria will enable coordinated upgrading of local authority status to deserving local 
authorities. The criteria encourage better performance from local authorities since change of 
local authority status means that a local authority will exercise more powers and functions. It 
is however argued the criteria require rationalisation as some factors are not relevant for a 
change of local authority status. 
5. Legal nature of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities 
5.1 Provincial and metropolitan councils 
As discussed above, provincial and metropolitan councils are the middle tier of 
government.
221
 In terms of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, a provincial 
council is a body corporate with perpetual succession.
222
 On its own, a provincial council is 
capable of suing and being sued and in general, capable of „doing‟, „suffering‟ and 
„performing‟ „all‟ things imposed on it by legislation.223 As highlighted above, at the time of 
writing, the Provincial Councils and Administration Act had not been aligned with the 
Constitution by making provision for both provincial and metropolitan councils. It is 
submitted that it may no longer be correct to refer to provincial councils as body corporates 
as they are now constitutional bodies which owe their existence to the Constitution. Body 
corporates is a term usually used to refer to bodies established by statutes. Thus, it may be 
necessary to review the status of provincial councils as recognised in the Provincial Councils 
and Administration Act. 
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5.2 Local authorities 
As highlighted above, the 2013 Constitution recognises local authorities as the lower tier of 
government.
224
 The RDCA provides that a rural local authority is a body corporate with 
perpetual succession and, in its own name, capable of suing and being sued.
225
 It further 
provides that a rural district council is generally capable of doing, suffering and performing 
all functions imposed on it by legislation.
226
 There is no similar provision in the UCA which 
governs the activities of urban local authorities. This requires reform of these pieces of 
legislation to provide some consistency in the statutory framework. The envisaged single- 
piece local government legislation may be an effective way to achieve such consistency. 
6. Conclusion 
Parliament, the ZEC and the President all have a role to play in the establishment of 
provinces and demarcation of provincial boundaries and delimitation of wards. While the 
Constitution provides for the demarcation of provincial and district boundaries and 
delimitation of wards, it does not provide for the demarcation of local boundaries. It also does 
not prescribe how local authorities are to be established. In terms of the UCA and RDCA, the 
President and Minister play a central role in the establishment of both urban and rural local 
authorities. It was argued that this statutory framework does not adequately provide for 
citizen participation in the establishment of local authorities, even though such governance 
processes have great consequences on the lives of citizens. The UCA does not provide for the 
consultation of municipal and town councils when establishing a new local authority – 
contrary to the 2013 Constitution, which seeks to promote cooperative governance.
227
 Some 
of the deficiencies identified in the statutory framework may be resolved if the statutory 
framework, the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, RDCA and UCA is aligned with 
the Constitution. 
Once provinces and local authorities have been established, how do they govern? This 
question will be answered in the following chapter on governance structures and procedures 
of provinces and local authorities. 
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Chapter 5 
Governance structures 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the establishment of provinces and local authorities in 
Zimbabwe. This chapter examines governance structures and processes at the provincial and 
local levels against the normative framework set in Chapter Two. The key design features 
relevant for the purposes of this chapter are political and administrative autonomy, 
supervision and intergovernmental cooperation. The extent to which a multilevel system of 
government will promote development, democracy and sustainable peace depends in part on 
the nature of these governance structures and processes. The first section discusses the 
composition of provincial and metropolitan councils. It then examines the election, removal 
from office and responsibilities of chairpersons of provincial and metropolitan councils. In 
the following section, the chapter analyses the role of committees and administrative 
structures of provincial and metropolitan councils. After examining governance structures 
and processes at the provincial level, the chapter analyses similar structures and processes at 
the local level. In the last section, the chapter discusses the role of the institution of traditional 
leadership given that it is an important governance structure in rural local governance besides 
rural local authorities. 
2. Provincial and metropolitan councils 
2.1 Composition 
It was contended in Chapter Two that a multilevel system of government may promote 
development, democracy and sustainable peace if certain design features form part of the 
legal and institutional design.
1
 A legal and institutional design which guarantees political 
participation of the citizens was highlighted as one of these key features.
2
 An important 
component of political participation is the direct election of local leaders by voters to foster 
local accountability, among other benefits.
3
 It was further contended that subnational 
governments be as representative as possible of the diversity of society, especially 
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2
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marginalised groups.
4
 As will be observed, the composition of provincial and metropolitan 
councils complies with this normative framework, although not adequately. It was 
highlighted in Chapter Three that non-metropolitan and metropolitan provinces are 
administered by provincial and metropolitan councils, respectively.
5
 As shown in the diagram 
below, the composition of these two councils is slightly different. 
2.1.1 Provincial councils 
As shown in Figure 12 below, provincial councils are composed of officials directly and 
indirectly elected. Section 268(1) of the Constitution provides that a provincial council 
consists of: 
 the chairperson of the council; 
 members of the National Assembly in the province; 
 six women National Assembly Members from the province; 
 six senators from the province 
 two senator chiefs; 
 mayors and chairpersons of local authorities in the province; and 
 ten directly elected councillors.6 
The president and deputy president of the National Council of Chiefs are also members of the 
provincial council in their respective provinces.
7
 Section 14(1) of the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act provides for the composition of provincial councils by provincial 
governors, mayors, chairpersons, councillors, chiefs and individuals who are appointed by the 
President.
8
 The President no longer has powers to appoint members of the provincial council 
under the 2013 Constitution. It is submitted that section 14(1) is inconsistent with the 2013 
Constitution. Hence, the section should be aligned with the Constitution.
9
 
                                                 
4
 See Bockenforde 2011: 16, the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 6. 
5
 See para 5.2. 
6
 The councillors are elected under a party list system of proportional representation which is based on the votes 
cast for candidates representing political parties in the province concerned in the general election for Members 
of the National Assembly. For an individual to be elected as a councillor on the provincial council, he or she 
should be qualified for election as a Member of the National Assembly. See s 268(2)(3) Constitution. 
7
 S 268(1)(d) Constitution.  
8
 S 14(1) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
9
 See Musekiwa 2014: 2. 
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Figure 12: Composition of provincial and metropolitan councils 
 
2.1.2 Metropolitan council 
Metropolitan councils are composed of: 
 members of the National Assembly in the province; 
 six women National Assembly Members from the province; 
 six senators from the province; 
 the mayors and deputy mayors and the chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of all 
local authorities in the province; and 
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 the mayor of the city in the province.10 
In the case of Harare Metropolitan Province, the mayor of Harare and the mayor or 
chairperson of the second-largest local authority make up the metropolitan council, while in 
Bulawayo Metropolitan Province the mayor of Bulawayo is the chairperson of the 
metropolitan council.
11
 Unlike in provincial councils, there is no provision for ten elected 
provincial councillors and chiefs in the composition of metropolitan councils. The argument 
is that since there are no distinct chieftainships in metropolitan provinces, unlike in other 
provinces, there is no need to make provision for the representation of chiefs in these 
provinces. 
2.1.3 General Analysis 
The 2013 Constitution strives to deepen representative democracy at the provincial level. It is 
submitted however that the Constitution falls short of fully promoting democracy since it 
does not give citizens in the province an opportunity to directly elect their leaders at 
provincial level.
12
 While members of the National Assembly are elected officials, they are not 
directly elected to be members of the provincial council. The same applies to mayors and 
chairpersons of local authorities. Chiefs are also not elected by the citizens but by their 
respective provincial assemblies to sit on provincial councils. The ten councillors are the only 
members of the provincial council who are directly elected by citizens.
13
 They are however 
not present in metropolitan councils. The method of electing the ten councillors is 
commendable in light of democracy since it guarantees the representation of women, who 
often lack representation in decision-making structures in government. The ten councillors 
are elected under a party list system of proportional representation in which male and female 
candidates are listed alternately, every list being headed by a female candidate.
14
 This method 
of election guarantees women representation on the provincial council. 
The domination of provincial and metropolitan councils by indirectly elected officials brings 
into question the accountability of members of the provincial council to the citizens of the 
                                                 
10
 S 269(1)(c)(d)(e)(f) Constitution. 
11
 S 269(1)(a)(b) Constitution. 
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 See Moyo 2013: 152; the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 6, 8; Article 3(2) European Charter of Local Self-
Government. 
13
 See Musekiwa 2014: 3. 
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province.
15
 Members of Parliament are more likely to commit themselves to the activities of 
the national government, while mayors and chairpersons are more likely to commit 
themselves to their local authorities than to the provincial or metropolitan council as a 
government structure.
16
 However, it is argued that even though the majority of members of 
the provincial and metropolitan councils are not directly elected officials, they are 
nonetheless democratically elected representatives.
17
 These officials might not be directly 
accountable to the provincial electorate but are however accountable to their constituencies 
within the province. Thus, they have legitimacy to govern which they derive from their 
constituencies. It is submitted that even though the democratic gains represented by the 2013 
Constitution are limited, in as far as composition of provincial and metropolitan councils is 
concerned, they nevertheless provide a foundation upon which representative democracy at 
the provincial level can be nurtured.
18
 
2.2 Termination of membership 
It was contended in Chapter Two that the legal framework governing a multilevel system of 
government should guard against arbitrary removal from office of elected officials of the 
subnational governments by officials of senior government(s).
19
 The 2013 Constitution 
provides safeguards against arbitrary removal from office of members of provincial and 
metropolitan councils. Members of Parliament and councillors cease to be members of the 
provincial or metropolitan council if they cease to be Members of Parliament or a local 
authority, respectively.
20
 A provincial councillor ceases to be a member of the provincial 
council only in circumstances set out in section 129 of the Constitution,
21
 which applies to 
Members of Parliament.
22
 Members of provincial and metropolitan councils may not be 
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 Chigwata & De Visser 2013: 3. 
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 Chigwata & De Visser 2013: 3. See also Chatiza 2014: 4, Makumbe 1996: 42. 
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 S 268(4)(a)(b) Constitution. See s 129 Constitution. 
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 In terms of section 129 of the Constitution, a seat of a Member of Parliament becomes vacant on the 
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councillors may be removed from office by an independent tribunal. See s 278 Constitution. 
22
 S 268(4)(c) Constitution. 
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removed from office except on these grounds. This requirement has provided safeguards to 
members of provincial and metropolitan councils which were not available under the 
Lancaster House Constitution.
23
 Under the Lancaster House Constitution the President could 
remove some members of provincial councils from office at any time.
24
 It is submitted that 
section 16 of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, which provides for the removal 
from office of some members of the provincial council by the President, is inconsistent with 
the 2013 Constitution.
25
 Thus, the section should be aligned with the Constitution.
26
 
2.3 Election of the chairperson 
Among other matters, democracy means that public officials at subnational level are 
primarily accountable to the citizens of the area they administer.
27
 One of the mechanisms of 
promoting local accountability of public officials is by ensuring that public officials are 
directly elected by the citizens in the area concerned. As submitted in Chapter Two, the direct 
election of local leaders provides voters with an opportunity to evaluate their performance 
and gives such leaders the legitimacy to govern, which is important for building sustainable 
peace.
28
 As will be observed below, the 2013 Constitution strives to reap these benefits 
associated with the direct election of leaders at subnational level. 
2.3.1 Provincial councils 
Unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, which made provision for the appointment of 
provincial governors by the President to chair provincial councils,
29
 the 2013 Constitutions 
requires provincial councils to be chaired by chairpersons.
30
 The chairperson is elected by the 
provincial council on its first sitting after every general election from a list of at least two 
qualified persons submitted by the political party which gained the highest number of 
National Assembly seats in the province concerned.
31
 This means that the chairperson of the 
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 See Bland 2010: 55. 
24
 See paragraph 5.2 of Chapter Three. See also s 16 Provincial Councils and Administration Act.  
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 S 16(1)(e) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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 See Chatiza 2014: 4, Musekiwa 2014: 3. 
27
 See Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006: 13. 
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 S 3(1) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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 S 272(1) Constitution. 
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Members of the National Assembly recommends the names of individuals for appointment as the chairperson. 
Political parties are required to recommend for appointment as chairperson of a provincial council individuals 
who are qualified for election as a Member of the Senate. See s 272(1)(b) and s 272(2) Constitution. 
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provincial council does not necessarily have to be a member of the provincial council. The 
implication of this method of electing chairpersons is that chairpersons of provincial councils 
are not going to be directly accountable to the citizens of their respective provinces but to the 
political parties which recommended their appointment.
32
 The changes brought about by the 
2013 Constitution in the election of chairpersons of provincial councils means that section 
3(1) of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act is inconsistent with the new 
constitutional order. The section provides for the appointment of provincial governors (who, 
as stated above, previously chaired provincial councils) by the President.
33
 Thus, the section 
has to be aligned with the Constitution.
34
 
The 2013 Constitution has reduced the powers of the President since he or she no longer has 
the power to appoint chairpersons of provincial councils and thus limits the scope for 
(re)deployments of party cadres by the President.
35
 Under the Lancaster House Constitution, 
the appointment and role of provincial governors reflected that they were agencies of the 
national government at the provincial level.
36
 Through provincial governors the President had 
effective control of the provinces. 
2.3.2 Metropolitan councils 
The metropolitan council of the Metropolitan Province of Harare is chaired by the Mayor of 
the City of Harare.
37
 The mayor or chairperson of the second-largest urban local authority in 
Harare Metropolitan Province is the deputy chairperson of the Harare Metropolitan Council.
38
 
The Metropolitan Province of Bulawayo is chaired by the Mayor of the City of Bulawayo.
39
 
The role of mayors in chairing metropolitan councils presents a democratic benefit since they 
are indirectly elected officials, unlike provincial governors who are appointed officials.
40
 The 
major question nonetheless is whether the mayors will be able to deliver on both positions of 
the chairperson of the metropolitan council and that of a mayor. Mayors are likely to deliver 
on both roles given that they have only ceremonial duties at the local level which gives them 
enough time to deal with provincial matters. 
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2.3.3 Ministers of State for provincial affairs 
After the harmonised elections held in July 2013, the President in terms of powers bestowed 
on him by the Constitution appointed a number of ministers to oversee various portfolios.
41
 
Ten of these ministers, known as Ministers of State for Provincial Affairs (provincial 
ministers), are charged with overseeing governance in the ten provinces. The position of 
provincial minister is not provided for in the Constitution, nor are they elected.
42
 A number of 
questions can be raised with regard to this development given that the Constitution makes 
provision for chairpersons of provincial council who more or less are expected to exercise 
similar responsibilities. What is the relationship between chairpersons of provincial and 
metropolitan councils, and provincial ministers? Will the two structures operate as parallel 
structures at the provincial level? Are provincial ministers former provincial governors by 
another name?
43
 What is the implication of the role of provincial ministers on decentralised 
governance? 
The exact role of provincial ministers is known to the President, but their exact relationship 
with provincial and metropolitan councils is unclear.
44
 However, three independent views on 
their role are offered here. Provincial ministers could be temporary positions established to 
fill the governance void before the establishment of provincial and metropolitan councils.
45
 
As highlighted in Chapter Three, as of July 2014, provincial and metropolitan councils had 
not been established, for they were awaiting enactment of the relevant legislation. This means 
that once the councils have been established, provincial ministers will be abolished. The other 
view is that, once provincial councils have been established, provincial ministers will be 
appointed as chairpersons of these councils.
46
 This option is only feasible in eight non-
metropolitan provinces where, after the 2013 Presidential Elections, ZANU-PF received the 
highest number of parliamentary seats in these provinces, therefore giving it the right to 
recommend individuals for appointment as chairpersons of provincial councils.
47
 In the 
metropolitan provinces of Harare and Bulawayo provinces, on the other hand, the MDC has 
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 See Machingauta et al 2014: 18. 
45
 See Local Governance Community Capacity Building and Development Trust 2014: 6. 
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the right to recommend names of individuals for appointment since the party received the 
highest number of parliamentary seats after the 2013 Presidential Elections. Thus, this 
probability depends on election outcomes. 
The other view is that provincial ministers could have been established to act as a parallel 
structure of governance at provincial level along with provincial and metropolitan councils. 
This view is supported by the fact that unlike former provincial governors (who reported to 
the President through the Minister responsible for local government), provincial ministers 
report directly to the President.
48
 If this is the accurate explanation, while perhaps motivated 
by the need to ensure greater coordination of government activities at the provincial level, the 
role of provincial ministers presents a significant challenge to decentralised governance and 
is arguably against the spirit of devolution enshrined in the 2013 Constitution. Provincial 
ministers are likely to compete with provincial and metropolitan councils – the constitutional 
bodies established to administer provinces.
49
 Tension between these two structures is likely to 
develop especially in provinces where different political parties occupy the position of the 
provincial minister and chairperson of the provincial and metropolitan councils, or command 
majority in the provincial or metropolitan council. 
2.4 Removal from office of the chairperson of the provincial or metropolitan 
council 
As argued above, it is important for local democracy that senior governments do not 
arbitrarily remove officials of subnational governments from their positions.
50
 Elected 
officials at subnational level should be removed from office after following due process of 
the law. The 2013 Constitution protects chairpersons of provincial councils from being 
arbitrarily removed from their positions. It provides for four ways in which the chairperson of 
the provincial council can vacate his or her position.
51
 A chairperson of the provincial council 
vacates his or her office: 
a) after tendering a resignation to the provincial council,52 
b) on the day on which the provincial council first meet after a general election, 
c) if he or she becomes disqualified to be a member of the provincial council, or 
                                                 
48
 See Local Governance Community Capacity Building and Development Trust 2014: 7. 
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d) upon removal by the provincial council or an independent tribunal. 
This shows that the national government plays no role in removing a chairperson of 
provincial councils from office. The Constitution does not provide such protection for 
chairpersons of metropolitan councils. In fact, the Constitution does not detail how 
chairpersons of metropolitan councils may be removed from office. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight, the Constitution provides for the removal of mayors by an independent 
tribunal.
53
 Once the mayor has been dismissed, he or she automatically loses the position of 
chairperson of the metropolitan council. The question is whether the mayor as the chairperson 
of the metropolitan council can be removed from office. While there is no explicit 
constitutional provision providing for the removal of chairpersons of metropolitan councils, it 
is submitted that chairpersons of metropolitan councils should be removed from office in 
similar circumstances which apply to chairpersons of provincial councils. Further, it is argued 
that once a chairperson of the metropolitan council is removed from office he or she should 
automatically lose his or her position as mayor. This is to avoid a situation where the 
chairperson of the metropolitan council is removed from office but remains the mayor at the 
local level. What follows is a discussion of the removal of chairpersons by the provincial 
council and an independent tribunal. 
2.4.1 Removal from office by the provincial council 
A chairperson of the provincial council may be removed from office upon a resolution passed 
by at least two-thirds of the total membership of the provincial council.
54
 The power of the 
council to remove the chairperson of the council is a commendable development since it has 
the potential to foster the accountability of the chairperson to the provincial council.
55
 It may 
also foster better performance on the part of chairpersons since they risk being voted out by 
members of the provincial council if they underperform.
56
 It is submitted that section 8(2)(b) 
of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, which provides for the removal of 
chairpersons of provincial councils from office by the President, is inconsistent with the 2013 
Constitution. The President no longer has such powers. In that way, the 2013 Constitution has 
reduced the scope for politically motivated removal from office of chairpersons of provincial 
                                                 
53
 See s 278(2) Constitution. 
54
 S 272(6)(c) Constitution. 
55
 See also Smith 2007: 202. 
56
 Chigwata & De Visser 2013: 5. 
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councils.
57
 It has provided safeguards for chairpersons which were not available to provincial 
governors. Thus, section 8(2)(b) should be aligned with the Constitution.
58
 
2.4.2 Removal from office by an independent tribunal 
The chairperson of the provincial council may be removed from office by an independent 
tribunal established in terms of an Act of Parliament.
59
 The independent tribunal may remove 
chairpersons of the provincial councils only on the grounds of: 
a) inability to perform the functions of their office due to mental or physical incapacity; 
b) gross incompetence; 
c) gross misconduct; 
d) conviction of an offence involving dishonesty, 
e) corruption or abuse of office; or 
f) wilful violation of the law, including a local authority by-law.
60
 
As at July 2014, like all other structures related to provincial and metropolitan councils, the 
tribunal had not been established yet. The removal from office of political office-bearers such 
as the chairperson of the provincial council by an independent tribunal is a new phenomenon 
in the Zimbabwe. The role of the tribunal ensures independent review of the conduct of 
chairpersons. It is also an effective mechanism of ensuring that elected officials at 
subnational level are not removed from office by senior governments for mere political 
reasons.
61
 As will be argued in Chapter Eight, there is a need for legislation to provide 
content to these grounds as they are broadly captured in the Constitution.
62
 It is also not clear 
whether the tribunal will monitor the day-to-day activities of the chairpersons of provincial 
council or whether the tribunal will operate like a court where a citizen or organisation has to 
lodge a complaint before it can investigate the conduct of a chairperson. There is also the 
possibility of overlap between the role of the provincial council and that of the tribunal. The 
overlap is examined below. 
                                                 
57
 Moyo 2013: 153, Chigwata & De Visser 2013: 5. 
58
 See Musekiwa 2014: 2. 
59
 S 272(6) Constitution. The Constitution requires the establishment of an independent tribunal to exercise the 
function of removing chairpersons of provincial council from office. 
60
 S 272(7) Constitution. 
61
 See Bland 2010: 55. 
62
 See para 7.4.2. 
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2.4.3 Overlap between the role of the provincial council and independent tribunal 
There is potential for confusion of roles between the provincial council and the independent 
tribunal with respect to the removal from office of chairpersons. As mentioned above, the 
provincial council may remove the chairperson of the provincial council on a resolution 
supported by at least two-thirds of the total membership of the council.
63
 The challenge is to 
define the boundaries of power of the provincial councils and independent tribunal to remove 
chairpersons. Does the power of the provincial councils include removal of chairpersons 
based on those grounds applicable to the tribunal? In practical terms, if the provincial council 
found the chairperson guilty of corruption may it remove the chairperson from office on that 
ground, which is one of the grounds upon which the tribunal may remove chairpersons from 
office? Another scenario could be the failure by the chairperson to implement decisions of the 
provincial council due to gross incompetence. Could the council dismiss the chairperson in 
such a scenario, given that „gross incompetency‟ is a ground upon which the tribunal may 
remove the chairperson from office? It is submitted that such conduct by the provincial 
council will amount to an encroachment into the functional area of the tribunal, which is 
constitutionally protected. Instead, it is suggested that the role of the provincial council 
should be limited to the removal of chairpersons on any other grounds than those which apply 
to the independent tribunal.
64
 The role confusion may be reduced if the removal of 
chairpersons by the provincial council is limited to one ground. The council should only 
remove the chairperson of the provincial council from office if it no longer has confidence in 
the chairperson based on political judgements. In all other cases, the council should refer the 
matter for the attention of the independent tribunal. 
2.5 Functions of chairpersons of a provincial or metropolitan councils 
The Constitution directs Parliament to enact a law providing for the functions of chairpersons 
of provincial and metropolitan councils.
65
 At the time of writing, the relevant act had not 
been enacted. Under the Lancaster House Constitution, provincial governors were charged 
with chairing provincial councils. They also exercised other responsibilities, including: 
                                                 
63
 See s 272(5)(c) Constitution. 
64
 See s 272(7) Constitution. 
65
 S 273(1)(b) Constitution. 
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a) coordinating the activities of various agencies of the national government operating at 
the provincial level,
66
 
b) coordinating the formulation and implementation of development plans in their 
provinces,
67
 and 
c) performing any other functions within or on behalf of their provinces that may be 
conferred upon them by law.
 68
 
It is proposed that in addition to these duties, chairpersons of provincial and metropolitan 
councils should be given responsibilities that reflect the wide range of functions which 
provincial and metropolitan councils are supposed to carry out under the 2013 Constitution.
69
 
For example, chairpersons could oversee the preparation and implementation of policies, 
including budgets, of the council. This responsibility is vital given that each provincial or 
metropolitan council is entitled to a certain share of nationally raised revenue which it should 
spend on various socio-economic programmes.
70
 Chairpersons could also supervise the 
administrative arm of the council to ensure effective implementation of policies. If the 
national government assigns law-making powers to provincial and metropolitan councils, the 
chairpersons could initiate laws for approval by the council. 
2.6 Committees of provincial and metropolitan councils 
It was contended in Chapter Two that subnational governments may respond better to the 
demands of their localities if they are authorised to determine as far as possible their own 
internal structures.
71
 It was further contended that such authority to determine internal 
structures allows subnational governments to adapt their structures to local needs and to 
ensure effective management.
72
 The 2013 Constitution has given provincial and metropolitan 
councils the authority to establish various committees to effectively discharge their 
functions.
73
 While giving provincial and metropolitan councils the power to determine the 
number of such committees, the Constitution specifies that such committees „must‟ be 
presided over by provincial councillors, as in the case of provincial councils.
74
 It is suggested 
                                                 
66
 S 10(a)(b) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
67
 S 10(c) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
68
 S 10(d) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
69
 See s 270(1) Constitution. 
70
 The equitable share will be discussed in para 4.2 of Chapter Seven. 
71
 See para 6.3.3. See also UN-Habitat 2009: 12. 
72
 UN-Habitat 2007: 8. 
73
 S 271 Constitution. 
74
 S 271 read together with s 268(1)(h) Constitution. In metropolitan councils, s 271 provides that the 
committees „must‟ be presided over by a member appointed in term of section 269(1)(h) of the Constitution. 
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that in metropolitan councils the committee should be presided over by mayors, deputy 
mayors, chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of local authorities.
75
 The autonomy given to 
provincial and metropolitan councils to establish their internal governance structures is 
commendable. It will allow each provincial or metropolitan council to adapt its governance 
structures to the needs of its province.
76
 
2.7 Administrative structures 
The 2013 Constitution gives Parliament the discretion to decide whether provincial and 
metropolitan councils should exercise any form of authority over internal administrative 
structures and procedures.
77
 Thus, as under the Lancaster House Constitution, the autonomy 
of provincial and metropolitan councils to set their internal administrative structures and 
procedures is not guaranteed.
78
 The situation has to a certain extent been changed by the 2013 
Constitution.
79
 The Constitution upgraded provincial and metropolitan councils from being 
mere extensions of the national government to governments in their own right.
80
 Therefore, it 
is submitted that provincial and metropolitan councils should be given the authority to 
establish their own administrative structures.
81
 Further, national legislation should provide the 
framework within which provincial and metropolitan councils exercise such authority. For 
example, the legislation may provide for the establishment of the post of an administrative 
head who will be supported by a team of other administrative officials. Other administrative 
officials may lead sub-administrative structures as determined by the provincial or 
metropolitan council. To foster accountability of the administrative officials to the council, it 
is suggested that the head of administration should be appointed by the council.
82
 The 
                                                                                                                                                        
Such a section does not exist. It is submitted that such inconsistency should be regarded as a „typo-error‟ rather 
than a substantive omission. 
75
 See s 269(1)(f) Constitution. 
76
 See Chatiza 2014: 5. 
77
 S 273(1)(a) Constitution. 
78
 See Machingauta et al 2014: 30. Under the Lancaster House Constitution, the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act made provision for the establishment of provincial development committees and other 
committees. These committees were composed of a majority of officials of the national government placed at 
the provincial level, some of members appointed by the Minister and senior officials of local authorities in the 
province concerned. They were the technical arm of the provincial council but were mainly responsible for 
provincial development planning and implementation. The domination of the committees by officials of the 
national government meant that provincial councils were merely extensions of the national government, with no 
administrative autonomy. See ss 26, 31, 26(1)(2) and 28 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. See also 
Keulder 1998: 188; Makumbe 1996: 49. 
79
 See Preamble of Chapter 14 Constitution, Musekiwa 2014: 4. 
80
 See s 5 Constitution. 
81
 Chatiza 2014: 5. See also Musekiwa 2014: 4, the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 9. 
82
 See Local Government Project, CLC 2008: 29-36. 
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administrative head should be given the responsibility to appoint other administrative 
officials. This proposal will mean that each council will have its own administrative structure 
independent of the national government.
83
 It will promote effective implementation of 
policies of provincial and metropolitan councils since the administrative officials will be 
directly accountable to the council and not to the national government. 
Having examined governance structures at the provincial level, the chapter will proceed to 
analyse similar structures at the local level. 
3. Local Authorities 
Local authorities in Zimbabwe are governed by an elected council which exercises both 
legislative and executive powers.
84
 As shown in the diagram below, in exercising these 
powers, a council is required to organise itself into various committees. The council is 
supported by administrative officials, led by the town clerk in the case of city and municipal 
councils. In town councils and local boards the council is supported by an administrative arm 
led by a secretary, while in rural local authorities it is led by the chief executive officer. The 
mayor is the political head in city and municipal councils, whereas in town councils, local 
boards and rural local authorities it is the chairperson. The council, the mayor or chairperson, 
committees of the council and the administrative arm of a local authority council are the main 
governance structures at the local level. These structures will be examined in this section. 
                                                 
83
 The Provincial and Metropolitan Councils Draft Bill has given provincial and metropolitan councils such 
authority. 
84
 See s 38 UCA and s 8(1) RDCA. 
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Figure 13: Governance structures of a local authority 
 
3.1 The Council 
3.1.1 Composition of a council 
It was contended in Chapter Two that officials at local level should be elected by the voters 
within the area concerned.
85
 As highlighted above, the direct election of local leaders by the 
voters fosters the accountability of such officials to the citizens and can enforce better 
performance of local leaders.
86
 The 2013 Constitution has recognised the need to have local 
leaders directly elected by the voters. It requires that „all‟ members of local authorities 
                                                 
85
 See para 6.1.1.1. See also the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 6, 8; Article 3(2) European Charter of Local Self-
Government. 
86
 See UN-HABITAT 2007: 3; Bahl 1999: 5, 61. 
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(councillors) be directly elected by registered voters within the areas which the local 
authorities are established to administer.
87
 Thus, unlike under the Lancaster House 
Constitution where some councillors were elected and others were appointed by the 
Minister,
88
 the 2013 Constitution seeks to advance local democracy as it only makes 
provision for directly elected councillors.
89
 
The system of appointment of a certain number of councillors by the Minister was not only 
undemocratic but controversial.
90
 Although the appointed councillors could not vote, their 
role in council undermined democratic governance. There are allegations that the Minister 
(ab)used the power to appoint a certain number of councillors by appointing individuals 
aligned to ZANU-PF as special interest councillors, at the expense of targeted groups.
91
 
These allegations are supported by an empirical study carried out by De Visser and Mapuva 
in 20 major urban local authorities.
92
 They found that out of 57 appointed councillors in these 
urban local authorities only 2 were affiliated to the MDC while 55 were aligned to ZANU-
PF.
93
 The controversy surrounding the appointment of councillors clearly indicates there was 
tension between the notion of democratically elected councils and the central appointment of 
ministerial representatives to that council.
94
 Thus, the 2013 Constitution is commendable in 
this regard as it has resolved this tension. It is submitted that section 4A of the UCA and 
section 11 of the RDCA, which provides for the composition of councils by elected and 
appointed councillors, is now inconsistent with the Constitution.
95
 Hence, the provisions have 
to be aligned with the Constitution so that provision is made for directly elected councillors 
only.
96
 
                                                 
87
 S 265(2) Constitution. See also s 274(2) and s 275(2)(b) Constitution. Councillors are elected under the first-
past-the-post electoral system.  
88
 S 4A UCA and Ss 11, s 31 RDCA.  
89
 See Chatiza 2014: 1, 4; Musekiwa 2014: 7; Mandiyanike 2013: 2, 8; Sims 2013: 23. 
90
 Sims 2013: 17. The system of appointing councillors in urban local authorities was only introduced in 2008. 
In rural local authorities the appointment of special interests councillors dates back to the pre-independence era. 
Appointed councillors are ideally appointed to represent specific interests of certain groups – such as women, 
business communities and the disabled – on the council of a local authority, which may not be adequately 
protected or represented through the ballot. 
91
 Mandondo & Mapedza 2003: 12, Sims 2013: 17-18. 
92
 See De Visser & Mapuva 2013: 170-1. 
93
 De Visser & Mapuva 2013: 13. The survey also reveals „arbitrary implementation‟ of the special interests 
clause given the inconsistency in the numbers of appointed councillors in local authorities and the failure by the 
Minister to appoint councillors in some local authorities. There is no positive evidence to suggest that the 
appointment of councillors to represent specific interests, such as marginalised groups, has resulted in improved 
participation of such groups. 
94
 Chigwata & De Visser 2013: 5. 
95
 See also s 31 RDCA. See Machingauta et al 2014: 20. 
96
 See De Visser & Mapuva 2013: 173, Musekiwa 2014: 2. 
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3.1.2 Qualifications of councillors 
In paragraph 6.1.1.1 of Chapter Two it was contended that rules governing the election of 
councillors should prescribe a minimum level of educational qualifications for a councillor so 
that capable individuals are elected into office. In Zimbabwe, a person is qualified to be 
elected as a councillor if he or she: 
a) is a citizen of Zimbabwe, 
b) has attained the age of twenty-one years, 
c) is enrolled in the voters roll for the council area concerned, and 
d) is not disqualified in terms of section 19(2) of the Electoral Act.97 
This means that anyone with or without primary and/or secondary education may be elected 
as a councillor. In practice, most councillors possess basic literacy qualifications but are less 
educated compared to senior administrative officials of local authorities.
98
 A study carried out 
by Bland in 2010 found that more than 14 per cent of councillors had no more than a primary 
school education and only 20 per cent had a university degree, diploma or certificate.
99
 It 
revealed that most local authorities have councillors with low education levels. This brings 
into question the ability of these councillors to effectively deliver on their mandate, especially 
where this involves technical issues such as budgets and strategic plans.
100
 
It is argued that a majority of councillors lack the competence to conceptualise, formulate, 
manage and evaluate policies, programmes and legislation, including holding administrative 
officials accountable for their actions.
101
 Such incapacity adversely impacts the ability of a 
local authority to discharge its mandate. It is further argued that this challenge has provided 
administrative officials with an excuse for making decisions for the people, a duty which 
should be carried out by elected officials.
102
 Political parties have not implemented effective 
measures to redress this problem as they are reluctant to nominate candidates for election as 
councillors based on qualifications. Instead, nomination is based on popularity and allegiance 
                                                 
97
 S 119(1) Electoral Act s 185/2013. Section 119(2) of the Electoral Act disqualifies a person from being 
nominated as a councillor on a number of grounds, including: membership of another local authority, 
membership of Parliament, conviction of an offence involving dishonesty and suspension in terms of the UCA 
and RDCA. 
98
 Mandondo & Mapedza 2003: 14. 
99
 Bland 2010: 3. In the study, 250 local government officials in 15 local authorities were interviewed. 
100
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 27. See also Bland 2011: 343. 
101
 Sachikonye et al 2007: 94. 
102
 See Makumbe 1996: 112. 
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to the party. Hence, it is submitted that legislation should provide for minimum levels of 
education so that only capable individuals are elected to fill the positions of councillors. 
3.1.3 Remuneration of councillors 
It was contended in Chapter Two that some of the problems of decentralisation, such as 
corruption, may be minimised if senior governments exercise effective supervision of local 
governments.
103
 One way of supervising local governments is by setting limits for the 
remuneration of office-bearers at local level to guard against resource-wastage.
104
 In 
Zimbabwe, the national government not only has the power to set such limits but determines 
whether any form of remuneration should be given to councillors in a particular local 
authority. In terms of the UCA and RDCA, local authorities may provide a monthly personal 
allowance to councillors only with the consent of the Minister.
105
 The rate of the personal 
allowance is determined by the council but may not exceed a sum prescribed by the Minister. 
Local authorities may not provide a personal allowance to a councillor who fails to attend 
council proceedings for a period exceeding 30 consecutive days.
106
 Further, they may not 
provide a personal allowance to a councillor in any circumstances in which a by-law or 
standing order of the council prohibits such payment.
107
 It is submitted that while the powers 
of the Minister to set salary scales are essential, the Minister should not have the power to 
determine whether each local authority should provide monthly personal allowances to its 
councillors or not, as that would undermine the predictability of the regulatory framework. 
Furthermore, there are opportunities for abuse of these powers since the Minister has wide 
discretion. It is suggested that the requirement for the consent of the Minister should be 
abolished.
108
 However, the Minister should retain the power to set salary and remuneration 
scales. 
                                                 
103
 See para 5.1. See also the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 9. 
104
 See Eaton & Schroeder 2010: 175. 
105
 S 112(1) UCA and s 54(1) First Schedule, RDCA. Appointed councillors were entitled to the same benefits 
in every respect as if they were elected councillors. The Minister may also grant authority to an urban council to 
pay pensions to councillors and ex-councillors in special circumstances. S 113 UCA. 
106
 S 112(2)(a) UCA and s 54(2)(a), First Schedule, RDCA. 
107
 S 112(2)(b) UCA. 
108
 See Clause 15 Urban Councils Amendment Bill 2011 (a private members bill introduced to reduce the 
powers of the central government over local authorities so as to promote local democracy). 
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3.2 Internal proceedings 
It was contended in Chapter Two that local governments may respond better to the demands 
of their localities if they are authorised to determine as far as possible their own internal 
proceedings.
109
 The authority of local authorities in Zimbabwe to determine their internal 
proceedings will be examined in this section. Attention is given to the role of the mayor or 
chairperson, council meetings, the privileges and immunities of councillors and the rules 
governing their conduct. The section also seeks to examine the extent to which the internal 
proceedings of local authorities provide for accountable, transparent and participatory 
governance. 
3.2.1 The mayor or chairperson 
As highlighted above, city and municipal councils are led by a mayor, while town councils, 
local boards and rural local authorities are led by a chairperson. This section examines the 
election, functions, term of office, remuneration and removal from office of mayors and 
chairpersons. 
3.2.1.1 Election 
The 2013 Constitution makes provision for the role of ceremonial mayors or chairpersons but 
does not prohibit the establishment of the post of an executive mayor or chairperson.
110
 It 
gives Parliament the discretion to determine whether there should be executive mayors or not. 
In the event that Parliament decides to establish the post of an executive mayor or 
chairperson, the Constitution requires such mayors or chairpersons to be directly elected by 
voters.
111
 The position of executive mayors is not new to Zimbabwe. It was highlighted in 
Chapter Three that at independence urban local authorities were led by ceremonial mayors.
112
 
In 1996, the UCA was amended to establish the post of a directly elected executive mayor to 
strengthen representative democracy and enforce local accountability.
113
 It is argued that 
ZANU-PF had almost a total majority in all urban local authorities and therefore it had 
nothing to fear by creating the office of a popularly elected executive mayor.
114
 In 2008, the 
                                                 
109
 See para 6.3.3. See also UN-Habitat 2009: 8, 12. 
110
 See s 274(5) and s 277(2) Constitution. 
111
 S 274(5) Constitution. 
112
 See para 4.2.2. See also Jonga & Chirisa 2009: 177. 
113
 Kamete 2006: 259. See also Chakaipa 2010: 61, Muchadenyika 2014: 125. 
114
 Kamete 2006: 259. 
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post of executive mayor was abolished and replaced by that of a ceremonial mayor. The 
national government cited abuse of power, mismanagement and unsustainable remuneration 
packages of executive mayors (at the expense of service delivery) as the primary reasons 
behind its decision to reintroduce ceremonial mayors.
115
 Jonga and Chirisa however argue 
that the abolition of executive mayors was a political move aimed at reducing the power of 
the MDC which commanded majority support in almost all urban local authorities since the 
elections of the early 2000s.
116
 Despite the controversy associated with the abolition of 
executive mayors, it is recommended that Parliament should consider establishing the post of 
an executive mayor to promote local accountability and efficiency, especially in large local 
authorities.
117
 A small executive led by the mayor has the „ability to act more quickly, 
efficiently and responsively than a large legislature‟.118 Under such a system, the local 
legislature „acts as a check on the powers of the executive, and is able to ensure that the 
executive act in a manner consistent with its mandate‟. 119 The local legislature can „call both 
the executive and administration to account and is able to stimulate debate on policy issues 
and probe the implementation process.‟120 Under such a system, although their roles are 
distinct, both the executive and legislature had important role to play in enhancing local 
democracy and accountability and ensure that the local authority delivers on its service 
delivery and development mandates.
 121
 These advantages may be minimal in small councils: 
for example, those which have less than 15 councillors. In such councils, decisions may be 
taken as efficiently in plenary as through the establishment of a separate executive, as smaller 
forums tend to make decisions faster.
122
 Besides the accountability and efficiency benefits 
discussed above, executive mayors have the advantage of giving a face to local government 
and creating a strong focal point for local politics, which is not available under a system of 
ceremonial mayors.
123
 Thus, it is submitted that national legislation should provide for the 
role of executive mayors in large local authorities such as city and municipal councils while 
other local authorities may be administered by ceremonial mayors. 
                                                 
115
 See Chakaipa 2010: 61, Jonga & Chirisa 2009: 177. 
116
 Jonga & Chirisa 2009: 177. See also Muchadenyika 2014: 125. 
117
 Chigwata & De Visser 2013: 6. Machingauta et al 2014: 21. See also Musekiwa 2014: 3, Musekiwa & 
Mandiyanike 2013: 8. 
118
 White Paper on Local Government, South Africa 1998. 
119
 White Paper on Local Government 1998. 
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 White Paper on Local Government 1998. 
121
 See White Paper on Local Government 1998. 
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Ceremonial mayors or chairpersons, on the other hand, are elected by councillors at the first 
meeting of the council following a general election.
124
 Unlike under the Lancaster House 
Constitution where a non-councillor could be elected a mayor or chairperson, the 2013 
Constitution requires ceremonial mayors and chairpersons to be elected by councillors from 
among the membership of the council.
125
 It is submitted therefore that section 103(1) of the 
UCA, which allows councillors to elect a non-councillor to be a mayor or chairperson, is 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Thus, the provision has to be aligned with the Constitution 
by providing for the election of the mayor or chairperson by councillors from among the 
membership of the council.
126
 
3.2.1.2 Functions 
Mayors or chairpersons carry out only ceremonial duties and do not have executive decision-
making powers.
127
 They preside over meetings of the council and in the event of an equality 
of votes on any matter before the council, the mayor or chairperson has a casting vote in 
addition to a deliberative vote.
128
 Outside the council chamber, the mayor is the political head 
who represents the local authority to the public by attending civic and other functions at 
which his or her presence has been requested. The mayor usually leads the delegation of the 
local authority when engaging with the national government or any other stakeholders. As 
head of the local authority, the mayor (and the town clerk) usually signs documents of the 
local authority and issues press statements reflecting the council‟s views and decisions.129 
The deputy mayor (or chairperson) performs the functions of the mayor (or chairperson) 
                                                 
124
 S 277(2) Constitution. See also s 103(1) UCA and s 45(1) RDCA. In rural local authorities, the Minister may 
also appoint the chairperson or vice-chairperson if the council fails to elect a chairperson or vice-chairperson. 
See s 45(2) RDCA. After electing a mayor or chairperson, councillors are required to elect a deputy mayor or 
deputy chairperson. A council may also elect an acting mayor or chairperson whenever the mayor and deputy 
mayor or chairperson and deputy chairperson are unable to carry out their duties. In rural local authorities, the 
Minister may also appoint an acting mayor or chairperson on behalf of the council. S 104(3) UCA and s 45(7) 
RDCA. 
125
 S 265(2) Constitution. See Musekiwa &Mandiyanike 2013: 12. 
126
 See Musekiwa 2014: 2. 
127
 Chairpersons, who head local boards and rural district councils, have always exercised ceremonial functions 
and never had executive decision-making powers. See Mushamba 2010: 103. 
128
 S 104(1) UCA. The mayor or chairperson may not exercise a casting vote for a council resolution to borrow 
money; see s 290(2)(a) UCA. A mayor or chairperson may also not exercise a casting vote when a person 
presiding over a meeting to elect a mayor or chairperson, deputy mayor or deputy chairperson is not a member 
of the council. S 103(7) UCA. 
129
 See Jordan 1984: 31. 
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whenever the mayor (or chairperson) is absent, incapacitated to carry out or fails to undertake 
his or her duties.
130
 
As highlighted above, the national government may establish the post of an executive mayor 
and require the council to delegate some of its executive decision-making powers to such 
mayors.
131
 In that case, the critical question becomes: how does the mayor as an individual 
exercise the executive decision-making powers especially given that in large local authorities 
additional political capacity may be needed? There are two broad options which can be 
borrowed from South Africa, which has fairly developed local political structures.
132
 The first 
is to allow the Mayor to constitute a mayoral committee by appointing a limited number of 
councillors to serve on the committee. In this case, the mayor delegates responsibilities to 
members of the committee but would remain accountable to council for the executive 
functions to the local authority.
133
 This option has the advantages of an individual executive, 
such as decisiveness and increased public visibility.
134
 The second option is to require the 
council to elect a collective executive („executive committee‟) chaired by the mayor. Under 
this system, the council delegates executive decision-making powers to the executive 
committee.
135
 By „spreading responsibility for executive functions across a number of 
councillors the [executive committee] can act as an effective method for building the capacity 
of emerging political leadership‟.136 It is submitted that national legislation could make 
provision for both the individual and collective executive options. In the event that the post of 
the executive mayor is established, it is recommended (on the South African model of local 
government) that provision should be made for the position of the speaker who should play a 
separate role to that of the mayor, including presiding over meetings of the council.
137
 
Effective oversight of the executive by the legislature requires the executive mayor not to be 
involved in chairing activities of the legislature such as presiding over council meetings. 
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3.2.1.3 Term of office 
It was contended in Chapter Two that the term of office of mayors (in particular, executive 
mayors) should be limited to reduce chances of local authoritarianism.
138
 The term of office 
of a mayor, chairperson, deputy mayor and deputy chairperson runs concurrently with the 
term of office of the President for a period of five years.
139
 The Constitution does not 
explicitly limit the term of office of mayors and chairpersons, nor do the UCA and RDCA. It 
however limits the term office of the President to a maximum of two five-year terms.
140
 It is 
submitted that national legislation should limit the term of office of mayors and chairpersons 
of local authorities to a maximum of two five-year terms, similar to the President. Limiting 
the term of office of mayors will be particularly important if Parliament decides to establish 
the post of executive mayors. Local authoritarianism is likely to develop under a system of 
unfixed terms of office.
141
 
3.2.1.4 Remuneration 
Mayors and chairpersons (as well as their deputies) of urban local authorities are paid a 
monthly allowance to cover general and personal expenses.
142
 The monthly allowance is 
determined by the council but may not exceed the rate prescribed by the Minister. It is 
submitted that the powers of the Minister to set a maximum limit for any form of 
remuneration of mayors and chairpersons falls within the framework of supervision, which is 
necessary to prevent corruption and resource-wastage at the local level.
143
 The RDCA is 
silent about the remuneration of chairpersons or deputy chairpersons in rural local authorities, 
although provision is made for the remuneration of councillors in general.
144
 It is suggested 
that a single piece of legislation should regulate the remuneration of councillors in all local 
authorities, taking into account the differences at local levels, including ability to remunerate 
political leaders and the class and category of local authority. 
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3.2.1.5 Removal and vacation from office 
As argued above, officials of senior governments should not arbitrarily remove locally 
elected officials from office as that would undermine local democracy.
145
 To safeguard local 
officials it may be necessary to recognise in legislation the grounds upon which local officials 
may be removed from office. In addition, it was contended in Chapter Two that there is need 
for oversight mechanisms on the exercise of such supervisory powers.
146
 The 2013 
Constitution has recognised the need to protect locally elected officials given the historical 
context where local leaders were unjustifiably removed from their positions by the national 
government.
147
 It is claimed that since the year 2000 some mayors were either suspended or 
dismissed from office for mere political reasons.
148
 Jonga argues that most of the mayors who 
were suspended or dismissed by the Minister since independence were aligned to the 
MDC.
149
 As will be argued in Chapter Eight, such politically motivated suspensions or 
dismissal of local officials could have occurred given that the UCA and RDCA gives the 
Minister unlimited powers to intervene in local affairs.
150
 These powers have been reformed 
by the 2013 Constitution, which provides for the manner in which a mayor or chairperson 
may be removed from office.
151
 As shall be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight, a mayor or 
chairperson does not vacate his or her seat except on these grounds.
152
 It is submitted 
therefore that section 114 of the UCA and section 157 of the RDCA, which provides for the 
removal from office of a mayor or chairperson by the national government, is inconsistent 
with the Constitution and have to be repealed. 
3.2.2 Council meetings 
This section discusses procedures relating to council meetings in both urban and rural local 
authorities. In particular, the section examines the calling and adjourning of meetings, 
minutes of proceedings, quorum, decision-making, validity of decisions and resolutions of a 
council. The examination will be carried against the backdrop of design features set in 
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Chapter Two, primarily citizen participation, accountability, transparency and administrative 
autonomy. 
3.2.2.1 Calling and adjourning of meetings 
The first meeting of a council is held at a place and date determined by the Minister.
153
 After 
the first meeting, the council decides the date and time of its meetings as well as the 
regulation of its proceedings.
154
 However, the council is required to hold ordinary meetings 
as soon as practicable after each general election and thereafter at least once a month.
155
 The 
mayor is required to call a special meeting of the council within 14 days at the request in 
writing by not less than one-third of the total membership of the council or of six 
councillors.
156
 The chamber secretary,
157
 in the case of city and municipal councils, and the 
secretary, in town councils and local boards, is charged with keeping minutes of all 
proceedings of the council and its committees.
158
 In rural local authorities, minutes of the 
council are kept by the chief executive officer.
159
 It is submitted that the regulation of who 
should keep minutes of the council is unnecessary and undermines administrative autonomy. 
It should be left to each individual council to determine who should keep minutes of 
proceedings of the council and its committees. While regulating the keeping of minutes, the 
UCA and RDCA does not make provision for how the public will be notified of meetings of 
the council. The absence of such a requirement may undermine citizen participation since 
citizens are unlikely to have the information relating to council meetings.
160
 It is submitted 
that legislation should require the chamber secretary or equivalent official in other local 
authorities to notify the public of the time, date and venue of every meeting of the council.
161
 
This is necessary to allow the public to make decisions relating to participation in council and 
committee meetings. 
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3.2.2.2 Quorum 
In urban local authorities, more than one-third of the total membership of a council 
constitutes a quorum.
162
 In rural local authorities, a quorum is constituted by not less than 
one-third of the total number of councillors entitled to sit on the council, in addition to the 
chairperson.
163
 The rationale behind the differences in quorum requirements between urban 
and rural authorities cannot be clearly justified. If there are not enough councillors to form a 
quorum, the Minister has the power to appoint caretakers or commissioners to act as the 
council until the council has enough councillors to form a quorum or a new council has been 
elected.
164
 
3.2.2.3 Decision-making 
At any meeting of the council all councillors present at that meeting are obliged to vote on 
any matter which is put to the vote.
165
 This implies that a councillor may not abstain from 
voting on any issue before the council. There is no similar requirement in rural local 
authorities. It is submitted that this requirement should be abolished as it is undemocratic to 
oblige councillors to vote on every issue before the council. Councillors should be allowed to 
abstain from voting if they so decide. In both urban and rural local authorities all matters or 
questions arising before the council are decided by a resolution passed by a majority of the 
vote cast.
166
 A council, on a resolution passed by two-thirds membership of the council, may 
hold a ballot or call a meeting of voters to ascertain their views on any matter which is before 
the council.
167
 It is submitted that this provision promotes direct citizen participation in 
council affairs. The problem, however, is its feasibility, especially in large local authorities 
such as Harare, which has over two million residents.
168
 In practice, more than 75% of 
decisions in both council and committee are taken unanimously and without discussion.
169
 In 
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the council, most issues before the council will have been dealt with by the relevant 
committee of the council (discussed below) and any differences among councillors are 
usually ironed out before the council meeting. As for committees, decisions are normally 
taken based on information and recommendations made by administrative heads of 
departments. In situations where a matter has been raised for discussion, there is a general 
tendency to try and find a consensus rather than resort to a vote.
170
 
3.2.2.4 Alteration or rescission of council resolutions or decisions 
A council may alter or rescind any of its resolutions.
171
 A notice of motion to rescind or alter 
the resolution has to be supported by not less than one-third of council membership.
172
 In 
rural local authorities, the Minister may direct a council to rescind or alter any resolution 
passed at a meeting of the council.
173
 As shall be argued in paragraph 5.7 of Chapter Eight, 
these powers of the Minister undermine the „right to govern‟ which local authorities enjoy 
under the 2013 Constitution.
174
 
3.2.2.5 Public access to council proceedings 
Effective accountability and citizen participation requires that decision-making processes at 
local level be open and transparent.
175
 Hence, it was submitted in Chapter Two that the legal 
framework should provide for mechanisms to foster transparency, including opening the 
meetings of legislative assemblies as well as their committees to the public and media.
176
 The 
statutory framework governing council procedures in Zimbabwe strives to uphold such 
transparency requirements, although not sufficiently. A council is required to open its 
meetings to the public and media, except in circumstances where a council decides that a 
matter can be more „conveniently and advantageously discussed in private‟.177 The closure of 
meetings for the sake of convenience and advantage may trump the right to access of 
information recognised in the 2013 Constitution.
178
 While it may be necessary that some 
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matters are discussed in private, it is submitted that legislation should regulate the matters 
which can be discussed in private and not leave it to each council or committee to decide 
whether an issue should be discussed in public or not. In other words, the regulatory 
framework must be set higher than convenience and advantage. It is submitted that meetings 
deliberating on critical issues such as by-laws, budget, performance management systems and 
local plans (district development plans) should be open to the public and media.
179
 
The UCA and RDCA provide that any resolution taken by a council in a closed meeting has 
full effect as any resolution of the council.
180
 To foster transparency, minutes of proceedings 
of a council and of its committees are open for inspection by the public.
181
 In urban local 
authorities, the minutes of council proceedings relating to staff matters, matters of internal or 
national security, acceptance of tenders, or any other matter determined by a council or its 
committee are not open for public inspection.
182
 It is submitted that this requirement 
undermines transparency as it gives councils broad powers to declare some minutes of the 
council classified information. It is based on these minutes that the public can hold councils 
accountable and thus their categorisation as classified information undermines transparency 
and accountability. In rural local authorities such restriction only applies to minutes of 
proceedings of a finance committee, relating to any legal proceedings or property 
negotiations which a local authority is or may be party to.
183
 There seems to be no rationale 
behind these differences in disclosure of meetings in urban and rural local authorities. It is 
suggested that similar disclosure requirements of information should apply in both urban and 
local authorities since equal levels of transparency and accountability are required in all local 
authorities, irrespective of category.
184
 
3.2.3 Rules governing the conduct of councillors 
The UCA and RDCA do not provide a specific code of conduct for councillors. In practice, 
councils with guidance from national policies have adopted their own code of conduct which 
is only applicable to their councillors. The UCA and RDCA however provide certain rules 
which govern the conduct of councillors to promote integrity. These rules are discussed in 
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this section. The rules seek to ensure that councillors carry out their duties in the best 
interests of the local authority. Further, they are designed to engender the accountability of 
councillors not only to the council but also to the citizens in their respective localities. The 
rules are discussed below. 
3.2.3.1 Provision of professional services 
Section 108 of the UCA provides that mayors or councillors (and their partners, employees 
and employers) may not provide professional services for or against the council and, if they 
do so, they are guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment or both.
185
 The 
RDCA does not provide similar rules for councillors in rural local authorities. The Minister 
may impose or remove restrictions involving the provision of professional services „if in his 
opinion‟ the interests of the inhabitants of the council area require that the restrictions be 
imposed or removed.
186
 It is argued that these powers of the Minister are too wide and prone 
to political abuse. For example, these powers could be used to reward councillors aligned to 
the party which the incumbent Minister is belongs to or vice versa. It is suggested that the 
circumstances upon which the Minister may impose or remove restrictions should be 
recognised in law.
187
 
3.2.3.2 Provision of goods and services 
In urban local authorities, a councillor may not provide any service to their local authority 
unless he or she has notified the council of the extent of his or her interest in the matter.
188
 
Further, a councillor is not permitted to sell or hire any goods to the local authority unless he 
or she has notified the council of the extent of his interests in the matter.
189
 It is therefore 
important that the council determines the extent of the conflict of interest and make a 
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decision as to whether the councillor may provide the service(s). There are no similar rules in 
rural local authorities highlighting the inconsistency in the statutory framework. 
3.2.3.3 Disclosure of interests and recusal from attending a meeting 
In both urban and rural local authorities councillors and members of committees of the 
council are required to disclose their interests and recuse themselves from any meeting or 
proceedings of the council or committee, as the case might be, in which they have a 
pecuniary interest.
190
 A similar restriction applies in cases involving contracts or matters 
where a partner or any person acting on behalf of a councillor or committee member has a 
direct or indirect pecuniary interest.
191
 These requirements are commendable as they seek to 
promote integrity and accountability at the local level. The major challenge seems to be the 
enforceability of this rule given that the Minister is primarily charged with its enforcement. 
The Minister may not be able oversee the implementation of this rule in all local authorities. 
Hence, it is submitted that, besides the Minister, every council should have the power to 
enforce this rule to ensure even enforcement across all local authorities. The Minister has the 
power to remove the requirement of recusal in certain situations.
192
 It is submitted that these 
powers of the Minister are prone to abuse and therefore should be abolished. In practice, 
councillors are often hesitant to declare their interest and recuse themselves in council 
proceedings in which they have interests. Some councillors have sought to use their positions 
to influence council proceedings for their own private benefit or for the benefit of close 
associates.
193
 Corruption is prevalent in tender procedures and the allocation of residential, 
commercial and industrial stands. 
3.2.3.4 Development of national code of conduct for councillors 
The rules governing the conduct of councillors are not consistent for both urban and rural 
local authorities. This may present challenges to the effective enforcement of these rules. It is 
submitted that a national code of conduct which applies to all councillors should be 
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developed.
194
 Such a code should seek to promote integrity, accountability and transparency 
at the local level.
195
 The code should stress that the councillor as an individual has no formal 
authority and only the council has the power to take decisions and issue instructions to its 
staff.
196
 Thus, the council may not delegate any powers to a councillor as an individual. The 
exception to this rule is the mayor as well as the chairperson of a committee.
197
 The current 
arrangement where each local authority develops its own code of conduct informed by 
relevant legislation and policies is not effective in promoting integrity and accountability at 
local level as evidenced by high a number of cases involving abuse of office, corruption and 
abuse of resources by councillors.
198
 
The other important question is who should be charged with the enforcement of the code of 
conduct. It is submitted that the responsibility of enforcing such a code should be given to the 
Mayor given that there is no provision for the role of the speaker in the council.
199
 In South 
Africa, it is the responsibility of the speaker to enforce the code of conduct for councillors.
200
 
If the mayor fails to act on a suspected case of misconduct by a councillor, the Minister 
should have the power to enforce the code of conduct. It is also important that the code of 
conduct is publicised as much as possible to allow citizens to enforce it. In other words, 
citizens should be able to trigger enforcement of the code of conduct. 
3.3 Committees of the council 
A council is required to organise itself into various committees. The committees of the 
council work closely with the responsible administrative department(s).
201
 In general, 
decision-making is often vested in committees, while the full council decides on general 
policy issues.
202
 The UCA and RDCA make provision for the establishment of different 
committees in urban and rural local authorities. These will be examined in this section 
following the urban-rural distinction. 
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3.3.1 Urban local authorities 
The UCA makes provision for the establishment of standing, audit and special committees. 
Urban local authorities must also establish a procurement board. Standing committees are 
charged with policy development and overseeing a specific policy or sectoral area. If they 
have been delegated the power to do so, a standing committee may take decisions, but if not 
they make recommendations to the council, which ultimately takes decision.
203
 Audit 
committees are established to oversee local expenditure and public property. The 
procurement committee is charged with making recommendations to the council in relation to 
procurement of goods and services. The organisation of the council into committees is 
presented in the diagram below. 
Figure 14: Committees of an urban local authority 
 
3.3.1.1 Standing Committees 
The UCA provides that a council may appoint standing committees on finance, health, 
community services, public works, housing and environment management committees, 
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among other matters.
204
 As shown in Figure 13 above, the finance, health and housing, and 
environmental management committees are mandatory.
205
 Thus, local authorities do not have 
discretion whether to establish these committees or not. The functions of these mandatory 
committees are also prescribed. A finance committee is responsible for overseeing the 
financial affairs of the council in accordance with standing orders and by-laws of the 
council.
206
 A health and housing committee is charged with overseeing local expenditure in 
the health and housing sectoral areas.
207
 An environmental management committee oversees 
the formulation and implementation of policies to preserve the environment in the council 
area.
208
 The council may establish other standing committees, such as community services 
and public works, in addition to the mandatory committees. They may also combine 
mandatory and non-mandatory committees. For example, health could be combined with 
environment, and housing with the community services committee. 
The total number of members of each standing committee is determined by the council but 
may not be less than three.
209
 A member of a standing committee ceases to be a member of 
the committee after the general election held for the council or if the member ceases to be a 
councillor.
210
 Thus, like establishment and role, the composition of standing committees as 
well as their proceedings (as observed below) is highly regulated. A standing committee may 
close its meetings to members of the public or of the council, except to the town clerk and the 
mayor.
211
 Like the council, each standing committee meets at least once in each calendar 
month. It is at these regular meetings that most of the work of the council is carried out.
212
 In 
these regular committee meetings, departmental heads submit policy proposals which are 
interrogated by the respective committees before a recommendation is made to the council 
for a final decision. They also submit reports or information relating to the implementation of 
various policies, programmes and projects by the local authority. If the committee has 
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delegated authority to make decisions, it may make a decision upon which the departmental 
head will take action after the meeting.
213
 
From the discussion above, it can be observed that the nature and role of standing committees 
is highly regulated. Even though urban local authorities have discretion to establish standing 
committees, they must establish the finance, health and housing and environment 
management committees. The question is whether such limitation of local discretion is 
necessary. It is submitted that the setting of a framework within which urban local authorities 
must establish local structures is consistent with a supervisory framework that allows local 
government to play a role in development, democracy and sustainable peace. However, the 
establishment, composition, role and proceedings of standing committees are highly 
regulated, leaving local authorities with little discretion to adapt these structures to their local 
environments. 
3.3.1.2 Audit Committees 
Every council is required to establish an audit committee which may not include in its 
membership the mayor, deputy mayor, chairperson, deputy chairperson or chairperson of 
other committees of the council.
214
 The functions of an audit committee are to: 
a) inquire into and report upon the manner in which the finances of the council, its assets 
and human resources are being used; 
b) ascertain whether the funds and assets of the council are applied to the purpose 
intended and are consistent with any regulations and standing orders issued by the 
council or the Minister; 
c) call for information, explanations and evidence in respect of any matters involving 
auditors‟ observations; 
d) receive and consider reports of internal and external auditors and make appropriate 
recommendations to the council; and 
e) recommend to the council appropriate methods of investing money, and custody of 
any other properties of the council.
215
 
The audit committee may only report its activities to the council.
216
 Every council is required 
to pay due regard to any recommendation(s) made by its audit committee, even though the 
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council does not necessarily have to act according to such recommendation(s).
217
 The audit 
committee is an important structure for fostering horizontal accountability at the local level as 
it provides independent oversight over local expenditure.
218
 Its independence is promoted by 
the requirement that the mayor, deputy mayor, chairperson, deputy chairperson or 
chairperson of other committees of the council may not be involved in its activities, as well as 
by the requirement that the audit committee may only report its activities to the council. 
However, the independence of the audit committee (and therefore its effectiveness as a tool 
of horizontal accountability) may be undermined by the requirement that the audit committee 
may have to report to the national government if directed to do so by the Minister.
219
 The 
Minister has the power to direct any audit committee to submit its report to the national 
government and the committee is required to comply with the directive.
220
 As will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight, based on the report of the committee and other relevant 
information, the Minister may intervene in local affairs, for example, by issuing a directive to 
address the identified financial problems.
221
 These powers of the Minister are consistent with 
the old constitutional order when local authorities were essentially extensions of the national 
government. The 2013 Constitution has upgraded the status of local authorities from 
extensions of the national government to a tier of government.
222
 This makes it inappropriate 
for the Minister to call upon the audit committee, as a structure of a local authority, to report 
to the national government. Accordingly, it is submitted that an audit committee should 
solely report to its council and not to the national government. 
3.3.1.3 Special committees 
A council may at any time establish special committees to carry out specific tasks but it may 
not delegate any powers to such committees.
223
 A special committee may be composed solely 
of councillors or by councillors and non-councillors, provided that the chairman of the 
committee is a councillor and that members of the committee are not less than three.
224
 In 
practice, councils have appointed special committees to deal with a number of issues, 
                                                 
217
 S 98(3) UCA. 
218
 See the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 8 
219
 S 98(2) UCA. 
220
 S 98(2) UCA. 
221
 See para 7.9. 
222
 See s 5 Constitution.  
223
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make up a quorum. S 100(1)(d) UCA. 
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including management of land, remuneration of administrative officials and conduct of 
administrative officials. Large local authorities tend to appoint special committees more 
frequently than smaller local authorities mainly because of the high magnitude and diversity 
of issues which they have to deal with compared to smaller local authorities. 
3.3.1.4 Procurement committee 
The UCA makes provision for the establishment of a municipal procurement board.
225
 The 
committee is responsible for arranging tenders and for making recommendations to the 
council in regard to the acceptance of tenders and the procurement of goods, materials and 
services.
226
 The procurement board has been succeeded by a procurement committee 
established in terms of section 14(1) of the Procurement Regulations.
227
 The procurement 
committee is set up by the town clerk, town secretary or the chief executive, as the case may 
be.
228
 The committee is headed by a Head of Department and may not have councillors in its 
membership.
229
 It is charged with the adjudication of all tenders of a local authority and 
making recommendations to the town clerk, town secretary or chief executive officer, as the 
case may be. The regulations make provision for the role of the national government-
controlled State Procurement Board (SPB) in municipal procurement processes of a value 
that exceeds US$ 10 000.
230
 Before the enactment of the regulations the national government 
played no role in municipal procurement processes. The establishment of the SPB role in 
municipal procurement was based on the argument that municipal procurement boards were 
duplicating the role of the SPB, although at local level.
231
 It was also believed that 
establishing the SPB would curb corruption in municipal procurement processes and ensure 
that local authorities receive value for money in tender processes.
232
 The role of the SPB 
raises two critical questions. Where should the procurement powers be located, at the national 
or local level? Have local authorities managed to receive value for money through the 
SPB?
233
 
                                                 
225
 S 210(1)(2)(3) UCA.  
226
 S 210(1)(2)(3) UCA.  
227
 Procurement (Amendment) Regulations, 2012 No. 17. 
228
 The role of town clerks, secretaries and chief executive officers will be discussed in para 4 below. 
229
 The role of heads of departments will be discussed below. 
230
 See s 6-10 Procurement Regulations. 
231
 Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA) 2010: 3. 
232
 Musanzikwa 2013: 125.  
233
 See the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation „State Procurement Board under scrutiny‟ 2014. This question 
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The creation of a multilevel system of government suggests that while senior governments 
may supervise the conduct of junior governments, each government at every level is directly 
in charge of its spending decisions, including procurement of goods and services.
234
 This is 
particularly important to promote the accountability of each government to the voters. When 
local procurement powers are centralised, local accountability is also undermined as it is 
unjustified to hold local authorities accountable for non-fulfilment of legislative mandates 
when procurement decisions are made at the centre. It is only when spending decisions 
(including procurement) are decentralised that citizens are likely to hold local authorities 
more accountable. Therefore, it is submitted that local procurement powers should be 
decentralised while the role of the national government be limited to setting a framework 
within which the powers must be exercised. 
The question of whether local authorities have managed to receive value for money since the 
inception of the SPB in municipal procurement processes is a critical one. Besides playing a 
role in local procurement, the SPB handles the procurement of all ministries and departments 
of the national government.
235
 Thus, the board has a huge responsibility which in some cases 
it has not been able to discharge efficiently, especially given that it is not only understaffed 
but also alleged to have unqualified employees.
236
 It is also argued that the procedures of the 
SPB are highly bureaucratic, making swift decision-making difficult.
237
 As a result, in some 
cases the board has taken too long to approve and award tenders not only referred by local 
authorities but also by ministries and departments of the national government.
238
 This has 
caused delays in the procurement of key goods and services, such as water treatment 
chemicals, and has therefore impacted adversely on service delivery.
239
 It is also alleged that 
the SPB is riddled with corruption and nepotism.
240
 Musanzikwa claims that most of the 
people tasked with the responsibility for making procurement decisions at the board are 
incompetent.
241
 Under these circumstances, tenders have controversially been awarded to 
underserving bidders (companies) that do not have the capacity to deliver goods and 
                                                 
234
 See Bahl 1999: 61, Eaton & Schroeder 2010: 180. 
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 See the Newsday Newspaper „Minister blasts State Procurement Board‟ 2014. 
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services.
242
 A combined effect of these challenges is that government as a whole has lost 
millions through procurement decisions of the SPB.
243
 It is thus submitted that local 
authorities have not managed to receive value for money through the SPB. As argued above, 
local procurement powers should be decentralised to local authorities while the national 
government oversees the exercise of such powers.
244
 This not only has the advantage of 
allowing swift decision-making but also improves local accountability. 
3.3.2 Rural local authorities 
Like urban local authorities, rural local authorities are required to organise themselves into 
various committees. Whereas urban local authorities must establish only three „mandatory‟ 
committees, rural local authorities must establish a total of five mandatory committees. Thus, 
rural local authorities have limited administrative autonomy compared to their urban 
counterparts. Furthermore, as observed below, the nature of committees in rural local 
authorities differs. Some committees are responsible for oversight and policy development 
while others have an implementation role which they undertake with oversight from the 
council. As shown in Figure 15 below, a council is required to establish a finance committee, 
town board, roads committee, ward development committee and rural development 
committee.
245
 In addition to these mandatory committees, the council may establish other 
committees as well as subcommittees of parent committees.
246
 This section discusses the 
establishment, composition and functions of various committees of the council in rural local 
authorities. 
                                                 
242
 See the Sunday Mail „SPB deals cost Treasury millions‟ 2014. It is also alleged that high-ranking politicians 
use their clout to influence tender processes so that companies they are linked to get tenders. See Musanzikwa 
2013: 125, the Sunday Mail Newspaper „SPB deals cost Treasury millions‟ 2014. 
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 The chairperson of the council is an ex officio member of every committee appointed by the council but may 
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Figure 15: Committees of a rural local authority 
3.3.2.1 Finance committee 
Every council must establish a finance committee.
247
 The committee consists of a certain 
number of councillors (not exceeding five) appointed by the council and a certain number of 
councillors (not exceeding four) appointed by the Minister.
248
 It is submitted that the power 
of the Minister to appoint certain members of the finance committee is no longer consistent 
with the 2013 Constitution where local authorities have a „right to govern‟.249 That right 
should be construed to also mean the right of local authorities to determine the composition 
of their committees without the involvement of the national government. Therefore the power 
of the Minister to appoint some members of a committee of the council should be abolished. 
The finance committee is responsible for overseeing the spending of public resources by the 
council. The committee may develop policies, rules and laws for approval by the council, 
which regulates the financial affairs of the local authority.
250
 It is also required to submit to 
an ordinary meeting of the council an interim report detailing the financial transactions and 
                                                 
247
 S 55(2) RDCA.  
248
 S 55(2) RDCA. The persons or councillors who are appointed by the Minister may not exceed one fewer than 
the total number of elected councillors. 
249
 See s 276(1) Constitution. 
250
 S 55(1)(b) RDCA. At least once every three months or at shorter intervals the committee is required to 
submit to an ordinary meeting of the council a schedule of all payments made by or on behalf of the council or 
committee of the council. The council may also direct the committee to submit the schedule of all payments 
more regularly. S 55(4) RDCA. 
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affairs of the council, as soon as possible after the end of every financial year.
251
 Unlike in 
urban local authorities, a council in rural local authorities may not take any action on matters 
relating to the financial affairs of the council until the finance committee has had an 
opportunity to consider and report upon the matter to the council.
252
 It is submitted that since 
the council delegates powers to its committees it should have the power to exercise delegated 
power if it so desires. Unlike the UCA, the RDCA does not make provision for the 
establishment of audit committees in rural local authorities.
253
 It is submitted that this is 
another form of inconsistency in the regulatory framework which should be addressed, 
especially given that audit committees are important tools of fostering horizontal 
accountability. 
3.3.2.2 Town Board 
Every council with a town area must establish a town board to administer the town area.
254
 It 
consists of the councillors elected for the town wards which constitute the town area 
concerned and a certain number of persons or councillors who are appointed by the 
Minister.
255
 The argument raised above in relation to the powers of the Minister to appoint 
some members of a committee also applies here. The town board, unlike the finance 
committee, has an implementation rather than an oversight role. Oversight of the activities of 
the town board is directly provided by the council. A council must delegate to a town board 
the powers held by the council that are solely concerned with the town area for which the 
town board is appointed.
256
 For example, the council may delegate to a town board powers 
relating to lighting, parking, advertising hoardings, pollution control and fire brigades. 
However, the council may not delegate the power to impose levies, rates, rents or charges; 
borrow money; expropriate property or make by-laws. A town board may undertake 
functions such as roads, bridges, dams, drains, sewers, sewerage works, water and pollution if 
authorised by the Minister, in consultation with the council concerned.
257
 It is submitted that 
the role of the Minister should be reformed so that the council is given discretion to decide 
whether to delegate such powers to its town board. A town board may graduate to the status 
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 S 55(5) RDCA. 
252
 S 62(9) RDCA.  
253
 See s 97 UCA. 
254
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of an urban local authority. For example, Beitbridge Town Council was formerly a town 
board of a rural local authority but graduated to the status of a town council. 
3.3.2.3 Roads Committee 
Every council must establish a roads committee consisting of a certain number of councillors 
who are appointed by the council and a certain number of other persons or councillors who 
are appointed by the Minister.
258 
As argued above, these powers of the Minister should be 
abolished since local authorities are no longer extensions of the national government under 
the 2013 Constitution.
259
 A road committee considers all matters relating to the construction 
and maintenance of roads in the council area.
260
 The council must delegate to the road 
committee powers relating to the construction and maintenance of roads.
261
 This shows that 
the council has limited administrative autonomy since it does not have discretion to decide 
whether to delegate powers or not. Akin to other committees, the council may not delegate 
the power to impose levies, rates, rents, charges, borrow money, expropriate property or 
make by-laws. With the consent of the Minister, the council may also delegate to a roads 
committee powers over bridges, dams, parking, omnibuses, ferries and aerodromes.
262
 It is 
submitted that a council should have the power to delegate powers to its roads committee 
without seeking the approval of the Minister. A council may not take any action on matters 
relating to roads or on any other delegated responsibilities until the roads committee has had 
an opportunity to consider and report upon the matter to the council.
263
 It can be argued that 
as the delegating authority, the council should be able to exercise any of the delegated powers 
without any hindrance. Thus, this requirement should be abolished. 
3.3.2.4 Ward Development Committees 
A ward development committee (WADCO) is charged with preparing and submitting a ward 
development plan to the rural district development committee (discussed below) before the 
31 March of each year. It consists of the councillor for the ward and the chairperson and 
secretary of every village development committee (VIDCO) and neighbourhood development 
                                                 
258
 S 58(2) RDCA. Members who are appointed by the Minister may not be equal to the total number of 
councillors appointed by the council.  
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committee in the ward.
264
 The WADCO is chaired by the councillor of the ward. VIDCOs 
and neighbourhood development committees are elected by citizens of a village or 
neighbourhood, respectively. The Minister has the power to appoint the WADCO in the case 
of a ward where there is neither a VIDCO nor a neighbourhood development committee.
265
 
WADCOs are required to prepare and submit a ward development plan to the rural district 
development committee (discussed below) before 31 March of each year.
266
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, WADCOs and VIDCOs are some of the structures which 
were created in terms of the Prime Minister‟s Directive on Decentralisation of 1984/85.267 
These structures were intended to provide people at the grassroots level with a platform to 
participate in development planning and implementation in their respective areas.
268
 The 
effectiveness of the VIDCOs and WADCOs has been undermined by limited citizen 
participation in the activities of these structures.
269
 As discussed below, citizens tend to pay 
more attention to traditional structures rather than to WADCOs and VIDCOs. The national 
government, through the Traditional Leaders Act, tried to address this challenge by 
combining elected and traditional structures to form ward and village assemblies, as 
discussed below. 
3.3.2.5 Rural district development committees 
In every council there is a rural district development committee (RDDC) which consists of: 
a) the district administrator (DA); 
b) the chairperson of [each]… committee established by the council; 
c) the chief executive officer of the council and such other officers of the council as the 
council may determine; 
d) the senior civil officer in the district of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Zimbabwe 
National Army, and the President‟s Department; 
e) the district head of each Ministry and department of a Ministry within the district that 
the Minister may designate; and 
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 S 59(1) RDCA. A VDC or neighbourhood development committee is elected by the citizens within the 
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265
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f) persons representing other organisations and interests [as designated by] the 
Minister.
270
 
The RDDC is established to assist in the development of the local authority area through 
coordinated development planning.
271
 Section 60(5) of the RDCA provides the functions of 
RDDCs as follows: 
a) to consider ward development plans submitted to it [by ward development 
committees]; 
b) to make recommendations to the council on matters to be included in the annual 
development and other long-term plans for the district within which the council area 
is situated; 
c) to prepare the annual district development plan for approval by the council and assist 
in the preparation of other long-term plans for the council area;
272
 
d) when instructed to do so by the council, to investigate the implementation of the 
annual development and other long-term plans for the council area; and 
e) to exercise such other functions in relation to the annual development and other long-
term plans for the district as may be assigned to it from time to time by the council. 
The DA presides over all meetings of a RDDC.
273
 RDDCs undertake an important 
development planning and implementation role. The potential of RDDCs to advance local 
priorities is limited by its composition.
274
 As highlighted above, the RDDC is chaired by the 
DA who is accountable to the national government and not to the council or local citizens.
275
 
The role of the DA puts into question the intent of the national government to democratise 
local government structures. While RDDCs are important institutions for development 
planning and implementation, they may have limited scope for popular participation as they 
are dominated by officials of the national government.
276 This therefore means that these 
committees are more accountable to the national government than to local authorities or to 
the local people. 
                                                 
270
 S 60(1) RDCA. 
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 Feltoe 2006: 134. 
272
 The district development plan must be prepared and presented to the council before 31 May every year. The 
plan is approved in a joint meeting of the RDDC and the council, which is chaired by the chairperson of the 
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3.3.2.6 Other committees 
A council may establish an area committee to exercise any functions of the council within 
any area of urban land within the council area.
277
 Besides the area committee, a council may 
appoint other committees, whether of a general, specific or local nature.
278
 The committees 
are composed of two or more councillors and non-councillors who are registered voters in the 
area of the local authority.
279
 The council may delegate to these committees some of its 
powers except the power to impose levies, rates, charges, borrow money, expropriate 
property or make by-laws.
280
 The Minister also has the power to direct a rural local authority 
to establish a committee and delegate functions to such a committee.
281
 It is submitted that 
these powers of the Minister are inconsistent with the new constitutional order.
282
 The „right 
to govern‟ which local authorities enjoy means that the Minister may not direct a rural local 
authority to establish committees. Hence, it is submitted that these powers of the Minister 
should be reformed. 
Committees are important governance structures in both rural and urban local authorities.
283
 
They provide an opportunity for active participation in decision-making of the council by 
each councillor.
284
 In urban local authorities, standing committees deliberate on a variety of 
issues within their portfolios before a council can make resolutions on those issues. They play 
an important oversight role over the activities of administrative officials. As observed above, 
in rural local authorities some committees play an oversight role, some an implementation 
role and others are designed to promote participatory governance and bottom-up planning. 
The ability of committees to deliver on their mandate has been hampered by insufficient 
resources, especially around infrastructural projects. Participation and development planning 
committees such as VIDCOs and WADCOs have not been effective, partly due to limited 
citizen participation in their activities.
285
 RDDCs have been most effective in formulating 
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 S 56(1) RDCA. 
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local plans, although such plans lack popular initiatives as planning is driven by officials of 
the national government stationed at the local level rather than by local officials. This has 
brought into question the ability of the multilevel system of government to facilitate bottom-
up development planning.
286 
4. Administrative structures of local authorities 
The previous section examined the role of the council, internal proceedings at local level and 
the committee system. This section analyses the administrative arm of a local authority which 
is charged with implementation of policies and by-laws, among other responsibilities. It 
discusses the relationships that exist between the administrative arm and the council. It will 
be argued that local authorities should have the authority to determine their administrative 
establishment in order to adapt them to local needs and ensure effective management, among 
other goals.
287
 The discussion is divided between urban and rural local authorities. 
4.1 Urban local authorities 
 As highlighted in Chapter Four, there are three classes of urban local authorities, namely 
city, municipal and town councils as well as local boards.
288
 The administrative arm of city or 
municipal councils is led by a town clerk, while that of local boards and town councils is led 
by a secretary. As shown in Figure 15 below, the town clerk or secretary is supported by a 
team of departmental heads. The town clerk and heads of department have an executive and 
advisory role.
289
 Heads of department report and recommend action to be taken, through the 
town clerk, to the responsible standing committee of the council or directly to the council.
290
 
While urban local authorities have discretion to establish administrative departments, city and 
municipal councils must establish the department responsible for administrative and 
secretarial services.
291
 Thus, urban local authorities have some measure of autonomy in as far 
as establishment of administrative services is concerned. The most common departments in 
urban local authorities include the administrative and secretarial services, health services, 
housing and community services, engineering services, finance and human resources. As 
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shown in the diagram below, these departments are divided into various divisions responsible 
for various policy areas.
292
 
Figure 16: Administrative arms of an urban local authority 
 
4.1.1 Office of the town clerk or secretary 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six, the town clerk is appointed by the council with 
the consent of the Local Government Board.
293
 The town clerk is the accounting officer 
directly accountable to the council. The town clerk serves as the link between the council and 
its administrative arm. As the chief advisor of the council, the town clerk attends all 
committee and full-council meetings. The council makes policies and by-laws which the 
town clerk implements. The UCA provides that the town clerk is responsible for the proper 
administration of the council, managing the operations and property of the council, and 
supervising and controlling the activities of the employees of the council in the course of 
their employment.
294
 The council may impose additional responsibilities on the town clerk. 
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293
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4.1.2 Department responsible for administrative and secretarial services 
As highlighted above, every city and municipal council is required to establish a department 
responsible for administrative and secretarial services. The department is headed by the 
chamber secretary who is appointed by the council with the consent of the Local Government 
Board.
295
 Unlike city and municipal councils, local boards and town councils do not include 
the position of a chamber secretary. The duties of a chamber secretary are carried out by the 
secretary (head of the administrative arm) of the local authority. Like all other heads of 
departments, the chamber secretary is accountable to the council through the town clerk. The 
chamber secretary is responsible for preparing and distributing minutes of the proceedings of 
a council and its committees as well as agendas and notices of any mayoral, council or 
committee meetings.
296
 
4.1.3 Other departments 
As highlighted above, urban local authorities have the discretion to establish other 
administrative departments. In practice, the number of departments in a local authority is 
determined by the class,
297
 size and nature of services provided by a local authority. There is 
a general pattern in most local authorities to group related functions under one department as 
a way of streamlining operations to minimise administrative costs.
298
 City and municipal 
councils tend to have more departments than town councils and local boards. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Six, departments are headed by senior officials (heads of departments) 
who are appointed by the council with the consent of the Local Government Board.
299
 As 
mentioned above, when discharging their functions, administrative departments work closely 
with the responsible committee of the council.
300
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297
 Whether city council, municipal council, town council or local board. 
298
 See Jordan 1984: 20. 
299
 S 134(1) UCA. See para 5.1.1. 
300
 See para 3.3.1. 
 
 
 
 
215 
 
Chapter 5: Governance structures 
4.1.4 Delegation of powers to employees 
A council may delegate to an employee some of its powers and may likewise amend or 
withdraw any delegation of powers.
301
 A council however may not delegate: 
a) powers conferred upon it by any acts other than the UCA except when the proposed 
delegation has been approved by the Minister responsible for the administration of the 
enactment concerned and any conditions fixed by that Minister have been complied 
with; 
b) any power conferred by model building by-laws, which have been adopted by or on 
behalf of the council, to grant a relaxation or waiver except when the by-law 
expressly provides that the power may be delegated or the Minister has consented to 
such delegation.
302
 
The power to review the exercise of any power by an employee exercising delegated 
authority may also not be delegated.
303
 It is submitted that the requirement that local 
authorities may not delegate powers conferred on them by sectoral legislation undermines 
local autonomy. It is further submitted that once powers and responsibilities have been 
decentralised through sectoral legislation, local authorities should have full discretion to 
exercise those powers (including delegating such powers) within the framework set by the 
national government. As contended in Chapter Two the setting of a national framework does 
not require the approval of higher tiers of government before local authorities can exercise 
decentralised responsibilities.
304
 The delegation of any powers to an employee does not 
preclude the council from exercising the delegated powers.
305
 A council may amend or 
rescind any decision of any employee exercising delegated authority.
306
 The amendment or 
withdrawal of any delegation may however not invalidate anything done in pursuance of a 
decision lawfully taken by the employee before the date of such amendment or withdrawal.
307
 
                                                 
301
 S 145(1) UCA. 
302
 S 145(1)(i)(ii) UCA.  
303
 S 145(1)(iv) UCA.  
304
 See para 6.6.1. See also Eaton & Schroeder 2010: 175, De Visser 2005: 44. 
305
 S 145(3) UCA. Any person aggrieved by the decision of another exercising delegated authority may appeal 
the decision. See s 145(2) UCA. 
306
 S 145(3) UCA. 
307
 S 145(1)(v) UCA. 
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4.2 Rural local authorities 
As highlighted above, the administrative arm of a rural local authority is led by the chief 
executive officer (CEO).
308
 This section examines the role of the chief executive officer 
before discussing the delegation of powers in rural local authorities. 
4.2.1 Role of the Chief Executive Officer 
Like the town clerk, the CEO is responsible for implementing decisions of the council, 
including by-laws and policies. As discussed in Chapter Six, the CEO is appointed by the 
council with the consent of the Minister.
309
 The CEO is supported by a team of other officers 
who lead various administrative departments, such as finance, health and public works.
310
 
Like the CEO, the officers are also appointed by the council with the consent of the 
Minister.
311
 As will be argued Chapter Six, this role of the Minister in the appointment of the 
CEO and other officers undermines administrative autonomy. It was contended in Chapter 
Two that administrative autonomy determines in part the role which local authorities play in 
development as it ensures that local authorities have control over their bureaucracies 
responsible for implementing policies.
312
 Thus, it is crucial that local authorities have 
administrative autonomy if they are to play a role in the realisation of development. 
4.2.2 Delegation of powers to employees 
A council may delegate to any of its administrative officials some of its powers, but such 
delegation does not preclude the council from exercising the delegated powers.
313
 However, a 
council may not delegate to administrative officials any power which the Minister has 
directed should not be delegated.
314
 Any power conferred upon the council by any other body 
than the RDCA may also not be delegated unless the proposed delegation has been approved 
by the Minister responsible for the administration of the enactment concerned and any 
conditions fixed by that Minister are complied with.
315
 The argument raised above in 
paragraph 4.1.3 with respect to the power of the national government to approve delegation 
                                                 
308
 S 66(1) RDCA. 
309
 See para 5.2. See also 66(1) RDCA. 
310
 See S 66(3)(a) RDCA. 
311
 See S 66(3)(a) RDCA. 
312
 See para 6.3.1. See also Bahl 1999: 5, Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006: 13, Eaton & Schroeder 2010: 174. 
313
 Ss 69(1) and 69(6) RDCA. A council, with the consent of the Minister, may also delegate to the chairperson 
or an officer of the council the power to appoint or dismiss employees. See s 68(1) RDCA. 
314
 S 69(2)(a) RDCA.  
315
 S 69(2)(b) RDCA. 
 
 
 
 
217 
 
Chapter 5: Governance structures 
also applies here. A council may not delegate power to amend or rescind a decision taken by 
an officer or employee exercising delegated authority or to review decisions taken by officers 
or employees exercising delegated authority.
316
 
A council may amend or withdraw any delegation of powers.
317
 The Minister may also direct 
a council to amend or withdraw any delegation of powers.
318
 It is submitted that such powers 
of the Minister limit the authority of rural local authorities to determine their internal 
procedures. It is further submitted that such powers are contrary to the „spirit‟ of devolution 
enshrined in the 2013 Constitution which seeks to create stronger local authorities with „all‟ 
the powers necessary to govern.
319
 Arguably, the „right to govern‟ includes the right to 
determine delegation of powers with limited control from the national government. A council 
may at any time amend or rescind a decision of an employee exercising delegated 
authority.
320
 As in urban local authorities, any amendment or withdrawal may not affect the 
validity of anything done in pursuance of a decision lawfully taken by the officer or 
employee concerned before the amendment or withdrawal.
321
 
5. The Institution of traditional leadership 
For people who reside in communal areas the most immediate form of local government is 
the institution of traditional leadership, rather than elected rural local authorities.
322
 Thus, a 
discussion of rural local government will not be complete without discussing the role of 
traditional leaders, especially given that the two institutions share some responsibilities. 
Chiefs are also ex officio members of the council. The discussion is however limited to the 
appointment and functions of chiefs and their relationship with councils.
323
 As shown in 
Figure 17 below, in order of hierarchy, the institution of traditional leadership comprises 
chiefs, headmen and village heads. The village head leads the village, the lowest 
administrative structure. The village head reports to a headman, a sub-chief who controls 
                                                 
316
 S 69(2)(c) RDCA. 
317
 S 69(3) RDCA.  
318
 S 69(3) RDCA.  
319
 See S 276(1) Constitution.  
320
 S 69(4) RDCA. Any person aggrieved by a decision of an officer or employee exercising delegated authority 
may bring the matter to the appropriate head of department in the first instance and, failing satisfaction, to the 
council for review. S 69(5) RDCA. 
321
 S 69(3) RDCA. 
322
 Matyszak 2010. See also Madhekeni & Zhou 2012: 29. See also Ndoro 2010: 323, Makumbe 2010: 88. 
323
 Headmen and village heads are not the primary focus of this section as they act as supportive structures of 
chiefs. See ss 8 and 9 Traditional Leaders Act. 
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several village heads. Several headmen report to the chief.
324
 In a district, there are usually 
more than one chief. As highlighted in Chapter Three, there are a total of 272 chiefs, 452 
headmen and an estimated 25 000 village heads. The hierarchical organisation of the 
institution of traditional leadership makes the institution an effective tool for communication 
between government and citizens.
325
 The role of traditional leaders is primarily governed by 
the Traditional Leaders Act. As discussed in detail below, the relationship between the 
traditional leaders and councillors is not cordial since significant governance powers and 
remuneration packages were restored to traditional leaders in 2002.
326
 
Figure 17: Organisation of the institution of traditional leadership 
 
5.1 Appointment of chiefs 
Section 283 of the 2013 Constitution directs Parliament to enact legislation providing for the 
appointment and removal from office of chiefs by the President. The Constitution requires 
such appointment to be made on the recommendation of the provincial assembly of chiefs 
through the Minister responsible for traditional affairs.
327
 The President approves the 
remuneration and benefits of chiefs.
328
 It is argued that the appointment of chiefs by the 
President means that chiefs are likely to be „controlled‟ and accountable to the national 
                                                 
324
 Musekiwa 2012: 242. 
325
 Musekiwa 2012: 240. 
326
 See Musekiwa 2012: 242. 
327
 S 283 Constitution. The consultation of the provincial assembly also applies with respect to the removal, 
suspension and resolution of disputes relating to appointment, removal and suspension of chiefs. 
328
 S 284(1) Constitution. 
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government and the ruling political party, in particular.
329
 This claim may be supported by 
evidence from the colonial and post-colonial eras, which suggests the alignment of chiefs to 
the government of the day.
330
 Thus, due to the method of appointment, chiefs are not 
accountable to the local people but to the President who appoints them.
331
 A chief may not be 
elected as a councillor, Member of Parliament or President unless he or she has ceased to 
occupy the position of chief.
332
 The question is whether this requirement infringes on the 
political rights of traditional leaders.
333
 It is submitted that the requirement does not prevent 
traditional leaders from seeking election as a councillor, Member of Parliament or President. 
It merely requires that before a traditional leader may seek a political office, he or she must 
relinquish the position of a traditional leader.
334
 
5.2 Powers and functions 
The importance attached to the institution of traditional leadership in the Zimbabwean 
multilevel system of government is reflected by the constitutional recognition of the 
responsibilities of traditional leaders. The 2013 Constitution provides that traditional leaders 
have the following responsibilities in their areas of jurisdiction: 
a) to promote and uphold the cultural values of their communities and, in particular, to 
promote sound family values; 
b) to take measures to preserve the culture, traditions, history and heritage of their 
communities, including sacred shrines; 
c) to facilitate development; 
d) in accordance with an Act of Parliament, to administer communal land and to protect 
the environment; 
e) to resolve disputes amongst people in their communities in accordance with 
customary law; and 
f) to exercise any other functions conferred or imposed on them by Act of Parliament.335 
The Constitution further provides that, „except as provided in an Act of Parliament, 
traditional leaders have authority, jurisdiction and control over the Communal Land or other 
areas for which they have been appointed, and over persons within those Communal Lands or 
                                                 
329
 Keulder 1998: 179. 
330
 See para 3.2.3.6 of Chapter Three. 
331
 Makumbe 2010: 93. 
332
 S 45 Traditional Leaders Act. 
333
 S 67 Constitution. 
334
 See Makumbe 2010: 99. 
335
 S 282(1) Constitution. 
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areas‟.336 Thus chiefs have significant functions relating to land, the environment, culture, 
facilitation of development and resolution of disputes. It is particularly their role relating to 
land and environment that has created conflicts with rural local authorities given the 
ambiguity in the division of responsibilities on these functional areas between the two 
institutions. This argument is elaborated in Chapter Six.
337
 
The Constitution states that, when performing their functions, „[chiefs] are not subject to the 
direction or control of any person, except as may be prescribed in an Act of Parliament‟.338 
Chiefs are further required to be apolitical and may not further the interests of any political 
party.
339
 In practice, Sachikonye et al argue that most chiefs openly align themselves with the 
government, and ZANU-PF in particular.
340
 Like the colonial governments, ZANU-PF 
appears to use both „carrot‟ and „stick‟ methods to acquire the allegiance of chiefs.341 
Matyszak alleges that the government, through structures such as the army, have used various 
coercive measures to garner the support of chiefs.
342
 His allegations are supported by 
Makumbe who highlights that chiefs were directed to support ZANU-PF and prevent the 
MDC from mobilising political support in their jurisdictions.
343
 It is further argued that chiefs 
who failed to follow these directives were/are allegedly threatened with harassment and 
withdrawal of their monthly allowances, vehicle support scheme and other benefits. As a 
result, most if not all chiefs have complied with the directives.
344
 Makumbe claims that some 
chiefs have made it extremely difficult for opposition political parties to mobilise political 
support in rural areas.
345
 
The ZANU-PF-led government also uses the „carrot‟ method, in which benefits are offered to 
acquire the allegiance of chiefs.
346
 Some of the benefits that are offered include a monthly 
allowance, a subsidised vehicle purchasing scheme, monthly fuel allocation, drilling of 
boreholes and electrification of the homes of chiefs.
347
 In return, it is argued that chiefs are 
                                                 
336
 S 282(2) Constitution. 
337
 See para 4.5.3.3. 
338
 S 282(3) Constitution. 
339
 S 281(2) Constitution. See also 46(1) Traditional Leaders Act. 
340
 Sachikonye et al 2007: 91. Musekiwa 2012: 242. See also The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa 2005: 
23. 
341
 See Makumbe 2010: 88, 93. 
342
 Matyszak 2010. 
343
 Makumbe 2010: 94. See also The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa 2005: 23. 
344
 Matyszak 2010 & Makumbe 2010: 98. See also Mandondo & Mapedza 2003: 12. 
345
 Makumbe 2010: 93. 
346
 See Musekiwa 2012: 242. 
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 See Makumbe 2010: 92. 
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tasked to play the role of „political commissars‟ for ZANU-PF.348 It is claimed that prior to 
the 2008 Presidential Elections the annual conferences of chiefs endorsed President Mugabe 
as their presidential candidate.
349
 This shows that the „carrot‟ method was effective in 
ensuring that chiefs advance the political interests of ZANU-PF. As stated above, the 2013 
Constitution prohibits chiefs from aligning themselves with a certain political party whilst 
they are occupying the position of a chief, a requirement which most chiefs are not 
complying with. At the time of writing, some chiefs have openly declared that they supported 
the elevation of the wife of the President to lead the Women‟s League of ZANU-PF, 
indicating the alignment of the institution with ZANU-PF. Surprisingly, the open alignment 
of chiefs with ZANU-PF does not appear to damage the legitimacy of traditional leadership 
among rural citizens.
350
 
5.3 Relationship with rural local authorities 
5.3.1 Role in council 
The RDCA does not provide for the role of chiefs in council proceedings.
351
 However, there 
is a culture in rural local government which developed prior to independence where chiefs are 
treated as ex officio members of councils with no voting powers.
352
 Chiefs are given the 
platform to address the council especially on issues which concern their powers and functions 
or the customs and traditions of people living in their jurisdictions. This is commendable 
given that chiefs and rural local authorities administer the same jurisdiction. It is submitted 
that this culture should be legally recognised so as to provide greater clarity as to the role of 
chiefs in the council, along the lines of the Municipal Structures Act of South Africa.
353
 
5.3.2 Role in village and ward assemblies 
Village and ward assemblies represent the quest in the decentralised system of government to 
integrate the institution of traditional leadership with democratically elected officials. They 
were introduced by an amendment to the Traditional Leaders Act in 2001. In each rural 
                                                 
348
 The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa 2005: 23, Matyszak 2010, Sachikonye et al 2007: 91. 
349
 Matyszak 2010. See also Ndoro 2010: 323 and Makumbe 2010: 93. See s 46(1) Traditional Leaders Act. 
350
 Musekiwa 2012: 242. 
351
 The Constitution provides for representation of chiefs in the Senate and on provincial councils. See ss 
120(1)(b), 268(1)(c) Constitution. 
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 Makumbe 2010: 90. 
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 See s 81 Municipal Structures Act, South Africa. The Act requires each municipal council, before taking a 
decision on any matter directly affecting the area of a traditional authority, to give the leader of the authority the 
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village, there is a village assembly which is composed of all the inhabitants of the village 
who are over the age of 18 years.
354
 The village assembly is chaired by the village head and is 
responsible for the general administration of the village, including cultural and land matters. 
The assembly elects and supervises the VIDCO, its technical arm.
355
 The village assembly 
also reviews and approves any development plans of the village, including those prepared by 
the VIDCO, before they are sent to the WADCO for incorporation into the Ward 
Development Plan.
356
 
In every ward of a rural local authority, there is a ward assembly which is composed of the 
councillor of the ward and headmen and village heads within the ward.
357
 The chairperson is 
elected by members of the ward assembly. The functions of the ward assembly are similar to 
those of a village assembly except that the ward assembly is responsible for a much larger 
jurisdiction than a village assembly. In addition, the ward assembly oversees the work of 
village assemblies and reviews and approves development plans submitted by village 
assemblies before submission of such plans for incorporation into the rural district 
development plan (as shall be discussed in paragraph 5.4 of Chapter Nine).
358
 The assemblies 
have not been effective in delivering on their mandate, partly because they are dominated by 
traditional leaders. They are not participatory but vehicles used by traditional leaders to 
impose their „will‟ on the rural populace. 
5.3.3 Relationships with councillors 
As stated earlier, the relationship between traditional leaders and councillors is not cordial.
359
 
This has been attributed to a number of reasons. First, the existence of the institution of 
traditional leadership parallel with elected rural local governments has created „conflicting 
claims of legitimacy and uneasy co-existence between councillors and chiefs‟. There is 
mistrust between chiefs and councillors which makes it difficult to build constructive 
relations. Ndoro argues that „to traditional leaders, councillors are a challenge to their 
hegemony, prestige and authority‟.360 She further asserts that given an option, traditional 
                                                 
354
 S 14(1) Traditional Leaders Act. 
355
 VIDCOs previously established by the Prime Minister‟s Directives on Decentralisation. 
356
 S 15 Traditional Leaders Act. See Feltoe 2006: 139. 
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leaders would prefer to be the sole local government structure in communal areas.
361
 This is 
evidenced by the fact that chiefs and councillors often trade accusations of abuse of power 
and non-compliance with laws, customs and traditions.
362
 
There is perceived unfair remuneration, with chiefs receiving better remuneration packages 
compared to councillors. At the time of writing, chiefs are reported to receive US$ 300 while 
councillors in rural local authorities are paid less than US$ 200 per month.
363
 Chiefs are also 
allowed to keep fines imposed on offenders in their traditional courts in addition to the 
salaries and allowances they are entitled to.
364
 The huge differences in salaries, allowances 
and other benefits could be one of the reasons causing growing tension as councillors feel 
side-lined, lower in status and discriminated against relative to chiefs. At the same time, chief 
tends to command more respect from rural communities than councillors do.
365
 As a result, 
councillors are overshadowed by chiefs in rural local government, in the process raising 
tensions with councillors. The tension which exists between chiefs and councillors has the 
potential to destabilise rural local government. It is against this background that it is 
suggested that there is a need to redefine the relationship between chiefs and councillors. The 
redefinition should focus on division of responsibilities between chiefs and rural local 
authorities (councillors) and the improvement of remuneration packages of councillors, 
among other issues.
366
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the governance structures of provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities. It paid particular attention to the composition, powers and functions of 
various governance structures at the provincial and local levels. It was observed that the 
governance structures and processes at both provincial and local levels were designed to 
sustain centralisation of power at the national level, a characteristic of the Lancaster House 
Constitution. Among other weaknesses, the rights of citizens to elect local leaders and to 
participate in important governance processes are limited. The 2013 Constitution has 
somehow tried to reverse the over-centralisation of power and to advance local democracy. 
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For example, the Constitution has abolished the power of the national government to appoint 
local leaders. At the time of writing, the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, UCA 
and RDCA have not been aligned yet with the Constitution. The implication is that some of 
the democratic benefits which the 2013 Constitution ushered in have not been realised yet. 
However, as at July 2014, efforts to develop new legislation are being spearheaded by the 
Ministry of Local Government. Having discussed the governance structures at provincial and 
local levels, the next chapter will examine the powers and functions of provincial and local 
governments. 
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Chapter 6 
Powers and functions 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the governance structures of provincial and metropolitan 
councils as well as those of local authorities. This chapter examines the division of 
responsibilities across the three tiers of government with a particular focus on the powers and 
functions of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. As contended in 
paragraph 6.1.3 of Chapter Two, subnational governments can play a role in the achievement 
of national and local objectives such as development, democracy and sustainable peace, 
especially if they have original, relevant, clearly demarcated and „differentiated‟ 
responsibilities. In the first section of the chapter, the study discusses the key constitutional 
principles, values and objectives which (as argued in this chapter) should inform the division 
of responsibilities among the three tiers of government. This is followed by an examination 
of the responsibilities and administrative authority of provincial and metropolitan councils. In 
the third section the chapter analyses the responsibilities of local authorities, before 
discussing the administrative authority of these authorities. 
2. Division of responsibilities across the three tiers of government 
As highlighted in Chapter Three, Zimbabwe is a unitary state
1
 which signifies some form of 
aggregated power at the national centre.
2
 In principle, this means that „all‟ governmental 
powers are assigned by the Constitution to the national government. The Constitution does 
not have a system of „enumerated powers‟ where the powers of all tiers of government are 
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. It, however, lists the responsibilities of provincial 
and metropolitan councils.
3
 The unitary nature of the Zimbabwean state means that the 
residual powers reside with the national government. While it is appreciated that 
governmental powers are vested in the national government, it is submitted that there are 
important constitutional values, objectives and principles which require the national 
                                                 
1
 See s 1 Constitution. 
2
 See Bockenforde 2011: 35.  
3
 See Musekiwa & Mandiyanike 2013: 8. See Bockenforde 2011: 48 for a discussion of a system of enumerated 
power. 
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government to decentralise some of its responsibilities to lower governments.
4
 These will be 
examined below. 
2.1 Principles of devolution and decentralisation 
The 2013 Constitution lists devolution and decentralisation as one of the founding values and 
principles of the Constitution.
5
 Founding values and principles have been found to constitute 
higher norms which are so fundamental to a constitutional legal order as to be incapable of 
amendment, either at all or except by special majority.
6
 These principles and values set 
positive standards with which all law must comply to be valid.
7
 Thus, they influence the 
drafting and interpretation of legislation and how the common law is developed. It is 
contended that the listing of devolution and decentralisation as one of the founding values 
and principles (as opposed to any other provision in the Constitution) is therefore significant. 
It is submitted that devolution and decentralisation are principles which should inform the 
interpretation of the Constitution and other laws.
8
 
Although devolution is generally categorised as one of the forms of decentralisation,
9
 the 
Constitution has recognised both devolution and decentralisation as modes of diffusing power 
to lower tiers of government. The recognition of both devolution and decentralisation 
emphasises the importance which the Constitution attaches to devolution as opposed to other 
forms of decentralisation, such as delegation and deconcentration.
10
 Even though the 
Constitution recognises devolution as one of the fundamental principles, it however does not 
itself devolve „real‟ powers and functions to provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities.
11
 As discussed below, the Constitution merely instructs the national government 
to devolve power to lower tiers of government under certain circumstances.
12
 This highlights 
the unitary nature of the state as identified in section 1 of the Constitution. 
                                                 
4
 See S 3(2)(I) Constitution. 
5
 S 3(2)(l) Constitution. 
6
 Roederer 2011:13-18. Such limitation to constitutional amendment has grown to be known as the „basic 
structure doctrine‟. For a discussion on the doctrine, see Indira Nehra Gandhi v Raj Narain 1975 SC 2299, para. 
2461. 
7
 See Roederer 2011:13-18. 
8
 See Roederer 2011:13-18. 
9
 See Chapter 1 on the difference between devolution and other forms of decentralisation, such as delegation and 
deconcentration. 
10
 See Moyo 2013: 154.  
11
 Sims 2013: 2, 13; Freedom House 2012: 5; Moyo 2013: 154. 
12
 See also s 264(1) Constitution. 
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2.2 Preamble of Chapter 14 
Chapter 14 is arguably one of the most important chapters of the 2013 Constitution of 
Zimbabwe. The significance of the chapter is reflected by the fact that it is the only chapter of 
the Constitution which has a preamble of its own. The Preamble reads: 
Whereas it is desirable to ensure: (a) the preservation of national unity in 
Zimbabwe and the prevention of all forms of disunity and secessionism; (b) 
the democratic participation in government by all citizens and communities 
of Zimbabwe; and (c) the equitable allocation of national resources and the 
participation of local communities in the determination of development 
priorities within their areas; there must be devolution of power and 
responsibilities to lowers tier of government in Zimbabwe. 
The Preamble of Chapter 14 entrenches devolution (as opposed to other forms of 
decentralisation) as the mode of diffusing governmental power from the national government 
to lower tiers of government. Although such diffusion may be limited to pursing the 
achievement of certain national and local goals, it shows that the national government will 
not exercise governmental powers by itself or merely deconcentrate or delegate such powers. 
Some of its powers „must‟ be devolved to provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities. The Preamble carries in itself a constitutional instruction to the national 
government to devolve power to lower level governments to preserve national unity, promote 
democratic participation, engender equitable allocation of resources and prevent exclusion of 
certain communities, among other objectives. It provides the foundation upon which 
devolution is based.
13
 While the Preamble signifies a strong intent for devolution, the rest of 
Chapter 14 does not devolve substantive powers to lower governments.
14
 Instead, the chapter 
in various provisions instructs Parliament to devolve powers to provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities. This role of Parliament implies that devolution is likely to be 
vulnerable to political party politics as Parliament is a political body.
15
 
2.3 Instruction to devolve power 
The Preamble of chapter 14 is further given effect by section 264(1) of the Constitution, 
which requires the national government to devolve power.
16
 The section states that „whenever 
                                                 
13
 See Moyo 2013: 148, Machingauta et al 2014: 6. 
14
 See Freedom House 2012: 35, Sims 2013: 13. 
15
 See Freedom House 2012: 35. 
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 See Moyo 2013: 154. 
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appropriate‟, the national government must devolve powers and responsibilities to provincial 
and metropolitan councils „which are competent‟ to carry out those responsibilities 
„efficiently and effectively‟.17 This provision is particularly important because it envisages 
further devolution of powers and responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities, in addition to what the Constitution has explicitly allocated to provinces and 
local authorities.
18
 Three important questions can be raised from this provision. When does it 
become „appropriate‟ to devolve power and responsibilities? When does a provincial or local 
government become „competent‟ to carry out any devolved task? Who determines that it has 
become „appropriate‟ or „competent‟? This requires an examination of the meaning of these 
terms and intent of the constitutional framers. 
2.3.1 Meaning of ‘whenever appropriate’ 
The Constitution requires the national government to devolve power to provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities „whenever‟ it becomes „appropriate‟.19 This is a 
constitutional instruction to devolve power under certain circumstances. The Constitution 
however does not provide guidance on when it becomes „appropriate‟ to devolve power.20 It 
is important that national legislation clarifies all these „grey‟ areas, in particular by providing 
„criteria to objectively adjudge when the conditions have been made for the devolution of 
powers and responsibilities to take place‟.21 As argued in detail below, the national 
government should devolve powers and functions to provincial and metropolitan councils so 
as to give effect to the 2013 Constitution which provides a framework for such devolution. 
What is required is for Parliament to enact legislation devolving powers to lower 
governments to give effect to the constitutional framework for devolution captured in Chapter 
14.
22
 The question of when the national government should devolve powers and 
responsibilities is also one determined by competency levels at provincial and local levels. 
                                                 
17
 S 264(1) Constitution. 
18
 Chigwata & De Visser 2013: 9. 
19
 S 264(1) Constitution.  
20
 De Visser & Chigwata 2013: 11, Machingauta et al 2014: 6. The lack of such guidance may have adverse 
effects on the implementation of the newly established multilevel system of government. 
21
 Machingauta et al 2014: 6. See Chatiza 2014: 6, Musekiwa 2014: 4, Local Governance Community Capacity 
Building and Development Trust 2014:12. The Provincial and Metropolitan Councils Administration Draft Bill 
of August 2014 has failed in this respect as it does not provide clear guidance on devolution of power to 
provincial and metropolitan councils. 
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 See De Visser & Chigwata 2013: 11. 
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2.3.2 Meaning of ‘competent’ 
Besides the question of „whenever appropriate‟, the Constitution requires devolution of 
power and responsibilities to provincial or local governments which are „competent‟ to carry 
out devolved responsibilities „efficiently and effectively‟.23 Such case by case devolution is 
likely to result in asymmetric decentralisation, which is necessary given that subnational 
governments are unlikely to have equal capacity and resources to deliver on their 
responsibilities and any other obligations.
24
 The challenge nevertheless is determining when a 
provincial council, metropolitan council or local authority has become „competent‟ to carry 
out its tasks „efficiently and effectively‟.25 The issue of competency implies the capacity of a 
subnational government to deliver on decentralised responsibilities. This provision raises the 
question of what has come to be known at the „capacity conundrum‟.26 The dilemma is 
whether capacity should be developed at subnational level before decentralisation of 
responsibilities, or vice versa, or whether the two processes should be carried out 
simultaneously. It is often argued that decentralisation should not take place until the 
necessary capacity exists at subnational level.
27
 This argument is commonly relied upon as an 
excuse by national governments not to devolve powers to subnational governments or to 
justify retaining central control. 
Shah argues against the decentralisation of powers and functions to subnational governments 
depending on capacity or competency levels.
28
 For him, „administrative capacity to develop 
and maintain modern organisational practices such as budgeting, auditing and accounting 
systems is no doubt important but should not be considered as a barrier to decentralisation 
provided that citizen participation and transparency in decision-making is ensured‟.29 The 
argument is that technical capacity can be borrowed from senior governments who also have 
an obligation to support junior governments to ensure that they have the capacity to deliver 
on decentralised responsibilities.
30
 Further, it is only the pressure of decentralisation which 
                                                 
23
 S 264(1) Constitution.  
24
 For a detailed discussion of the relevance of asymmetric decentralisation, see para 6.1.3.5 of Chapter Two. 
25
 De Visser & Chigwata 2013: 11, Machingauta et al 2014: 6. 
26
 Ribot 2004: 59. 
27
 See Shah 2004: 38, Conyers 1990: 30 in Ribot 2004: 54, Ribot 2004: 61. 
28
 Shah 2004: 38. 
29
 Shah 2004: 38. 
30
 See Shah 2004: 38. 
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motivates subnational governments to recognise their own potential, demonstrate their real 
abilities and learn from their mistakes.
31
 
Chatiza argues that the fact that the 2013 Constitution has provided a framework for 
devolution indicates that there will be immediate devolution of powers to provincial and local 
governments soon after its adoption.
32
 This means that instead of making devolution of 
powers and responsibilities conditional on the basis of competency or capacity at subnational 
level, it is the responsibility of the national government to ensure that each provincial and 
local government has the capacity to carry out decentralised tasks.
33
 After all, capacity 
sometimes follows power, that is, officials at provincial and local levels learn from exercising 
power. Moreover, the „capacities needed cannot be separated from the kinds of obligations 
and mandates accompanying those power transfers‟.34 Capacity is likely to develop once the 
necessary powers and responsibilities have been decentralised. Thus, it is submitted that 
devolution of powers and responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities in Zimbabwe is immediate rather than deferred to a later time.
35
 The argument is 
that much capacity at provincial and local levels is needed, but its absence is not an excuse 
for inaction by the national government. 
2.3.3 Who determines that a provincial council, metropolitan council or local 
authority has become ‘competent’? 
The question of who determines that a provincial or local government has become 
„competent‟ is also vital. The Constitution however does not provide guidance on who 
decides when it is „appropriate‟ to devolve power.36 The nature of the Zimbabwean multilevel 
system of government suggests that it is the national government which has that 
responsibility given that it is the most senior government.
37
 Does this mean that an individual 
provincial or local government may not claim that it has become „appropriate‟ for it to 
exercise additional powers? It is submitted that subnational governments may use 
intergovernmental forums, Parliament or even the courts and claim that it is competent to 
                                                 
31
 See Conyers 2000: 30 in Ribot 2004: 64. 
32
 Chatiza 2014: 6. See Moyo 2013: 148. 
33
 See Musekiwa 2014: 8. 
34
 Ribot 2004: 59. 
35
 See Musekiwa 2014: 7, UN-Habitat 2007: 4. However, an incremental approach to devolution of power may 
be most suitable for Zimbabwe given the country‟s unstable economic environment. 
36
 De Visser & Chigwata 2013: 11, Machingauta et al 2014: 6. The lack of such guidance may have adverse 
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exercise additional powers. Lobbying for the decentralisation of additional powers in 
intergovernmental forums and Parliament relies on persuasive instruments. The use of the 
courts is based on the rationale that the Constitution instructs the national government to 
devolve additional powers to lower governments.
38
 
2.4 Objectives of devolution 
It is submitted that the 2013 Constitution requires the division of responsibilities across the 
three tiers of government to be guided by the objectives of devolution of powers and 
responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities captured in 
section 264(2) of the Constitution. The objectives are: 
a) to give powers of local governance to the people and enhance their participation in the 
exercise of the powers of the State and in making decision affecting them; 
b) to promote democratic, effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government 
in Zimbabwe as a whole; 
c) to preserve and foster the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe; 
d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
own development; 
e) to ensure the equitable sharing of local and national resources; and 
f) to transfer responsibilities and resources from the national government in order to 
establish a sound financial base for each provincial and metropolitan council and local 
authority.39 
These objectives envisage the devolution of „significant‟ powers to provincial and local levels 
that are relevant for the realisation of a number of goals, including democracy, development 
and sustainable peace.
40
 For instance, the „right of communities to manage their own affairs‟ 
should be construed to mean that provincial and local governments are assigned 
responsibilities which are relevant for the management of provincial or local affairs.
41
 As 
discussed in Chapter Eight, objectives such as the need to preserve and foster the peace, 
national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe points towards the supervisory role of the 
national government to ensure that the exercise of devolved powers does not undermine 
sustainable peace. Hence, it is submitted that the objectives must guide the process of 
                                                 
38
 See Preamble Chapter 14 and S 264(1) Constitution. 
39
 S 264(2) Constitution. 
40
 De Visser & Chigwata 2013: 11. 
41
 See Moyo 2013: 154. 
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devolution, especially development of legislation in trying to balance the need for local 
autonomy and the requirement for supervision.
42
 
It has been observed in this section that whereas the Constitution provides intent for 
devolution it does not itself devolve „real‟ powers and functions to provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities.
43
 The implication of this is that without providing 
for the powers and functions to be devolved, there is likely to be a continuation of the 
practice under the Lancaster House Constitution where power was centralised at the centre 
with subnational governments mainly acting as agents of the national government.
44
 Unlike 
the Lancaster House Constitution, though, the 2013 Constitution mandates the national 
government to devolve powers and functions. It is submitted therefore that there is a need to 
develop legislation to give effect to the devolution framework enshrined in the 2013 
Constitution.
45
 Internationally recognised principles such as the principles of subsidiarity, 
UN-Habitat Guidelines on decentralisation and strengthening of local authorities, the 
Aberdeen Principles and the European Charter of Local Self-Government can inform the 
division of responsibilities across the three tiers of government.
46
 
Having examined the constitutional basis for the devolution of powers and functions, the 
following section examines the powers and functions of provincial and metropolitan councils. 
The major question is whether the responsibilities are original, relevant, clearly demarcated 
and differentiated. The extent to which provincial and metropolitan councils have final 
decision-making powers over their responsibilities will also be assessed. 
3. Provincial and Metropolitan Councils 
Section 270(1) of the Constitution provides that provincial and metropolitan councils are 
responsible for social and economic development of their respective provinces, including: 
a) planning and implementing social and economic development activities in its 
province; 
b) coordinating and implementing governmental programmes in its province; 
                                                 
42
 See Machingauta et al 2014: 9. 
43
 See Sims 2013: 2, 13; Musekiwa 2014: 4; Moyo 2013: 148. 
44
 See Freedom House 2012: 5. 
45
 See Chatiza 2014: 10; Musekiwa 2014: 4, 7; Local Governance Community Capacity Building and 
Development Trust 2014: 13. 
46
 On division of responsibilities, see Stigler 1953, „Stigler‟s Menu‟; Olson 1969, „Fiscal equivalency‟; Oates 
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c) planning and implementing measures for the conservation, improvement and 
management of natural resources in its province; 
d) promoting tourism in its province, and developing facilities for that purpose; 
e) monitoring and evaluating the use of resources in its province; and 
f) exercising any other functions, including legislative functions, that may be conferred 
or imposed on it by or under an Act of Parliament.47 
While section 270(1) provides for the responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan councils, 
there is no provision in the Constitution which explicitly gives these councils the powers 
necessary to undertake socio-economic development. It is not conceivable that the 
Constitution can assign a responsibility to a particular tier of government without the 
necessary powers required to undertake the responsibility. The only rational conclusion one 
can make is that the power of provincial and metropolitan councils to undertake socio-
economic development is implied in section 270(1). This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that the Constitution only requires Parliament to enact legislation providing for the manner in 
which the councils may exercise their functions.
48
 It is submitted that this does not amount to 
an instruction to provide for the content and powers but the manner in which socio-economic 
development should be carried out. Thus, the powers to undertake socio-economic 
development are implied in section 270(1). The other challenge is that the Constitution does 
not go on to define the term socio-economic development or explain what it entails. Thus, an 
interrogation of the term is required, which will be followed by a general assessment of the 
responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan councils. 
3.1 Defining socio-economic development 
As highlighted in paragraph 2.1 of Chapter Two, economic development is concerned with 
economic growth and is measured using economic indicators such as gross national product, 
inflation rate, unemployment rate and gross domestic product.
49
 Social development on the 
other hand is concerned with qualitative aspects of human life, reflected by factors such as 
equity, social cohesion, social mobility, participation and cultural identity.
50
 Thus socio-
economic development is multidimensional, geared towards improving people‟s socio-
economic welfare both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Given this multi-dimensional 
nature of socio-economic development, the question is whether provincial and metropolitan 
                                                 
47
 S 270(1) Constitution. 
48
 S 270(2) Constitution. 
49
 Soubbotina & Sheram 2000: 9, 96. 
50
 Soubbotina & Sheram 2000: 9. 
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councils have the competence to carry out all responsibilities which have implications for 
socio-economic development.
51
 For instance, can they adopt policies and spend budgets on 
functional areas such as water supply, health, sanitation and housing which have implications 
for socio-economic development? 
Provincial and metropolitan councils are unlikely to adopt and implement policies which 
have a significant impact on socio-economic development unless the national government 
devolves additional responsibilities to them. Their role may be limited to development 
planning, coordination and implementation, as was the case under the Lancaster House 
Constitution.
52
 This argument is supported by the fact that the Constitution does not grant 
provincial and metropolitan councils any resource-raising and legislative powers.
53
 Such 
powers are necessary if provincial and metropolitan councils are to undertake functions 
which have implications on socio-economic development. It is submitted however that 
provincial and metropolitan councils may undertake responsibilities which have significant 
consequences on socio-economic development. What is required is for national legislation to 
specify the exact functions which these councils should undertake. Some of these functions 
might currently be undertaken by the national or local governments but may be better 
exercised by the councils. For example, provincial planning, provincial cultural matters, 
provincial tourism and management of certain natural resources may be better undertaken by 
provincial and metropolitan councils than by other tiers of government. 
The argument that provincial and metropolitan councils do not have resource-raising and law-
making powers does not justify why these councils should not undertake significant 
responsibilities. The Constitution does not close the door for the councils to exercise these 
powers at it leaves it to Parliament to decide on whether these councils should exercise such 
powers.
54
 It is submitted that the national government should devolve significant powers and 
responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils as the Constitution envisages that 
these councils will play a key role in the socio-economic development of their respective 
provinces and not merely a planning and coordinating role. As highlighted above, the 
Constitution provides some of the responsibilities which provincial and metropolitan councils 
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 See De Visser & Chigwata 2013: 12, Machingauta et al 2014: 15. 
52
 See S 13 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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 See Sims 2013: 2, Freedom House 2012: 35. 
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may undertake to realise social and economic development in their respective provinces.
55
 
These responsibilities are examined in detail below. 
3.1.1 Planning and implementing social and economic development activities 
Provincial and metropolitan councils are responsible for planning and implementing social 
and economic development activities in their provinces.
56
 This seems to suggest that the role 
of these councils may be limited to planning and implementing programmes to achieve social 
and economic development.
57
 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Constitution may not have 
created a government with the responsibility of only assisting other governments without its 
own unique role to play. If that were the case, then provincial and metropolitan councils 
would have not been recognised in the Constitution as a tier of government but perhaps just 
an agency of national or/and local governments. It can be argued that the fact that the 
Constitution recognised these councils as governments means that they have a significant role 
to play in socio-economic development. Thus, the role of the councils is not limited to 
development planning but extends to adoption and implementation of policies to further 
socio-economic development. 
3.1.2 Coordinating and implementing governmental programmes 
Provincial and metropolitan councils are also charged with coordinating and implementing 
„governmental programmes‟.58 It is however not clear whose programmes provincial and 
metropolitan councils are tasked with coordinating and implementing given that government 
is organised at the national, provincial and local levels.
59
 Are these programmes of the 
national government or provincial and metropolitan councils, or those of local authorities, or 
of all governments? It is submitted that since provincial and metropolitan councils are 
composed of members from both the national and local governments they should coordinate 
and implement programmes of government (whether national, provincial and local) in the 
province.
60
 It is argued that it appears from their composition that these councils have an 
intergovernmental relations role to play rather than carrying out distinct powers and 
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 See s 270(1) Constitution. 
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functions.
61
 Yet section 264(1) of the Constitution mandates the national government to 
devolve powers to these councils. These two requirements taken together do not make for a 
coherent constitutional picture of the actual role and function of provincial and metropolitan 
councils.
62
 This requires national legislation to clarify the exact place and role of provinces. 
However, it is submitted that the intergovernmental relation element which these councils 
have does not prevent them from exercising distinct powers and functions relating to socio-
economic development. 
3.1.3 Conservation, improvement and management of natural resources 
Provincial and metropolitan councils are responsible for planning and implementing 
measures for the conservation, improvement and management of natural resources in their 
respective provinces.
63
 It is not clear whether these councils have „real‟ decision-making 
powers with respect to the conservation, improvement and management of natural 
resources.
64
 Their role seems to be limited to assisting the national and local tiers of 
government in formulation and implementation of policies to conserve, improve and manage 
natural resources. It is however submitted that the role of these councils may not be limited to 
assisting the national and local governments. In fact, the councils have the power to adopt 
and implement programmes to conserve, improve and manage natural resources. For 
example, a council may adopt and implement programmes to reduce deforestation and 
environmental degradation in its province. This means that provincial and metropolitan 
councils have the right to reject certain commercial exploitation of local resources to preserve 
the environment.
65
 Such a right include the right to determine who exploits natural resources 
for commercial or any other purposes.
66
 Further, the councils can be involved in the 
determination of beneficiaries from the exploitation of natural resources in their respective 
provinces. They should be entitled to a certain portion of revenue generated from such 
exploitation of natural resources. 
It submitted that to effectively carry out the conservation, improvement and management of 
natural resources, the national government should consider devolving executive and resource-
                                                 
61
 Machingauta et al 2014: 16. Moyo 2013: 152. See para 2.1 of Chapter Five for a discussion of the 
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raising powers to provincial and metropolitan council(s) to empower them with real decision-
making power.
67
 The effective conservation, improvement and management may require that 
provincial and metropolitan councils exercise legislative powers so that they are able to make 
rules and laws regulating, for instance, conservation of natural resources.
68
 It may also 
require that the councils raise revenue to implement their policies. 
3.1.4 Tourism 
Provincial and metropolitan councils have the responsibility over tourism in their respective 
provinces.
69
 The question is whether their role is limited to promoting tourism and 
developing facilities for that purpose or having full competency over tourism. The 
Constitution suggests that the role of provincial and metropolitan councils is limited to 
promoting and developing facilities for promoting tourism.
70
 Promoting tourism encompasses 
a variety of activities, including setting up centres, employing individuals and establishing 
agencies for that purpose. Developing facilities is a significant responsibility which may 
involve creating infrastructure to accommodate and cater for the needs of tourists. Promoting 
and developing facilities for tourism will likely require financial resources. 
It is submitted that even though provincial and metropolitan councils are entitled to a portion 
of nationally raised revenue in each year, it is necessary to allow the councils to retain some 
of the revenue generated from tourism-related activities.
71
 This is particularly necessary to 
establish a close link between consumption of tourism services and payment of such services 
at the provincial level.
72
 For example, the councils can be allowed to keep a certain 
percentage of money paid by tourists.
73
 The councils could also be given the power to levy a 
tourism tax or/and hotel tax. Thus, it is submitted that the national government should 
devolve to the provincial level the necessary revenue-raising powers related to tourism to 
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 See S 264(1) Constitution. See also ss 183 and 198 Law Society Draft Constitution. 
68
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69
 S 270(1)(d) Constitution. 
70
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allow the council to raise revenue necessary to promote tourism and developing facilities for 
that purpose.
74
 
3.1.5 Monitoring and evaluating the use of resources 
The Constitution requires provincial and metropolitan councils to monitor and evaluate the 
use of resources in their respective provinces.
75
 The question is, are these resources at the 
disposal of the national, provincial or local government which the councils are required to 
monitor their use? What should these councils do with the outcome of such evaluation? Can 
they hold the national or local government accountable for its use of resources or should they 
rather aim at coordinating the use of resources? The Constitution does not provide clarity on 
these issues.
76
 It is submitted that provincial and metropolitan councils should monitor and 
evaluate the use of all public resources in the province.
77
 This implies that the council will 
monitor how national ministries and departments and local authorities are spending public 
resources in the province, especially with regard to the realisation of socio-economic 
development. It must also monitor the use of its own resources in the province. The councils 
should be given the power to bring to the attention of the responsible Minister, mayor, 
Auditor-General and other relevant institutions any improper spending or use of public 
resources by the responsible ministry, agency or local authority in the province concerned. 
3.1.6 Additional powers 
A provincial and metropolitan council may exercise additional powers and functions, 
including legislative powers that may be conferred or imposed on it by or under an Act of 
Parliament.
78
 This provision raises a number of questions. For example, what does 
assignment of powers and functions „by‟ or „under‟ an Act of Parliament mean? Is the 
assignment of legislative powers necessary and, if so, how should it be carried out? Should 
the national government assign additional executive responsibilities on provincial and 
metropolitan councils?  
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3.1.6.1 Assignment of powers and functions ‘by’ or ‘under’ an Act of Parliament 
A provincial or metropolitan council may exercise additional powers and functions that may 
be conferred or imposed on it „by or under‟ an Act of Parliament.79 This provision gives 
Parliament the discretion to determine if a provincial and metropolitan council should 
exercise any additional responsibilities and their nature.
80
 Further, Parliament has the 
discretion to assign varying powers and functions to different provincial or metropolitan 
councils.
81
 Parliament may assign additional powers and functions to a provincial or 
metropolitan council by following two methods. It may confer powers and functions „by‟ 
means of an Act of Parliament. This means that the relevant Act of Parliament directly 
assigns powers and functions to a particular provincial and metropolitan council. After such 
an assignment, the relevant provincial or metropolitan council generally does not require any 
other authorisation to exercise or undertake the assigned powers or functions, respectively. 
Parliament may confer powers and functions to a provincial or metropolitan council „under‟ 
an Act of Parliament.
82
 This implies that Parliament will authorise a particular body to assign 
additional powers and functions to a provincial or metropolitan council. For example, 
Parliament can authorise the President or Minister to assign powers and functions to a 
provincial and metropolitan council. The critical question is whether Parliament can give 
„blanket‟ powers to the President or Minister to assign powers and functions to a provincial 
or metropolitan council? Are there any limitations to what Parliament can delegate with 
respect to the assignment of powers and functions to provincial and metropolitan councils? 
These questions are interrogated below. 
3.1.6.2 Assignment of legislative functions 
The Constitution does not grant legislative powers to provincial and metropolitan councils.
83
 
It envisages that provincial and metropolitan councils may exercise legislative powers by 
giving Parliament the power to confer or impose legislative powers on these councils.
84
 It is 
submitted that there are limitations to the manner in which Parliament may delegate 
legislative powers. First, it is submitted that Parliament may not delegate the power to assign 
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legislative powers to the President or Minister as the executive is not vested with primary 
law-making powers. Thus, if Parliament resolves to assign legislative powers to a provincial 
or metropolitan council, it has to do so itself. There are also limitations to the assignment of 
legislative powers to a provincial or metropolitan council. It is submitted that Parliament may 
not delegate its primary law-making power as that would be unconstitutional.
85
 The Act of 
Parliament providing for the assignment of legislative powers „must specify the limits of the 
power, the nature and scope of the [law] that may be made, and the principles and standards 
applicable to the [law]‟.86 This implies that Parliament may not give to a provincial or 
metropolitan council unlimited power to make laws. 
Having dealt with legal requirements pertaining to assignment of legislative powers to 
provincial and metropolitan councils, the question is whether the ability of the councils to 
deliver on their mandate and obligations will be enhanced if these councils have some 
legislative powers. It is submitted that to enable the councils to effectively carry out socio-
economic development, it may be necessary to allow the councils to exercise legislative 
powers.
87
 Some of the responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan councils require them to 
exercise some regulatory role which cannot be effectively carried out without legislative 
powers. An example stated above is conservation of the environment, which may be 
effectively carried out if the councils make laws and rules regulating the interface between 
human beings and the natural environment.
88
 Effective management of natural resources may 
also require these councils have the power to formulate and implement their own laws.
89
 
Other areas where provincial and metropolitan councils may make laws include provincial 
tourism, soil conservation and provincial planning.
90
 It is submitted that effective 
implementation of policies on these functional areas require that the councils exercise 
legislative powers. The decentralisation of legislative powers to the provincial level is also 
necessary to enable the realisation of the constitutional „right of communities to manage their 
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own affairs and to further their development‟.91 It is highly unlikely that communities at 
provincial level can fully exercise that right without any legislative powers. 
3.1.6.3 Assignment of executive functions 
Besides assigning legislative powers, Parliament may assign additional executive functions to 
a provincial or metropolitan council.
92
 This may take place by an Act of Parliament or under 
an executive act. In the first case, Parliament itself assigns additional executive functions to a 
provincial or metropolitan council. In the second scenario, Parliament may give a member of 
the executive (for example, President or Minister) the power to assign additional executive 
functions to a provincial and metropolitan council. It is submitted that Parliament may not 
give „blanket‟ powers to the President or Minister with respect to assignment of functions to a 
provincial or metropolitan council. Under the 2013 Constitution, no institution of government 
has unlimited powers as that may contravene the founding values and principles of the 
Constitution, including rule of law, principle of separation of powers and accountability.
93
 
Thus, for example, it is unconstitutional for Parliament to give the President or Minister 
„blanket‟ powers to assign additional responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils. 
The Act of Parliament giving the President or Minister power to assign functions should 
explicitly provide for what executive powers can be assigned and when such an assignment 
can take place. 
The argument does not end with how additional executive functions can be assigned to a 
provincial or metropolitan council. It extends to the question of whether additional executive 
functions should be decentralised to the provincial level. As highlighted above, the Preamble 
of Chapter 14 requires devolution of powers and responsibilities to the provincial level 
„whenever‟ preservation of national unity, prevention of secession, democratic participation 
and equitable allocation of national resources requires it. This therefore means that the socio-
economic responsibility which the Constitution has imposed on these councils is not the sole 
responsibility which the councils may undertake. The councils may have to undertake other 
responsibilities to preserve national unity, prevent secession, promote democratic 
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participation and ensure equitable allocation of national resources.
94
 However, it may be 
naive to argue that additional executive functions should be given to these councils even 
before they have been established. The starting point will be to establish the councils and 
once they have been established, an assessment should be carried out of what additional 
functions may be decentralised to the provincial level.
95
 In the following section, the chapter 
provides a general assessment of the powers and functions of provincial and metropolitan 
councils. 
3.2 General assessment 
It was contended in paragraph 6.13 of Chapter Two that subnational governments are likely 
to assist in the realisation of national and local goals such as development, democracy and 
sustainable peace if they have original, relevant, clearly demarcated, and „differentiated‟ 
powers as well as final decision-making powers over their responsibilities. In this section the 
chapter examines the extent to which the responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan 
councils comply with this normative framework. 
3.2.1 Are the powers and functions original? 
It was contended in paragraph 6.1.3.1 of Chapter Two that subnational governments are 
likely to play a meaningful role in the achievement of national and local goals, such as 
development, democracy and sustainable peace, if they have original powers.
96
 As mentioned 
above, the Constitution enumerates the responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan 
councils with powers to carry these responsibilities implied in section 270(1).
97
 This 
constitutional recognition of the powers and responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan 
councils has provided the highest form of protection of the powers and responsibilities of the 
councils. The national government may not recentralise the responsibilities of provincial and 
metropolitan councils without amending the Constitution. However, original powers and 
responsibilities by themselves are not enough to enhance the role of provincial and 
metropolitan councils in the realisation of development, democracy and sustainable peace if 
they are not relevant for the achievement of these goals. 
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3.2.2 Are the powers and functions relevant? 
It was submitted in paragraph 6.1.3.2 of Chapter Two that subnational governments are likely 
to play a central role in development, democracy and sustainable peace if their powers and 
functions are relevant for the realisation of these national and local goals.
98
 As mentioned 
above, provincial and metropolitan councils are responsible for socio-economic development 
in their respective provinces.
99
 It was highlighted above that socio-economic development is 
geared towards improving people‟s socio-economic welfare both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms. Thus, provincial and metropolitan councils have responsibilities with a 
direct relationship to the realisation of development. 
Responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan councils such as tourism and management of 
resources may improve economic growth, create employment and provide opportunities for 
citizen participation in the economy.
100
 This may result in improvement in the well-being of 
the citizens, which usually tends to reduce impetus towards violent conflict and therefore 
engenders sustainable peace. It is submitted that the extent to which the responsibility of 
socio-economic development is relevant for development, democracy and sustainable peace 
depends on the extent to which the councils are allowed to carry out substantive functions 
rather than merely overseeing the implementation of national programmes. Therefore, as 
argued above, provincial and metropolitan councils should be allowed to carry out „real‟ 
responsibilities pertaining to socio-development development and other responsibilities 
which the national government is encouraged to devolve the provincial level.
101
 
3.2.3 Are the powers and functions clearly demarcated? 
As argued in paragraph 6.1.3.3 of Chapter Two the extent to which the responsibilities of 
provincial and metropolitan councils are clearly demarcated has implications for the role 
which these governments can play in the realisation of development, democracy and 
sustainable peace.
102
 The 2013 Constitution has not provided clarity with regard to the socio-
economic responsibility of provincial and metropolitan councils.
103
 As discussed above, 
socio-economic development encompasses a number of aspects, from the provision of public 
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services such as health, water supply and housing to the creation of employment. This makes 
it difficult to delineate the functional competency of these councils given that some of the 
responsibilities which have implications for socio-economic development are carried out by 
the national and local governments.
104
 Hence, it is submitted that the responsibilities of 
provincial and metropolitan councils are not clearly demarcated.
105
 This further brings into 
question the effective functioning of the entire multilevel system of government.
106
 The 
Constitution seems to suggest that some of the functions which have implications on socio-
economic development which were carried out by the national and local governments, under 
the Lancaster House constitutional order, should be assigned to provincial and metropolitan 
councils. These include: provincial planning, nature conservation, soil conservation, 
provincial recreation, provincial tourism and provincial amenities. Thus, it is submitted that 
national legislation should provide for clear division of responsibilities among the three tiers 
of government. This is in line with one of the objective of devolution which is to promote 
transparent government.
107
 
3.2.4 Do provincial and metropolitan councils have final decision-making powers 
over their responsibilities? 
In paragraph 6.1.3.4 of Chapter Two it was contended that the extent to which subnational 
governments have final decision-making powers over their functions is also important for the 
role which they may play in the realisation of development, democracy and sustainable 
peace.
108
 In Zimbabwe, the extent to which provincial and metropolitan councils can make 
final decisions relating to socio-economic development is constrained in a number of ways. 
While the councils may formulate plans to realise socio-economic development, provincial 
and metropolitan councils do not have resource-raising powers. As discussed in paragraph 2 
of Chapter Seven, this implies that the councils are wholly funded by the national 
government through intergovernmental grants. Thus, the national government will make the 
final decision making role in determining programmes which are implemented at provincial 
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level by virtue of controlling the national „purse‟.109 Independent decision-making at 
provincial level requires that provincial and metropolitan councils have autonomous revenue-
raising powers. The ability of provincial and metropolitan councils to make final decisions 
relating to socio-economic development is also constrained by the fact that there is no clear 
assignment of responsibilities to these councils, as contended above.
110
 It is submitted that a 
clear assignment of authority to provincial and metropolitan councils can go a long way in 
ensuring that the councils make final decisions on their responsibilities, despite greater 
reliance on the national government for funding.
111
 This may also promote transparent 
governance.
112
 
3.2.5 Are the powers and functions ‘differentiated’? 
It was argued in paragraph 6.1.3.5 of Chapter Two that it is useful to have a multilevel system 
of government that recognises differences at subnational level by diffusing varying powers 
and responsibilities to subnational governments depending on the individual circumstances of 
each subnational government and the area it is in charge of.
113
 While creating different 
structures to govern provinces (in provincial and metropolitan councils),
114
 the Constitution 
has assigned to provinces equal powers and functions of fostering socio-economic 
development. The Constitution however allows the development of a „differentiated‟ model 
of assigning powers and functions to provincial and metropolitan councils. It empowers the 
national government to devolve additional powers to provincial and metropolitan councils 
depending on a number of variables, including competency levels and development needs of 
each provincial or metropolitan council.
115
 
3.3 Administrative authority 
The previous section discussed the powers and functions of provincial and metropolitan 
councils. This section establishes whether provincial and metropolitan councils have 
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administrative authority given that it is important to the role which subnational governments 
can play in development, democracy and sustainable peace. As discussed in paragraph 6.3 of 
Chapter Two, administrative authority entails the power of subnational governments to hire, 
fire, and remunerate employees as well as to determine their internal administrative 
procedures. The section is divided in two parts, the first part devoted to personnel issues and 
second to internal administrative procedures. 
3.3.1 Authority over personnel issues 
The 2013 Constitution does not assign to provincial and metropolitan councils the power to 
manage their personnel. It leaves it to the national government to determine the appointment, 
condition of services and removal of employees of provincial and metropolitan councils 
through an Act of Parliament.
116
 This means that, as under the Lancaster House Constitution, 
the autonomy of provincial and metropolitan councils to appoint, discipline and dismiss their 
staff is not guaranteed.
117
 The national government may decentralise or recentralise such 
powers at any time. This may undermine the stability of the multilevel system of government 
and therefore the ability of provincial and metropolitan councils to deliver on development, 
democracy and sustainable peace objectives. Indications are that the national government is 
considering assigning to provincial and metropolitan councils authority to hire administrative 
officials.
118
 This would be a positive move since authority over personnel issues can be 
effective in promoting direct accountability of staff at provincial level to their provincial or 
metropolitan councils and allow these governments to better respond to local needs and 
opportunities. Direct accountability of the administrative arm to provincial governments is 
important for effective policy implementation by provincial and metropolitan councils.
119
 If 
provincial and metropolitan councils are given powers to appoint their own staff, the question 
is what will happen to provincial administrators (PAs) who previously provided technical 
support to provincial councils? PAs could be incorporated into the bureaucracy of each 
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provincial or metropolitan council in the relevant province.
120
 Alternatively, PAs could 
continue serving as deconcentrated offices of the Ministry responsible for local government 
charged with coordination of national programmes at provincial level. This alternative would 
require greater clarity of roles of PAs, on the one hand, and the administrative officials of 
provincial or metropolitan council, on the other. 
3.3.2 Conduct and conditions of employment of employees 
The Constitution regulates the conduct of employees of provincial and local governments. 
Employees of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities are required to act in 
accordance with the Constitution and any Act of Parliament.
121
 They may not be office-
bearers of any political party.
122
 They may also not act in a partisan manner, further the 
interests of any political party or cause, prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or 
cause, or violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.
123
 The Constitution 
directs Parliament to enact legislation to ensure the political neutrality of employees of 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
124
 Given the history of the 
involvement of some employees of subnational governments in advancing the cause of 
political parties in Zimbabwe, the regulation of the conduct of employees of provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities will ensure that employees of these councils 
concentrate on their core mandate of serving the public.
125
 
3.3.3 Internal administrative procedures  
The 2013 Constitution does not allocate to provincial and metropolitan councils the power to 
determine their internal administrative procedures. Instead, Parliament has been given the 
discretion to decide the internal administrative procedures of provincial and metropolitan 
councils.
126
 Thus, the autonomy of provincial and metropolitan councils to determine their 
internal administrative procedures is not guaranteed as the national government may 
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recentralise and decentralise such authority at any time.
127
 It can be argued that the absence of 
the constitutional protection of the administrative autonomy of provincial and metropolitan 
councils will permit the national government to interfere with internal administrative 
procedures of provincial and metropolitan councils.
128
 It is submitted that provincial and 
metropolitan councils should be given some discretion to set up their internal administrative 
procedures to enable them to adjust these to suit their local environments and respond better 
to opportunities.
129
 For example, the councils can be given the power to determine the nature 
of departments they may establish, how such departments should be composed, the functions 
of such departments and the delegation of powers to any of its administrative officials. 
4. Powers and functions of local authorities 
The previous section discussed the responsibilities of provincial and metropolitan councils. In 
this section the chapter examines the responsibilities of local authorities. The section will 
begin by examining the constitutional framework for the assignment of responsibilities to 
local authorities. It then examines the responsibilities of local authorities as provided by 
various Acts of Parliament.
130
 
4.1 Constitutional framework 
The 2013 Constitution has repositioned the role of local authorities in the multilevel system 
of government despite the fact that it does not enumerate their responsibilities. As under the 
Lancaster House Constitution, the responsibility to determine the responsibilities of local 
authorities remains with the national government.
131
 Thus, the powers and responsibilities of 
local authorities may not be original as they are not guaranteed in the Constitution.
132
 The 
implication of the lack of constitutional recognition of the powers and responsibilities of local 
authorities is that (re)centralisation of power cannot be stopped on the basis of the 
Constitution.
133
 It is submitted that the absence of guaranteed powers and functions of local 
authority may be a major weakness of the multilevel system of government and so undermine 
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the ability of local authorities to deliver on development, democracy and sustainable peace 
objectives.
134
 However, unlike under the Lancaster House Constitution, Parliament is not 
entirely free when assigning responsibilities to local authorities under the 2013 
Constitution.
135
 It is bounded by the founding values and principles of the Constitution, the 
Preamble of Chapter 14, objectives of devolution and principles of local government listed in 
the Constitution.
136
 In addition, section 276(1) of the Constitution provides that 
subject to th[e] Constitution and any Act of Parliament, a local authority has 
the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local affairs of the people within 
the area for which it has been established, and has all the powers necessary 
for it to do so. 
This provision resembles section 151(4) of the Constitution of South Africa which provides 
that a municipality has a „right to govern … on its own initiative … the local affairs of its 
community‟.137 As discussed in detail below, this provision seems to allocate powers directly 
to local authorities.
138
 The provision requires a thorough analysis, which this section strives 
to provide. 
4.1.1 Meaning of ‘right to govern’ 
As stated above, the Constitution provides that a local authority has a „right to govern‟ the 
local affairs of the area for which it has been established. Although higher tiers of 
government are to exercise governmental power, the Constitution does not use the „right to 
govern‟ terminology. This implies that the Constitution emphasises the existence of a local 
authority entitlement that can be legitimately claimed and defended in terms of the 2013 
Constitution.
139
 This claim to exercise power is supported by the use of the term „right‟ 
which, as in the South African context, is used to refer to local governments and not to other 
senior governments. The use of the verb „govern‟, which again does not appear elsewhere in 
the Constitution, denotes a regulatory and policy-making role.
140
 In the South African context 
„right to govern‟ was construed to mean more than the right to implement and administer law 
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but also involves the formulation and implementation of its own laws and policies.
141
 
Therefore, while local authorities in Zimbabwe do not have enumerated powers in the 
Constitution, they have a constitutionally guaranteed claim to a „right to govern‟ the areas for 
which they have been established. The claim originates from the „right‟ which the 
Constitution expressly grants to local authorities. Hence, it can be argued that section 276(1) 
of the Constitution seems to grant local authorities original powers to regulate and adopt and 
implement their own policies and laws, in addition to implementing policies and laws of 
higher governments.
142
 Nonetheless, unlike the South African context,
143
 the „right to govern‟ 
of local authorities in Zimbabwe is not only limited by the Constitution but also by national 
legislation. This then significantly reduces the constitutional protection offered by this 
provision.
144
 However, it is maintained that unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, the 
2013 Constitution requires that local authorities exercise significant powers and enjoy a 
certain measure of local autonomy.
145
 As discussed in detail in Chapter Eight, this means that 
some of the „excessive‟ supervisory powers which were assigned to the Minister under the 
Lancaster House Constitution (such as the power to reverse, suspend and alter council 
resolutions) should be reformed so that the „right to govern‟ of a local authority can be 
protected and promoted.
146
 
4.1.2 Meaning of ‘on its own initiative’ 
A local authority does not only have a right to govern but it has a right to do so „on its own 
initiative‟.147 Governing „on its own initiative‟ means that local authorities no longer rely on 
national and provincial governments to govern. The 2013 Constitution has ushered in a new 
era where local authorities are not merely implementers of national government policies but 
can actually formulate and implement their own policies.
148
 Thus, in principle, local 
authorities do not have to wait for instructions from the national government to govern. The 
difficulty with this reasoning is that local authorities do not have original powers. They 
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actually do rely on national legislation for them to govern.
149
 It is submitted nevertheless that 
the 2013 Constitution requires the development of new legislation which assigns to local 
authorities power not only to implement national policies but also to formulate and 
implement their own policies and laws.
150
 
4.1.3 Meaning of ‘the local affairs’ 
A local authority has a „right to govern‟ the „local affairs‟ of the people within the area for 
which it has been established.
151
 In principle, this could mean that a local authority has the 
power to undertake „all‟ responsibilities and exercise „all‟ powers which directly affect the 
lives of people within its jurisdiction. This reasoning assumes that the authority of local 
authorities is not bounded by that of higher tiers of government. This assumption is not 
correct since the conduct of local authorities is not only limited by the Constitution but also 
by national legislation.
152
 This means that what local authorities may do within their 
respective jurisdictions is determined and limited by the national government. Such a view is 
supported by section 276(2) of the Constitution, which gives the national government the 
power to determine and confer functions on local authorities. 
It is submitted nonetheless that local authorities should be assigned full responsibility in 
matters which affect the interest of local citizens so as to capitalise on „efficiency‟ benefits 
associated with a multilevel system of government.
153
 Such assignment should be informed 
by the historical context in Zimbabwe with regard to the role of urban and rural local 
authorities. It was highlighted in paragraphs 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.4 of Chapter Three that in the 
colonial period urban and rural local authorities, respectively, had competency over „purely‟ 
local functions. In the post-independence era, the local authorities have retained the majority 
of these functions. Indications are that the national government will allow local authorities to 
continue carrying out these responsibilities.
154
 This will be a positive development given that 
local authorities should be in charge of „real‟ functions that are relevant for development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. 
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4.1.4 Meaning of ‘all powers necessary’ to govern 
The Constitution provides that a local authority has „all‟ the powers necessary to govern on 
its own initiative the local affairs of its people.
155
 This means that under the 2013 
Constitution local authorities have a legitimate constitutional claim to exercise certain 
governmental powers if such powers are necessary to govern the affairs of the people within 
their jurisdictions.
156
 This marks a departure from the Lancaster House constitutional order 
where local authorities did not have any basis to claim powers from the national 
government.
157
 Local authorities could only exercise those powers which the national 
government had assigned to them. 
It is submitted however that under the 2013 Constitution a local authority may claim 
authority from the national government if such authority is necessary in order for that local 
authority to govern on its own initiative the local affairs of its people.
158
 It follows from this 
line of argument that local authorities may approach the Constitutional Court to the challenge 
constitutional validity of national legislation which significantly takes away the powers they 
require to govern (on their own initiative) the local affairs of their people.
159
 Such legislation 
may be declared unconstitutional as it contravenes section 276(1) of the Constitution. It is 
further submitted that local authorities may also make use of intergovernmental relations 
structures and Parliament to lobby the national government to decentralise the necessary 
powers which they require to effectively exercise their „right to govern‟. It is suggested that 
when enacting legislation providing for the powers and functions of local authorities, national 
government should give local authorities powers and functions which are relevant, clearly 
demarcated and „differentiated,‟ with final decision-making power to execute those 
functions.
160
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4.2 Statutory framework 
Having examined the constitutional framework for the assignment of powers and functions to 
local authorities, this section assesses the statutory framework which provides for the powers 
and functions of local authorities. The section will establish whether the statutory framework 
is consistent with the 2013 Constitution as well as the normative framework discussed in 
paragraph 6.1.3 of Chapter Two. In the first part, the section discusses the powers and 
functions of urban local authorities before discussing those for rural local authorities. The last 
part provides a general assessment of the powers and functions of local authorities. The UCA 
and RDCA are the primary pieces of legislation that currently provide for the powers and 
functions of urban and rural local authorities, respectively. The Acts make distinction 
between mandatory and permissive powers and functions of local authorities. Mandatory 
powers and functions are those that are basic and to be carried out by all local authorities.
161
 
These include: provision of water and roads, provision of health services, refuse removal, 
sanitation and drainage services, establishment of cemeteries, provision of houses and 
serviced stands, and planning and implementation of plans.
162
 Permissive powers and 
functions are those matters which local authorities may undertake. These include: operation 
of business enterprises, provision of markets and taverns and establishment of community 
development schemes.
163
 The discussion in this chapter is not structured on this 
categorisation between mandatory and permissive functions but on the category of local 
authority (whether urban or rural). 
4.3 Urban Local Authorities 
The national government has assigned various powers and functions to urban local authorities 
including the power to make and implement laws and policies. These powers and functions 
are examined in this section against the normative framework set in Chapter Two and the 
2013 Constitution. The section begins by examining legislative powers followed by executive 
powers before discussing incidental powers of urban local authorities. The section then 
discusses the assignment of powers and responsibilities to local boards. 
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 4.3.1 Legislative powers 
The 2013 Constitution does not assign legislative powers to local authorities. The 
Constitution however envisages that local authorities will exercise the power to make by-laws 
since it recognises that the national government may confer such powers to local 
authorities.
164
 It is submitted that the national government should assign the power to make 
by-laws to urban local authorities as these powers are necessary for them to effectively 
„represent‟ and „manage‟ the affairs of people in urban areas.165 As observed below, the UCA 
gives urban local authorities the power only to propose by-laws. The Act further limits the 
exercise of law-making powers by urban local authorities to matters listed in its Third 
Schedule, as provided in the table below.
166
 
Table 5: Matters in respect of which urban local authorities may make by-laws 
General Control of any service, institution or thing; control of collections; 
inspections; fees, offences and penalties 
Proceedings of the 
councils and 
financial matters 
Proceedings at meetings; disclosure of documents and publication 
of proceedings; financial; contracts; tenders; capital development 
funds; estates account; and allowances for municipal councillors 
Control over 
property 
Protection of council property; vegetation; conservation of natural 
resources; congregation, entry and parking on council property; 
permits of certain activities on council land; removal of 
unauthorised buildings on council land; advertisements; 
depreciation of property; overcrowding; regulation and control of 
occupation and use of land or buildings; excavations; masts and 
poles; hedges and trees; fire places and chimneys; cooking and 
washing facilities; occupation or use of buildings; dangerous or 
neglected buildings; public holidays; and fire-fighting equipment 
and fire-escapes 
Planning, 
construction and 
use of buildings 
Location and situation; plans, specifications and structural 
calculations; nature, design and appearance of buildings; drainage 
and sewerage provisions; water suppliers; materials and 
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and structures construction; conduct of building operations; inspections, samples 
and tests; temporary structures; use of buildings; completion of 
buildings; use of scaffolding, hoarding or protective devices; 
numbering of buildings; and administration of by-laws relating to 
certain matters 
Roads, public 
places and traffic 
Work in the vicinity of roads; scaffolding and decorations on roads; 
gatherings and noises in roads; prevention of the use of sidewalk for 
unauthorised purposes; trees, shrubs, etc., in relation to roads and 
traffic; regulation of use of roads; obstruction of roads and other 
public places; processions and public meetings; driving stocks; 
parking of vehicles; loading and unloading of vehicles; use of 
warning vehicles; regulating and licensing of cycles and certain 
other vehicles; taxi-cabs and omnibuses; drivers of taxi-cubs; and 
omnibuses. 
Amenities and 
facilities 
Sanitary conveniences; parks, recreation grounds, caravan parks, 
camping grounds etc.; boating establishments; and crèches 
Water General; pollution of water; wells and boreholes 
Electricity Supply of electricity to consumers; cutting of electricity and 
recovery of charges; inspections and testing; meters; and prevention 
of interference 
Sewerage, effluent 
and the removal of 
refuse and 
vegetation 
Sewerage; sanitary fittings; effluent and refuse removal; cleansing 
of private sewers, streets and yards; crops, vegetation, rubbish and 
waste material 
Animals Keeping of animals, reptiles and birds; disease-carrying animals, 
insects and vermin; noxious insects; public riding stables and 
kennels; dog tax; slaughter of animals and slaughter-houses; dipping 
tanks; and stock pens 
Food, food 
premises or 
vehicles and 
markets 
Sale and supply of food; premises, vehicles and employees; food 
introduced from outside council area; market gardens; and markets 
Trade, occupations Dangerous trade; employment bureaux and compulsory examination 
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and other activities and treatment of workers; disinfection and fumigation; infectious 
diseases; hawkers and street vendors; electricians; plumbers and 
drain-layers; hairdressers; launderers, cleaners and dyers; funeral 
parlours and mortuaries; boarding-houses and public auctions 
Nuisances General; horns, bells etc.; use of loudspeakers; and objectionable 
advertisements, etc. 
Functions, 
performances, 
events and 
amusements 
Performances dangerous to the public; amusements and open-air 
events 
Fires, combustible 
materials and 
explosives 
Fires; bonfires and burning vegetation; and combustible or 
inflammable material and explosives 
Source: Third Schedule, Urban Councils Act 
As shown in the above table, urban local authorities may legislate on quite a variety of 
matters. The degree to which urban local authorities have autonomy to legislate on these 
matters has consequences for the ability of these authorities to „govern on their own 
initiative‟, as required by the Constitution.167 Thus, it is important to analyse the legislative 
process including the making and adoption of model by-laws at the local level. 
4.3.1.1 Law-making process 
As shown in Figure 18 below, the law-making process begins with a council formulating 
draft by-laws which are forwarded to the full council for a resolution.
168
 After the proposed 
draft by-laws have been passed by the council, they are published for public comment.
169
 If 
there are any objections made, the council is required to consider those objections before 
passing a resolution approving the proposed by-laws.
170
 After the proposed by-laws have 
been passed by the council, they are forwarded to the Minister for approval.
171
 A by-law may 
not be enforced by a local authority unless approved by the Minister through a statutory 
                                                 
167
 See s 276 Constitution. See also Pasipanodya et al 2000: 49. 
168
 See s 228(1)(5) UCA. 
169
 S 228(5) UCA. 
170
 S 228(7) UCA. 
171
 S 228(7) UCA. 
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instrument. When considering a proposed by-law the Minister may withhold approval of the 
by-laws, amend the by-laws or approve part of the by-laws.
172
 
Figure 18: Law-making processes at the local level 
 
It is submitted that the power of the Minister to approve by-laws limits the legislative 
autonomy of local authorities. Legislative autonomy is important for local democracy 
because it is through by-laws that the council advances the preferences and aspirations of the 
local populace.
173
 The question is whether the power of the Minister to approve by-laws is 
consistent with the 2013 Constitution which gives local authorities „right to govern‟ 
(arguably, which includes right to make laws independent of the national government).
174
 It is 
submitted that a council is an elective assembly whose legislative powers should not be 
circumscribed by requiring the approval of by-laws by the Minister. This requirement 
significantly limits local authorities‟ „right to govern‟ on their „own initiatives‟.175 Thus, it is 
argued that these powers of the Minister should be abolished and local authorities be assigned 
full responsibility to make their own laws.
176
 
                                                 
172
 S 229(2) UCA. 
173
 See De Visser 2005: 272. 
174
 S 276(1) Constitution. 
175
 See s 276(1) Constitution. 
176
 See s 280 Law Society Draft Constitution. 
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4.3.1.2 Model by-laws 
The Minister may formulate model by-laws on matters specified in Part IV of the Third 
Schedule of the UCA, namely planning, construction and use of buildings
177
 and 
structures.
178
 At first glance, the power of the Minister to make model by-laws does not 
constrain the legislative powers of urban local authorities since they have the option to adopt 
a model by-law either in its entirety or adopt parts of it.
179
 What limits the legislative 
autonomy of local authorities is the power of the Minister to adopt a model by-law or parts of 
a model by-law on behalf of a council.
180
 These powers of the Minister not only undermine 
the legislative autonomy of a local authority but also allow the Minister to exercise the 
legislative authority on behalf of a local authority.
181
 It is submitted that such supervisory 
powers of the Minister are no longer in conformity with the 2013 Constitution, which 
requires local authorities to represent and manage the affairs of people within their 
jurisdictions by adopting and implementing laws, among other ways.
182
 
4.3.1.3 The making and adoption of by-laws by the Minister 
If the Minister considers that a matter should be regulated by by-laws, he or she may direct a 
council to make a by-law on that matter.
183
 If the council concerned fails to make the 
concerned by-laws within the specified time period, the Minister may make or adopt a model 
by-law on behalf of that council.
184
 All by-laws made or adopted by the Minister are legal 
and a council must implement them.
185
 It is submitted that such intervention powers go 
beyond supervision as they enable the Minister to encroach on the legislative competence of 
local authorities, as discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. The Minister does not only have the 
power to direct the council to exercise its legislative powers in a certain way but may also 
assume the legislative powers. 
                                                 
177
 S 232(3) UCA. See S 232(1) UCA. 
178
 S 232(1) UCA. 
179
 S 232(2) UCA. 
180
 See S 233 UCA. 
181
 S 232(3) UCA. 
182
 See s 5, s 276(1) Constitution. 
183
 S 233(1) UCA. 
184
 S 233(1)(b) UCA. If the Minister proposes to make by-laws on behalf of the council, he/she is required to 
cause a notice to be published, inviting objections and describing the general effect of the proposed by-laws and 
the area which such by-laws will apply. S 233(2) UCA. 
185
 S 233(4) UCA. 
 
 
 
 
259 
 
Chapter 6: Powers and functions 
It is submitted that whereas urban local authorities may make by-laws over a number of 
matters areas, their legislative autonomy is limited in a variety of ways. The major question is 
whether the Minister has the power to encroach on the legislative terrain of local authorities 
under the 2013 constitutional order. It was argued above that while the Minister may 
supervise the exercise of legislative powers at the local level such powers should not extend 
to approving by-laws. It is submitted that local authorities now have a „right to govern‟ which 
includes the power to make by-laws to govern their areas. This means that there should not be 
any form of review of the exercise of legislative authority by the national government.
186
 If 
there are any concerns with the exercise of legislative authority by a local authority the 
Minister should approach the courts so that they can declare the by-laws illegal or 
unconstitutional. 
4.3.2 Executive powers 
Executive powers allow subnational governments to implement their own laws and policies 
as well as those of senior governments.
187
 Urban local authorities have the power to 
formulate and implement their own policies and laws.
188
 They can also implement policies 
and laws of senior governments. Urban local authorities have executive decision-making 
powers over a variety of matters, including: the acquisition, alienation and expropriation of 
land; construction of sidewalks; sewerage and drainage; water supply and treatment; parking, 
omnibus and other transport services; fire brigade; numbering of houses and naming of roads; 
closure or deviation of entrances to roads; production and supply of electricity; and street 
lighting.
189
 In addition to these, the Regional Town and Country Planning Act has given them 
competency over land-use planning and development control.
190
 Section 198(1) of the UCA 
provides the general powers and functions of urban local authorities. In terms of this section, 
urban local authorities have the power to carry out any or all of the matters set out in the 
Second Schedule of the UCA. These matters are provided in the Table 6 below. 
                                                 
186
 See De Visser 2005: 272. 
187
 See Steytler & De Visser 2011: 22-44. 
188
 Mushumba 2010: 104.  
189
 See Part X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV; and Ss 200, 204, 205, 212, 214, 216 and 217 UCA. Urban councils have the 
power to make by-laws in respect of matters specified in the Third Schedule of the UCA or anything which is 
incidental to their powers in terms of the UCA. S 227(1) UCA. 
190
 See the Regional Town and Country Planning Act. 
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Table 6: The general powers of urban local authorities 
1. Land, buildings and works 
2. Open spaces 
3. Recreational facilities. 
4. Showgrounds 
5. Trees 
6. Conservation of natural resources 
7. Cultivation and farming 
8. Grazing 
9. Clearing of land 
10. Stock pens and dip tanks 
11. Slaughter-houses 
12. Markets and agricultural produce 
13. Sale of products 
14. Conduct of liquor undertakings 
15. Manufacture and sale of mahewu 
16. Application of controlled liquor monies 
17. Charges 
18. Plant and machinery 
19. Roads, bridges, dams, etc. 
20. Decorations and illuminations 
21. Advertising hoardings 
22. Public conveniences 
23. Effluent or refuse removal and treatment 
24. Control of pests 
25. Hospitals and clinics 
26. Ambulances 
27. Creches 
 
28. Maternity and child welfare services 
29. Family planning services 
30. Charitable institutions 
31. Maintenance allowances 
32. Funerals 
33. Grants to charities, sports, etc. 
34. Grants to local authorities 
35. Educational institutions 
36. Youth centres 
37. Employment bureaux 
38. Libraries, museums, theatres, public 
halls, botanical and zoological gardens. 
39. Orchestras and bands 
40. Aerodromes and helicopter stations 
41. Boats 
42. Publicity 
43. Public entertainment 
44. Congresses 
45. Courses for councillors and employees 
46. Subscriptions to associations 
47. Travelling expenses 
48. Loans to employees for transport 
49. Insurance 
50. Mementoes 
51.Coats of arms and seals 
52. Freedom of the municipality 
53. Monuments, statutes and relics 
Source: Second Schedule, Urban Councils Act 
Urban local authorities are in charge of a variety of important responsibilities which have 
consequences for the realisation of development and sustainable peace. Some of the 
responsibilities such as water supply, health and maternal services and refuse removal have 
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implications for the achievement of national and local goals including development and 
sustainable peace. As argued in paragraph 4.2.1 of Chapter Two, responsive service delivery 
by local authorities, particularly the delivery of basic services, can prevent conflicting groups 
from resorting to the use of violence. The reason is that there is little impetus for armed 
conflict in situations where citizens believe government is concerned about and responsive to 
their needs.
191
 Responsive service delivery is likely to improve the living conditions of the 
citizens and reduce the risk of conflict.
192
 Thus, urban local authorities have responsibilities 
which allow them to undertake a key role in the realisation of development and sustainable 
peace. However, as will be argued below, the assignment of relevant powers and 
responsibilities to local authorities is not enough. The powers and responsibilities also have to 
be original, „differentiated‟, clearly demarcated, and local authorities should have final 
decision-making powers over such responsibilities.
193
 
4.3.3 Incidental powers 
Urban local authorities may exercise incidental powers. Section 198(3) of the UCA provides 
that a council „shall have the power to do any act or thing which, in the opinion of the 
council, is necessary for administering or giving effect to any of its by-laws‟. This provision 
should not be interpreted as giving additional powers to local authorities. Rather, the 
provision gives effect to the powers and functions which have already been assigned to local 
authorities through various Acts of Parliament. The Minister may also authorise a local 
authority to carry out „any act or thing‟ which in his or her opinion is necessary that the 
council be able to do or carry out.
194
 
4.2.4 Assignment of responsibilities to local boards 
Unlike other classes of urban local authorities whose powers are allocated to them directly by 
the UCA and other sectoral legislation, the powers and functions which a local board may 
exercise are determined and assigned by the Minister. The Minister through a warrant 
actually confers or imposes on a local board all or any of the powers, privileges, duties or 
responsibilities conferred or imposed on city, municipal and town councils in terms of the 
                                                 
191
 Siegle & O‟Mahony 2010: 135.  
192
 Jackson & Scott 2007: 5. Improvements in service delivery minimises dissatisfaction with the state and may 
prevent inter-group conflict over service provision. 
193
 See the institutional design section in chap 2. 
194
 S 198(2) UCA. Urban local authorities have also the power to enter into partnerships with the central 
government, another subnational government(s) or the private sector for the better carrying out of their 
functions. S 223(1) UCA. 
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UCA.
195
 When conferring powers to a local board the Minister is required to specify the 
provisions of the UCA or regulations thereof which will apply to that local board and the 
local government area for which it has been established.
196
 At any time after the 
establishment of a local board, the Minister may alter the warrant of that local board at the 
request or with the consent of the local board.
197
 The Minister may also direct that a local 
board be deemed to be a council and in such event, the local government area for which the 
local board has been established will be deemed to be a council area.
198
 Such a local board 
will be deemed competent to exercise the legislative and executive powers assigned to city, 
municipal and town councils. It can be observed that the Minister has wide powers with 
respect to local boards. The Minister can assign, reassign and remove responsibilities to/from 
a local board. Thus unlike city, municipal and town councils, which have a certain measure of 
security over their powers and functions, local boards do not have such security. Such a 
system undermines predictability in terms of powers and functions of local boards which is 
necessary for the effective performance of these responsibilities. 
4.4 Rural local authorities 
Like their urban counterparts, rural local authorities have a variety of powers and functions. 
These will be examined in this section, beginning with legislative powers, followed by 
executive and incidental powers. The examination is carried out on the basis of the normative 
framework set in Chapter Two and the 2013 Constitution. 
4.4.1 Legislative powers 
Section 276(2) of the Constitution provides that an Act of Parliament may confer functions 
on rural local authorities, including the power to make by-laws, regulations and rules.
199
 As 
with urban local authorities, the Constitution envisages that rural local authorities will 
exercise legislative powers. The RDCA confers legislative powers on rural local authorities 
on matters similar to those provided for urban local authorities.
200
 In addition to these 
matters, rural local authorities may make by-laws on bush fires, fisheries, fences, agricultural 
                                                 
195
 S 6(4)(e) UCA. 
196
 S 6(4)(e) UCA. The Minister may impose restrictions or modifications when specifying the provisions of the 
UCA or regulations thereof, which will apply to the local board and the local government area. 
197
 S 6(6) UCA. 
198
 S 6(4)(d) UCA. 
199
 S 276(2)(a) Constitution. 
200
 Second Schedule, RDCA. 
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and related services, animal diseases and obstruction of water flow.
201
 Thus, rural local 
authorities may make by-laws on a myriad of matters. The legislative process applicable to 
urban local authorities discussed above is also applicable to rural local authorities.
202
 The 
difference is that if any proposed by-law affects the functions of the roads committee, town 
board or area committee of a rural local authority, the council is required to give that 
particular committee the opportunity to consider and report upon the by-laws before it can 
pass a resolution on the by-law.
203
 Thus, in this respect rural local authorities have little 
discretion in relation to how they exercise their powers compared to their urban counterparts. 
As with urban local authorities, by-laws may not be binding unless approved by the Minister 
through a statutory instrument.
204
 Further, the Minister may make model by-laws for any 
matter for which rural local authorities may make by-laws.
205
 A council may make by-laws, 
adopting wholly or in part and with or without modification any model by-laws.
206
 As with 
urban local authorities, the Minister may direct a council to make a by-law or adopt a model 
by-law on any matter which a council may make by-laws.
207
 If the council does not abide by 
such a directive within the specified period, the Minister may make or adopt by-laws on 
behalf of the council.
208
 The argument raised above with respect to the power of the Minister 
to assume legislative powers of a council is also applicable here. 
4.4.2 Executive powers 
Rural local authorities have the power to formulate and implement policies and laws as well 
as to implement laws and policies of senior governments. Section 71(1) of the RDCA assigns 
to rural local authorities the power to undertake matters set out in the First Schedule of the 
RDCA. The schedule lists matters which are similar to those provided by the Second 
Schedule of the UCA, discussed in paragraph 4.3.2 above. In addition to these matters, the 
schedule lists other matters, namely: bush fires, fences, agriculture and other services, animal 
diseases, facilities for animals, fisheries, lighting, drains and sewerage works, water, 
                                                 
201
 Second Schedule, RDCA. 
202
 See s 88(4) RDCA. 
203
 S 88(3) RDCA. See para 3.3.2 of Chapter Two for a discussion of the role of committees. 
204
 S 90(4) RDCA. 
205
 S 91(1) RDCA. 
206
 S 91(2) RDCA. 
207
 S 94(1)RDCA. 
208
 S 233(1)(b) UCA. If the Minister proposes to make by-laws on behalf of the council, he/she is required to 
cause a notice to be published, inviting objections and describing the general effect of the proposed by-laws and 
the area to which such by-laws will apply. S 233(2) UCA. 
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obstruction of water flow and pollution. The RDCA also confers developmental functions on 
rural local authorities, namely to: 
a) promote the development of the council area; 
b) formulate policies, both long-term and short-term, for the council area; 
c) prepare annual development and other plans for the council area; 
d) monitor the implementation of development plans and policies within the council 
area; and 
e) exercise any other functions in relation to development that may be conferred upon it 
by or in terms of th[e RDCA] or any other enactment.
 209
 
It can be observed that rural local authorities have power to carry out a number of functions. 
Even though rural local authorities have a variety of responsibilities, in practice most of them 
do not carry out all these responsibilities.
210
 Usually, rural local authorities lack the financial 
resources, human resources and technical capacity to carry out all their responsibilities. 
Hence, they limit their operations to the provision of a few public services while allowing 
various agencies and ministries of the national government to deliver on other 
responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructural development.
211
 It is suggested that 
these agencies and ministries of the national government should continue to provide these 
public services in rural areas given lack of capacity by most rural local authorities. However, 
it is submitted that the legislation should clarify the circumstances in which national agencies 
may assume local functions in rural areas. Furthermore, necessary support mechanisms 
should be provided to rural local authorities so that they are in a position to fully exercise 
their autonomy and undertake all their functions.
212
 
4.4.3 Incidental powers 
Unlike urban local authorities, rural local authorities may only exercise incidental powers 
with the approval of the Minister. The Minister may authorise a rural local authority to carry 
out „any act or thing‟ which in „his opinion‟ is incidental to the exercise of the council‟s 
powers.
213
 Further, the Minister may authorise a rural local authority to carry out „any act or 
thing‟ which in „his opinion‟ is necessary or desirable in the interests of the inhabitants of the 
                                                 
209
 S 74(1) RDCA. S 18 of the Local Authorities Draft Bill (August 2014) has assigned similar functions to all 
local authorities. 
210
 Chakaipa 2010: 46.  
211
 Chakaipa 2010: 46. 
212
 See Steytler 2009: 410. 
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 S 71(2)(a) RDCA. 
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council area.
214
 This shows that urban local authorities have more discretion compared to 
rural local authorities in that they don‟t have to seek the approval of the Minister to exercise 
incidental powers.
215
 
4.5 General assessment 
In paragraph 6.1.3 of Chapter Two a case was made for the decentralisation of original, 
relevant, clearly demarcated, and „differentiated‟ local powers and functions. In addition, it 
was contended that higher tiers of government should not encroach on the terrain of local 
governments without any legal basis or by going beyond setting „operating frameworks‟.216 
The extent to which local governments have final decision-making powers over their 
responsibilities was highlighted as also crucial for the role which local government can play 
in development, democracy and sustainable peace.
217
 In this section, the chapter provides a 
general assessment of the powers and functions of local authorities discussed against this 
normative framework. 
4.5.1 Are the powers and functions original? 
As in many other British influenced traditions, the powers of local authorities are not 
provided for in the Constitution.
218
 Although the Constitution states that local authorities 
have a „right to govern‟ the local affairs of their people and have „all the necessary powers‟ to 
do so, it does not itself allocate any distinct powers and functions to local authorities.
219
 It 
leaves it to the national government to determine the powers and responsibilities of local 
authorities. As argued above, the lack of constitutional recognition and protection of the 
powers of local authorities mean that (re)centralisation of power cannot be stopped on the 
basis of the Constitution.
220
 Due to this lack of constitutional protection of local powers and 
functions, the national government has recentralised some key local responsibilities.
221
 Soon 
after independence the national government recentralised the production and provision of 
electricity. It created the Zimbabwe Electricity Distribution Company, which is now charged 
                                                 
214
 S 71(2)(b) RDCA. 
215
 The Local Authorities Draft Bill (August 2014) seeks to eliminate this difference by providing for equal 
powers for both urban and rural local authorities. See Part IV Local Authorities Draft Bill. This is against the 
principle of asymmetric decentralisation put forward in para 6.1.3.5 of Chapter Two. 
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 See Bahl 1999: Rule number 6. Supervision through will be discussed in detail in chap 8. 
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218
 Olowu 2010: 101. 
219
 See S 276(1) Constitution. 
220
 Madhekeni & Zhou 2012: 22. 
221
 The Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 4. 
 
 
 
 
266 
 
Chapter 6: Powers and functions 
with the production and supply of electricity. In 2005, the national government recentralised 
the provision of water and sewerage removal and treatment functions. Again, it created a 
parastatal, Zimbabwe National Water Authority, to provide water and dispose of sewerage. 
The recentralisation of the water and sewerage removal functions was attributed to the 
incapacity of local authorities to deliver on these functions. These parastatals failed to deliver 
these core public services.
222
 In both cases, local authorities were deprived of much needed 
revenue.
223
 It is against this background that during the constitution review process 
arguments were made for the enumeration of the powers and functions of local authorities in 
the Constitution to address the threat of recentralisation of these responsibilities by the 
national government.
224
 Unfortunately, the 2013 Constitution did not go far in providing a 
distinct list of the powers and functions of local authorities. 
4.5.2 Are the powers and functions relevant? 
In paragraph 6.1.3.2 of Chapter Two an argument was made for the relevance of local powers 
and functions for development, democracy and sustainable peace given that what local 
governments can achieve depends on the responsibilities and powers they have.
225 
As 
observed above, urban and rural local authorities have competency over a variety of 
responsibilities including water supply, land-use planning, provision of health and education 
services, sanitation, refuse removal, transport services and roads. There is no doubt that these 
responsibilities are relevant even though some of the matters listed in the Second Schedule 
and First Schedule of the UCA and RDCA, respectively, are not „real‟ powers and functions. 
These include travelling and acting allowances, courses for councillors and employees, 
allowance for councillors and committee members, maintenance allowances, and 
subscriptions to associations. It is suggested that these matters be regulated somewhere and 
                                                 
222
 A study carried out by Jonga and Chirisa in 2009 revealed that during the period 2006 to 2008, when the 
central government was responsible for the supply of water and sewerage removal and treatment, the delivery of 
these services further deteriorated. Jonga & Chirisa 2009: 173. Water supply was erratic due to the shortages of 
water treatment chemicals and burst water pipes. These challenges reduced the quality and quantity of water 
supply to citizens. In the same period, sewerage removal service was poor and raw sewerage was flowing in 
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not provided under the schedule(s), which provides for the powers and functions of local 
authorities. 
As highlighted above, local authorities have been assigned the provision of essential public 
services including the provision of water, health and sanitation services. It was argued in 
paragraph 4.2.1 of Chapter Two that the effective delivery of these public services to various 
communities by local authorities can reduce impetus towards violent conflict.
226
 On the other 
hand, failure by local authorities to provide these services efficiently and effectively may also 
increase impetus towards violent conflict, as evidenced by events in South Africa.
227
 Thus, it 
is important that once responsibilities have been assigned to local authorities, they deliver 
services that meet the expectations of the people both in quantity and quality. For example, 
local authorities (with assistance from higher governments) should ensure that all citizens 
have equal access to basic public services such as water supply and sanitation. Local 
authorities in Zimbabwe are failing to meet these expectations given that service provision is 
erratic and poor.
228
 Thus, while local authorities have the relevant responsibilities to build 
sustainable peace, they are underperforming. This is likely to undermine their role in 
sustaining peace in Zimbabwe. 
While local authorities have responsibilities which if effectively undertaken may contribute 
to sustainable peace, they have other powers and functions which are directly linked to 
building sustainable peace. Local functions such as educational institutions, public 
entertainment, decorations and illuminations, funerals and public sanitary conveniences allow 
local authorities to determine their immediate environment.
229
 Even though local authorities 
do not determine the education curriculum, they at least administer some schools and crèches 
within their jurisdiction. This allows each local authority and its citizens to exercise a 
measure of self-rule which, as argued in paragraph 4.2.2 of Chapter Two, allows local groups 
to exercise self-determination.
230
 Self-determination offered to local groups may enhance 
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national cohesion and undermine feelings of neglect among ethnic groups, contributing to the 
building of sustainable peace.
231
 
Local authorities also have competence over mementoes, coats of arms and seals, 
monuments, statues and relics.
232
 These powers may seem trivial but they can be significant 
in building sustainable peace at the local level. They are examples of symbolic codes which 
may be effective in accommodating local identity.
233
 For example, competency over 
determination of coats of arms and seals allow each local authority to define or protect its 
unique identity. If they are distinct local groups, as is the case in some local authorities, such 
groups have the political space at local level to practice their customs and religious beliefs.
234
 
This may reduce conflict among groups competing to advance their respective interests.
235
 
Thus, it is submitted that while relevant for development, the powers and functions of local 
authorities are also relevant for building sustainable peace by accommodating distinct local 
identities. 
4.5.3 Are the responsibilities clearly demarcated? 
It was contended in paragraph 6.1.3.3 of Chapter Two that the effective performance of 
decentralised functions by local governments requires clear division of responsibilities among 
tiers of government.
236
 As highlighted above, the responsibilities of local authorities are 
provided for by various Acts of Parliament. Mashumba is of the view that most functions of 
local authorities in Zimbabwe are clearly demarcated.
237
 To the contrary, it is submitted that a 
number of functional areas are not clearly divided between the national government and local 
authorities.
238
 It is difficult, for example, to delineate competency of each tier of government 
in the health and education functional areas. The division of responsibilities between 
traditional leaders and rural local authorities remains ambiguous. In this section the chapter 
will interrogate the problem of ambiguity in the division of responsibilities, focusing on the 
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health and education sectors as well as the division of responsibilities between rural local 
authorities and traditional leaders. 
4.5.3.1 Health 
The provision of health services is a competency which is shared between the national 
government and local authorities. Local authorities have the power to provide health services, 
including the provision of primary health care, ambulances, clinics, maternal services, and 
hospitals.
239
 The challenge is in identifying the competency boundaries of local authorities. 
For example, does the competency cover the provision and operation of clinics and 
dispensaries, including medical staff in these institutions? Does it include the authority to 
determine health fees? The practice has been that the national government, through the 
ministry responsible for health, determines the health fees which are payable in health 
institutions administered by local authorities. As discussed below, the national government 
approves the hiring and firing of senior medical staff in all health institutions run by local 
authorities. It also pays the salaries of medical staff in clinics that are run by small urban and 
rural local authorities. In these small urban and rural local authorities, health drugs are also 
purchased through the national government medical stores.
240
 The national government is 
also expected to provide funding to local authorities for provision of primary health care, 
especially to indigent people. 
The division of responsibilities in the health sector is ambiguous, which results in overlaps of 
tasks between the national and local governments. Such overlaps have negatively affected the 
delivery of health services. It is submitted that there is a need to clarify which tier of 
government is responsible for the hiring, firing and remuneration of health personnel and the 
purchasing of drugs and determining health fees. Further clarity is required with respect to 
the tier of government which has competency over clinics, hospitals, ambulances and other 
health-related services. As will be discussed in the following chapter, it is important that there 
is greater clarity on the tier of government which has the responsibility to finance health-
related expenditure to reduce unfunded mandates.
241
 This is important to promote transparent 
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governance, as required by the 2013 Constitution.
242
 It is recommended that while local 
authorities can administer clinics and hospitals, the national government should provide a 
health grant to cover the payment of salaries and purchase of medical drugs.
243
 The national 
government should also retain the management of referral hospitals. 
4.5.3.2 Education 
Local authorities have the responsibility to „provide, operate and maintain schools and other 
educational institutions and facilities and amenities connected therewith and for such 
purposes to levy and collect fees and other charges‟.244 It is not clear whether these are 
primary or secondary schools, or both. These issues are not clearly provided in the legislative 
framework. In practice, urban local authorities and the private sector provide primary school 
facilities in urban areas. Secondary school facilities are provided by urban local authorities, 
national government, private sector and church organisations. In rural areas, rural local 
authorities provide secondary school facilities, while the provision of primary school 
facilities has been decentralised to school development committees and church organisations. 
Despite the decentralisation of the education function, the national government continues to 
pay teachers, determine the curriculum and set fee structures in both urban and rural areas.
245
 
While it has been argued that local functions are clearly delineated,
246
 it is however submitted 
that there is a need for a clear division of responsibilities with respect to some functions, 
especially health and education. As argued above, the lack of clarity in the division of some 
responsibilities between national and local governments has resulted in role confusion and, in 
some cases, unfunded mandates. The result has been poor service delivery and, in some 
cases, no service provision at all.
247
 In areas of shared responsibility such as education and 
health, greater clarification of the role of each tier of government is necessary.
248
 The 2013 
Constitution requires transparent governance which among other things means that powers 
and functions are clearly divided among governments at various levels.
249
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4.5.3.3 Division of responsibilities between rural local authorities and 
traditional leaders 
As highlighted in paragraph 5.3.3 of Chapter Three, rural areas are administered by rural 
local authorities alongside the institution of traditional leadership, which comprises chiefs, 
headmen and village heads. The division of responsibilities between these two institutions is 
not clear with respect to certain functional areas, especially land and environmental 
preservation. The Constitution allocates the power to administer communal land to traditional 
leaders.
250
 Such powers are exercised subject to any Act of Parliament. The Traditional 
Leaders Act provides that chiefs have the responsibility to prevent any unauthorised 
settlement or use of communal land.
251
 In terms of the Communal Lands Act, communal land 
may be occupied or used for agricultural or residential purposes only with the consent of the 
rural local authority established for the area concerned.
252
 When granting consent to the 
occupation and use of communal land, rural local authorities are required to consider 
customary law relating to the allocation, occupation and use of land in the area concerned. 
They are also mandated to „consult and co-operate‟ with the chief appointed to preside over 
the community concerned.
253
 While the Communal Lands Act suggests that rural local 
authorities are the custodians of land within their jurisdiction, the Traditional Leaders Act 
allocate to chiefs some power over communal land. It is therefore difficult to identify a clear 
demarcation of competency of rural local authorities, on one hand, and traditional leaders, on 
the other, in relation to land matters. 
The division of responsibilities between rural local authorities and traditional leaders is also 
ambiguous with respect to environmental conservation, cultivation, grazing and farming. The 
Constitution assigns to traditional leaders the power to protect the environment subject to an 
Act of Parliament.
254
 The Traditional Leaders Act requires traditional leaders to ensure that 
natural resources are used and exploited in terms of the law.
255
 In particular, the Act requires 
traditional leaders to control over-cultivation, overgrazing, and the indiscriminate destruction 
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of flora and fauna.
256
 As discussed in paragraph 4.4.2 above, rural local authorities have 
power to carry out a number of functions, including conservation of natural resources, 
clearing of land, cultivation and farming, fisheries, trees and bush fires.
257
 This suggests that 
both rural local authorities and traditional leaders have competency over the preservation of 
the environment in communal areas. 
The absence of clear division of responsibilities with respect to land and environmental 
matters has created a number of operational challenges, including the duplication of duties, 
conflict of interests and power struggles between traditional leaders and rural local 
authorities. Conflict of interests and power struggles are mostly common in relation to the 
allocation of scarce resources such as land and grazing pastures.
258
 In some cases, traditional 
leaders have acted like parallel governments in rural areas. It is therefore submitted that there 
is a need for a clearer delineation of competency (through legislation) between rural local 
authorities and traditional leaders which should be informed by respect for the institution of 
traditional leadership while promoting democracy through elected rural local authorities.
259
 In 
addition, ways promoting harmonisation of the role of rural local authorities and traditional 
leaders in rural local government should be explored. 
4.5.4 Do senior governments abide by the rules of decentralisation? 
In paragraph 6.1.3 of Chapter Two it was contended that the effective functioning of a 
multilevel system of government depends in part on the willingness of senior governments to 
abide by the rules of decentralisation.
260
 It was also submitted that in cases where the national 
government has decentralised certain powers and functions to lower tiers of government 
through various statutes, the national government should not assume such powers without 
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amending the relevant Act. The ability of the national government to abide by the rules of 
decentralisation is argued in this study to constitute an extended concept of rule of law. This 
concept has been at the centre of debates on multilevel governance in Zimbabwe. Despite the 
challenge of ambiguity with respect to certain responsibilities of local authorities discussed 
above, there are certain responsibilities of local authorities which are clearly demarcated. 
Although legislation clearly allocates these responsibilities to local authorities, in practice the 
national government has carried out these responsibilities.
261
 Water supply and sewerage 
removal and treatment are examples. 
The UCA and RDCA assign to local authorities the power to supply water and to remove and 
treat sewerage.
262
 Despite this legislative assignment, in 2005 the Minister issued a directive 
recentralising water supply and sewerage removal functions. As stated above, the Minister 
cited lack of capacity at local level as the reason for the recentralisation of these 
responsibilities.
263
 The national government did not even amend the UCA and RDCA when it 
recentralised the water and sewerage management functions, bringing into question the rule 
of law in the country.
264
 This is an indication that in certain cases the national government 
has failed to abide by its own rules of decentralisation. It is submitted that when 
responsibilities are decentralised the national government should not carry out such 
responsibilities. Constitutional recognition of local powers and functions would have been an 
effective deterrent to this culture of recentralisation of responsibilities, even without 
amending the relevant Acts. Unfortunately, as stated above, while giving local authorities the 
„right to govern‟, the 2013 Constitution does not enumerate the powers and responsibilities of 
local authorities.
265
 The implication of this lack of constitutional recognition is that the 
culture of recentralisation of local powers and functions is likely to continue. 
4.5.5 Do local authorities have final decision-making power over their 
responsibilities? 
It was contended in paragraph 6.1.3.4 of Chapter Two that the extent to which local 
governments have final decision-making powers over their responsibilities is important for 
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the role which they can play in development, democracy and sustainable peace.
266
 Local 
authorities in Zimbabwe lack final decision-making power over the majority of their 
responsibilities. Decision-making is limited in a variety of ways. There are a number of 
functional areas where local authorities may not make decisions without the approval of the 
Minister. For example, with respect to estate development the exercise of powers by local 
authorities is subject to the consent of the Minister. Urban local authorities have the power to 
lay out and service any land and to construct buildings for residential, commercial or 
industrial purposes.
267
 Before an urban local authority may exercise these powers, the council 
is required to submit the proposal to exercise such power to the Minister for approval.
268
 This 
requirement shows that although local authorities have competency over estate development, 
they do not have final decision-making powers over estate development in their areas. 
In other functional areas where local authorities may make decisions, the Minister has the 
power to reverse, suspend, and rescind resolutions, decisions or actions of local authorities.
269
 
Moreover, the Minister may give directions to local authorities with respect to policy 
formulation and implementation.
270
 These powers of the Minister together limit the final 
decision-making powers of local authorities over most of their responsibilities. A local 
authority may propose policies in response to the preferences and needs of its citizens but 
such a proposal runs the risk of not being approved or modified by the Minister. As shall be 
argued in Chapter Eight, these supervisory powers of the national government significantly 
undermine the autonomy of local authorities and therefore their ability to contribute fully to 
the realisation of national and local goals such as development. Hence, it is submitted that 
such powers should be reformed so that local authorities are given some measure of local 
autonomy necessary if they are to deliver on development, democracy and sustainable peace 
goals.
271
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4.5.6 Are the powers ‘differentiated’? 
It was highlighted in paragraph 6.1.3.5 of Chapter Two that local governments are unlikely to 
have equal capacity to deliver on their responsibilities and obligations.
272
 Thus, it was 
contended that it may be useful to have „differentiated‟ assignment of powers and functions 
to local authorities.
273
 Zimbabwe has adopted such a multilevel system of government. As 
highlighted in paragraph 3 of Chapter Four, the Constitution provides for the establishment of 
different categories and classes of local authorities.
274
 It further requires the devolution of 
powers and responsibilities to local authorities which are „competent‟ to carry out those 
responsibilities „efficiently and effectively‟.275 This implies that some local authorities may 
exercise more powers than others depending on their level of capacity. 
The UCA, RDCA and other sectoral Acts provide for a „differentiated‟ approach of assigning 
powers and functions to local authorities. While both urban and rural local authorities have 
competency over more or less similar functional areas, they also have unique functional 
areas. Urban local authorities have been assigned responsibilities which may be considered to 
be „urban‟ in nature, whereas rural local authorities have competency over responsibilities 
which can be classified as „rural‟ – for instance, bush fires and animal diseases.276 In the 
urban local authority category, city and municipal councils have competency over more 
functional areas and enjoy wide discretion relative to town councils when undertaking their 
responsibilities. Town councils have competency over more responsibilities and some 
measure of discretion compared to local boards when carrying out these responsibilities.
277
 
Even though the assignment of responsibilities to local authorities under the 2013 
Constitution is expected to be through a single primary local government Act, it is submitted 
that the „differentiated‟ approach of assigning responsibilities to local authorities should be 
maintained to take into account differences at local level.
278
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5. Administrative authority of local authorities 
The previous section discussed the general powers of local authorities. This section examines 
the administrative authority of local authorities. Administrative authority entails the power of 
local governments to hire, fire, remunerate and discipline employees as well as to determine 
their internal administrative procedures.
279
 As argued in paragraph 6.3 of Chapter Two, 
administrative authority frees local government from relying on higher levels to implement 
local policies and allows local governments to adapt their internal administrative procedures 
to the local environment.
280
 Like the Lancaster House Constitution, the 2013 Constitution is 
silent on the administrative authority of local authorities.
281
 The Constitution leaves it to 
national government to decide whether local authorities should exercise authority over their 
administrative establishment.
282
 It however regulates the conduct of employees of local 
authorities in a similar way to employees of provincial and metropolitan councils.
283
 As 
argued above, the absence of the constitutional protection of administrative authority means 
that local authorities do not have guaranteed administrative authority.
284
 Even if the national 
government gives local authorities administrative authority through legislation, it may revoke 
such authority at any time. It is submitted that the absence of guaranteed administrative 
authority may undermine the ability of local authorities to deliver on development, 
democracy and sustainable peace especially in cases where national legislation allows 
unrestricted involvement of senior governments in local affairs. As will be observed below, 
this weakness is evident in the UCA and RDCA, which regulate personnel and administrative 
issues of local authorities. 
The section will begin by assessing the power of local authorities over their personnel 
establishment before discussing their power to determine internal administrative procedures. 
The last part of this section will examine the role of the Local Government Board in 
personnel and administrative establishments at the local level as it has significant 
implications for the administrative authority of local authorities. 
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5.1 Urban local authorities 
The UCA makes provision for a separate process of appointing, disciplining and dismissing 
senior and junior employees. Senior employees are the town clerk (or secretary), chamber 
secretary, head or deputy head of a department or such other employee that may be 
prescribed.
285
 The discussion in this section follows this division between senior and junior 
employees. 
5.1.1 Appointment of senior employees 
Senior employees of urban local authorities are appointed by the council with the consent of 
the Local Government Board (the Board).
286
 The appointment of the head of department 
responsible for health (medical officer) is carried out by the council with the consent of not 
only the Board but also the Minister responsible for health.
287
 The process of recruiting senior 
employees begins with a council recommending to the Board the names of suitable 
candidates. The Board then interviews the prospective candidates whom it may approve and 
disapprove for appointment.
288
 In cases where the Board disapproves the appointment of a 
person(s) recommended by a council, the council concerned is required to recommend 
another list of names for appointment.
289
 If a period of two months lapses since the Board 
notified the council of its refusal to approve a person for appointment and the council has not 
recommended any other person(s) who meets the approval of the Board, the Board is required 
to refer the matter to the Minister for consideration.
290
 The decision of the Minister on the 
matter is final.
291
 It is submitted that urban local authorities do not have the autonomy to 
appoint their senior employees. Their role is limited to proposing names of individuals for 
appointment as senior officials. As observed above, the final decision regarding the 
recruitment of senior officials rests with the Board and in some cases, with the Minister. 
Besides weakening the autonomy of urban local authorities, the role of the Board in the 
appointment of senior employees has also resulted in excessive delays in filling senior 
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positions as local authorities wait for approvals from the Board.
292
 As a result, vacancies in 
some local authorities go unfilled for long periods of time, in the process impacting adversely 
on the operations of the local authority. 
5.1.2 Conditions of service of senior officials 
Conditions of service of senior employees are determined by the council with the consent of 
the Board and national government. Section 138 of the UCA provides that „no council shall 
fix or alter the conditions of service of its employees‟ except with the approval of the 
Minister responsible for Labour. The Board in consultation with the Minister and the Minister 
responsible for finance determines the pension, medical aid, funeral expenses and other 
benefits of all employees of urban local authorities.
293
 In 2013 the Minister announced the 
introduction of performance contracts for senior employees of all local authorities in line with 
the requirements of the economic blue-print of the government, Zimbabwe Agenda for 
Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset).
294
 The contract is signed between 
the Minister and every senior employee. This implies that senior employees of local 
authorities are accountable in part to the national government for their performance. All 
senior employees were required to have signed the performance contract by 31 December 
2013. The Minister is reported to have stated that senior employees of local authorities who 
fail to meet their targets as stipulated in the contract risk being fired by the national 
government.
295
 It is submitted that these performance contracts should have been signed with 
the council rather than with the national government to engender the accountability of senior 
employees to the council. 
5.1.3 Disciplinary measures applicable to senior employees 
5.1.3.1 Suspension of senior employees 
A mayor or chairperson may suspend a town clerk (or secretary) from office if it appears that 
the town clerk is guilty of such conduct that is not desirable and should not be permitted to 
carry on his or her work.
296
 The mayor or chairperson is required to notify the council in 
writing of such suspension and cause the suspension to be reported to the council at the first 
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opportunity.
297
 After receiving a report of suspension of the town clerk, the council must 
conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of the suspension.
298
 Based on the outcome of the 
inquiry the council may lift the suspension, reprimand the town clerk, reduce the salary 
payable to the town clerk, impose a fine recoverable through deductions from the salary of 
the town clerk, or discharge the town clerk.
299
 The disciplinary procedures which apply to the 
town clerk with respect to suspension also apply to other senior employees.
300
 The exception 
is that the suspension of other senior employees is carried out by the town clerk, with the 
mayor or chairperson mandated to report the suspension to the council for investigation.
301
 
Thus, urban local authorities have the power to institute disciplinary proceedings against their 
senior employees, as discussed below, including dismissal of such employees. 
5.1.3.2 Discharge of senior employees 
A council may discharge a senior official „upon notice of not less than three months; or 
summarily on the ground of misconduct, dishonesty, negligence or on any other ground that 
would in law justify discharge without notice‟.302 The council is required to seek the consent 
of the Board before discharging any senior official.
303
 The head of department of health may 
only be discharged by the council with the approval of the Board and the Minister responsible 
for health.
304
 Thus, urban local authorities do not have the autonomy to dismiss their senior 
officials as the final decision rests with the Board and the national government. Some urban 
local authorities have lost huge sums of money in compensation to senior employees who 
were dismissed or suspended by the council without following the correct procedures. In 
some cases, the Minister has ordered the reinstatement of senior officials with full salary and 
benefits after they have been suspended or dismissed by the council. For instance, in January 
2014, the Minister ordered the reinstatement of the town clerk of Harare who had been 
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suspended by the mayor.
305
 It is submitted therefore that the limited administrative authority 
of urban local authorities undermines their ability to manage their own affairs. It is further 
submitted that such a limitation is inconsistent with the 2013 Constitution which gives local 
authorities the „right to govern‟, which arguably includes the right to appoint, discipline and 
dismiss employees.
306
 
5.1.4 Appointment and conditions of service of other (junior) employees 
Urban local authorities have the power to appoint junior employees. Junior employees are 
appointed by the council on the recommendation of the town clerk or secretary, as the case 
may be.
307
 Thus, urban local authorities have significant autonomy to appoint junior 
employees since the appointment is carried out by the council on the recommendation of the 
town clerk or secretary. Such autonomy nevertheless has been limited by the national 
government through a directive issued by the Minister. In terms of a directive titled 
„Ministerial Directive on Employment‟ of 29 September 2010, the Minister directed all local 
authorities to seek the approval of the Minister before they appoint any staff member.
308
 
Thus, the powers of local authorities to appoint junior employees have in fact been taken 
away by this directive. It is submitted that the directive go beyond regulation (setting a 
general framework) as it requires a specific act, that is, approval of the Minister before any 
appointments can be made.
309
 It is further submitted that this directive is inconsistent with the 
2013 Constitution which gives local authorities the „right to govern‟, which includes the right 
to appoint staff.
310
 
5.1.5 Disciplinary procedures applicable to junior employees 
5.1.5.1 Suspension of junior employees 
If it appears to a head of department that an employee who is not a senior employee of the 
council has been guilty of such conduct that it is desirable that that employee should not be 
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permitted to carry on his or her work, he or she may suspend the employee from office.
311
 
When disciplining junior employees, local authorities with a registered code of conduct of 
employees are required to abide by that code. On the other hand, local authorities without a 
registered code of conduct are required to discipline their employees in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act.
312
 Thus, local authorities have autonomy to discipline junior employees, 
especially those local authorities which have their own code of conduct. Such a measure of 
local autonomy is line with 2013 Constitution which requires that local authorities enjoy a 
certain measure of discretion.
313
 This is a positive move as it incentivises the formulation of 
local policies such as codes of conduct. It is recommended that local authorities which fully 
exercise their powers to make policies should be rewarded with more autonomy. 
5.1.5.2 Dismissal of junior employees 
Urban local authorities have the power to dismiss their junior employees.
314
 A council may at 
any time discharge a junior employee upon notice of not less than three months.
315
 An 
employee may also be discharged summarily on the ground of misconduct, dishonesty, 
negligence or any other ground that would in law justify discharge without notice.
316
 The 
exception is the discharge of a health inspector which requires the approval of the Minister 
responsible for health. The powers of urban local authorities to discharge junior employees 
have been reviewed by the courts in a number of labour disputes. For instance, in Silas 
Luthingo Rusvingo vs City of Harare,
317
 the High Court had to determine whether urban local 
authorities may dismiss their employees following procedures other than those provided by 
section 141 of the UCA. The Court declared that the City (like any other urban local 
authority) cannot conduct any disciplinary proceedings otherwise than in accordance with the 
provisions of section 141 of the UCA.
318
 Further, the court decided that, as a creature of the 
statute, the City „is not …at liberty to ignore set procedures when it feels like ignoring them 
                                                 
311
 S 141(4)(a) UCA. After suspending, the head of department concerned is required without delay to notify the 
town clerk or secretary, as the case may be, of such suspension. Upon receipt of notification from the head of 
department, the town clerk or secretary must cause the suspension to be reported at the first opportunity to the 
council. Following the notification by the town clerk or secretary, the council is required to follow the 
disciplinary procedures applicable to senior employees of the council, discussed above. See s 141(4)(5)(6) UCA. 
312
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 209. 
313
 See S 276(1) Constitution. 
314
 S 141 UCA. 
315
 S 141(2) UCA. 
316
 S 141(2) UCA. 
317
 Silas Luthingo Rusvingo vs City of Harare HH 132-2004, HC 10637/02. 
318
 Silas Luthingo Rusvingo vs City of Harare, page 9.  
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and setting up its own unlegislated disciplinary rules and subjecting its employees to such‟.319 
This judgement provides valuable lessons to urban local authorities that they may not conduct 
any disciplinary proceedings other than in terms of section 141 of the UCA. 
5.2 Rural local authorities 
Like the UCA, the RDCA provides for separate procedures for the appointment of senior and 
junior employees of rural local authorities. These procedures are examined in this section, 
beginning with those applicable to senior employees and followed by those for junior 
employees. 
5.2.1 Senior employees 
Senior employees of rural local authorities are referred to as „officers‟.320 These include the 
chief executive officer (CEO), treasurer, engineer, medical officer or any other head of 
department. As highlighted in paragraph 4.2.1 of the previous chapter, the CEO is the 
administrative head of a rural local authority. The CEO is appointed by the council with the 
consent of the Minister.
321
 If a rural local authority fails to appoint a CEO, the Minister may 
appoint a member of the public service as the CEO.
322
 Other officers are also appointed by 
the council with the consent of the Minister.
323
 It is submitted that the role of the Minister in 
the appointment of the CEO and other officers means that rural local authorities do not have 
autonomy to appoint their senior employees. In practice, the role of the national government 
has caused excessive delays in filling senior positions as council awaits the approval of the 
Minister.
324
 The operations of local authorities are severely undermined in such delays. 
5.2.2 Junior employees 
Rural local authorities have the power to appoint junior employees necessary for the effective 
discharge of their responsibilities.
325
 However, no employee may be appointed or promoted 
to occupy such a position as the Minister may designate without the approval of the 
                                                 
319
 Silas Luthingo Rusvingo vs City of Harare, pg 9. 
320
 S 65 RDCA. 
321
 S 66(1) RDCA. 
322
 S 66(2) RDCA. 
323
 S 66(3) RDCA. 
324
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 208. 
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Minister.
326
 Thus, the autonomy of rural local authorities to appoint staff is not only limited 
with respect to the appointment of senior employees but also junior employees. A council 
may delegate to the Chairman or officer of the council the power to appoint and dismiss 
employees. In both cases, the approval of the Minister is required.
327
 It is submitted that while 
urban local authorities have a certain measure of autonomy with respect to their personnel 
issues, rural local authorities have no discretion at all. Almost all decisions relating to 
personnel issues have to be approved by the Minister. This is contrary to the new 
constitutional order which requires local authorities to exercise some discretion when 
managing their affairs, including personnel issues.
328
 The 2013 Constitution gives local 
authorities the „right to govern‟, which should be construed to include authority to determine 
personnel establishment.
329
 It is submitted therefore that the powers of the Ministers over 
personnel establishment in rural local authorities should be reformed. In particular, the role of 
the Minister should be limited to setting the national framework, for example, comprising 
minimum skills required for appointment to certain positions. 
5.2.3 Conditions of service and disciplinary procedures 
The conditions of service of employees and officers of rural local authorities are fixed by the 
council with the approval of the Minister.
330
 Thus rural local authorities have limited 
autonomy to set the conditions of employment of their employees. The 2013 Constitution 
requires that rural local authorities enjoy some measure of discretion to determine the 
conditions of service of their employees.
331
 Thus, the role of the Minister must be redefined 
to allow rural local authorities to determine the conditions of service of their employees 
within a framework determined by the national government.
332
 When it comes to disciplining 
employees, rural local authorities with a registered code of conduct are required to abide with 
the code when disciplining their employees. Those without a registered code of conduct are 
required to discipline their employees in terms of the Labour Relations Act.
333
 Thus, like their 
urban counterparts, rural local authorities have the autonomy to develop their own codes of 
                                                 
326
 S 66(3) RDCA. 
327
 S 68 RDCA. 
328
 See ss 5, 264(2), 274 and 275 Constitution.  
329
 See s 276(1) Constitution.  
330
 S 67(1) RDCA. When setting the conditions of service the Minister is required to consult the Public Service 
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conduct for their employees. However, few rural local authorities have exercised this 
autonomy. 
5.3 Internal administrative procedures of local authorities 
As stated above, authority over the determination of internal administrative procedures allows 
local authorities to adjust their bureaucracies to suit their local needs and to ensure effective 
management.
334
 The question is, do local authorities have such authority? The UCA and 
RDCA regulate the setting of internal administrative procedures of urban and rural local 
authorities, respectively. This section will not discuss in detail the establishment of internal 
administrative structures of local authorities and related procedures as these were discussed in 
section 4 of Chapter Five. However, the chapter maintains that local authorities have limited 
autonomy to determine their internal administrative procedures, a development which is 
likely to undermine their role in development, democracy and sustainable peace. 
5.4 Role of the Local Government Board 
Administrative authority of urban local authorities cannot be fully understood without 
analysing the role of the Local Government Board. The Board has a critical role to play in 
overseeing the activities of urban local authorities.
335
 The purpose of the section is to 
establish the implications of the role of the Board on the administrative authority of local 
authorities. The assessment of the role of the Board is particularly necessary given that the 
national government is proposing retaining the Board under the 2013 constitutional order.
336
 
The Board is not a creature of the Constitution but established in terms of the UCA, with 
competency only over urban local authorities.
337
 Indications are that the national government 
is going to give the Board competency over all local authorities, including rural local 
authorities.
338
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5.4.1 Composition 
The Board consists of seven members who are appointed and removed from office by the 
Minister.
339
 In terms of section 124 of the UCA, the Minister may give the Board policy 
directives of a „general character‟ as he or she may consider requisite in the „national 
interests‟.340 Thus, the Minister exercises significant influence over the Board by virtue of 
having the power to appoint, discipline, and determine the terms of employment of members 
of the Board. Further, the power to give directives to the Board is also critical. This brings 
into question the independence of the Board from the Minister and its ability to carry out 
independent oversight over the activities of urban local authorities. 
5.4.2 Powers and responsibilities 
The Board has various powers over personnel issues and general administrative organisation 
in urban local authorities. Its responsibilities are: 
a) to provide guidance for the general organisation and control of employees in the 
services of councils; 
b) to ensure the general well-being and good administration of council staff and the 
maintenance thereof in a high state of efficiency; 
c) to make model conditions of service for the purposes stated in (a) and (b) for adoption 
by councils; 
d) to make model regulations stipulating the qualifications and appointment procedures 
for senior officials of councils; 
e) to approve the appointment and dismissal of senior officials; 
f) to conduct inquiries into the affairs and procedures of councils; 
g) to exercise any other functions that may be imposed or conferred upon the Board in 
terms of the [UCA] or any other enactment.
341
 
In the exercise of its functions the Board has the power to require submission of any 
information or records as well as the power to summon and examine any witnesses.
342
 It has 
equal powers to those conferred upon commissioners in terms of the Commissions of Inquiry 
Act
343
 other than the power to order a person to be detained in custody.
344
 If it considers that 
                                                 
339
 Ss 116(2), 120 UCA. The Minister appoints one of the seven members to be the chairperson of the board and 
the another to be the vice-chairperson. Members of the board hold office for a period not exceeding four years, 
as determined by the Minister. The Minister determines terms of employment and remuneration of members of 
the board. See ss 117(1)(2) and 118 UCA. 
340
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341
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there are grounds to suspect an employee of a local authority has committed misconduct in 
terms of his or her conditions of service, the Board may direct the local authority to institute 
disciplinary proceedings.
345
 With the approval of the Minister, the Board may make by-laws 
providing for matters which in its „opinion are necessary or convenient‟ for the better 
carrying out of or giving effect to its functions.
346
 Urban local authorities have the discretion 
to adopt, wholly or in part and with or without modifications, these model by-laws.
347
 It is 
submitted that the power of the Board to make model by-laws does not undermine local 
autonomy since urban local authorities have the discretion to adopt such by-laws. 
5.4.3 Implications of the role of the Local Government Board on administrative 
autonomy 
It is submitted that the role of the Board constrains the autonomy of urban local authorities 
with respect to the hiring, firing, remuneration and disciplining of senior officials. Although 
the Board may provide the necessary checks and balances, it is submitted that it should not 
have the power to strike down decisions of local authorities with regard to appointment, 
disciplining and dismissal of staff. Its role should be limited to reviewing the decisions of 
local authorities. If the Board does not agree with the decision of a local authority to appoint, 
dismiss or discipline certain individuals, it should refer the decision back to the local 
authority for reconsideration.
348
 In cases of an impasse between the Board and the local 
authority, the Board should be given the power to refer the decision to the courts for 
resolution. In this way, administrative authority of urban local authorities will be protected. 
As highlighted above, the Board only has supervisory powers over urban local authorities and 
not rural local authorities.
349
 In rural local authorities, the functions of the board are carried 
out by the Minister.
350
 If it is to be admitted that the Board plays a crucial role in providing 
independent oversight over the activities of urban local authorities, then it is submitted that it 
should exercise that role over all local authorities. The argument is that independent oversight 
is not only required in urban local authorities but also in rural local authorities. This implies 
that the powers of the Minister over personnel issues in rural local authorities should be 
                                                                                                                                                        
344
 S 123(3) UCA. 
345
 S 128(1) UCA. 
346
 S 129(1) UCA. 
347
 S 130 UCA. 
348
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 217. 
349
 See Part VIII UCA. 
350
 See Part IX RDCA. 
 
 
 
 
287 
 
Chapter 6: Powers and functions 
transferred to the Board so that there is predictability in the supervision of all local authorities 
with particular reference to personnel and administrative organisation.
351
 To enhance its 
independence, it is suggested that members of the board should be appointed in the manner in 
which members of independent commissions are appointed.
352
 The powers of the Minister to 
issue policy directives to the board should be limited. This could be done by abolishing the 
condition of „national interest‟353 and providing in explicit terms the nature of the directives 
the Minister can issue and when the Minister can do so. 
5.4.4 Ineffective Board 
As highlighted in paragraph 5.4.2 above, the Board has the responsibility to provide general 
guidance on staff establishment of urban local authorities which may include setting the 
salary scale for senior employees.
354
 Setting of salary scales is particularly necessary to 
ensure that employees are remunerated in line with economic developments and ensure that 
local authorities are able to pay such salaries and benefits. The Board has hitherto not been 
able to deliver on this responsibility effectively. Despite the presence of the Board, most 
urban local authorities pay huge salaries and benefits to their senior employees whilst they 
are failing to pay salaries of junior employees on time. It is reported that some senior 
employees of local authorities are earning as much as US $16 000 per month, while these 
local authorities are failing to meet the service delivery expectations of their communities.
355
 
The Minister intervened to correct the unsustainable salaries that were being paid to senior 
employees of urban local authorities. In 2013, the Minister issued a directive slashing the 
salaries of senior employees of local authorities by 50 per cent.
356
 In addition, the Minister 
directed that remuneration of any employee of local authorities may not exceed US $8000, 
including benefits. Thus, the Board has not been effective in promoting sound human 
resource management at the local level. This is mainly attributed to the absence of human and 
financial resources.
357
 The Board is funded through the Ministry of Local Government. The 
financial resources allocated by the Ministry have been inadequate for the Board to 
effectively discharge its mandate. The Board also lacks adequate support staff required to 
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carry out its mandate.
358
 Against this background it is suggested that if the role of the Board 
is to be maintained (as the ongoing policy review suggests), there is need to review its role 
with a view to strengthening its supervisory capacity.
359
 
5.4.5 Relevance of the Local Government Board under the 2013 Constitution 
As highlighted above, under the 2013 Constitution local authorities have a „right to govern‟ 
the local affairs of their communities with „all‟ the powers necessary to do so.360 A local 
authority is unlikely to fully exercise its „right to govern‟ without control over personnel 
establishment and its internal administrative procedures. It is submitted therefore that the 
„right to govern‟ includes administrative authority.361 This implies that the role of the Board 
may be inconsistent with the new constitutional dispensation where local authorities have 
„all‟ the powers necessary to govern.362 It is submitted that under the 2013 Constitution local 
authorities should hire, fire, remunerate and discipline staff without reference to the national 
government.
363
 There is however no political will to abolish the Board so as to give local 
authorities administrative authority. Thus, strengthening the capacity of the Board and 
improving its independence are the more realistic reforms. In the event that the Board is 
retained, it is suggested that its role should be limited to setting national frameworks
364
 and 
not extend to approving individual decisions of every local authority pertaining to personnel 
and administrative establishment. In that way, local authorities will exercise a certain 
measure of local discretion which is necessary if they are to play a role in the realisation of 
development, democracy and sustainable peace. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter it was argued that a multilevel system of government is more likely to realise 
development, democracy and sustainable peace if the powers and responsibilities assigned to 
each level of government are original, relevant, clearly demarcated, and differentiated. In 
addition, subnational governments should have final decision-making powers over their 
                                                 
358
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responsibilities so that they are in a position to better respond to the demands of their 
localities. It was observed in this chapter that provincial and metropolitan councils have 
original powers although they are ambiguous. Thus, it was submitted that national legislation 
should clarify this ambiguity by providing for clearly demarcated powers in line with the 
„spirit‟ of devolution central to the 2013 Constitution. It was submitted that local authorities 
have been assigned responsibilities which are powers and relevant for the realisation of 
development, democracy and sustainable peace. The potential of local authorities to deliver 
on these goals is undermined by the fact that the powers and functions are not original and in 
some other cases not clearly demarcated. Furthermore, local authorities have little final 
decision-making authority over the majority of their responsibilities. It was also observed that 
provincial councils and local authorities have limited administrative autonomy. Indications 
are that the national government intends to give provincial and metropolitan council a certain 
measure of administrative autonomy.
365
 The same cannot be said for local authorities. The 
national government intends to increase its control over the administrative establishment of 
local authorities, mainly through the Local Government Board.
366
 It is submitted that the lack 
of administrative autonomy at local level is likely to undermine the role of local authorities to 
deliver on development, democracy and sustainable peace goals. Thus, the national 
government is advised to give local authorities administrative autonomy. The ability of 
provincial and local governments to deliver on development, democracy and sustainable 
peace goals also depends on the resources which they have. This will be examined in the 
following chapter on finance. 
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Chapter 7 
Finance 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the powers and functions of provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities. This chapter discusses how provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities finance the delivery of their responsibilities. It examines the 
revenue-raising and spending powers of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities. The chapter argues that what provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities can achieve depends in part on the fiscal resources they have as well as the 
discretion which they have to spend such resources. It is therefore of critical importance that 
significant resource-raising and spending powers are devolved to the provincial and local 
levels. The chapter begins by examining the revenue-raising and spending powers of 
provincial and metropolitan councils before discussing similar powers at the local level. It 
then analyses the intergovernmental grant system designed to complement the subnational 
resource-raising effort. 
2. Provincial and Metropolitan Councils 
In paragraph 6.2.1.1 of Chapter Two it was contended that once expenditure has been 
assigned among governments at various levels, the assignment of taxing powers becomes 
critical in matching expenditure needs with revenue needs at various levels of government.
1
 It 
was further argued that, among other considerations, the assignment of taxing powers 
between the national and provincial governments should reflect the principles of efficiency in 
tax administration, equity, benefit-pay principle
2
 and fiscal need of each level of 
government.
3
 This will usually result in corporate, personal, progressive and value-added 
taxes, and custom duty being assigned to the national government. Provincial governments 
are likely to be assigned residence-based taxes, sales taxes, excises, supplementary income 
taxes, congestion tolls and benefit charges such as payroll taxes, vehicle taxes, business 
                                                 
1
 Shah 1994: 29. 
2
 The benefit-pay principle requires the establishment of a close link between consumption and payment of a 
particular public service. This is likely to be achieved if the level of government which is responsible for the 
delivery of a particular public service has the power to collect user-charges in respect of the consumption of that 
service. 
3
 See Shah 1994: 8, Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 234. 
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registrations and poll taxes, among others. The question of whether provincial and 
metropolitan councils should be assigned any taxing powers is one of the key issues which 
characterised debates relating to devolution during the constitution-review process.
4
 This 
question will be examined in this section. 
2.1 Resource-raising powers 
In paragraph 6.2.1 of Chapter Two an argument was made for the decentralisation of 
resource-raising powers to subnational governments so that they can have independent 
revenue streams.
5
 Besides providing independent revenue streams, the assignment of 
resource-raising responsibility to subnational governments has the advantage of promoting 
local accountability.
6
 It may also provide incentives for subnational governments to provide 
local public services in a more cost effective way than would be the case when subnational 
governments are wholly funded by the national government through intergovernmental 
grants.
7
 Thus, decentralising resource-raising powers to the subnational level has both 
democratic and development benefits. Zimbabwe has not sought to maximise these benefits 
by devolving resource-raising powers to the provincial level, as the discussion on the 
constitutional and statutory framework for resource-raising and spending powers at the 
provincial level will show. 
2.1.1 Constitutional framework 
Like the Lancaster House Constitution, the 2013 Constitution does not assign resource-
raising powers to provincial and metropolitan councils.
8
 It nonetheless does not prevent the 
national government from decentralising resource-raising powers to provincial and 
metropolitan councils. The Constitution provides that a provincial or metropolitan council 
may exercise any other functions that may be conferred or imposed on it by or under an Act 
of Parliament.
9
 This may include resource-raising responsibility. Thus, the question of 
whether provincial and metropolitan councils should exercise any resource-raising powers is 
determined by the national government. It is submitted that devolution in the 2013 
Constitution may be limited as provincial and metropolitan councils do not have 
                                                 
4
 Sims 2013: 12. 
5
 See the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 8. 
6
 See Shah 1994: 16. 
7
 See Shah 1994: 16. 
8
 See Musekiwa & Mandiyanike 2013: 9. 
9
 S 270(1)(f) Constitution. 
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constitutionally protected revenue-raising powers.
10
 This is likely to undermine the role of 
these councils in development, democracy and sustainable peace as such a role requires that 
they enjoy a certain measure of financial autonomy which is likely to be promoted if the 
councils exercise some resource-raising responsibility.
11
 One of the objectives of devolution 
in the Constitution is „to transfer responsibilities and resources from the national government 
in order to establish a sound financial base for each provincial and metropolitan council‟.12 A 
„sound financial base‟ implies that each provincial or metropolitan council has sufficient 
resources to enable it to carry out its responsibilities and obligations. While 
intergovernmental grants may go a long way in ensuring that provinces have a financial base, 
they are unlikely to be adequate to meet the financial needs of each council. Hence, it is 
submitted that the national government must devolve resource-raising powers to provincial 
and metropolitan councils which have potential to raise sufficient resources. 
2.1.2 Statutory framework 
The Provincial Councils and Administration Act does not assign resource-raising powers to 
provincial councils.
13
 If the Act is not amended to provide for resource-raising powers of 
provincial and metropolitan councils the implication is that these councils are going to be 
entirely dependent on the national government for funding.
14
 This brings into question the 
ability of provincial and metropolitan councils to secure adequate funding to meet their 
obligations and development needs, as required by the Constitution.
15
 As submitted above, 
the national government must devolve resource-raising powers to provincial and metropolitan 
councils which have potential to raise sufficient resources given that the Constitution requires 
each provincial or metropolitan council to have a „sound financial base‟.16 Alternatively, the 
national government could make use of intergovernmental grants to ensure that each 
provincial or metropolitan council has a „sound financial base‟.17 The 100 per cent funding of 
these councils through intergovernmental grants however has democratic and efficiency 
                                                 
10
 Musekiwa 2014: 3. 
11
 See UN-Habitat 2007: 8. 
12
 S 264(2)(f) Constitution. 
13
 Indications are that the national government is not going to grant provincial and metropolitan councils any 
resource-raising powers. See the Provincial and Metropolitan Councils Draft Bill (August 2014). 
14
 See Machingauta et al 2014: 23. 
15
 Musekiwa and Mandiyanike 2013: 12. 
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 S 264(2)(f) Constitution. 
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 See Machingauta et al 2014: 22. 
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weaknesses.
18
 Provincial and metropolitan councils are likely to be more accountable to the 
national government than to the local people.
19
 Further, there will not be any incentive for 
efficient spending at provincial level as there is no close link between revenue-raising and 
expenditure of revenue. Hence, it is suggested that while intergovernmental grants can be 
relied upon to complement subnational resources, provincial and metropolitan councils 
should be given resource-raising powers so that they can at least raise a portion of their 
financial resources.
20
 
2.1.3 Devolving resource-raising powers to the provincial level 
As in most countries, the national government in Zimbabwe controls the most lucrative 
sources of revenue such as personal, income, and value-added taxes.
21
 The need to mobilise 
sufficient resources to undertake redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation has been 
cited as one of the reasons behind the retention of the most lucrative sources of revenue by 
the national government.
22
 It has also been argued (rightly so) that decentralising high 
yielding taxes such as customs duty and excise duty to the subnational level could create 
distortions in the economy.
23
 Hence, it is argued that such resource-raising powers should be 
retained by the national government.
24
 Resource-raising powers such as vehicle registration 
and licensing, tourism, toll fees, business licensing, fuel levies, liquor licensing and proceeds 
from natural resources however could be devolved to the provincial level as they are less 
likely to cause distortions in the economy. As argued in paragraph 6.2.5 of Chapter Two (and 
discussed in detail below), while there is rationality in allowing the national government to 
retain high yielding taxes, it is of critical importance to ensure the resultant mismatch 
between expenditure and revenue at subnational level is addressed by a responsive system of 
intergovernmental grants. 
                                                 
18
 See Bahl 1999: 61, Watts 2001: 33. 
19
 See Shah 1994: 16. 
20
 See Muchadenyika 2014: 138. On the importance of independent revenue streams, see UN-Habitat 2007: 9. 
21
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 243, Pasipanodya et al 2000: 110. 
22
 Ministry of Local Government „Budget Guidelines for 2010: All Local Authorities‟ 2009: 9. 
23
 See Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 46. It may also create challenges with equal treatment of citizens. 
24
 See Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 46. 
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2.2 Provincial expenditure 
2.2.1 Constitutional framework 
The 2013 Constitution does not explicitly assign spending powers to the provincial and 
metropolitan councils. It however guarantees provincial and metropolitan councils (and local 
authorities) not less than five per cent of nationally raised revenue in each year.
25
 This 
implies that under the new constitutional order provincial and metropolitan councils have the 
power to spend revenue by virtue of being entitled to a certain portion of nationally raised 
revenue. Such spending powers may be widened through legislation if the national 
government decides to assign revenue-raising powers to these councils. It is submitted that in 
line with the devolution „spirit‟ of the 2013 Constitution, the national government should 
devolve more spending powers to the councils so that they can respond to the needs of the 
people in their respective provinces. They should have the power to formulate and implement 
provincial budgets to advance socio-economic development.
26
 Such powers could be 
assigned through national legislation in order to promote the realisation of the constitutional 
right of communities in each province to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development.
27
 It is submitted that communities are unlikely to fully exercise their right to 
manage their own affairs at provincial level if provincial and metropolitan councils do not 
have wide spending powers. 
2.2.2 Statutory framework 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 2013 Constitution has assigned socio-economic 
development responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils.
28
 The question of 
whether provincial and metropolitan councils should have spending power by formulating 
and implementing budgets to realise socio-economic development becomes critical.
29
 Under 
the Lancaster House constitutional order, the Provincial Councils and Administration Act did 
not make provision for spending powers of provincial councils. As highlighted in paragraph 
3.1 of Chapter Six, the role of provincial councils was limited to development planning and 
coordinating the implementation of national policies in their respective provinces. These 
                                                 
25
 See S 301(3) Constitution. 
26
 See Sims 2013: 24, Musekiwa & Mandiyanike 2013: 9. 
27
 See S 264(2)(d) Constitution. 
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responsibilities could be carried out without spending powers. Thus, the Act did not assign 
such powers to provincial councils. Under the 2013 Constitution provincial and metropolitan 
councils are responsible for socio-economic development in their respective provinces.
30
 In 
addition, the councils may exercise additional powers and functions given that the national 
government has an obligation to devolve powers and responsibilities.
31
 The responsibility of 
socio-economic development (and other responsibilities which the councils may undertake) is 
unlikely to be realised if provincial and metropolitan councils do not have spending powers. 
Thus, as argued above, the national legislation should make provision for the spending 
powers of provincial and metropolitan councils by giving them the power to formulate and 
implement their own budgets. 
This section discussed the resource-raising and spending powers of provincial and 
metropolitan councils. It was observed that provincial and metropolitan councils do not have 
constitutionally assigned resource-raising powers. The national government may however 
devolve such powers to the provincial level. It was also argued that although the 2013 
Constitution does not explicitly assign to provincial and metropolitan councils spending 
powers, implicitly the councils have such powers by virtue of an entitlement to nationally 
raised revenue (in each year) which they must spend in their respective provinces. 
3. Local Authorities 
Having examined the resource-raising powers at the provincial level, this section examines 
the resource-raising and expenditure powers of local authorities. Particular attention is given 
to the raising of revenue through user-charges, licensing fees, taxes and borrowing. The 
section will examine the potential of these resource-raising powers to mobilise sufficient 
revenues needed by local authorities to deliver on their mandates and development needs. 
The question is whether local authorities have financial autonomy, which is crucial for the 
role of local authorities in realising development, democracy and sustainable peace.
32
 The last 
part of the section deals with local expenditure, including formulation and implementation of 
budgets. 
                                                 
30
 See S 270(1) Constitution. 
31
 See S 264(1) Constitution. 
32
 See UN-Habitat 2007: 8. 
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3.1 Resource-raising powers 
In paragraph 6.2.1 of Chapter Two an argument was made for the decentralisation of 
resource-raising powers to local governments to enable these governments to raise revenue to 
finance their obligations.
33
 It was also contended that the guiding principle when designing a 
fiscal system is that „finance follows function‟ so that local governments are in charge of 
resource-raising powers that can raise financial resources commensurate with their 
responsibilities.
34
 Following the principles of tax assignment discussed in Chapter Two, local 
governments can be assigned taxes that are non-mobile in nature, including property taxes, 
tolls on local roads, taxes on fairs and markets, poll taxes and user-charges.
35
 Local 
authorities in Zimbabwe have been assigned some of these resource-raising measures through 
various Acts. Before discussing these measures, the chapter will analyse the constitutional 
framework for the assignment of resource-raising powers to local authorities. 
3.1.1 Constitutional framework 
The 2013 Constitution does not explicitly assign resource-raising powers to local authorities, 
but also does not prevent local authorities from exercising such powers.
36
 Thus, as at the 
provincial level, the question of whether local authorities should exercise taxing powers is 
determined by the national government. It is submitted therefore that the 2013 Constitution 
does not offer strong protection of the financial autonomy of local authorities which, as 
argued in paragraph 6.2.1 of Chapter Two, defines in part the role which local authorities can 
play in the realisation of development, democracy and sustainable peace.
37
 The Constitution, 
however, envisages national government allocating resource-raising powers to local 
authorities.
38
 It provides that an „Act of Parliament may confer functions on local authorities, 
including the power to levy rates and taxes and generally to raise sufficient revenue for them 
to carry out their objects and responsibilities‟.39 
Musekiwa and Mandiyanike argue that the 2013 Constitution has given local authorities 
original resource-raising powers in the form of rates and taxes.
40
 Conversely, it is submitted 
                                                 
33
 See UN-Habitat 2007: 8-9. 
34
 World Bank 2000: 124. See also Bahl 1999: 7, Article 9(2) European Charter of Local Self-Government. 
35
 Shah 1994: 8. See Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 234. 
36
 See Machingauta et al 2014: 22-3. 
37
 See Machingauta et al 2014: 23. 
38
 Machingauta et al 2014: 22. 
39
 S 276(2)(b) Constitution. 
40
 Musekiwa & Mandiyanike 2013: 10. 
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that the power to determine whether local authorities should exercise any resource-raising 
powers rests with the national government. Thus, any resource-raising powers which may be 
assigned to local authorities are not original. However, unlike the Lancaster House 
Constitution, the 2013 Constitution encourages the national government to decentralise 
resource-raising powers to establish „a sound financial base‟ for each local authority.41 It is 
suggested that national government should decentralise resource-raising powers capable of 
raising significant revenue to the local level.
42
 This will enable local authorities to mobilise 
revenue required for them to carry out their objects and responsibilities, as required by the 
Constitution.
43
 
3.1.2 Statutory framework 
The national government has decentralised resource-raising powers to local authorities.
44
 
Under various Acts of Parliament, local authorities have the power to raise revenue by 
imposing user-charges, property tax, levies, licencing fees and vehicle taxes.
45
 They also 
generate revenue from selling, renting and leasing of land or buildings. Local authorities have 
struggled to raise sufficient revenue to meet their expenditure and development obligations 
despite having these resource-raising powers.
46
 It is submitted that this challenge should be 
addressed given that without sufficient revenue local authorities will not be able to perform 
their assigned tasks adequately.
47
 As will be observed below when resource-raising powers 
are examined, the failure to raise adequate revenue has been attributed to a number of reasons 
including the absence of lucrative taxes at the local level, failure by local authorities to ensure 
cost recovery on services provided, an unstable macro-economic environment and a culture 
of non-payment for services provided by consumers of public services.
48
 
                                                 
41
 See s 276(2), s 264(2)(f) Constitution. See Machingauta et al 2014: 22. 
42
 The Aberdeen Principles 2005: 8, Article 9(1) European Charter of Local Self-Government, UN-Habitat 
2007: 8-9. See also Musekiwa 2014: 5. 
43
 See s 276(2)(b) Constitution. 
44
 See Coutinho 2010: 72 
45
 The UCA, the RDCA and the Regional Town and Country Planning Act, the Public Health Act, the Education 
Act [Chapter 20: 4], the Liquor Licensing Act, the Roads Traffic Act [Chapter 13: 11], the Land Survey Act 
[Chapter 20: 12], the Water Act [Chapter 20: 22] and the Electricity Act [Chapter 13: 5]. 
46
 Coutinho 2010: 71, Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 43, Marumahoko &Fessha 2011: 52, Chikulo 2010: 151. 
47
 Bockenforde 2011: 22. 
48
 Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 47, Coutinho 2010: 71-2, Machingauta et al 2014: 23. 
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3.1.3 User-charges and fees 
It was contended in paragraph 2.2.2.2 of Chapter two that local governments should be given 
the power to impose user-charges since most of the public services which they provide can be 
priced and are amenable to full cost-recovery.
49
 In this section, the chapter examines the 
power of local authorities to impose user-charges and determine user-charges. It further 
discusses the power of the national government to approve user-charges, the role of citizens 
in the determination of user-charges and the raising of revenue through user-charges in 
practice. 
3.1.3.1 Power to impose user-charges and fees 
Local authorities have the power to impose user charges on the provision of water and 
electricity, removal of sewerage and refuse disposal services, and any other services.
50
 Unlike 
urban local authorities, rural local authorities mainly charge consumption fees only in areas 
where they provide piped water.
51
 All local authorities may impose fees in respect of 
certificates, licences and permits issued as well as on inspections or any „act‟ carried out.52 
Urban local authorities have the power to charge fees: 
a) for the construction of sidewalks;53 
b) for construction (or connection) of sewer related infrastructure and services such as 
the treatment of trade effluent;
54
 
c) for the use of its cemeteries, storage facilities and market places;
55
 and 
d)  on the processing of building plans and provision of health, education and maternal 
services.
56
 
It can be observed that local authorities may impose user-charges and fees on a variety of 
services which they provide. Ideally, this widens the revenue streams available to local 
                                                 
49
 Bahl 1994: 14. 
50
 S 218 UCA and s 75 RDCA. See also number 17, Second Schedule, UCA. A local authority may impose 
charges on owners of stands, lots, premises or other areas, even if the owner is not a user of the services it 
provides. User-charges on water are categorised into connection fees, water consumption charges and deposit 
fees. Charges on sewerage removal services are divided into fixed charges, blockage clearance, septic tank 
emptying and sewerage connection fees. See Pasipanodya et al 2000: 174. 
51
 In areas where there is no piped water, where boreholes and wells are the sources of water, water-related user-
charges are imposed and managed by the benefitting communities. 
52
 Number 17 Second Schedule, UCA. 
53
 S 159(1) UCA. 
54
 S 179 UCA. See also ss 173, 174 and 178 UCA. These provisions of the UCA also apply to rural local 
authorities. See s 72 RDCA. 
55
 Number 12, Second Schedule, UCA. 
56
 See the Regional Town and Country Planning Act, the Public Health Act, and the Education Act. 
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authorities and thus their potential to raise revenue. As discussed in detail below, it is 
important to note that the potential of user-charges to raise significant also depends on 
whether local authorities have the right power to determine the user-charges and fees. Such a 
right creates flexibility by enabling local authorities to adjust tax rates to suit their budgetary 
requirements or when economic circumstances require.
57
 This right is examined in detail the 
following paragraph. 
3.1.1.2 Power to determine user-charges 
The extent to which local authorities have autonomy to determine tax rates has implications 
for the mobilisation of revenue at local level. Thus, in paragraph 6.2.2 of Chapter Two it was 
submitted that local governments should have the power to determine user-charges and 
fees.
58
 The UCA and RDCA give local authorities some measure of discretion to determine 
user-charges.
59
 Local authorities are required to fix charges, tariffs or deposits only through a 
resolution supported by a majority of the total membership of the council.
60
 They also have 
the power to fix fees payable in respect of certificates, licences or permits issued, inspections 
carried out or services rendered.
61
 Moreover, they determine fees applicable in the provision 
of maternal, education and health services.
62
 While legislation gives local authorities the 
power to determine user-charges and fees, the discretion to determine user-charges and fees is 
limited in a number of ways, which are analysed below. 
3.1.1.3 Approval of user-charges by the Minister 
In local government areas
63
 administered by the council or in such parts of a council area as 
may be prescribed by the Minister, local authorities may not raise user-charges in respect of 
any residential accommodation except in the form of a by-law.
64
 After independence and in 
line with its socialist policies, the national government prescribed high density suburbs
65
 as 
other areas where councils may not raise user-charges than in the form of a by-law. As 
                                                 
57
 See Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006: 13, World Bank 2000: 117. 
58
 See Eaton & Schroeder 2010: 180. 
59
 S 219(1) UCA and s 17(1) RDCA. 
60
 S 219(1) UCA and s 17(1) RDCA. 
61
 S 219(1)(b) of the UCA.  
62
 The determination of education and health fees will be explored in detail below. 
63
 See para 3.1.2 of Chapter Four for the definition of local government areas. 
64
 S 219(1) UCA and s 17(1) RDCA. The same requirements apply in respect of services provided specifically 
to or in connection with any residential accommodation. 
65
 High density suburbs are inhabited by a majority of poor citizens. 
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discussed in paragraph 4.3.1.1 of Chapter Six, a by-law may only be binding after it has been 
approved by the Minister. Thus, while legislation gives local authorities the power to 
determine user-charges, the Minister has the final decision-making power with regard to the 
determination of user-charges which applies to local government areas and high density 
suburbs. Almost three-quarters of the population in urban local authorities reside in high 
density areas. Local authorities spend a significant portion of their budget providing services 
in these areas even though they are not allowed to raise user-charges in these areas without 
the consent of the Minister. 
In terms of a directive issued by the national government in May 2010, local authorities may 
not increase user-charges and fees without the written approval of the Minister.
66
 The 
Minister has further issued directives to local authorities setting ceilings for user-charges and 
other fees.
67
 Hence, whereas the UCA and RDCA give local authorities the power to 
determine user-charges and fees, the directives have not only given the Minister power to set 
ceilings but to approve any increment of user-charges and fees.
68
 It is submitted that even 
though the directives may seek to advance equity by ensuring that user-charges do not go 
beyond the reach of the poor, they undermine the mobilisation of revenue at local level.
69
 The 
powers of the Minister to approve any increments of user-charges and fees may also be used 
to achieve political ends against the interests of citizens. This claim is supported by Chikulo 
who argues that the ability of local authorities in the Southern Africa to derive adequate 
revenue from user-charges is „constrained by central government restrictions imposed for fear 
of eroding political support among the urban populace‟.70 It is submitted that the national 
government should provide intergovernmental grants for the implementation of 
„protectionist‟ policies at the local level, such as delivery of basic services.71 In the absence 
of such intergovernmental grants, local authorities should be given some measure of 
autonomy to determine user-charges and fees so that cost recovery can be achieved.
72
 
                                                 
66
 Ministry of Local Government „Ministerial Directive on local authority service charges, fees and rates‟ 2010.  
67
 Sachikonye et al 2007: 79. 
68
 S 219(1) UCA and s 17(1) RDCA. 
69
 See Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 49, Ndlovu et al 2006: 10. 
70
 Chikulo 2010: 151. 
71
 See Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 49. 
72
 See Article 9(3) European Charter of Local Self-Government, Clause 21 Urban Councils Amendment Bill. 
See also Sachikonye et al 2007: 83, Pasipanodya et al 2000: 85. 
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3.1.1.4 Role of citizens in the determination of user-charges 
In paragraph 6.1.5 of Chapter Two an argument was made for the participation of citizens in 
activities which affect their lives such as the determination of user-charges.
73
 The UCA and 
RDCA provide for mechanisms to allow citizens to influence decisions relating to the 
determination of user-charges. Both urban and rural local authorities are required to give 
citizens a period of not less than 30 days to make any objections to the proposed tariff before 
they can implement such a tariff.
74
 If objections are made by 30 or more people, the 
concerned local authority must consider such objections.
75
 The issue of consideration of 
objections was at the centre of Matopo Indigenous Business Development Association vs 
Matopo Rural District Council.
76
 The background to the case is that sometime in 2005 the 
respondent (the council), in terms of section of 76(1) and 96 of the RDCA,
77
 published a 
notice of its intention to increase tariffs by 350-400 per cent. Following the publication of the 
notice, applicants and other stakeholders objected to the tariff increase. Various meetings 
were held between the council and the applicant and other stakeholders to resolve the 
disputes related to the proposed tariffs but the meetings yielded no result. On 1 April 2005, 
the council held a special full council meeting to consider the objections raised by the 
applicants, as required by the RDCA.
78
 The council resolved to reduce the proposed vehicle 
licence fees and other tariffs by 50 per cent. 
Following the resolution of the council the applicants approached the courts seeking an 
interdict to prevent the respondent from implementing the new tariffs. Further, they sought an 
order directing the council to convene a meeting with them to resolve the tariff dispute. The 
applicants also wanted the notice to increase tariffs to be declared null and void by the 
court.
79
 The court found that, in terms of section 76, when fixing tariffs a council is only 
required to pass a resolution, publish proposed tariffs and consider objections raised by 30 or 
more voters. It declared that there is no legal requirement for the council to convene meetings 
with voters to review proposed tariff increases although that may be necessary to promote 
                                                 
73
 See Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 234. 
74
 S 219(3) UCA and S 76(3) RDCA. 
75
 S 219(3) UCA and S 76(3) RDCA. 
76
 Matopo Indigenous Business Development Association vs Matopo Rural District Council Judgement No. 
HB55/05, Case No. HC 757/05, 30 June 2005. 
77
 Section 96 of the RDCA gives rural local authorities the power to impose levies. 
78
 See s 76(3) RDCA. 
79
 Matopo Indigenous Business Development Association vs Matopo Rural District Council, page 1. 
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accountability and transparency.
80
 The court ruled that the council had complied with the 
requirements of section 76 and therefore dismissed the application with costs.
81
 This 
judgment highlights that while the participation of citizens in reviewing tariff increases is an 
important element of local democracy, it is the statutory responsibility of a council to 
determine tariffs. Thus, a local authority does not have to seek consensus with objectors to 
proposed tariff increases although such a move may make enforcement of tariffs easier.
82
 As 
stated above, local authorities no longer have the discretion to determine user-charges since 
the Minister has to approve any increment in user-charges. Under this system, citizen 
participation in the determination of user-charges at the local level is of little use since the 
final decision-making power relating to user-charges and fees rests with the Minister and not 
with the local authority. The 2013 Constitution requires democratic, transparent and 
accountable government.
83
 This in part means that citizens are allowed to play a central role 
in the determination of user-charges and fees. Such citizen participation in the determination 
of user-charges will be of no value unless the power of the Minister to approve user-charges 
and fees is limited to only setting tariffs ceilings and not extend to approving them. 
3.1.1.5 ‘Culture of non-payment of services’ 
Local authorities are owed large sums of money by consumers of their services. This can be 
attributed, in part, to a „culture of non-payment of services‟ provided by local authorities such 
as water supply and refuse removal.
84
 Citizens fail to pay for services provided as they cannot 
afford the user-charges due to declining income and rising poverty.
85
 On the other hand, 
citizens who can afford to pay user-charges have been reluctant to settle their bills due to 
poor service delivery and inaccurate billing.
86
 Besides the citizens, some commercial and 
                                                 
80
 Matopo Indigenous Business Development Association vs Matopo Rural District Council, page 4. 
81
 Matopo Indigenous Business Development Association vs Matopo Rural District Council, page 4. 
82
 See Matopo Indigenous Business Development Association vs Matopo Rural District Council, page 4. 
83
 See ss 3, 264(2)(b) Constitution. 
84
 Sachikonye et al 2007: 83, Pasipanodya et al 2000: 122. Chakaipa 2010: 63, Combined Harare Residents 
Association 2014: 74. A culture of non-payment of service charges is not unique to Zimbabwe but prevalent in a 
number of developing countries. For example in South Africa, municipalities continue to face a „culture of non-
payment‟ mainly by township dwellers, a habit which has origins in the apartheid. See Chikulo 2010: 210. The 
other challenge is that water infrastructure is dilapidated. A significant number of local authorities have lost 
revenue from water charges due to burst or leaking water pipes. Large quantities of water are lost during 
transportation to service users due to leaking water pipes. Other challenges relate to illegal connections and the 
usage of unmetered water by some residents. 
85
 Bland 2010: 4, Ndlovu et al 2006: 13. 
86
 Coutinho 2010: 74. Maruamahoko & Fessha 2011: 48. Local authorities do not have accurate billing data 
about service-users. The billing of service-users is highly inconsistent and riddled with irregularities. The lack of 
accurate data has compromised the ability of local authorities to recover debts. See Chakaipa 2010: 63. 
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industrial entities have also failed to pay user-charges as they cannot afford due to liquidity 
crisis being experienced in Zimbabwe at the time of writing. The challenge has been 
worsened by the fact that the national government and its various agencies owe local 
authorities huge sums of money in unpaid user-charges.
87
 Against this background, user-
charges, although contributing significantly to budgets of most urban local authorities, have 
generated less revenue than they potentially could. 
3.1.1.6 The setting of uneconomic user-charges and fees 
The setting of uneconomic rates has undermined local revenue mobilisation in many local 
authorities. User-charges and fees are normally set at sub-economic levels as local authorities 
are forced to adjust to the demands of the national government and the citizens.
88
 There is 
often pressure on local authorities from different political groupings that use ratepayers‟ 
inability to pay high user-charges and fees for political gain. Marumahoko and Fessha point 
out that when elections approach, there is often political pressure on the local tax 
administration to relax user-charges and revenue collection in general for political gain.
89
 In 
such scenarios, user-charges and fees are set at very low levels to the extent that, sometimes, 
revenue collection costs outweigh actual revenue collected.
90
 Health and education fees are 
usually kept beyond economical values as they are normally determined by the national 
government based on norms and not actual consumption.
91
 These fees tend to be fixed and 
unresponsive to economic pressures. For example, it is argued that fees charged at clinics 
operated by local authorities „do not even come close to recovering a quarter of the cost of 
health drugs in stock‟.92 These core public services are usually subsidised by other local 
sources of finance. As a result, most local authorities have been unable to implement cost 
recovery systems in the provision of services.
93
 As will be argued in paragraph 4 below, 
intergovernmental grants are required to finance the provision of these core public services. 
                                                 
87
 Sachikonye et al 2007: 83. See also the Report of the Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and 
Urban Development 2011: 8. 
88
 Jonga & Chirisa 2009: 174, Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 48, Mushamba 2010: 110. 
89
 Jonga & Chirisa 2010: 8. Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 48. 
90
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 43, Coutinho 2010: 74. 
91
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 125, 174. 
92
 Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 48.  
93
 See Coutinho 2010: 74.  
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3.1.1.7 Ineffective debt recovery mechanisms 
Local authorities have not realised significant revenue from user-charges and fees due to 
ineffective debt recovery mechanisms. In terms of section 151 of the RDCA and section 281 
of the UCA, local authorities have the power to recover debts by instituting legal proceedings 
in the courts.
94
 Efforts by rural local authorities to recover money using this legal route have 
been undermined by the national government.
95
 In terms of Local Government Circular 
Number 3 of 2010, rural local authorities were directed to desist from approaching the courts 
and contracting debt collectors to recover unpaid levies.
96
 The Herald newspaper quoted the 
Minister as having said: „We no longer want to hear that there are some councils in this 
country that attach and sell the property of those who fail to pay their rates and taxes.‟97 
This essentially means that the Minister directed rural local authorities not to exercise their 
statutory powers. The obvious implication of such a directive is that it has undermined the 
efficiency and effectiveness of debt collection methods available to local authorities.
98
 While 
such a directive may seek to protect the poor, it has adverse effects on the sustainable 
delivery of public services. Public services are unlikely to be provided on a sustainable basis 
without effective cost recovery mechanisms and associated measures to recover debts to raise 
revenue. Similar implications have resulted out of the directive of the Minister to local 
authorities regarding writing off debts. 
In a directive dated 23 July 2013, the Minister instructed all local authorities to write off 
debts owed by citizens from February 2009 to 30 June 2013.
99
 The Minister justified the 
directive by the need to „cushion individual ratepayers from the severe effects of the 
economic challenges experienced‟.100 The timing of this directive is questionable given the 
political environment which prevailed when it was issued. The directive was issued a week 
                                                 
94
 S 151 RDCA and s 281UCA 
95
 See Pasipanodya et al 2000: 134. 
96
 Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, Local Government Circular Number 3 of 
2010. 
97
 The Herald „Hands off defaulters‟ property, council told‟ 2012. Instead, the Minister is reported to have 
directed local authorities to give residents enough time to settle their arrears and to develop innovative 
approaches to generate revenue. 
98
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 134. 
99
 Ministry of Local Government „Directive to write off debts by all local authorities‟ 2013. This directive was 
later followed by the directive of 29 August 2013 in which the Minister instructed all local authorities to go 
public in the broadcast media through national or radio and print media regarding progress in implementing the 
directive of writing off debts for the benefit of the citizens. See Ministry of Local Government: Implementation 
of Ministerial directive to all local authorities to write off debts, dated 29 August 2013. 
100
 Ministry of Local Government „Directive to write off debts by all local authorities‟ 2013. 
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before the harmonised elections of 31 July 2013. Could there be a link between the timing of 
the directive and the July 2013 harmonised elections? Are there any hidden agendas, such as 
mobilising support for ZANU-PF political party, behind the directive? These questions may 
be answered by examining the legality of the directive. 
In terms of section 313 of the UCA, the Minister has the power to issue directives of a 
„general character‟ to urban local authorities if it appears to be in the national interest. It is 
submitted that the directive to write off debts cannot be said to be of a „general character‟ as 
it did not merely relate to policy but requires local authorities to undertake a specific act, 
namely writing off debts.
101
 In terms of section 155 of the RDCA, if a rural local authority 
has failed to carry out a statutory duty, the Minister may direct the local authority to take 
specified action to remedy the situation. Again, this section does not empower the Minister to 
issue directives to write off debts as rural local authorities had not failed to carry out a 
statutory duty.
102
 Thus, there was no legal basis for the directive to write off debts. The 
directive had the overall effect of undermining local resource-raising efforts.
103
 Hence, as 
argued in Chapter Eight, the supervisory powers of the Minister should be reformed and 
exercised with oversight from Parliament. Furthermore, the validity or legality of directives 
of the Minister should be checked in court especially now that local authorities are a 
constitutionally recognised tier of government. 
This section discussed the raising of revenue at the local level through user-charges and fees. 
As highlighted in Table 7 below, revenue generated from charges imposed on water supply, 
refuse removal and sewerage removal constitutes a majority portion of the total revenue 
generated by most urban local authorities.
104
 Unlike urban local authorities, rural local 
authorities do not derive significant revenue from user-charges because they do not provide a 
variety of public services where cost recovery can be achieved. For example, the majority of 
citizens in rural areas do not have piped water. They rely on boreholes and wells. 
Furthermore, the tax base in most rural areas is poor due to limited commercial or industrial 
activity.
105
 Hence, user-charges are minimal. User-fees imposed on permitting and licensing 
                                                 
101
 Veritas Zimbabwe, Constitutional Watch 37/2003. 
102
 Veritas Zimbabwe, Constitutional Watch 37/2003. Under section 133 of the RDCA, rural local authorities 
may only write off debts in specific circumstances which did not exist when the Minister issued the directive. 
Even if the circumstances existed, such powers to write off debts can only be exercised by the rural local 
authority and not the Minister. 
103
 See Pasipanodya et al 2000: 134. 
104
 See Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 235, Coutinho 2010: 74. 
105
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 243, Coutinho 2010: 74, Chikulo 2010: 151. 
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in rural local authorities also tend to contribute insignificant revenue due to the absence of tax 
base.
106
 
3.1.4 Land development and special levies 
Land development levies are imposed by rural local authorities. They can be considered to be 
synonymous to property rates in urban local authorities. This section discusses the raising of 
revenue through land development and special levies. Attention is given to the power to levy, 
determine rates and the raising of revenue in practice through land development levies. 
3.1.4.1 Power to impose levies 
Rural local authorities may impose land development levies upon all persons who own land 
in rural areas and all persons who are heads of household within any communal ward of the 
council.
107
 Further, they may impose levies on mining companies, the business community 
and holders of permits authorising the occupation and use of any portion of rural land.
108
 
Rural local authorities may impose special levies for recovering expenses incurred (or which 
will be incurred) in carrying out any development project within the council area.
109
 Special 
levies may be imposed to meet expenses which are of an „unusual nature‟, arise from 
„unusual circumstances‟, or arise from „unequal demand of services provided by the 
council‟.110 For example, a rural local authority may impose special levies to finance the 
expansion of infrastructure in a particular area of the council to meet growing demand of a 
particular public service. Before a rural local authority may impose any special levies, they 
have to seek the approval of the Minister.
111
 Thus, while rural local authorities have 
discretion with regard to land development levies, in cases of special levies the Minister has 
the final decision-making power. 
3.1.4.2 Right to determine levies 
Rural local authorities have the power to determine rates applicable to land development 
levies and special levies but the Minister may prescribe applicable rates.
112
 They may not fix 
                                                 
106
 Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 48. 
107
 S 96(1)(2) RDCA. 
108
 S 96(1)(2) RDCA. 
109
 S 97(1) RDCA. 
110
 S 97(1) RDCA 
111
 S 97(1) RDCA. The Minister has the power to direct a rural district council to impose a special rate. 
112
 S 96(3)(4) RDCA and s 97(2)(3) RDCA. 
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different rates in respect of different classes of heads of household without the approval of 
the Minister.
113
 As highlighted in paragraph 3.1.3 above, in 2010 the Minister issued a 
directive requiring all local authorities to seek approval of the national government before 
increasing levies, fees and rates.
114
 The argument raised above also applies here as rural local 
authorities lack the autonomy to determine the rates of levies.
115
 
In practice, levies tend to generate insignificant revenue due to the concentration of poor 
residents and limited commercial or industrial activity in rural areas.
116
 Limited 
administrative capacity to levy and collect revenue has also undermined the realisation of 
significant revenue from the imposition of levies.
117
 Accurate information on commercial, 
mining, residential and agricultural property is yet to be established in most rural local 
authorities.
118
 This has made it difficult for rural local authorities to impose levies on these 
activities. 
3.1.5 Rents and sales of land and buildings 
Local authorities generate revenue from selling, renting or leasing land and buildings.
119
 A 
local authority has the power to sell, exchange, lease or permit the use of any of its land.
120
 It 
may also sell, lease or rent buildings.
121
 Unlike urban local authorities, rural local authorities 
are required to seek the approval of the Minister before they can develop any land or 
buildings for the purposes of generating revenue by renting, leasing or selling.
122
 As 
discussed below, the extent to which local authorities have the power to determine rents and 
deposits
123
 has a bearing on the actual revenue mobilised from this source. 
Local authorities may determine rents or deposits which are to be paid on leased land or 
buildings but such rents and deposits may not be enforced unless approved by the Minister.
124
 
                                                 
113
 S 96(3)(a) RDCA.  
114
 Ministry of Local Government „Ministerial Directive on local authority service charges, fees and rates‟ 2010. 
115
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 240. 
116
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 243, Chikulo 2010: 151. 
117
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 240. 
118
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 243.  
119
 See Coutinho 2010: 76. 
120
 S 152(1) UCA and s 86 RDCA. With the approval of the Minister, rural local authorities may develop state 
land within their jurisdictions. 
121
 S 153(2) UCA. See also s 86 RDCA. 
122
 S 86(3) RDCA. 
123
 Money paid by the lessee to the council to provide some sort of guarantee which is paid back at the end of 
the leasing period unless the contract is renewed.  
124
 S 219(1) UCA. Local authorities are required to publish any proposal to increase rents or deposits and to 
invite objections to such a proposal for a period not less than 30 days. S 219(2)(3) UCA. 
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They may fix interest rates applicable to any rents or deposit unpaid after such date as 
determined by the council.
125
 The rate on interest is passed in the form of a by-law, which 
means that it has to be approved by the Minister before it can be enforced.
126
 Thus, local 
authorities do not have the autonomy to determine rents and deposits as such rents or deposits 
have to be approved by the Minister before they can be implemented. This has a negative 
implication on the mobilisation of revenue at the local level. 
In practice, revenue mobilised from the renting, leasing and selling of land or buildings 
contributes insignificantly to budgets of most local authorities. While the absence of 
autonomy to set rents and deposits may undermine local resource mobilisation, 
mismanagement and poor business practices have been cited as the main causes behind the 
failure of rents and deposits to live up to their revenue mobilisation potential.
127
 Rents and 
deposits payable in properties owned by local authorities are normally set far below market 
value.
128
 The report of the Investigation Committee, appointed by the Minister to report on 
tendering and management of estates by the City of Harare revealed that some senior officials 
of the City rent council houses and flats, where they pay close to nothing, while renting their 
mansions at market rates.
129
 As a result, revenue raised from rents and deposits is very low. 
Local authorities, especially urban local authorities, have potential to generate significant 
revenue from the sale and leasing of land.
130
 Cities such as Bulawayo and Harare own a 
significant number of estates or properties which they rent or lease to generate revenue. 
Harare City Council, for example, owns around 14 000 properties divided into houses, shops 
and industrial complexes.
131
 Tenants in these properties tend to pay rents which are below 
market rates. If such properties are rented or leased following market principles, they can 
generate a substantial amount of revenue. This view is supported by a report of the 
Investigation Committee which recommended that the City float a public tender to have its 
                                                 
125
 S 219(6) UCA. 
126
 S 219(6) UCA. 
127
 See The Herald „City urged to rent out properties‟ 2012, Coutinho 2010: 76. 
128
 See The Herald „City urged to rent out properties‟ 2012, Coutinho 2010: 76. 
129
 The Herald „City urged to rent out properties‟ 2012. Other senior officials even sublet their allocations to 
third parties. 
130
 Although rural authorities are the custodians of rural land, they may not sell such land unless given the 
permission by the national government. Most rural local authorities do not own buildings. Thus, they may not 
derive revenue through renting or selling of such buildings.  
131
 The Herald „City urged to rent out properties‟ 2012. 
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properties valued and then float tenders so that such properties are managed professionally on 
market-based principles.
132
 
3.1.6 Property tax 
It was contended in paragraph 2.2.2.1 of Chapter Two that property tax is the „most 
appropriate‟ tax for local governments as services they provide tend to benefit property 
owners and occupants.
133
 It is also argued that although property tax can be a major source of 
revenue for local government, in some countries it does not produce significant revenue 
because of the administrative burden involved in collecting it and the fact that it is politically 
unpopular.
134
 As in most countries that have multilevel systems of government, local 
authorities in Zimbabwe raise some of their revenue from property tax. The raising of 
revenue through property tax (rate) is examined in this section. 
3.1.6.1 Power to impose property rate 
Local authorities have the power to impose a general rate on all property within their 
jurisdictions except on exempted property.
135
 Exempted property includes property which is 
owned by the national government or a local authority;
136
 is used exclusively for religious 
and educational purposes; used as a public institution for aged, mentally or physically 
handicapped persons; used as a public hospital; used as a public orphanage, cemetery or 
crematorium and for youth-related activities.
137
 In addition, rural local authorities may not 
impose property rates on mining companies, rural land or any other land that is exempted by 
law.
138
 In addition to the general rate, local authorities may impose a special rate on all 
rateable property for the purposes of recovering expenses incurred in the execution, 
maintenance or operation of any works in a portion of a council area which derives benefits 
from such works.
139
 For example, a council may impose a special rate to recover expenses 
                                                 
132
 See The Herald „City urged to rent out properties‟ 2012. 
133
 See Bahl 1994: 14.  
134
 Bahl 1994: 14. 
135
 S 272(1) UCA and s 98(1)(a) RDCA. See also s 269 UCA.  
136
 S 270(1) UCA and s 98(1)(c) RDCA. Property owned by a local authority can only be exempted from rates if 
it is less than five hectares in extent and is used for public purposes. 
137
 S 272(1) UCA and s 98(1)(a) RDCA. See s 167 UCA. 
138
 S 98(1)(f) RDCA. 
139
 S 273(1) UCA and S 100(1) RDCA. Section 273(3) of the UCA requires that before any special rate is levied 
a notice of intention to levy the rate must be served in writing to the owners of the property concerned and 
placed in three issues of a newspaper. The council can only levy the special rate if within 30 days of the last 
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related to the erection of a water reservoir which supplies water to a particular potion of the 
council area. However, a local authority may not levy a special rate on property without the 
approval of the Minister.
140
 
3.1.6.2 Power to determine property rates 
The power of local authorities to impose property rates is coupled with the power to 
determine rates. Local authorities have the power to determine a general rate on all rateable 
property within their jurisdictions.
141
 Property rates are assessed on the valuations as shown 
in the valuation rolls unless the Minister has given consent to any alternative.
142
 The 
valuation roll is prepared by a valuation officer appointed by a local authority and approved 
by a valuation board appointed by the Minister.
143
 Thus, the Minister has an indirect 
influence in the formulation of valuation rolls by virtue of his role in appointing members of 
valuation boards.
144
 The Minister has a more direct role to play in the determination of 
property rates which are imposed in high density suburbs. 
Even though supplementary charges which are imposed in high density areas are by 
definition property tax, section 219 of the UCA treats them as charges which have to be 
approved by the Minister before they may be enforced. The Minister is required to 
authenticate his or her approval by gazetting the increase or adjustments through a statutory 
instrument.
145
 As mentioned above, there is a ministerial directive which states that no local 
authority may increase user-charges and rates without the approval of the Minister.
146
 While 
the UCA limits the powers of the Minister to approving only rates applicable to high density 
areas, this directive has broadened the requirement of approval of rates to include areas other 
than high density areas. Hence, local authorities do not have the autonomy to determine 
                                                                                                                                                        
publication of the notice there is no objection to the special rate. If there are any objections and the council seeks 
to proceed, the consent of the Minister on the special rate is required. S 273(4) UCA. 
140
 S 273(4) UCA and s 100(3) RDCA. 
141
 See Part XVIII and UCA. This part of the UCA and 266-78 of the UCA also applies to rural local authorities 
with reference to valuation of property. See s 101 RDCA. 
142
 S 101 RDCA S 272(7)(8) UCA, s 99(4)(6) RDCA and s 278 UCA . 
143
 S 241 UCA. Section 247 of the UCA requires all local authorities to update their general valuation rolls any 
time between three and ten years. 
144
 S 242 UCA. 
145
 219(1) UCA. The Minister has been accused of causing revenue loss at local level by delaying gazetting the 
statutory instrument. As a result, some local authorities usually go on to implement new rates without the 
statutory instruments in a bid to minimise the impact of the delays such as revenue loss. See Pasipanodya et al 
2000: 193. 
146
 Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development „Ministerial Directive on Local Authority 
service charges, fees and rates‟ 2010. 
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property rates applicable not only to high density areas but also other parts of the council 
area. This has undermined the local resource mobilisation effort. It is submitted that local 
authorities should be given autonomy to determine property rates while the national 
government can retain the power to set ceilings applicable to property rates.
147
 
3.1.6.3 The practice of raising of revenue through property rates 
Property rates are an important source of revenue for most urban local authorities, especially 
city and municipal councils.
148
 Rural local authorities, like most of their counterparts in the 
Southern African region, do not generate substantial revenue from property rates due to 
absence of a high concentration of rateable property in their jurisdictions.
149
 In Zimbabwe, 
the ability of local authorities to derive adequate revenue from property rates has been 
constrained by a number of factors, chief amongst them administrative complexities, fear of 
eroding political support and the large number of properties exempted from rates.
150
 
A significant number of local authorities do not have a comprehensive valuation roll of all 
properties within their jurisdictions. They fail to set up rating zones and rating units to be 
assigned to residential properties for rating purposes or to regularly update their valuation 
roll.
151
 This can be attributed in part to unavailability of skilled personnel to assess 
properties.
152
 As a result, some of the properties which should be subjected to rates are often 
excluded, properties are otherwise under-rated because there are no rating zones, or 
properties are classified in the wrong zone. Hence, property rates have failed to raise 
significant revenue despite their huge potential to do so. 
The exemption of a large number of national government properties from property rates has 
diminished revenue raised from property rates in both urban and rural local authorities.
153
 
Some of these properties generate income and this makes it unsound to exempt them from 
property rates. Rural local authorities are the worst affected by the exemption as they have 
                                                 
147
 See Article 9(3) European Charter of Local Self-Government, Clause 9 Urban Councils Amendment Bil. See 
also Combined Harare Residents Association 2014: 74. 
148
 Coutinho 2010: 73, Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 235. 
149
 See Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 243, Chikulo 2010: 151. 
150
 See Chikulo 2010: 151, Combined Harare Residents Association 2014: 74. In practice, it is difficult for local 
authorities to enforce payment of property rates especially from the poor and powerful. Zhou & Chilunjika 
2013: 235. 
151
 Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 48, Mushamba 2010: 110, Coutinho 2010: 73. 
152
 Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 235. 
153
 Coutinho 2010: 73. 
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vast tracts of land owned by the state.
154
 Urban local authorities are also host to a number of 
properties of the national government. An estimated average of between 5 to 7 per cent is lost 
in potential revenue due this exemption, in urban local authorities alone.
155
 The national 
government used to compensate local authorities for potential loss of revenue through a grant, 
but it has defaulted on the payment of this grant.
156
 The 1984 commission of enquiry into 
taxation stressed the need to abolish the exemption of property owned by the national 
government from property rates.
157
 The Commission recommended that the national 
government should pay all service charges and only 50 per cent of the rateable value of its 
properties.
158
 This chapter concurs with this recommendation of the commission as a way to 
increase the revenue mobilisation potential of local authorities. 
3.1.7 Motor vehicle taxes 
It was contended in paragraph 6.2.1.1 of Chapter Two that local governments should be 
assigned taxes which may not be easily exported between jurisdictions. Motor vehicle taxes 
are suitable taxes for local governments because they meet the test of not being easily 
exported and being administratively feasible.
159
 These include taxes on motor fuels, restricted 
licenses, unrestricted licences, tolls and parking taxes. In Zimbabwe, local authorities do not 
have the power to impose vehicle taxes, with the exception of parking fees and traffic 
fines.
160
 Vehicle taxes, which include licence fees and vehicle ownership fees, are national 
government taxes. Thus, the national government determines the tax rates for these vehicle-
related taxes. Since independence the position has been that local authorities collect vehicle 
taxes on behalf of the national government. After collection, local authorities are required to 
remit the revenue to the national government and retain five per cent of the total revenue to 
cover administration fees involved in the collection of the vehicle taxes.
161
 This arrangement 
has since been abolished as the national government through the Zimbabwe National Roads 
Agency is collecting all vehicle taxes. Local authorities generate revenue from parking 
                                                 
154
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 184. Further, when state land is sold by the central government, the proceeds go to 
the central government and subnational governments are only given development fees, if any. 
155
 Coutinho 2010: 73. Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 48. 
156
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 123, 192. The grant was calculated at a rate of 66 per cent of the rateable value. 
157
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 192. 
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 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 192. 
159
 Bahl 1994: 13. 
160
 See Coutinho 2010: 75. 
161
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 121. 
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fees.
162
 They also mobilise revenue from traffic fines imposed in terms of the Municipal 
Traffic Enforcement Act.
163
 However, local authorities do not have the autonomy to 
determine traffic fines as they are fixed by the national government.
164
 The role of the 
national government has had the overall effect of undermining resource mobilisation by local 
authorities. 
3.1.8 Other sources of revenue 
This section discusses other sources of revenue for local authorities. Attention is given to the 
mobilisation of revenue through income-generating projects and proceeds from the 
exploitation of national resources and investments. 
3.1.8.1 Income-generating projects 
The UCA and RDCA empower local authorities to engage in any commercial, industrial, 
agricultural or other activity for the purpose of raising revenue.
165
 They may conduct liquor 
and mahewu
166
 undertakings for the same purpose.
167
 Some local authorities have ventured 
into brick moulding and farming to generate income and supplement their main sources of 
revenue.
168
 The approval of the Minister is required before a local authority engages in any 
commercial, industrial and agricultural activity for the purposes of raising revenue. While the 
powers of the Minister to approve income-generating projects may be necessary, for 
oversight reasons it may undermine investment and innovation at the local level. Thus, it is 
submitted that such a form of supervision should be reformed so that local authorities have 
discretion to make decisions relating to income-generating projects.
169
 The role of the 
Minister should be limited to regulating and monitoring their financial affairs. In practice, the 
raising of revenue by operating liquor undertakings is mainly carried out by city and 
municipal councils which have the capacity to operate such undertakings. Liquor trading 
entities tend not to generate profit in most local authorities and are in fact subsidised by 
                                                 
162
 S 189, s 190 UCA.  
163
 Municipal Traffic Enforcement Act [Chapter 29: 10]. 
164
 S 9 Municipal Traffic Enforcement Act. 
165
 S 221(1) UCA and s 80 RDCA. See Feltoe 2006: 134. 
166
 See Number 15, Second Schedule, UCA. Mahewu is a traditional African drink. 
167
 See Number 14, Second Schedule, UCA. 
168
 Coutinho 2010: 76. 
169
 See Clause 22 Urban Councils Amendment Bill. 
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revenue from other sources.
170
 Some of the reasons cited for the poor performance of liquor 
trading entities are mismanagement, corruption and poor business practices.
171
 This has led to 
most local authorities abandoning liquor trading operations. 
3.1.8.2 Proceeds from natural resources 
Some local authorities derive revenue from proceeds connected to the exploitation of natural 
resources such as minerals, wildlife, woodlands, sand and rocks. Natural resources are often 
exploited by private individuals and corporations while local authorities impose royalties or 
permit fees for their exploitation.
172
 The most common royalties are royalties on minerals, 
sand extraction and hunting concessions. Proceeds from natural resources are an important 
source of revenue for some rural local authorities given that most of the country‟s natural 
resources are found in their areas of jurisdiction.
173
 It is submitted that there is need for the 
development of a clear legislative framework to govern the imposition of royalties and permit 
fees by local authorities on the exploitation of natural resources within their jurisdictions. 
This is not only necessary to promote transparency as required by the 2013 Constitution,
174
 
but also to improve the capacity of local authorities to generate revenue from this source. 
3.1.8.3 Investment 
Local authorities may invest any surplus funds.
175
 Despite having the power to invest, very 
few local authorities, if any, have managed to do so since 2000. This can be attributed to the 
unstable economic environment which made it difficult for local authorities to generate any 
surplus funds.
176
 In practice, local authorities are actually failing to generate sufficient 
revenue to meet their recurrent expenditure. 
Table below provides a summary of the main sources of revenue of local authorities. It uses 
the proposed 2014 estimates of revenue of the City of Harare to show the significance of each 
tax or source of revenue. The table shows that charges on water supply are the main source of 
                                                 
170
 See Coutinho 2010: 76, Phelps 1997: 19. The City of Harare has since stopped to operate Rufaro Marketing, 
a beer trading entity, as it was not making any profit. See The Herald „City urged to rent out properties‟ 2012.  
171
 See Coutinho 2010: 76. 
172
 Coutinho 2010: 76. 
173
 Coutinho 2010: 76. 
174
 See s 264(2)(b) Constitution. 
175
 See s 131(1) UCA. 
176
 See Bland 2010: 2, Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa 2005: 16. 
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revenue for the City of Harare.
177
 In 2014, water charges were expected to contribute about 
39.3 per cent towards revenue of the City. Water charges are followed by property rates and 
refuse removal. Welfare services are expected to contribute the least amount of revenue of 
around 0.21 per cent of the total revenue expected to be mobilised. For rural local authorities, 
the main sources of revenue are the land development levy, unit tax and land sales.
178
 
Table 7: Estimates of revenue of the City of Harare 
Source Amount-US$ (millions) 
  
Property 102.0 
Refuse collection 23.3 
Welfare  0.6 
Zinara and Billboards 4.0 
City Architect 3.6 
Clamping and towing 5.4 
Health fees 9.9 
Housing: Rentals, Leases and Markets 11.0 
Harare Water  108.0 
Parks and Cemeteries 0.8 
Metropolitan Police 1.6 
Education 2.7 
Estates 2.7 
Other  0.8 
  
Total 274.6 
 Source: City of Harare, 2014 Budget Speech and Proposals 2014: 12. 
This section examined the revenue-raising powers of local authorities. It was contended that 
although local authorities have revenue-raising powers, they have not been able to raise 
sufficient revenue to deliver on their functions.
179
 Such failure can be attributed to the fact 
                                                 
177
 This also applies to most urban local authorities. 
178
 See Chakaipa 2010: 63, Coutinho 2010: 80. The contribution of the land development levies is now limited, 
given that some components of the levy have been recentralised. People who own land, particularly resettled 
farmers, are now required to pay land levies to the Ministry of Lands. 
179
 Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 19, Coutinho 2010: 85. 
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that the revenue-raising powers of local authorities are not wide enough to mobilise sufficient 
revenue.
180
 It was also observed that the power of the national government to approve tax 
rates has also undermined the local resource-raising effort. As highlighted above, the 2013 
Constitution requires each local authority to have a „sound financial base‟ so as to ensure that 
it is in a position to deliver on its mandate and development obligations.
181
 To establish that 
„sound financial base‟ the chapter recommends that the national government should 
decentralise more taxing powers.
182
 Granting local authorities access to a variety of revenue 
streams will enable them to finance their expenditure obligations. Furthermore, local 
authorities should have the authority to determine tax rates, user-charges and fees so that they 
have the discretion to adjust them in response to economic and social developments.
183
 The 
supervisory powers which allow the Minister to prevent local authorities from recovering 
debts should be abolished. It was observed that such powers have been used to the detriment 
of the local resource-raising effort. Revenue raised from the sources discussed in this section 
can be complemented by borrowing, especially to finance capital development projects, as 
discussed below. 
3.2 Borrowing powers 
There is a growing demand for new and upgraded public infrastructure in Zimbabwe, 
especially in urban areas due to the combined effect of urbanisation and depleted 
infrastructure. Traditional sources of funding public infrastructure at local level, funds from 
the national government and donors, have failed to meet the ever-expanding demand for 
infrastructural investment.
184
 As a result, the question of how local authorities can gain access 
to an expanded pool of financial resources to finance infrastructure development has gained 
more prominence.
185
 Borrowing has emerged as one of the alternatives to the financing of 
capital projects. As argued in paragraph 6.2.1.2 of Chapter Two, subnational governments 
which have the capacity to repay loans should be allowed to borrow money to finance capital 
                                                 
180
 See Chikulo 2010: 150. The ability of local authorities to collect and administer revenue has also been 
adversely affected by the lack of capacity, especially in rural local authorities. A significant number of rural 
local authorities do not have the skilled personnel and administrative machinery to collect service charges, taxes, 
tariffs and levies. See Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 240, Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 20. 
181
 S 264(2)(f) Constitution. 
182
 See Sims 2013: 24, Coutinho 2010: 85, Muchadenyika 2014: 138. 
183
 See Sims 2013: 24, Coutinho 2010: 85, Muchadenyika 2014: 138. 
184
 Phelps 1997: ix. 
185
 See Phelps 1997: ix. 
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projects.
186
 The advantage of financing capital projects from loans is that capital assets are 
long-lived and therefore ought to be financed by bonds whose maturity approximately 
matches the asset life.
187
 Allowing larger subnational governments to borrow money may 
also free up grant monies for use in subsidising the budgets of poorer subnational 
governments. However, it was also stressed that borrowing at subnational level must be 
regulated so as to minimise unintended effects on macro-economic stability which may be 
caused by uncontrolled borrowing.
188
 This section analyses the mobilisation of resources 
through borrowing at the local level. Attention is given to the constitutional and statutory 
frameworks for borrowing as well as the practice of borrowing money by local authorities. 
3.2.1 Constitutional and statutory framework 
Borrowing by the government at all levels is regulated by the Constitution. The Constitution 
directs Parliament to enact a law setting the limits on state borrowing, public debt and state 
guarantees.
189
 It states that limits set by Parliament on borrowing and public debt may not be 
exceeded without the authority of the National Assembly.
190
 Parliament is directed to enact a 
law prescribing „terms and conditions under which the Government may guarantee loans‟.191 
The Constitution further requires the Minister responsible for finance to report to Parliament 
on the performance of loans raised and guaranteed by the „State‟ at least twice a year.192 As 
contended in paragraph 5.3 of Chapter Two, the guaranteeing of subnational loans by the 
national government could have negative effects on macro-economic stability in cases where 
subnational governments fail to repay loans. Instead, it was contended that the national 
government should implement a hard budget constraint and ensure disciplined financial 
management at subnational level.
193
 Besides the Constitution, borrowing by local authorities 
is regulated by the UCA and RDCA. These Acts make provision for two forms of borrowing, 
namely long-term and short-term borrowing. 
                                                 
186
 Larger local governments, such as the City of Harare and Bulawayo, require capital investment to adequately 
meet demands for water, power, sanitation, roads and other infrastructure. See Phelps 1997: ix. 
187
 Bahl 1999: 14. 
188
 McCarten 2003 cited in Rodrígues-Pose & Gill 2005: 5.  
189
 S 300(1) Constitution.  
190
 See s 300(2) Constitution. 
191
 S 300(2) Constitution. 
192
 S 300(1(c) Constitution. 
193
 See Eaton & Schroeder 2010: 182; Bahl 1999: 5, 27; Phelps 1997: xi.  
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3.2.2 Long-term borrowing 
Local authorities may borrow money on a long-term basis to finance the acquisition or 
construction of permanent works, acquisition of immovable property, making of advances 
permitted by legislation and payment of compensation.
194
 Further, they may borrow money to 
liquidate the principal monies owing on account of any previous loan; provide relief of 
„general distress occasioned by some calamity‟ within the jurisdiction of the local authority; 
or to acquire plants, equipment and vehicles, among other related assets.
195
 The sources and 
procedure of long-term borrowing are analysed below. 
3.2.2.1 Sources 
A local authority may borrow money from the national government, a pension fund,
196
 a 
municipal provident fund, municipal medical aid fund, or another local authority.
197
 They 
may raise money by issuing stock, bonds, debentures or bills or from any other sources.
198
 
Cities and municipalities may source funds by issuing municipal bonds in the „open market‟ 
although very few have done so since independence.
199
 Local authorities may raise funds 
from building societies specifically to finance housing-related infrastructure and community 
facilities, under the Building Societies Act.
200
 
3.2.2.2 Procedure 
When borrowing money, local authorities are required to follow a certain procedure, which is 
depicted in figure 19 below. 
                                                 
194
 S 290(1) UCA. 
195
 S 290(1) UCA. 
196
 For example, the Local Authorities Pension Fund (LAPF) serves as the pension fund of a significant number 
of local authorities. The LAPF makes direct loans to local authorities and also buys the bonds of local 
authorities. 
197
 S 290(5)(a) UCA. 
198
 S 290(5)(b) UCA. 
199
 Phelps 1997: 14. 
200
 Phelps 1997: 15. This source has so far been under-utilised by local authorities. 
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Figure 19: Borrowing procedure 
 
As shown by the diagram above, a local authority may not borrow money unless it has passed 
a resolution supported by a majority of the total membership of the council and the mayor or 
chairperson has not exercised a casting vote.
201
 After a resolution has been passed, the local 
authority concerned is required to give notice stating the intended purposes for which monies 
are to be borrowed and the amount to be borrowed.
202
 In addition, the local authority must 
invite objections (comments) to the proposed borrowing and ensure that the copies of the 
borrowing proposal are available at its offices.
203
 After considering any objections made and 
passing a resolution, a council may then apply to the Minister for the authority to borrow 
money. When applying for borrowing powers, a local authority is required to attach a copy of 
the objections made and its response to the objections.
204
 As discussed below, the Minister 
may approve or disapprove the application for borrowing powers. 
                                                 
201
 S 291(2)(a) UCA. 
202
 S 290(3)(a)(i) UCA. 
203
 S290(3)(a)(b) UCA. In particular, the subnational government should ensure that information relating to the 
borrowing proposal, as requested by the ratepayers association and citizens, is made available. A period of 30 
days should be given to the citizens for any objections they may wish to make. 
204
 S 290(3)(c)(d) UCA. 
Council passing a 
resolution to borrow 
money 
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to the proposed 
borrowing 
Consideration of any 
objections by the 
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Minister for borrowing 
powers 
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borrowing application 
by the Minister(s) 
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of the borrowing 
application by the 
Minister(s) 
Borrowing of money (if 
approved) 
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3.2.2.3 Approval of borrowing powers 
Local authorities may not borrow money on a long-term basis unless the Minister has granted 
authority to borrow money.
205
 If a local authority seeks to raise money by issuing stock, 
bonds, debentures or bills or from any other sources, it has to seek not only the approval of 
the Minister but also of the Minister responsible for finance.
206
 In such a case, the Minister of 
Finance exercises the final decision-making powers relating to the granting of borrowing 
powers. The Minister(s) may approve the project in whole or in part and grant the local 
authority the authority to borrow money applied for.
207
 The Minister may also grant authority 
to borrow money applied for, either in whole or in part, and may impose conditions including 
limiting the period of validity of borrowing authority.
208
 An application for borrowing powers 
is evaluated on set criteria. Some of the key elements of the criteria include: whether a 
council passed a resolution to borrow; if local authority advertised the intention to borrow; if 
comments made by the public on the proposed borrowing were considered by the council; 
and if the local authority has audited financial statements.
209
 Other debt obligations and the 
financial viability of the local authority are also considered.
210
 It is submitted that the criteria 
provides a fair assessment of the status of the local authorities and its ability to repay the 
loan. 
3.3.3 Short-term borrowing 
Local authorities may borrow money on a short-term basis to finance recurrent expenditure 
such as salaries. Short-term borrowing is undertaken by means of bank overdraft or short-
term loans, or both, for the purpose of temporary financial accommodation.
211
 Money 
borrowed by means of a bank overdraft or short-term loans may not exceed the aggregate of 
the income of the local authority in the preceding financial year from rates unless the 
                                                 
205
 290(2)(c) UCA. 
206
 S 290(5)(b) UCA. 
207
 S 290(4) UCA. 
208
 S 290(4) UCA. 
209
 Ministry of Local Government „Evaluation criteria for borrowing‟. 
210
 Ministry of Local Government „Evaluation criteria for borrowing‟. Other elements are whether: key 
administrative positions (town clerk and treasurer) are filled; there is a debt recovery programme in place; the 
project for which the loan is required appears in the council budget and in the Council Development Plan; the 
local authority has capacity to implement the project for which the funds are being borrowed; the application for 
borrowing powers is accompanied by a detailed project proposal; the local authority operates a separate 
Development Account into which the funds will be deposited; and the status of the council in relation to its 
debtors, creditors and employment costs. 
211
 S 291 UCA. Overdraft accounts or lines of credit are mostly accessed from commercial banks on corporate 
interest rates applicable to various bank accounts, usually of 30-90 days. See Phelps 1997: 16. 
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approval of the Minister for the borrowing of the amount in excess of that figure has been 
granted.
212
 Local authorities are not authorised to undertake short-term borrowing for the 
purposes of financing capital expenditure unless the Minister has authorised such borrowing 
by granting borrowing powers.
213
 The ability of local authorities to undertake short-term 
borrowing is usually dependent on the credit worthiness of a local authority and the security 
collateral a local authority can offer.
214
 Short-term borrowing to bridge finance gaps through 
bank overdrafts has generally been available to most local authorities.
215
 Coutinho claims that 
some local authorities have undertaken short-term borrowing without seeking the necessary 
approval from the national government. In such cases, it is submitted that legislation should 
provide for stronger penalties, including dismissal of concerned officials given that 
borrowing has significant implications on the financial positions of a local authority and 
therefore its ability to deliver services. 
3.3.4 The spending of borrowed funds 
After securing the borrowing authority
216
 and subsequent loan, local authorities are required 
to spend borrowed funds solely on the project for which the funds were borrowed. If such 
borrowed funds are not immediately required for that project, the local authority concerned is 
allowed to invest the money.
217
 In cases of illegal borrowing,
218
 all councillors who were 
present when the resolution to borrow money was passed and who did not record their dissent 
or councillors who purported to authorise the borrowing, are liable to repay the borrowed 
money with interest.
219
 This provision is essential to discourage unauthorised borrowing by 
local authorities. 
                                                 
212
 S 291(i) UCA. 
213
 S 219 UCA. 
214
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 197. 
215
 See Coutinho 2010: 82. 
216
 S 290(8) of the UCA empowers the Minister to cancel borrowing authority if the local authority concerned 
fails to utilise the borrowing powers. The Minister is required to give 12 months‟ notice of his intention to 
cancel the borrowing powers. 
217
 S 290(6)(a) UCA. See also s 302 UCA. If the borrowed money is not expended in full on the project for 
which it was borrowed, local authorities are required „to apply the unexpended option to the reduction of the 
original loan or advance; or any other purpose for which the council has borrowing power; or any other purpose 
approved by the Minister‟. See s 290(6)(b) UCA. 
218
 Illegal borrowing occurs when a local authority does not follow the borrowing procedure discussed above 
when borrowing money. 
219
 S 294 UCA. The exception is a councillor who can prove that he/she did not know of the contravention or 
who can prove that his/her lack of knowledge was not the result of a failure on his part to exercise reasonable 
care in the matter.  
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3.3.5 Borrowing in practice 
3.3.5.1 Loans from the national government 
From independence to around 2000, both urban and rural local authorities relied more on the 
national government than the market for loans to finance capital projects. The national 
government, through the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP), allowed local 
authorities to access concessionary interest-bearing loans.
220
 Funds available under the PSIP 
however have drastically decreased since 2003 due to the economic and political meltdown in 
Zimbabwe.
221
 There is a lack of predictability and transparency in the determination and 
allocation of funds to local authorities under the PSIP.
222
 This has also brought into question 
the equitable allocation of these funds to local authorities. Table 8 below shows funds which 
were allocated to some local authorities by the third quarter budget performance period 
ending 30 September 2011. As shown in the table, some high category local authorities (cities 
and municipalities), Chitungwiza and Masvingo, which have higher populations, received 
US$ 650 000 and US $ 300 000, respectively; whereas Ruwa (a local board), with less than a 
quarter of the population of Chitungwiza, received US$ 2 000 000. The basis upon which 
benefitting local authorities were identified is not clear, neither is the actual allocation to each 
individual local authority.
223
 
Table 8: PSIP allocations by the end of the third-quarter budget performance (period ending 30 
September 2011) 
Local Authority Amount (US $) 
Mutoko Rural District Council 560 000 
Chiredzi Town Council 150 000 
Chitungwiza Municipal Council 650 000 
Chegutu Municipal Council 550 000 
Ruwa Local Board 2000 000 
City of Harare 2000 000 
Gokwe Town council 375 000 
Tongogara Rural District Council 245 000 
                                                 
220
 See Coutinho 2010: 81. 
221
 See Mushamba 2010: 111. 
222
 See Coutinho 2010: 81, 85; Mushamba 2010: 111. 
223
 See Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 2011: 9. 
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Chinhoyi Municipal Council 1500 000 
Gwanda Rural District Council 720 000 
Chipinge Rural District Council 580 000 
City of Bulawayo 2000 000 
City of Masvingo 300 000 
Murehwa Rural District Council 450 000 
Mutasa Rural District Council 200 000 
Runde Rural District Council 280 000 
Chivi Rural District Council 450 000 
City of Gweru 1000 000 
City of Mutare 1000 000 
Redcliff Town Council 550 000 
Rusape Town Council 600 000 
Total 16 160 000 
Source: Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 2011: 
7.224 
The Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and Urban Development noted with 
concern the absence of transparency and equitability in the PSIP allocations.
225
 The 
committee recommended that there is a need for a fair allocation and distribution of funds to 
local authorities.
226
 In particular, the committee highlighted that, among other factors, 
demographic consideration should inform the allocation of these funds to local authorities.
227
 
Between 2000 and 2005, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe availed itself of the Productive 
Sector Finance (PSF). Like the PSIP, the PSF allowed local authorities to access loans from 
the national government at friendly rates.
228
 To qualify for the funds under the PSF, local 
authorities had to meet stringent conditions including up-to-date budgets, appropriate 
governance policy and management structures.
229
 The funds made available under this 
facility were largely insufficient to cover the large number of local authorities in need of such 
funds. A number of local authorities have found it difficult to settle loans borrowed from the 
                                                 
224
 Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 2011: 7.  
225
 Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 2011: 9. 
226
 Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 2011: 9. 
227
 Portfolio Committee on Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 2011: 9. 
228
 Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 20, Coutinho 2010: 81. 
229
 Zimbabwe Institute 2005: 20. 
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national government.
230
 The primary reason for this is the dwindling subnational resources 
which has made it difficult for local authorities to service loans while delivering on their day-
to-day service delivery mandate. As of 2000, most local authorities have accrued huge debts 
to the national government.
231
 
3.3.5.2 Loans from the financial market 
Since independence in 1980, no rural local authority has raised funds by issuing securities 
into the capital market because of the national government policy which restricts them from 
doing so. Up to 1997, the cities of Harare and Bulawayo were the only local authorities which 
raised funds by issuing securities (bonds) into the capital market. For example, the City of 
Harare issued municipal bonds from the capital markets amounting to Z$481.5 million as of 
30 June 1997.
232
 Unlike loans sourced from the national government, local authorities seem 
to be more willing to service loans acquired from the financial market.
233
 There seems to be 
more of a culture of compliance with the terms and conditions of loans secured from the 
financial market than with the terms and conditions of loans secured from the national 
government. This could be attributed to the advantage which the private sector tends to have 
over the national government in monitoring and enforcing conditions of loans. Between 2000 
and 2008, urban local authorities were not able to borrow funds from the market. The main 
reason behind the inability was that most local authorities were not creditworthy due to 
diminished revenue mobilisation capacity.
234
 Further, Zimbabwe was considered to be an 
unfavourable destination to lend money due to the highly unstable political and economic 
environment. 
3.3.5.3 Loans from the international monetary institutions and other countries 
Few local authorities have managed to access funds from international monetary institutions, 
which usually come through the national government.
235
 Monetary institutions such as the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank have financed a number of infrastructural-
                                                 
230
 See Coutinho 2010: 81. 
231
 See Pasipanodya et al 2000: 131. 
232
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 128. 
233
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 131. 
234
 Ndlovu et al 2006: 9. Creditworthy subnational governments mean those subnational governments that have 
in place sound financial management systems as well as sustainable and predictable sources of revenue. Such 
subnational governments have the capability to repay borrowed loans.  
235
 See Coutinho 2010: 81. 
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related projects especially in the period before the economic meltdown in 2000. For example, 
the World Bank supported the Urban I project under Loan No. 2445-zim, which was 
implemented between 1984 and 1989.
236
 Under this loan facility, the cities of Harare and 
Mutare and the town councils of Marondera and Masvingo accessed a total of US$95 million. 
The money was used to service about 18 185 residential plots in these local authorities.
237
 In 
2013, the City of Harare secured a loan amounting to US$ 144 000 000 from the Exim Bank 
of China for the purposes of rehabilitating its water and sewerage treatment plants.
238
 As 
discussed below, local authorities have faced various obstacles in trying to access money on 
the financial market. 
3.3.6 Obstacles to accessing money on the financial market 
Intervention by the national government into subnational affairs, while necessary, may 
undermine the ability of local governments to access funds from the financial market. In this 
section the possible implications of the powers of the national government to approve tariffs, 
reverse (or suspend, rescind) decisions of local authorities and to abolish local authorities are 
examined. 
3.6.6.1 Approval of tariffs 
As discussed above, local authorities may not increase user-charges, rents and rates without 
the approval of the Minister. This requirement inserts uncertainty into the revenue-raising 
process at local level.
239
 It increases the real risk of a municipal investment by the private 
sector.
240
 As a result, the private sector is likely to be reluctant to lend funds to local 
authorities. As argued above, the „approval requirement‟ has to be removed if the chances of 
local authorities to access funds on the financial market are to be improved. In other words, 
broader revenue-raising powers will need to be decentralised to local authorities so that tariffs 
are determined that are in line with market forces.
241
 
                                                 
236
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 79. See Coutinho 2010: 81. 
237
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 79. 
238
 City of Harare „2014 Budget Speech and Proposals‟ pg 8. 
239
 Phelps 1997: 26. See Coutinho 2010: 82. 
240
 Phelps 1997: 26, Coutinho 2010: 82. 
241
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 85, Phelps 1997: 26. 
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3.6.6.2 Abolition of local authorities and reversal or suspension of resolutions 
The ability of local authorities to borrow money is highly dependent on their 
creditworthiness. The creditworthiness of local authorities is adversely affected by provisions 
of the UCA and RDCA that give the President power to abolish or alter the boundaries of a 
local authority at any time.
242
 Moreover, section 314 of the UCA authorises the Minister to 
reverse, suspend or rescind resolutions and decisions of the council. It is submitted that these 
powers of the national government create uncertainty in terms of the sustainability of a local 
authority and the security of the monies that will have been borrowed.
243
 For instance, 
decisions taken by local authority to secure a loan can be rescinded by the Minister in terms 
of the powers bestowed on him/her. Hence, the private sector is likely to be reluctant to lend 
money to local authorities under the current regulatory regime.
244
 It is submitted that local 
authorities require greater autonomy which will allow them to make the financial 
commitments that investors and other private partners require when lending funds.
245
 As for 
the abolition of local authorities, it is suggested that legislation should provide for 
mechanisms to allow a local authority to justify its existence such as a requirement for 
consultation. 
3.6.6.3 Non-payment of services 
The ability of local authorities to access funds on the financial market may be affected the 
„culture of non-payment‟ of services. As discussed above, a significant number of citizens 
have boycotted the payment of user-charges due to their inability to pay, while others have 
cited poor service delivery. As a result, most local authorities are owed large sums of money 
by service consumers. Rates boycotts and non-payment of services in general, have been 
found to seriously undermine the creditworthiness of local authorities.
246
 As observed above, 
efforts by local authorities to recover such debts are met with strong resistance from the 
national government, either by directing local authorities to write off debts or not to attach 
properties of defaulters. Such interventions increase the risk to lenders who may want to lend 
                                                 
242
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 197. See s 8 RDCA and s 4 UCA. 
243
 Pasipanodya et al 2000: 197. 
244
 See Coutinho 2010: 82. 
245
 Phelps 1997: 26. 
246
 Phelps 1997: 35. 
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money to local authorities.
247
 Consequently, this reduces the number of lenders who are 
willing to lend money to local authorities. 
This section discussed the mobilisation of revenue by local authorities through borrowing. It 
was observed that although local authorities may borrow money there are a number of 
obstacles which have made them financially „unattractive‟ to lenders. These include approval 
of tariffs by the national government, the power of the national government to abolish a local 
government unit at any time, the power of the national government to reverse or suspend 
decisions of local authorities and non-payment of user-charges. While recognising the 
importance of the supervisory role of the national government over the use of borrowing 
powers, it is submitted that local authorities should be given the freedom to borrow money 
from the national and international capital market within the confines of national 
legislation.
248
 National regulation is particularly important given the volatile economic 
environment being experienced in Zimbabwe since 2000.
249
 It was also argued that even 
though the Constitution allows the national government to guarantee subnational loans, the 
national government is discouraged from doing so as that could have negative repercussions 
on macro-economic stability when subnational governments fails to repay borrowed funds.
250
 
Having discussed the resource-raising powers of local authorities, the following section will 
examine local expenditure. 
3.3 Local expenditure 
The decentralisation of resource-raising powers by itself is unlikely to be enough for 
subnational governments to assist in the realisation of development, democracy and 
sustainable peace. It was contended in paragraph 6.2.4 of Chapter Two that, in addition to 
resource-raising powers, subnational governments should be given the power to spend 
revenue.
251
 However, it was argued that the national government should retain the power to 
set expenditure frameworks to influence local spending to achieve national goals such as 
equity. It was further argued that citizens should be actively involved in the determination of 
                                                 
247
 Phelps 1997: 35. See Coutinho 2010: 82. 
248
 See Article 9(8) European Charter of Local Self-Government. See also Combined Harare Residents 
Association 2014: 76. 
249
 See UN-Habitat 2007: 10. 
250
 See para 5.3 of Chapter Two. 
251
 Marumahoko & Fessha 2011: 51. 
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expenditure priorities at subnational level, for example, in the formulation of budgets.
252
 
Local expenditure will be examined in this section with specific focus on local budgets, 
budget autonomy, local expenditure in practice and the challenge of „unfunded mandates‟. 
3.3.1 The budget 
The budget is the main instrument through which local authorities deliver on their 
responsibilities. It is a financial plan which shows „how government resources will be 
generated and used over the fiscal period‟. 253 At local level, the budget is a key instrument 
for promoting both local and national objectives, strategies and programs.
254
 Given the 
importance of the budget in the realisation of local and national goals, the budget-making 
process will be examined in detail in this section. 
3.1.1.1 Formulation of budgets 
Before the end of each financial year,
255
 the finance committee of an urban local authority is 
required to formulate estimates of the income and expenditure on revenue and capital 
accounts for the next financial year.
256
 In rural local authorities, every committee of the 
council prepares detailed estimates of income and expenditure on revenue and capital 
accounts for its functional area.
257
 It is then required to submit the estimates to the finance 
committee which in turn presents the estimates to the council for approval.
258
 As discussed in 
detail below, it is submitted that it may be necessary for legislation to make provision for 
uniform budget formulation procedures in both rural and urban local authorities to allow 
easier supervision of local authorities, among other advantages. Local authorities may 
formulate supplementary budgets to cater for unforeseen expenditure and economic 
developments.
259
 A supplementary budget is drawn up and presented in the same manner as a 
normal budget. 
                                                 
252
 See Zhou & Chilunjika 2013: 234. 
253
 Kriel & Monadjem 2011: 23-27. 
254
 See Kriel & Monadjem 2011: 23-7. 
255
 The financial year of local authorities coincides with that of the national government, ending 31 December in 
any year. See s 2 Public Finance Management Act. 
256
 S 288(1) UCA. 
257
 S 121 RDCA. 
258
 S 121 RDCA. 
259
 S 288(5) UCA. 
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3.1.1.2 Content and arrangement of items in a budget 
The form of the budget goes beyond the functional layout of the document to the content.
260
 
Thus, it is submitted that there may be a need for the national government to prescribe the 
minimum content of the budget. This has the advantage of providing a unified approach 
which makes it easier to monitor the budgets of local authorities.
261
 The Ministry of Local 
Government sends out yearly budget minute circulars to local authorities prescribing the time 
frames, information and arrangement of matters in budget estimates. For example, the Local 
Government Circular Number 3 of 2012 requires local authorities when preparing budgets to 
follow the standardised format prescribed in the Standardised Accounting and Budgeting 
Systems, Procedures and Policies manual.
262
 The arrangement of terms in the budget as 
presented in the circular is provided in the table below. 
Table 9: Standard arrangement of terms in the budget (2013 budgets) 
 Vision and mission statement 
 Vital statistics263 
 Finance Chairperson‟s speech 
 Review of current budget, including a performance statement 
 Macroeconomic environment 
 Local government climate 
 Revenue budget 
 Capital budget 
 Consolidated income and expenditure statement 
 Classified income and expenditure statement 
 Individual activity accounts (service objectives and standards, summarised 
income and expenditure statement) 
 Proposed capital budget 
 Certificate of consultation 
 Mayor or Chairperson‟s signature 
Source: Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, Local government 
Circular Number 3 of 2012. 
                                                 
260
 Kriel & Monadjem 2011: 28. See also Bahl 1998: 8. 
261
 Kriel & Monadjem 2011: 28. Coherence promotes greater accountability and transparency in respect of the 
budgets as the opportunity for comparison between local authorities becomes possible. 
262
 Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, Local government Circular Number 3 of 
2012. 
263
 For example: area of authority (hectares) growth rate, population growth rate, rateable values (land and 
buildings), refuse collected growth rate (%), industrial units growth rate (%), council clinics growth rate (%) and 
water sold growth rate (%). See Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development Local 
government Circular Number 3 of 2012. 
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The RDCA requires rural local authorities to attach to the budget information relating to the 
number of their employees and related remuneration costs.
264
 While this requirement applies 
to rural local authorities, the UCA gives urban local authorities the discretion to attach such 
information to the budget.
265
 However, such discretion has been taken away by the Local 
Government Circular Number 3 of 2012 which makes it mandatory for all local authorities to 
show employment costs supported by a schedule of salaries. It is submitted that the 
submission of such information is necessary to enable the national government to carry out its 
supervisory role. It is based on this information that national government, for example, 
assesses whether it is necessary to implement or adjust expenditure frameworks to influence 
local spending. 
3.1.1.3 The budget cycle 
The UCA and RDCA do not regulate in detail the budget-making process. As mentioned 
above, the Ministry of Local Government issues yearly budget circulars determining time 
frames for budget preparation. This has undermined certainty in the budget-making time 
frames. In practice (as shown in Figure 20 below), the budget cycle usually begins in August 
of each year with various sections making budget proposals to the Head of Department.
266
 
Toward the end of August, the local authority holds consultative meetings with various 
stakeholders including residents and ratepayers to get their input. The meeting is followed by 
the formulation of a draft budget proposal. In the third week of October, the local authority 
advertises the draft budget proposal and invites objections to the proposal. The local authority 
then considers any objections to the budget proposal in the last week of October. The first 
draft budget is formulated in the first week of November with the final draft adopted by the 
council in the third week of the same month. A council is required to pass a resolution 
approving the proposed budget before it is forwarded for the signature of the mayor or 
chairperson, as the case may be.
267
 After the mayor or chairperson has signed the budget, the 
council must make copies of the budget available for public inspection.
268
 Within three 
months after the budget has been signed by the mayor or chairperson, three copies of the 
                                                 
264
 See 121(4) RDCA. The information relates to: (a) the total number of employees and the aggregate of the 
salaries and wages payable to them; (b) the total number of employees in each department and the aggregate of 
the salaries payable to them; (c) information listed in (a) and (b), above, in respect of the year prior to that to 
which the estimates relate; and (d) the posts held by employees in each department. See also s 288(3) UCA. 
265
 S 288(3) UCA. 
266
 For more on the role of heads of department, see section 4.1.3 of Chapter Five. 
267
 S 288(2) UCA. 
268
 S 288(2) UCA 
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budget must be forwarded to the Minister for his or her information and approval of tariffs 
and supplementary charges in high density areas.
269
 The Local Government Circular Number 
3 of 2012 requires local authorities to submit their budgets to the district administrator (DA) 
by 10 November, who in turn forwards it to the Minister by 30 November. In practice, some 
local authorities have failed to follow the budget time frames, with some submitting budgets 
to the Minister in December or even the following year. It is submitted that to create certainty 
the budget time frames should be legally recognised. In addition, legislation should provide 
for intergovernmental oversight and corrective mechanisms in cases where a local authority 
fails to submit a budget on time. The Minister should have the power to intervene if a local 
authority fails to approve the budget. Such powers can include the power to adopt a 
temporary budget to provide for the continued functioning of the local authority.
270
 In serious 
cases, the Minister can dissolve the council and appoint a caretaker until a new council is 
elected.
271
 In both cases, the Minister should seek the approval of Parliament and the 
provincial (or metropolitan) council of the province for intergovernmental checks and 
balances. 
                                                 
269
 See S 288(2)(b) UCA. As discussed below, a local authority may only implement the budget after it has been 
approved by the Minister. 
270
 See s 139(4)(b) Constitution of South Africa. 
271
 See s 139(4)(a) Constitution of South Africa. 
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Figure 20: The budget cycle 
 
Source: Zimbabwe Women‟s Resource Centre and Network (2010) 
3.1.1.4 Role of citizens in the budget process 
As highlighted above, legislation does not prescribe the process to be followed when crafting 
the budget. It merely assigns responsibilities to the finance committee and the council. This 
means that there is no legal requirement for citizen participation in the budget-making 
process. While citizens and other stakeholders are allowed to inspect and make comments on 
the proposed budget, legislation does not oblige the council to consult the citizens and 
consider their views.
272
 It is submitted the absence of such a legal obligation may undermine 
local democracy since budget-making was identified in paragraph 6.1.5 of Chapter Two as 
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 Coutinho 2010: 84.  
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one of the critical governance processes which has significant implications on the lives of 
citizens.
273
 Nonetheless, the Minister usually sends circulars requiring local authorities to 
consult citizens and other interested stakeholders when making their budgets.
274
 For example, 
the Local Government Circular Number 3 of 2012 requires local authorities to consult 
various stakeholders and to explain the changes made to the tariffs and expenditure. Further, 
as shown in Table 9 above, the Circular requires each local authority to attach to its budget a 
certificate of consultation as proof that citizens were consulted in the formulation of the 
budget. It is submitted that the practice of issuing circulars prescribing such important 
governance process should be abolished. Instead, legislation should require every council to 
provide mechanisms for the participation of citizens and other stakeholders in the budget-
making process, especially determination of priorities.
275
 
3.1.1.5 Unlawful expenditure 
The „object of a … budget is to provide forward planning for expenditure which, after a 
deliberative process of budget approval, binds the [local authority] in its expenditure 
decisions‟.276 The „binding nature of the budget entails that expenditure not incurred in terms 
of the budget is regarded as [unlawful] expenditure‟.277 Local authorities are not authorised to 
spend any money unless such expenditure has been covered by their budget or supplementary 
budget.
278
 The exception is expenditure arising due to unforeseen events which cannot be 
postponed without detriment to the interests of the local authority.
279
 In such cases, the mayor 
or chairperson may authorise such expenditure.
280
 Town clerks or chief executive officers, as 
accounting authorities, have a responsibility to ensure that expenditure of the local authority 
is in accordance with the approved budget.
281
 While legislation requires local authorities to 
spend only in terms of their budgets it however does not provide for what happens if a local 
                                                 
273
 See the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 7. 
274
 Coutinho 2010: 84.  
275
 The Local Authorities Draft Bill has not made provision for such consultation. It is recommended that the 
Bill should be reformed to make it mandatory for the council to involve the citizens and other stakeholders in 
the formulation of the budget. 
276
 Steytler & De Visser 2009: 14-5. 
277
 Steytler & De Visser 2009: 14-6. Unlawful expenditure includes overspending on the total vote of the 
budget, overspending on a vote, expenditure unrelated to a vote and expenditure for a purpose other than an 
approved purpose. See s 1(1) Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, South Africa. 
278
 S 288(7) UCA. 
279
 S 288(8) UCA. 
280
 S 288(8) UCA. Such expenditure has to be reported at the next meeting of the finance committee. 
281
 S 47(4) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
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authority incurs unlawful expenditure.
282
 Thus, there are no sanctions in cases involving 
unlawful expenditure, thus encouraging officials to incur such expenditure. 
It is submitted that legislation should provide for the personal liability of both councillors and 
administrative officials in cases involving deliberate and negligent incurring of unlawful 
expenditure.
283
 Further, a local authority should recover such expenditure from the councillor 
or administrative official concerned.
284
 Apart from recovering such expenditure the council 
should be allowed to institute disciplinary criminal proceedings against the councillor or 
administrative official for breaching legislative prescriptions.
285
 It is further suggested that in 
cases of unlawful expenditure, the town clerk (or equivalent) should notify the mayor, 
Minister and Auditor-General (AG) of the occurrence of such expenditure and measures 
which the council is taking to recover or rectify the unlawful expenditure.
286
 Notification of 
the Minister and the AG is necessary to provide intergovernmental oversight. 
3.3.2 Budget autonomy 
It was contended in paragraph 6.2.4 of Chapter Two that the degree to which local 
governments are able to determine expenditure programmes is important for development 
and, in particular, for adjusting the mixture of services to closely match local preferences. 
Budget autonomy suggests that senior governments do not have the power to determine 
expenditure programmes of local governments or have the power to approve their budgets.
287
 
The achievement of national and local goals nevertheless may require senior governments to 
set expenditure frameworks at the local level.
288
 National goals, such as equity, require the 
involvement of the national government in setting expenditure parameters at subnational 
level. As will be observed below, in Zimbabwe the national government has firm control over 
spending decisions at local level by virtue of its powers to approve budgets and set 
expenditure frameworks.
289
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3.3.2.1 Approval of budgets 
Section 47 of the Public Finance Management Act requires local authorities to submit their 
budgets and annual plans to the Minister for approval at least thirty days before the beginning 
of the next financial year. These powers of the Minister are buttressed by the UCA and 
RDCA which require increments of user-charges and rates in high density areas and local 
government areas to be approved by the Minister.
290
 This essentially means that the Minister 
has to approve the entire budget since user-charges in high density areas are dependent on 
those charged in other areas and on overall expenditure.
291
 In practice, the Minister has been 
reluctant to approve the budgets of local authorities proposing increments of rates, fees and 
charges in cases where they do not adhere to the prescribed expenditure parameters.
292
 It is 
submitted that the approval of budgets by the Minister goes to the „heart‟ of budget autonomy 
and thus limits the ability of local authorities to adjust the mixture of services to closely 
match local preferences.
293
 Thus, it is submitted that the power of the Minister to approve 
budgets should be abolished so that local authorities have some measure of discretion to 
spend revenue. The Minister should however retain the power to set expenditure frameworks 
to influence local spending.
294
 For example, the Minister can determine the spending 
framework between service delivery and administrative costs, as discussed below. 
3.3.2.2 Expenditure frameworks 
The Minister regularly issues circulars providing for percentages and ratios of expenditure 
items at the local level. For example, the Ministry has prescribed the percentage increases of 
tax ratio between recurrent and capital development expenditure as well as on expenditure on 
workers‟ salaries and allowances versus the total budget. The Local Government Circular 
Number 3 of 2012 requires local authorities to comply with the spending ratio of 70:30 for 
service delivery and employment cost, respectively.
295
 Most local authorities have not been 
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able to comply with this expenditure framework due to huge salary bills against limited 
financial resources being mobilised. As demonstrated by Table 10 below, the City of Harare 
is one such local authority. 
Table 10: Service delivery and employment costs ratio for the City of Harare 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Employment 
costs 
96% 73% 65% 55% 48% 
Service 
delivery 
4% 27% 35% 45% 52% 
Source: City of Harare, 2014 Budget Speech and Proposals 2014: 7. 
The table above shows that although revenue spent on service delivery relative to 
employment costs has been increasing since 2009, the city has failed to comply with the 
required 70:30 percentage ratio of service delivery and employment costs, respectively. The 
Minister has on numerous occasions withheld the approval of the budgets of certain local 
authorities, citing expenditure programmes that go beyond the prescribed spending 
frameworks.
296
 As argued above, while these expenditure parameters tend to limit the budget 
autonomy of local authorities, they are however necessary to ensure that certain expenditure 
decisions at local level are prioritised over others so to realise local and national goals. The 
realisation of equity, for example, may require the national government to set spending 
frameworks for the supply of public services to poor and rich jurisdictions within a local 
authority. 
3.3.3 Expenditure of revenue in practice 
The expenditure of revenue at local level tends to mirror that of the national government. At 
national level, employment costs consume a large part of the budget. For example, for the 
period up to November 2013, employment costs amounted to US$2.429 billion, accounting 
for 68.9% of total expenditure.
297
 Similarly at the local level, employment costs consume the 
majority of the budget followed by general operating expenditure,
298
 repairs and maintenance 
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and, if resources are available, capital investment.
299
 In all local authorities, employment 
costs usually consume between 28-60 per cent of the budget.
300
 Yet, as discussed above, 
national government policy on expenditure of revenue is that revenue should be spent on a 
percentage ratio of 70:30 service delivery and employment costs, respectively. If the national 
government is failing to abide by this expenditure framework due to the volatile macro-
economic environment, how is it possible for local authorities to conform with this spending 
framework? 
The proposed 2014 budget of the City of Harare indicates that salaries will consume 48 per 
cent of the US$369.3 million of the budget.
301
 General operating expenditure will amount to 
26 per cent, repairs and maintenance will consume nine per cent and administration charges 
will amount to eight per cent of the budget.
302
 As highlighted above, capital investment is 
non-existent in most local authorities given the limited resources at their disposal.
303
 High 
category local authorities are beginning to invest in capital projects as their revenue 
mobilisation is slowly improving. The City of Harare has set aside US$95.6 million for 
capital projects in its proposed 2014 budget.
304
 This amount, however, is inadequate to meet 
the required infrastructure refurbishment and development caused by years of under-
investment in public infrastructure, urbanisation and the growing population. As argued in 
paragraph 3.1 above, unless the national government decentralises more resource-raising 
powers to local authorities or alternatively improves the amounts and predictability of 
intergovernmental grants to local authorities, the current expenditure patterns at local level 
are likely to continue. 
3.3.4 ‘Unfunded mandates’ 
An „unfunded mandate‟ is defined as an expenditure assignment that is not funded.305 It 
occurs where a „government agency has the responsibility of conducting a function but lacks 
suitable revenue raising capacity or does not receive a grant necessary for the performance of 
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the function‟.306 The funding of responsibilities which are shared between the national and 
local governments has been at the centre of debates on revenue and expenditure assignment 
in Zimbabwe.
307
 Functions which are shared between these two tiers of government include 
health, education, and water.
308
 This section will use the example of health function to 
examine the challenge of „unfunded mandates‟. Attention is also given to funding problems 
associated with the implementation of national directives by local authorities. 
3.3.4.1 Health function 
Traditionally the health sector was funded jointly by local authorities and the national 
government.
309
 The national government is responsible for the running of referral hospitals 
and some medical facilities in rural areas. It also reimburses local authorities for costs, 
particularly costs associated with implementing directives of the Ministry of Health. Local 
authorities are responsible for operating clinics and, in addition, the cities of Harare and 
Bulawayo operate referral hospitals. Local authorities fund the provision of health services 
from health fees, with the rest of the costs covered by a grant from the national 
government.
310
 This funding model changed in the 1990s. The health grant, like other 
intergovernmental grants from the national government, became highly unreliable and 
insufficient to bridge the deficit in the health accounts of local authorities. The non-provision 
of health grants or the provision of intergovernmental grants not adequate to meet the 
expenditure related to the provision of health and maternal services amounts to an „unfunded 
mandate‟.311 
The financial position of local authorities with regard to the funding of the health function 
has been worsened by the fact that the national government approves health fees which are 
charged by local authorities for the provision of health and maternal services, as discussed in 
paragraph 3.1.1.2 above. The justification for the regulation of health and maternal fees is 
that full costs related to the provision of health and maternal services may not be recovered 
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without excluding the poor.
312
 It is submitted that even though this form of regulation 
promotes equity, it undermines the economic viability of health service provision. Since cost-
recovery may not be possible for the provision of health and maternal services, it is further 
submitted that the national government should provide adequate financial support through 
predictable grants. The practice of health and maternal services being subsidised from other 
local sources of finance is not sustainable.
313
 It has not only undermined the effective 
delivery of health and maternal services but also the ability of local authorities to deliver on 
other mandates.
314
 
3.3.4.2 Costs of implementing directives of the national government 
The national government regularly issues directives to local authorities which have 
implications for expenditure of revenue at the local level. As explained below, in most cases 
the directives are not accompanied by funds for their implementation by local authorities. An 
example is Operation Murambitsvina which was launched by the national government in 
2005. Under Operation Murambatsina, local authorities were directed by the national 
government to demolish all illegal structures, including houses, shops and market places, 
within their jurisdictions. Despite the fact that the implementation of this directive required 
funds, the national government did not provide any funds. Instead, local authorities were 
forced to fund the implementation of the „operation‟ even though they had not budgeted for 
it.
315
 
As a result of the demolition of illegal structures under Operation Murambatsvina, a 
significant number of people were left homeless. The national government then directed local 
authorities to provide housing to the homeless people, under Operation Garikayi. Again, local 
authorities were forced to meet the costs of the provision of housing despite having not 
budgeted for this form of capital expenditure.
316
 The implementation of national directives 
such as these has in part contributed to budget deficits at local level. This further buttresses 
the argument that local authorities in Zimbabwe have very limited expenditure autonomy. It 
is submitted that the two „operations‟ amounted to „unfunded mandates‟. 
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This section examined local expenditure and it was established that local authorities have 
limited autonomy to spend revenue. The powers of the national government to approve 
budgets present the most significant challenge to budget autonomy. It was however 
contended that the powers of the national government to set expenditure frameworks are 
necessary to influence spending decisions at the local level to realise national and local goals 
such as equity and poverty reduction. The challenge of an „unfunded mandate‟ was also 
discussed and it was submitted that this challenge can be addressed by a responsive system of 
fiscal intergovernmental relations. The following section will discuss the attributes of such a 
system. 
4. Intergovernmental grants 
Under a multilevel system of government the assignment of revenue powers to subnational 
governments is unlikely to match their expenditure obligations.
317
 It was contended in 
paragraph 6.25 of Chapter Two that such an imbalance requires a complementary system of 
fiscal intergovernmental relations which recognises the need for nationally raised revenue to 
be shared among governments at various levels. Revenue-sharing serves multiple objectives, 
mainly bridging the fiscal gap, promoting fiscal equalisation and regional development, and 
stimulating tax effort at subnational levels.
318
 To achieve these objectives, it was further 
contended that the system of fiscal intergovernmental relations should be transparent, 
flexible, predictable and equitable.
319
 If there are no equalisation measures, a multilevel 
system of government is likely to increase disparities between jurisdictions following the 
exercise of financial autonomy by subnational governments.
320
 Disparities pose a threat to the 
achievement of national and local goals, among them sustainable peace, democracy and 
development. 
This section examines the system of fiscal intergovernmental relations in Zimbabwe against 
the normative framework set in paragraph 6.2.5 of Chapter Two. Under the Lancaster House 
Constitution, subnational governments relied on the „goodwill‟ of the national government 
for any form of financial support.
321
 The difficulty with this system of financial support was 
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that there was no predictability in the allocation of intergovernmental grants.
322
 This 
adversely affected budgeting at the local level. As will be discussed below, the 2013 
Constitution has reformed this system. In the first part of this section, the chapter examines 
the constitutional framework for fiscal intergovernmental relations. This is followed by a 
discussion of equitable share, capital grants, and other allocations to provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities. The chapter then examines the criteria for sharing 
revenue before making an argument for the involvement of provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities in the determination of intergovernmental grants. 
4.1 Constitutional framework 
The question of how much detail on fiscal decentralisation should be recognised in the 
constitution has to be considered when drafting a new constitution. In paragraph 6.2.5.4 of 
Chapter Two it was stated that detailed fiscal decentralisation in the constitution may make it 
difficult for the national government to (re)adjust the fiscal system in response to economic 
and political environments.
323
 Nonetheless, it was contended that a certain measure of 
constitutional recognition of fiscal decentralisation is necessary to create predictability, 
transparency and to provide a guaranteed source of funding for subnational governments. As 
observed below, the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides a certain measure of fiscal 
decentralisation especially in relation to the sharing of revenue among the three tiers of 
government.
324
 The Constitution mandates the national government to „ensure that all 
institutions and agencies of government at every level … are provided with adequate 
resources and facilities to enable them to carry out their functions conscientiously, fairly, 
honestly and efficiently‟.325 It further requires revenue raised nationally to be shared 
equitably among the three tiers of government.
326
 The Constitution provides for the allocation 
an equitable share and other grants to provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities.
327
 This will take place through an annual act of division of revenue raised 
nationally. The nature of the equitable share and other grants is examined in the following 
section. 
                                                 
322
 Coutinho 2010: 85. 
323
 See Bahl 1994: 24. 
324
 See Machingauta et al 2014: 23, Local Governance Community Capacity Building and Development Trust 
2014: 11, Muchadenyika 2014: 138. 
325
 S 9(2) Constitution. 
326
 Section 298(1)(b)(ii) Constitution. 
327
 S 301 Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
342 
 
Chapter 7: Finance 
4.2 Equitable share  
Section 303(3) of the Constitution states that „not less than five percent‟ of national revenue 
raised in any financial year must be allocated to provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities as their share in that year‟. This provision raises a number of questions. Does 
it give provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities any entitlement? Does 
national revenue mean national government revenue? Does five per cent amount to an 
equitable share, as required by the Constitution?
328
 Is the five per cent inclusive or exclusive 
of conditional and non-conditional grants that the national government may allocate to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities? The following section aims to 
provide answers to these questions. 
4.2.1 Entitlement 
For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe, provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities are entitled to a certain portion of nationally raised revenue in each financial 
year.
329
 Such a portion may not be less than five per cent of the „whatever‟ revenue is 
generated by the national government in every financial year.
330
 However, this does not 
guarantee any individual council or local authority any specific amount or percentage but 
guarantees at least five per cent for the entire provincial and local sector.
331
 It is submitted 
that the equitable share induces certainty of funding and goes a long way in providing 
guaranteed financial resources to provinces and local authorities.
332
 It is further submitted 
that prior to the allocation of five per cent (or more) to the provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities, nationally raised revenue may not be regarded as national 
government revenue even though such funds are kept in the national fund. It is only when 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities have been given their share of five 
per cent (or more) that the remainder can be regarded as national government revenue. Thus, 
the general notion that all funds in the national „purse‟ are funds of the national government 
is inaccurate under the 2013 Constitution. 
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4.2.3 What is equitable? 
In the 2014 Budget Statement, the Minister of Finance made provision for the allocation of 
US$200 million to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities, as their share in 
2014.
333
 This is against projected national revenues for the year 2014 amounting to US$4.120 
billion.
334
 Five percent of US$4.120 equates to a total of US$206 million. Thus, the Minister 
under-allocated by US$6 million. There is no evidence to suggest that even the US$200 
million was actually distributed to subnational governments, especially given that by June 
2014 provincial and metropolitan councils had not been established. Further, there was no 
formula for sharing revenue among provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities. In 2015, a projected US$4.340 billion is going to be mobilised nationally, five per 
cent of which is US$217 million.
335
 If the projected figures are not revised, the Constitution 
requires that provincial and metropolitan councils be allocated not less than US$217 million 
in 2015. It is hoped that the national government will abide by the Constitution by giving 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities their share. 
Besides the question of whether the national government actually allocates five per cent of 
national revenues, another important question is whether five per cent is enough for ten 
provincial and metropolitan councils and 92 local authorities?
336
 Alternatively, does the five 
per cent amount to an equitable share? It is submitted that five per cent is not enough, 
especially given that provincial and metropolitan councils do not have resource-raising 
powers.
337
 Further, local authorities have a huge service delivery responsibility which 
requires significant revenue. Section 298(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution requires equitable 
sharing of nationally raised revenue among the national, provincial and local tiers of 
governments. Equitability means sharing relative to need. This implies that the sharing of 
nationally raised revenue should be informed by the responsibilities which each tier of 
government has.
338
 Five per cent serves as the minimum which can be given to provincial and 
local tiers of government but may be insufficient to amount to an equitable share of the 
„national cake‟. Therefore, the portion of nationally raised revenue which provincial and local 
tiers of government are entitled to in each year depends on the responsibilities which they 
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have but may not be less than five per cent of nationally raised revenue. It is suggested that 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities should be given more than five per 
cent in line with other countries which have recently adopted a devolved system of 
government, such as Kenya and South Africa.
339
 In Kenya, for example, counties 
(subnational governments) are entitled to not less than 15 per cent of nationally raised 
revenue but in practice they receive more than 15 per cent.
340
 In the 2014/15 financial year 
provinces and municipalities in South Africa received about 46 per cent of the national 
revenue available for sharing.
341
 Some scholars propose that a minimum of 11 per cent 
should go to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities in each year to address 
the fiscal gap.
342
 
4.2.4 Can any conditions be imposed on the provincial and local equitable share? 
As discussed below, the national government may allocate capital grants and other 
conditional grants to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. It may also 
allocate non-conditional grants. The question is whether the five per cent (or more) which 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities are entitled to is a conditional 
grant?
343
 In other words, can the national government impose conditions on how it is spent? It 
is submitted that the five per cent (or more) may not be allocated with any conditions because 
it is „share‟.344 Generally a share is allocated with few or no conditions. Attaching conditions 
to the spending of the equitable share however reduces local discretion and undermines local 
accountability. In South Africa, it was found that an equitable share is an unconditional 
grant.
345
 Kriel and Monadjem state that „a grant is unconditional if it has limited conditions 
relating to the transfer‟.346 Thus, the five per cent (or more) may be allocated only with 
limited conditions related to how it is spent. However, this does not mean that provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities may use whatever share of money they receive to 
fund extravagant expenditure. The grant should be used to fund the delivery of key public 
services and development. 
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4.3 Capital grants 
A capital grant is a form of conditional grant. A grant is conditional „if conditions are used to 
direct the spending of the grant in receiving municipalities or provinces‟.347 Conditional 
grants are an effective tool of influencing local level spending in areas considered of less 
priority by the subnational governments but which are of importance to the achievement of 
certain national goals.
348
 The Constitution recognises the importance of capital grants as tools 
for influencing spending at subnational level. Section 301(1)(a) of the Constitution directs 
Parliament to enact a law providing for the „equitable‟ allocation of capital grants between 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. The use of the term „equitable‟ 
highlights the importance which is attached to redistribution of financial resources across 
provinces and local authorities. In addition, it is submitted that the grants must be predictable 
to allow effective budgeting at subnational level. Such requirements were lacking under the 
Lancaster House Constitution, as discussed below.
349
 
Prior to the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, capital grants were transferred to various local 
authorities at the discretion of the national government. Generally, the capacity of local 
authorities to absorb conditional grants and comply with the attached conditions was an 
important variable determining future disbursement of conditional grants.
350
 The allocation of 
capital grants to local authorities was often „marked by secrecy, giving credence to claims 
that political considerations [were] at the centre of the disbursements‟.351 There was little 
transparency and predictability in such allocations.
352
 Due to limited capacity the national 
government failed to effectively monitor the spending of capital grants so as to ensure that 
allocated funds were spent in accordance with the relevant conditions of spending. The 
Portfolio Committee on Local Government found that the Ministry of Local Government was 
failing to follow up on capital grants which were disbursed to local authorities in 2011.
353
 A 
total of US$16 160 000 disbursed in grants could not be monitored effectively by the national 
government. As a result, some local authorities diverted capital grants from financing capital 
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projects to paying salaries of employees.
354
 It is submitted that the national government 
should build its own capacity to monitor the spending of capital grants to ensure that capital 
grants are spent on intended projects. 
4.4 Other allocations to provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities 
4.4.1 Constitutional recognition of allocations 
Besides the equitable share and capital grants, the Constitution recognises that the national 
government may transfer other forms of grants (whether conditional or non-conditional) to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. The Constitution directs 
Parliament to enact a law providing for any allocations to provinces and local authorities, and 
any conditions on which those allocations may be made.
355
 While recognising the importance 
of influencing subnational priorities, it submitted that a majority of these allocations should 
be unconditional grants so that provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities 
have discretion to spend such funds, thereby enabling them to respond to the needs and 
preferences of their citizens.
356
 
4.4.2 The allocation of grants before adoption of the 2013 Constitution 
Since independence, the national government has transferred both conditional and non-
conditional grants to local authorities.
357
 Unconditional grants have been transferred mostly 
to rural local authorities which usually have limited fiscal resources. Such grants can be used 
to finance any expenditure programme at the discretion of the local authorities.
358
 The 
national government has also transferred conditional grants to local authorities. The most 
notable forms of conditional grants are the health, roads, administration and education grants 
which are designed to cover budget shortfalls.
359
 In the period between 1980 and 1990, grants 
to local authorities were generally disbursed on time and were sufficient to cover expenditure 
shortfalls at local level. Since the introduction of the structural economic adjustment 
programmes in the early 1990s, grants from the national government have gradually 
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decreased due to the shrinking revenue resources available to the national government.
360
 The 
nature of the grants has also changed from non-conditional to conditional grants. 
From the late 1990s to the time of writing, grants to local authorities were unreliable, 
inconsistent and insufficient.
361
 This can be attributed to the deepening economic crisis which 
the country experienced over this period. During this period the national government 
drastically reduced the size and number of grants to local authorities. In 1998, the national 
government transferred Zim$17.5 million to 58 rural local authorities. This amount was 
reduced to Zim$6 million in 2000. In 2003, rural local authorities were allocated less than 10 
per cent of the money under the vote of the Ministry of Local Government.
362
 During this 
period, conditional health and education grants were insufficient to cover the health and 
education expenditure, respectively.
363
 As a result of the reduced amount of grants to local 
authorities, local authorities raise more than 98 per cent of their recurrent income through 
taxes and user-charges.
364
 The reduction in the amount of funds given to local authorities was 
not complemented by the decentralisation of additional resource-raising powers. After the 
formation of the Government of National Unity in 2008, grants to local authorities have 
gradually improved because of the stabilised economic and political environment. Revenue 
mobilisation potential of the national government has significantly improved, allowing the 
national government to allocate more financial resources to local authorities. With the 
adoption of the 2013 Constitution, which recognises the need for the national government to 
provide financial support to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities,
365
 it is 
hoped that the national government will allocate more financial resources to these lower 
governments to enable them to effectively deliver on their obligations. 
4.5 Criteria of sharing revenue 
It was contended in paragraph 6.2.5 of Chapter Two that intergovernmental grants can be an 
effective instrument for equalising fiscal capacities of subnational governments, especially if 
they incorporate explicit standards of equalisation.
366
 Such standards of equalisation have to 
ensure that resources are transferred from rich to poor regions so as to ensure horizontal 
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equalisation.
367
 The 2013 Constitution has recognised the need for not only vertical but 
horizontal equalisation. It directs Parliament to enact legislation providing for „equitable‟ 
allocation of capital grants and any other allocations to provincial and metropolitan. Such 
legislation must take into account: 
a) national interests, 
b) any provision that must be made in respect of the national debt and other national 
obligations, 
c) the needs of the central government, determined by objective criteria, 
d) the need to provide basic services, including educational and health facilities, water, 
roads, social amenities and electricity to marginalised areas, 
e) the fiscal capacity and efficiency of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities, 
f) developmental and other needs of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities, and 
g) economic disparities within and between provinces.
368
 
The wording of section 301 of the Constitution seems to suggest that these criteria only apply 
to the sharing of revenue at provincial and local level. As explained below, it is submitted 
that these criteria apply to both vertical and horizontal sharing of revenue. The argument is 
that the criteria provide for the consideration of factors such as national interests, national 
debt and needs of the national government, which are usually prime considerations when 
determining the vertical sharing. For example, in Kenya and South Africa, where the 
Zimbabwean Constitution significantly borrowed from, these factors are key considerations 
when determining both horizontal and vertical sharing of revenue.
369
 Other factors such as 
provision of basic services, fiscal capacity and efficiency, developmental needs, and 
economic disparities have more relevance when determining the horizontal sharing of 
resources. Thus, it is submitted that the criteria should be applied to both vertical and 
horizontal sharing of revenue. The chapter will examine the criteria in detail below. 
4.5.1 National interests and obligations 
The Constitution requires that the allocation of grants to provinces and local authorities 
„must‟ take into account the national interest and any provision that must be made in respect 
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of the national debt and other national obligations.
370
 This means that the allocation of grants 
to provincial and local governments should be cognisant of the needs and interests of the 
national government.
371
 Such needs and interests of the national government have to be 
determined by objective criteria.
372
 The requirement of objective criteria is commendable as 
it seeks to promote transparency in the determination of the share of the national government 
from nationally raised revenue. The consideration of national debt however has significant 
implications on the sharing of revenue among the three tiers of government given that 
Zimbabwe has a huge external debt amounting to US$10 billion.
373
 If prime consideration is 
given to the servicing of this debt this means that there will be few or no financial resources 
available to be allocated to provincial and local governments. Thus, while consideration of 
national debt is necessary, it is submitted that the fiscal needs of provincial and local 
governments should also be taken into account. 
4.5.2 Provision of basic services 
Under a multilevel system of government, where subnational governments are responsible for 
providing basic services, citizens living in different jurisdictions may have varying access to 
public services caused by differences in revenue-raising capacity of subnational 
governments.
374
 This differential treatment of citizens, in terms of access to public services, is 
contrary to the democratic principle of equality, which requires that citizens have comparable 
access to public services, especially basic services. One of the mechanisms of ensuring 
comparable access to basic services is by factoring a basic service component into the 
criterion of sharing resources among subnational governments.
375
 The 2013 Constitution 
provides such a requirement.
376
 
When sharing financial resources between provincial and metropolitan councils, and local 
authorities, the national government is required to take into account the need to provide basic 
services by each council or local authority.
377
 In particular, consideration should be given to 
the funding of key public services including educational and health facilities, water, roads, 
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social amenities and electricity to marginalised areas.
378
 This implies that poor provinces and 
local authorities will receive more funding compared to their wealthier counterparts. With 
additional funding, poor councils and local authorities will be in a position to fund the 
delivery of basic services. It is submitted that the criterion of sharing financial resources 
promotes redistribution by acknowledging the importance of ensuring that citizens in the 
country, irrespective of where they reside, have comparable access to public services. 
4.5.3 Fiscal capacity and efficiency of provinces and local authorities 
As contended above, subnational governments are unlikely to have equal potential to raise 
revenue as their respective jurisdictions are endowed with varying levels of wealth.
379
 
Moreover, subnational governments may not have equal capacity to collect revenue due to 
different levels of administrative capacity. As a result, some subnational governments may be 
able to finance their expenditure and development programmes with little or no assistance 
from the national government, while others may not.
380
 If not addressed, such a scenario will 
exacerbate disparities across jurisdictions. It is therefore important that the criterion of 
sharing revenue across subnational governments consider these differences in fiscal capacity 
and efficiency.
381
 The 2013 Constitution requires such consideration. It mandates the national 
government to consider the fiscal capacity and efficiency of each provincial and metropolitan 
council and local authority when allocating intergovernmental grants.
382
 In this regard, it is 
submitted that, unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, the 2013 Constitution seeks to 
advance redistribution of wealth and financial resources across provinces and local 
authorities. 
4.5.4 Developmental needs of provinces and local authorities 
Provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities have a developmental role to play 
within their jurisdictions and beyond.
383
 The developmental role of each provincial council, 
metropolitan council or local authority is likely to be affected by the environmental factors 
within their respective jurisdictions. For example, some local authorities have to direct their 
resources towards the delivery of a particular public service compared to other services. It is 
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therefore important that the sharing of resources among local authorities and provincial and 
metropolitan councils takes into account these varying developmental obligations. The 
Constitution is commendable in this respect as it requires consideration of the developmental 
and other needs of provincial and provincial and local governments when sharing nationally 
raised revenue.
384
 
4.5.5 Economic disparities 
As highlighted above, a multilevel system of government may promote the widening of 
disparities across jurisdictions.
385
 If not addressed, disparities have negative consequences for 
the achievement of development and democracy. Unequal development may undermine the 
achievement of sustainable peace due to its potential to weaken national integration.
386
 
Hence, it was stressed above that measures to reduce disparities among jurisdictions are 
required.
387
 This has been recognised in the 2013 Constitution. Section 13 of the Constitution 
requires government at every level to facilitate rapid and equitable development by taking 
measures to bring about balanced development between rural and urban areas.
388
 To ensure 
this balanced development, the Constitution requires the allocation of revenue to provincial 
and metropolitan councils and local authorities after consideration of economic disparities.
389
 
Consideration of these disparities in the determination of the share of each provincial council, 
metropolitan council or local authority is likely to promote redistribution of fiscal resources 
from rich to poor regions and local authorities.
390
 
This section examined the criteria of sharing resources among provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities.
391
 As discussed above, the criteria encompass a broad range of 
issues, including national interests, service delivery obligations, fiscal capacity, economic 
disparities and development objectives. The consideration of these factors may promote the 
redistribution of financial resources and wealth across provinces and local authorities, thereby 
reducing disparities. It was contended in paragraph 6.2.5.4 of Chapter Two that the ever-
changing political and economic environment will require national governments to 
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continually adjust standards of equalisation or grant distribution formulae.
392
 While the 2013 
Constitution provides criteria to guide the sharing of revenue, it (correctly) does not provide a 
specific formula to guide the actual sharing of revenue at vertical and horizontal levels.
393
 It 
is submitted that there is a need to develop a transparent formula for both the vertical and 
horizontal sharing of revenue informed by the criteria set out in the Constitution, discussed 
above.
394
 This is particularly important given that provinces and local authorities are different 
in physical size, population, level of development and fiscal need, among other differences. 
For example, Harare Province has an estimated population of 2 098 199; Matabeleland South 
Province, 685 046; while 1 139 940 people are estimated to reside in Mashonaland Central 
Province.
395
 At local level, Beitbridge Municipal Council has an estimated 42 218; City of 
Bulawayo, 655 674; and City of Kwekwe 100 455.
396
 As argued below, such a formula 
should be developed with the participation of provincial and local governments. 
4.7 Involvement of provincial and local governments in revenue sharing 
It was contended in paragraph 6.5.2.3 of Chapter Two that subnational governments should 
have the means and mechanisms of influencing the sharing and distribution of financial 
resources across and within levels of governments.
397
 The primary reason for this is that 
revenue sharing directly affects their financial sustainability. Thus, the question of whether 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities have the mechanisms to influence 
the sharing of revenue or whether this should be left exclusively to the national government 
to decide on its own becomes critical.
398
 Under the Lancaster House Constitution there was 
little or no involvement of provincial councils and local authorities in the determination of 
both the amounts or forms of intergovernmental grants and the time frames in which such 
grants ought to be disbursed.
399
 This negatively affected the budgeting processes and fiscal 
discretion of subnational governments, particularly local authorities. Like its predecessor, the 
2013 Constitution does not provide for the involvement of provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities before the enactment of legislation providing for grants or on 
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the vertical sharing of revenue. Yet these are critical matters for provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities as they directly affect their financial sustainability and therefore 
their ability to deliver on their obligations.
400
 
As will be discussed in Chapter Nine, the 2013 Constitution seeks to promote cooperative 
governance among tiers of government and their respective institutions.
401
 Cooperative 
governance means that lower tiers of government are consulted or participate in decision-
making processes that affect their institutions and functions, such as sharing of revenue. 
Thus, unlike under the Lancaster House Constitution, the national government under the 2013 
constitutional order has an obligation to involve provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities in the determination of the vertical and horizontal sharing of revenue.
402
 The 
involvement of these councils and local authorities also promotes transparency in the sharing 
of revenue.
403
 In this regard, it is recommended that Parliament should consider adopting a 
specific law that facilitates intergovernmental fiscal relations, particularly around the annual 
determination of grants and the role of provincial and metropolitan councils.
404
 Provincial 
and metropolitan councils could also provide a platform where revenue sharing can be 
discussed. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the finances of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities. It was argued that the ability of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities to deliver on development, democracy and sustainable peace goals depends on the 
resources they have. In particular, financial resources were identified as key for provincial 
and local governments to deliver on their obligations. It was observed that local authorities do 
not have powers to raise sufficient resources, while provinces have none at all. Accordingly, 
the councils and local authorities are unlikely to deliver on development, democracy and 
sustainable peace objectives since fiscal resources determine in part the role which these 
governments can play in the realisation of these objectives. Against this background the 
chapter suggested that the national government should decentralise resource-raising powers 
to the provincial and local levels so that these lowers governments are in a position to raise 
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own-revenue enough to meet their obligations. The decentralisation of significant resource-
raising powers to the subnational level is likely to promote local accountability, among other 
advantages. Since revenue raised at subnational level is unlikely to be commensurate to 
expenditure obligations at this level, the resultant fiscal gap should be reduced through 
intergovernmental grants. The 2013 Constitution strives to reduce the fiscal gap at the 
provincial and local levels. It guarantees provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities of not less than five per cent of nationally raised revenue in each financial year. 
The Constitution further provide for the allocation of other non-conditional and conditional 
grants to provinces and local authorities to achieve various objectives. The allocation of these 
funds to the provincial and local levels of government will likely require supervision from the 
national government to monitor the spending of these resources. This argument is explored in 
greater detail in the following chapter, which focuses on the supervision of junior by senior 
governments in Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 8 
Supervision 
1. Introduction 
Countries all over the world have adopted various forms of multilevel government to realise 
development, democracy and sustainable peace, among other goals. It was contended in 
Chapter Two that while these forms of government may promote development, democracy 
and sustainable peace they also have the potential to undermine the achievement of these 
goals. The disadvantages of local autonomy associated with multilevel systems of 
government, such as corruption, inequality, macroeconomic instability, secession and ethnic 
conflict, have adverse effects on development, democracy and sustainable peace. It is 
submitted that a „counterbalance‟ to the exercise of local autonomy is therefore necessary to 
realise development, democracy and sustainable peace. This takes the form of supervision of 
junior governments by senior governments intended to minimise the disadvantages of 
autonomy and prevent the possible „centrifugal effect of decentralisation on government 
functioning‟.1 Supervision means that senior governments can in certain circumstances make 
binding decisions affecting the exercise of autonomy by junior governments.
2
 Its overall 
objective is to ensure that the government as a whole delivers on both national and local 
objectives, including development, democracy and sustainable peace.
3
 In this regard 
supervision is twofold. First, it is carried out to ensure compliance with constitutional and 
legislative framework. Second, supervision is undertaken to ensure that junior governments 
do not jeopardise the overall development agenda. As stated in Chapter Two, supervision is 
carried out through regulation, monitoring, support and intervention. 
In this chapter, the study examines supervision of junior governments by senior governments 
in the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government. It will be argued that although 
supervision is important it should not compromise the minimum level of local autonomy 
necessary for provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities to play a role in 
development, democracy and sustainable peace.
4
 Once the Constitution and national 
legislation has guaranteed a minimum level of local autonomy, supervision should only be 
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„exercised in accordance with such procedures and in such cases as provided for by the 
Constitution or by law‟.5 The chapter begins by briefly discussing the nature of the 
Zimbabwean multilevel system of government which informs supervision. The following 
section discusses the supervisory role of the Ministry of Local Government, before 
examining the supervisory role of other institutions. The rest of the chapter discusses the four 
main methods in which senior governments supervise junior governments in Zimbabwe. 
2. Changed nature of the system of government and supervision  
Before examining the manner in which the senior governments supervise junior governments 
it is important to briefly discuss how the system of government has changed under the 
Lancaster House Constitution and 2013 Constitution. The crucial question is what that 
change suggests for the manner in which senior governments supervise junior governments. 
Does it allow the continuation of „old‟ ways of supervising provincial council and local 
authorities? This section interrogates this question. 
2.1. Identifying the supervisory role of senior governments in the 2013 Constitution 
Section 1 of the Constitution provides that Zimbabwe is a „unitary‟ state. Unitary signifies a 
form of „aggregated‟ power at the national centre.6 In the Zimbabwean context, this implies 
that governmental power resides with the national government, which may decentralise some 
of it to lower governments. It therefore follows that the exercise of decentralised 
governmental powers, even if such powers are constitutionally recognised, is supervised by 
the national government.
7
 This argument is supported by the use of the term „tiers‟ of 
government in the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the „tiers‟ of government in 
Zimbabwe are the national government, provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities.
8
 
The word „tiers‟ suggests a hierarchical organisation rather than a relationship of equality 
among governments.
9
 Thus, the national government is at the apex of the hierarchy of 
governments in Zimbabwe, followed by provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities. As shown in the diagram below, provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
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authorities are subordinate to the national government.
10
 The hierarchical organisation 
suggests that the national government, as the superior government, has the right and 
obligation to supervise other governments organised at provincial and local levels.
11
 Thus, 
while not explicitly recognised in the Constitution, the supervisory role of the national 
government is informed by this understanding. It also follows that provincial and 
metropolitan councils, as superior governments to local authorities, should have the power to 
supervise local authorities. The nature and extent of such supervision will be determined by 
the national government. 
Figure 21: Organisation of governments 
 
2.2 Changing nature of supervision 
2.3.1 Lancaster House Constitution. 
The adoption of a new constitution has brought about the constitutional recognition of 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities as tiers of government. The 
question at issue is what impact the 2013 Constitution has on the supervisory relationships 
between tiers of government. This applies to both to supervisory and cooperative 
relationships.
12
 As discussed in Chapter Three, under the Lancaster House Constitution the 
system of government was highly centralised, with provincial councils and local authorities 
operating as extensions of the centre.
13
 Provincial councils and local authorities were not 
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recognised in the Constitution. They exercised delegated authority provided for under various 
Acts of Parliament.
14
 The national government exercised significant supervisory powers, 
including the power to dismiss locally elected leaders or to assume decentralised 
responsibilities at any time.
15
 
2.3.2 2013 Constitution 
The 2013 Constitution has reformed these supervisory powers. It recognises provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities not as extensions of the national government but 
tiers of government.
16
 Further, the Constitution explicitly recognises devolution as the mode 
of transferring powers and functions to provincial and local governments.
17
 The Preamble of 
Chapter 14 of the Constitution specifically requires devolution of powers and functions to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities in certain circumstances. Local 
authorities now have the „right to govern‟ their areas and „all‟ necessary powers to do so.18 
Thus, the Constitution envisages that provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities will exercise some measure of local autonomy which the national government 
should respect. It is submitted that to guarantee this minimum level of autonomy, the 
supervisory powers of the national government, through the Minister, have to be reformed. 
Thus, the statutory framework governing provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities requires adjustment in relation to the new constitutional framework. 
2.3.3 Implications of the absence of constitutional limitations on supervision 
It is clear from the discussion above that while the Constitution provides the broad 
framework for devolution, supervision of provincial and local governments by the national 
executive will be determined by Parliament through legislation. It therefore follows that any 
limitations on the use of supervisory powers will be imposed by Parliament.
19
 Thus, there are 
no constitutional checks on the use of supervisory powers except (as discussed below) with 
regard to the powers to suspend and dismiss local officials from office.
20
 The danger with 
such a system is that the national government may „over-supervise‟ or „under-supervise‟ 
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provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. In both cases, effective multilevel 
governance will be undermined. It is submitted that when determining the supervisory power 
of the national government Parliament should strive to strike a balance between the 
requirement for supervision and need for local autonomy. Such a balance requires reform of 
the extensive supervisory powers of the Minister under the Lancaster House Constitution.
21
 
Having provided a brief background to the changed landscape for the supervisory role of the 
national government, the chapter will provide a brief overview of the institutions which are 
responsible for supervising provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. 
3. Supervisors 
There are a number of institutions which are responsible for supervising provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities. These include the Ministry of Local Government, 
provincial ministers, the Local Government Board, the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the 
President and Cabinet and sector ministries. In this section primary attention is given to the 
role of the Ministry of Local Government, provincial ministers, and provincial and 
metropolitan councils 
3.1 Ministry of Local Government 
The Ministry of Local Government is the institution of the national government which has the 
primary responsibility to supervise provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities.
22
 It has the responsibility to develop the legal and policy framework which 
governs the activities of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
23
 Under 
various Acts of Parliament,
24
 the Minister has the power to regulate, monitor and support 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
25
 It may also intervene in 
provincial and local affairs under certain circumstances. When undertaking the supervisory 
role, the Minister is supported by administrative officials who are stationed at the national, 
provincial and district (local) levels.
26
 The hierarchical organisation of the supervisory 
structure of the ministry is illustrated in Figure 22 below. 
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Figure 22: Organisation of the Ministry of Local Government 
 
As shown in the diagram above, at the national level there is the Minister who oversees the 
entire multilevel system of government. The Minister is supported by a number of 
administrative departments, including the departments of Rural Local authorities, Urban 
Local authorities and Physical Planning. The Department of Rural Local authorities oversees 
rural local authorities,
27
 whereas the Department of Urban Local Authorities supports the 
Minister in supervising urban local authorities.
28
 The Physical Planning Department assists 
the Minister in supervising all local authorities with particular reference to land use planning 
and development control.
29
 
At the provincial level, the provincial administrator (PA) supervises all local authorities in the 
provinces on behalf of the Minister.
30
 The PA reports to the Minister via the administrative 
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departments stationed at the national level.
31
 At the local level, there are district 
administrators (DAs) who report to the PAs. Among other duties, the DA „monitors, advises 
and supervises local authorities within the district to ensure that their operations are within 
the provisions of the appropriate statutes, policies and circulars‟.32 
3.2 Ministers of State responsible for provincial affairs 
As discussed in paragraph 2.3.3 of Chapter Five, the President has appointed a Minister of 
State responsible for provincial affairs in each of the ten provinces. The question is: do these 
Ministers have a role to supervise provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities? 
The evidence suggests that they represent the President at the provincial level and are 
expected to oversee general governance at this level. While it is legally permissible for the 
President to appoint provincial ministers, it is submitted that it will be contrary to the 
constitutional principle of devolution to allow these ministers to supervise provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities.
33
 The provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities are constitutional structures whose activities should not be supervised by 
appointed officials such as provincial ministers.
34
 It is submitted that the role of provincial 
ministers should be abolished, although there might not be political will to do so. If 
provincial ministers are retained, it is suggested that their role should be limited to 
representing the President at the subnational level and not extend to supervising provincial 
and local governments. 
3.3 Provincial and metropolitan councils 
It was argued above that while the Constitution is silent about the supervisory role of 
provincial and metropolitan councils over local authorities, the hierarchical nature of the 
Zimbabwean multilevel system of government would suggest that the councils may have a 
supervisory role to play over local authorities. However, their exact supervisory role is 
unclear and subject to determination by the national government. The Constitution has 
assigned to these councils responsibilities to monitor and evaluate use of resources in the 
province which, as argued in paragraph 3.1.5 of Chapter Six, include use of resources by 
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local authorities.
35
 Thus the Constitution envisages that provincial and metropolitan councils 
will play some form of supervisory role over local authorities. However, that role is unlikely 
to involve regulating and intervening in local affairs given that such supervisory powers are 
exercised directly by the national government. The councils may also oversee local 
authorities with regard to development planning and implementation, as their predecessors 
used to do.
36
 
3.4 Other supervisors 
Sectoral institutions also supervise provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities, 
especially in sectors such as water, health, environment, transport and roads. The National 
Treasury plays a very important supervisory role, particularly relating to finances (including 
borrowing) and development planning.
37
 As observed in Chapter Four, the President has a 
very important role, especially with regard to the establishment of local authorities.
38
 The 
Office of the President and Cabinet directly oversees the delivery of public services by local 
authorities under the government‟s new economic blueprint, ZimAsset.39 The supervisory 
role of the Auditor-General,
40
 and National Parliament,
41
 was discussed in the previous 
chapter while that of the Local Government Board was examined in Chapter Six. This 
chapter will not discuss in detail the role of these institutions but reference to their role is 
made when necessary. The sections that follow will examine the supervision of provincial 
and metropolitan councils following the broad categories of supervision, as set out in 
paragraph 6.4 of Chapter Two. 
4. Regulation 
It was contended in paragraph 6.6.1 of Chapter Two that the protection and promotion of 
national and local interests require senior governments to regulate the activities of junior 
governments. Regulation refers to senior governments setting „frameworks within which 
                                                 
35
 See s 270(1)(e) Constitution. 
36
 See s 13 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
37
 See Mushamba 2010: 117. 
38
 See Mushamba 2010: 117. 
39
 ZimAsset 2013: 65. It directly oversees the implementation of the Integrated Results Based Management 
(RBM) at all levels of government. RBM is a new management style adopted by the national government which 
emphasises the use of resources available to achieve the most desired results (2013: 13, 32). See also Ministry of 
Local Government 2013: 18-20. 
40
 See s 309 Constitution. 
41
 See s 299 Constitution.  
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local autonomy can be responsibly exercised‟.42 Frameworks may comprise norms and 
standards on the delivery of public services, financial reporting and accounting practices. 
Junior governments must exercise their autonomy within the frameworks defined by the 
constitution, national legislation and policies.
43
 A distinction can be made between regulatory 
powers affecting the institutions, on one hand, and those affecting functions of junior 
governments and finances of junior governments, on the other hand.
44
 In this chapter a further 
distinction is made between regulatory powers affecting provincial and metropolitan councils 
and those affecting local authorities. Attention in this section is given to regulatory powers 
affecting the functions of provinces and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
45
 
4.1 Regulatory powers affecting functions of provincial and metropolitan councils 
4.1.1 Constitutional framework 
The Constitution provides that provincial and metropolitan councils are responsible for socio-
economic development in their respective provinces.
46
 It further directs Parliament to enact 
legislation providing for the functions of provincial and metropolitan councils.
47
 It is 
submitted that such an Act may only provide for the manner in which provincial and 
metropolitan councils exercise their functions. Such an act may not go further to provide the 
content of the functions, but is limited to the method of exercising them. Thus, the national 
government has power to regulate the manner in which provincial and metropolitan councils 
undertake socio-economic development. This responsibility must be exercised in a „manner 
that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of another tier 
of government‟.48 
4.1.2 Statutory framework 
The Provincial Councils and Administration Act provides for the functions of provincial 
councils which mainly revolve around development planning and implementation. Section 
45(1) of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act empowers the Minister to regulate 
                                                 
42
 Steytler & De Visser 2009: 5-15. See also De Visser 2005: 170. 
43
 UN-Habitat 2007: 6. 
44
 See De Visser 2005: 170, Machingauta 2010: 140. 
45
 The section will not discuss regulatory powers affecting institutions and finances of provinces and local 
authorities since these were discussed in the previous chapters. 
46
 S 270(1) Constitution. 
47
 S 270(2) Constitution. 
48
 S 265(c) Constitution. 
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„anything‟ which in „his opinion is necessary or convenient‟ to be regulated at the provincial 
level. This means that the Minister has discretion to determine what has to be regulated and 
when such regulation should take place. It is argued that this provision gives the Minister 
unfettered powers since he or she may regulate „anything‟ which in „his opinion‟ requires 
regulation. As submitted above, the Minister may only regulate the manner in which 
provincial and metropolitan councils may exercise their functions. For example, the Minister 
may regulate the manner in which councils may monitor use of public resources in their 
respective provinces. Hence, it is submitted that section 45(1) of the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act should be reformed.
49
 
4.2 Regulatory powers affecting functions of local authorities 
4.2.1 Constitutional and statutory frameworks 
The 2013 Constitution gives local authorities the „right to govern‟ their areas with „all‟ the 
powers necessary to do so.
50
 Such a right is not without boundaries. It is limited by the 
Constitution and in certain circumstances by national legislation.
51
 The national government, 
through Parliament, has enacted various acts which regulate the functions of local authorities. 
Legislation regulating the functions of local government can be categorised into sectoral 
legislation and local government legislation. The two categories are analysed in this section. 
4.2.2 Sectoral regulation 
Sectoral regulation entails the regulation of a particular sectoral area which cuts across the 
hierarchical organisation of government. Sectoral regulation is carried out and overseen by 
sectoral ministries and departments
52
 of the national government. Some of the key sectoral 
legislation includes the Public Health Act, the Education Act, the Water Act, the Roads Act, 
the Environmental Management Act, the Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act and the 
Shop Licenses Act. To complement these Acts, relevant ministers periodically make 
Statutory Instruments and Proclamations regulating local authorities in their respective 
sectoral areas.
53
 The legislation often defines the norms and standards and other guidelines 
                                                 
49
 See Chatiza 2014: 5. 
50
 S 276(1) Constitution. 
51
 See s 276(1) Constitution. 
52
 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 17-18. 
53
 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 18. See also Mushamba 2010: 105. 
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which local authorities are required to abide by when delivering public services.
54
 This 
section examines the regulation of the health, education and water sectors, which are some of 
the key local government responsibilities. 
4.2.2.1 Health sector 
As highlighted in Chapter Six, local authorities have competency over health, including the 
administration of hospitals and clinics.
55
 The Public Health Act defines the competence of 
local authorities and imposes obligations on local authorities with respect to health.
56
 For 
instance, the Act requires local authorities to hire medical officers and health inspectors 
whose qualifications, appointment, dismissal and terms of employment are determined by the 
national government through the Minister responsible for health.
57
 The national government 
also determines fees which are payable in all health institutions administered by local 
authorities as well as on those fees which are payable for other services undertaken by local 
authorities such as inspections.
58
 It is submitted that the health competence is highly 
regulated, leaving limited opportunities for local discretion. While some form of regulation is 
desirable in the health sector, it is submitted that room for local discretion should be 
provided. For example, the national government may retain the power to set a broad national 
health-fee structure while allowing each local authority to determine individual fees. 
4.2.2.2 Education sector 
Local authorities have the power to provide education services.
59
 The Education Act imposes 
obligations on all local authorities for the purposes of ensuring „fair and equitable‟ provision 
of primary education throughout Zimbabwe. Section 5 of the Act provides that „every local 
authority shall endeavour to establish and maintain such primary schools as may be necessary 
for all children in the area under its jurisdiction‟. This means that local authorities have the 
autonomy to determine how they are going to establish primary schools and the number of 
such schools. While local authorities have the power to establish and administer schools the 
                                                 
54
 See Jordan 1984: 83, Masuko 1996: 50, Chatiza 2010: 9. 
55
 See the Second Schedule UCA and First Schedule RDCA. 
56
 For example, s 14 of the Public Health Act states that „every local authority shall take all lawful and necessary 
precautions for the prevention of prevalence of the occurrence, or for dealing with the outbreak or prevalence, or 
any infectious or communicable or contagious diseases‟.  
57
 Ss 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 Public Health Act. 
58
 S 81 Public Health Act. 
59
 See Second Schedule UCA and First Schedule RDCA. 
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national government determines the curriculum. It is submitted that this form of regulation is 
necessary given that education curriculum cannot be left for the determination of individual 
local authorities since it has implications on the quality of education. Thus, such powers of 
the national government fall within the required scope of supervision. 
4.2.2.3 Water Sector 
The UCA and RDCA give local authorities the power to supply water for domestic and 
industrial purposes.
60
 The Water Act sets the framework within which local authorities 
exercise their power to supply water. For example, when considering, formulating and 
implementing any proposal for the use, management or exploitation of water resources, local 
authorities are required to give due regard to the conservation of the environment.
61
 Section 
64(1) of the Water Act empowers catchment councils
62
 to regulate the maximum volume of 
water which can be extracted from a public stream or storage works and the maximum rate 
per month at which water may be extracted from any borehole or well in a water shortage 
area.
63
 These are typical examples of provisions determining the parameters within which 
local authorities exercise their competence. In some cases, however, the national government 
has gone beyond determining the parameters involved in the day-to-day operational work of 
local authorities. For example, the ZimAsset makes provision for the procurement of water 
treatment chemicals for all local authorities by the national government.
64
 It is submitted that 
in such cases, the national government has reduced the ability of local authorities to make 
decisions. Without such an ability, local innovation and experimentation, which can promote 
the realisation of development goals, is likely to be lost.
65
 
4.2.3 Primary local government regulation 
The primary local government legislation, namely the UCA and RDCA, regulates the 
majority of local government functions. As highlighted above, the Minister is responsible for 
                                                 
60
 See s 183 UCA and s 71 read together with the First Schedule RDCA. 
61
 S 67 Water Act. 
62
 Catchment councils are bodies which are established by the Minister to, among other responsibilities, regulate 
and supervise the exercise of rights to, and use of, water in respect of a specific river system. See s 20 and s 21 
Water Act. 
63
 S 64(1) Water Act. A local authority may apply to the catchment council concerned for a permit to abstract 
water within a water shortage area at a rate higher than the prescribed maximum rate. S 64(6) Water Act. 
64
 ZimAsset 2013: 76. 
65
 See Jordan 1984: 89, Masuko 1996: 53. 
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developing and administering these pieces of legislation.
66
 Under these Acts, the Minister 
enjoys various regulatory powers, including the power to issue policy directives and 
regulations governing the manner in which local authorities carry out their responsibilities.
67
 
These powers of the Minister are examined below. 
4.2.3.1 Policy Directives 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the role of subnational governments in development is likely to 
be enhanced if they have some measure of discretion when exercising their responsibilities. It 
was argued that such a minimum level of autonomy may be protected if the regulatory 
powers of the national government are limited to setting the national framework comprising 
norms and standards for the delivery of services, for example.
68
 Further, the regulatory 
powers of the national government should be predictable and exercised within defined 
boundaries.
69
 The Minister may issue directives to guide policy-making at local level. For 
example, with respect to land use planning, the Minister may issue directives regulating the 
form and content of land use and development plans and preliminary planning permits.
70
 In 
urban local authorities the Minister may issue directives of a „general character‟ guiding local 
policy-making.
71
 It is submitted that the powers of the Minister to issue policy directives are 
necessary. However, such powers should be exercised in setting the national framework 
within which local authorities operate and not to take away local discretion, as discussed in 
detail below.
72
 
4.2.3.2 Regulations 
The Minister may regulate the functions of local authorities by issuing regulations in addition 
to policy directives.
73
 Using the same example of land use planning discussed above, the 
Minister may issue regulations prescribing the form and content of master plans and local 
plans.
74
 The Minister may also make regulations „generally in respect of all matters for which 
                                                 
66
 Ministry of Local Government 2013: 13. 
67
 Masuko 1996: 50. 
68
 See para 6.4.1. See also De Visser 2005: 44, the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 9 
69
 See Ford 1999: 13. 
70
 S 69(1)(a) Regional, Town and Country Planning Act. 
71
 S 313 UCA.  
72
 See Chatiza 2014: 5-6; Combined Harare Residents Association 2014: 37; Madhekani and Zhou 2012: 21, 22; 
Machingauta 2010: 140. 
73
 See Ministry of Local Government 2013: 13. 
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 S 68(2)(a) Regional Town and Country Planning Act.  
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[the Minister] considers it necessary or expedient to provide for the better carrying out of the 
purposes and objects of [the UCA]‟.75 In local government areas, the Minister may issue 
regulations governing almost „all‟ activities which can be carried out in those areas.76 It is 
submitted that these provisions give the Minister „unlimited‟ powers since he or she has the 
power to regulate almost „all‟ matters concerning the functions of local authorities. Under this 
legal arrangement, the autonomy of local government depends entirely on the ability of the 
incumbent Minister to exercise restraint.
77
 If the Minister does not exercise restraint, the 
autonomy of local authorities will be significantly undermined as there are no limitations to 
the powers of the Minister.
78
 It is submitted that these powers of the Minister should be 
reformed by explicitly recognising in legislation the matters where the Minister can make 
regulations.
79
 Further, those regulations should be limited to setting national frameworks in 
line with the 2013 Constitution, which envisages local authorities exercising some measure of 
local autonomy.
80
 Section 276(1) of the Constitution provides that local authorities have a 
„right to govern‟ their areas and „all‟ the powers necessary to do so. Further, section 265(1)(c) 
highlights that local authorities have a geographical, functional and institutional integrity. It is 
submitted that these provisions suggest that the Minister may not have unlimited powers to 
regulate the functions of local authorities as that is likely to undermine their „right to govern‟ 
and functional integrity. 
In this section, the chapter examined the regulatory powers of the national government. It was 
argued that the national government has the necessary powers to regulate. However, it was 
stressed that in some cases the regulatory powers have been exercised beyond national 
framework-setting. In so doing, such regulatory powers endanger the minimum level of local 
autonomy which is necessary to reap the benefits associated with a multilevel system of 
government.
81
 It is submitted that the statutory framework providing for the regulation of 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities is now inconsistent with the 2013 
Constitution, which requires that provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities 
                                                 
75
 S 234(1)(h) UCA. See also s 159 RDCA. 
76
 See s 235 UCA. 
77
 Jonga 2012: 117. 
78
 See Mushamba 2010: 119, Madhekani & Zhou 2012: 22. 
79
 See Clause 28 Urban Councils Bill, Chatiza 2014: 5, 10. 
80
 Preamble of Chapter 14, s 276 Constitution. See Chatiza 2014: 6. 
81
 See De Visser 2005: 44. Ford suggests that „legal barriers may inappropriately restrain the ability of local 
authorities to select the most desirable options for the delivery of decentralised services‟ (1999: 13). 
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exercise some measure of autonomy.
82
 The Constitution requires the development of a new 
regulatory framework only comprising national standards, frameworks and guidelines.
83
 It is 
submitted that when developing such a framework, compliance costs, especially by poor or 
low level subnational governments, should be taken into account.
84
 
5. Monitoring 
Supervision may be exercised through monitoring. Monitoring occurs when one tier of 
government measures the compliance with the constitutional, legislative and performance 
frameworks of another tier of government.
85
 It is through monitoring that senior governments 
gather information upon which they make decisions determining the kind of support a 
particular government requires to fully exercise its autonomy.
86
 It is also through monitoring 
that senior governments determine whether it is necessary to intervene at subnational level to 
address cases of „serious‟ non-compliance with laws and policies. In this section, the chapter 
analyses the role of the national government to supervise provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities by monitoring their activities. 
5.1 Constitutional framework 
The Constitution does not explicitly provide for the role of the national government to 
monitor provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. Thus, like any other forms 
of supervision, monitoring of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities is 
going to be carried out outside the Constitution. The Constitution nonetheless imposes an 
obligation on the national government, through Parliament, to monitor the financial affairs of 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
87
 Section 299(1) of the 
Constitution mandates Parliament to supervise expenditure at provincial and local levels in 
order to ensure that all revenue is accounted for, all expenditure has been properly incurred 
and any limits and conditions on appropriation have been observed. The Constitution further 
directs Parliament to enact a law providing for mechanisms of monitoring and overseeing the 
                                                 
82
 See Preamble of Chapter 14, ss 264 and 276 Constitution. 
83
 Local Governance Community Capacity Building and Development Trust 2014: 12. 
84
 For a discussion on the importance of compliance cost, see the National Planning Commission 2011: 385-91. 
85
 Steytler & De Visser 2009: 15-5. See Article 8(2) European Charter of Local Self-Government 2007: 33. 
86
 Steytler & De Visser 2009: 15-5, Ayele 2014: 218. 
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financial affairs of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities (and other 
government institutions).
88
 
The supervisory role of Parliament over the finances of all governments at all levels is 
commendable. The question is how Parliament is going to exercise the responsibility of 
monitoring finances at subnational level. Will it, for example, call a mayor or chairperson of 
the provincial council to explain certain financial decisions? If the answer is positive, local 
accountability of provincial and local governments is likely to be undermined. Will 
Parliament go to local authorities and investigate financial problems relating to corruption? 
What does Parliament do with the outcome of such investigation given that the Constitution 
has not assigned it the power to impose any penalties? Will it hold the Minister responsible 
for provincial and local governments accountable for financial problems at subnational level? 
This brings into question the feasibility of the role of Parliament to directly monitor 
subnational finances. Given that Parliament is part of the national government, it is suggested 
that its role with respect to monitoring the finances of provincial and local governments 
should be limited to developing the legislative framework governing the monitoring of 
finances at subnational level rather than being involved in the day-to-day monitoring of 
finances. 
5.2 Statutory framework 
The UCA and RDCA provide the main mechanisms through which the national government 
monitors the activities of local authorities.
89
 Sectoral legislation also provides the monitoring 
regime for specific sectors. Under the ZimAsset,
90
 provision is made for performance 
monitoring of all government institutions, including local authorities.
91
 There are a number of 
tools at the disposal of the Ministry of Local Government to monitor the compliance of local 
authorities with regulatory and performance frameworks.
92
 They range from requesting 
performance and financial reports, conducting investigations, monitoring minutes of councils, 
conducting monitoring visits, self-reporting, accessing records, and approving certain 
decisions or resolutions.
93
 Self-reporting mainly relates to the financial statements which 
                                                 
88
 S 299(2) Constitution. 
89
 See Machingauta 2010: 142. 
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 Economic blue print covering the period 2013 to 2018. 
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 ZimAsset 2013: 32. 
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local authorities are required to submit regularly to the national government and AG, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. This section examines the following monitoring 
mechanisms: right of the national government to access records, request information, inquire 
and investigate and approve resolutions and decisions. It will also analyse the regular 
submission of minutes by rural local authorities to the Minister. 
5.3 Right of access to records and other documents 
As argued in Chapter Two, the national government should have the right to access certain 
documents and information at subnational level.
94
 Supervision is almost impractical without 
an instrument to obtain information on the basis of which senior governments can assess 
whether or not intervention, support or regulation is necessary.
95
 However, such a right of 
senior government to request information and to access materials, information, places and 
persons of junior governments should not be exercised without limitations. For example, the 
national government may not demand access to information of junior governments on a daily 
basis. If such a situation is permitted, junior governments are likely to be diverted from their 
core functions of delivering services. The administrative burden involved in making 
information available for the perusal of the national government also has to be considered.
96
 
The UCA gives the Minister „unrestricted access‟ to all council records, minutes and any 
documents in the possession of any local authority which relate to the council‟s meetings, 
resolutions and affairs.
97
 This implies that the Minister may access any document or 
information of a local authority at any time and without providing reasons for why he or she 
needs such information or document. There is no corresponding provision in the RDCA and 
Provincial Councils and Administration Act adding to the inconsistency in the supervisory 
framework. While this provision allows the Minister to keep abreast of what is happening in 
local authorities, it represents a challenge to the institutional integrity of local authorities.
98
 
Under the 2013 Constitution, local authorities are governments in their own right. Thus, a 
certain amount of respect should be given when encroaching on their institutional integrity.
99
 
This requires a restriction to be placed on the Minister‟s right to access certain key 
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 See para 6.4.2. 
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 De Visser 2005: 179. 
96
 De Visser 2005: 182. 
97
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documents of local authorities in routine monitoring. Such documents include annual reports, 
budgets and strategic plans. The Minister however should have unrestricted access to all 
documents if there are problems in a local authority. 
5.4 Right to request information 
Effective supervision of junior governments requires in part that senior governments have the 
right to request certain information upon which they can assess whether or not intervention, 
support or regulation is necessary.
100
 However, it is submitted that such a right should not be 
construed to mean that senior governments may request information from junior governments 
on a regular basis. As highlighted above, the administrative burden involved in furnishing 
information should also be considered.
101
 
5.4.1 Provincial and Metropolitan councils 
The Provincial Councils and Administration Act states that the Minister may from time to 
time require a provincial council to submit to him or her copies of records of its proceedings, 
statistics and any documents or information.
102
 This means that there are no limitations to the 
kind of information the Minister may request. It is submitted that such powers of the Minister 
are not consistent with the 2013 Constitution. Under the 2013 Constitution, provincial and 
metropolitan councils are not extensions of the national government. Thus, the Minister may 
not request access to „all‟ information or documents of a provincial or metropolitan council 
for routine monitoring as that would infringe on their institutional integrity.
103
 However, in 
cases where there are problems in a provincial or metropolitan council, the Minster should 
have unlimited access to all documents or information. 
5.4.2 Local authorities 
The Minister may require a local authority(s) to submit to him certified copies of its 
proceedings, statistics, and other documents, or any such other information.
104
 Machinguata 
argues that these powers of the Minister indicate the kind of relationship which local 
government legislation envisaged between the Minister and local authorities.
105
 The 
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legislation is „silent on how the information may be sought and seems to accept that a simple 
letter requesting the information from the Minister suffice[s]‟.106 Further, there are no 
limitations to what the Minister may request as long as it is information of a local authority. It 
has been argued that this form of supervision by the Minister is excessive.
107
 There is the 
danger that the exercise of these powers will impose an excessive administrative burden on 
local authorities since they have to provide almost „all‟ types of documents and information 
at their disposal if requested by the national government. Under these circumstances, local 
authorities are likely to be preoccupied with complying with information requests rather than 
on delivering services to the people, which is their core mandate. 
In practice, the Minister has requested a variety of information and reports from local 
authorities. For example, in terms of Local Authority Circular No 2 of 2000, all urban local 
authorities are required to provide monthly updates to the Minister on development 
programmes and service delivery. In particular, an update needs to be provided on a number 
of activities, including: budget performance, health delivery system, building plans approved 
and value thereof, comment on the state of water and sewerage reticulation as well as the 
number of refuse removal vehicles available and the regularity of refuse removal.
108
 While 
the nature of information requested may be important for effective monitoring, it is submitted 
that legislation should provide the nature of information the Minister may request as well as 
the regularity and form of such information requests. 
5.5 Submission of minutes to the Minister 
One of the monitoring mechanisms available to the national government is the requirement 
that rural local authorities must submit council and committee minutes at certain intervals to 
the Minister. Rural local authorities are required to submit a copy of all minutes to the 
Minister within six weeks of the date on which the meeting to which they relate was held.
109
 
There is no corresponding requirement for urban local authorities or provincial and 
metropolitan councils. It is argued that this provision of the RDCA is too intrusive on local 
autonomy. It undermines the institutional integrity of rural local authorities which they have 
under the 2013 Constitution.
110
 It presents rural local authorities as mere extensions of the 
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national government with no discretion even to keep minutes of proceedings. It is submitted 
that the provision should be repealed. 
5.6 Right to inquire and investigate 
As argued in Chapter Two, the powers of the senior governments to investigate and inquire 
into the affairs of junior governments are necessary among other reasons to detect corruption 
and resource-wastage. It was contended however that the exercise of such intervention 
powers should not undermine local autonomy.
111
 Among other mechanisms, local autonomy 
may be protected by legally recognising the conditions upon which senior governments may 
undertake investigations and inquiries at subnational level.
112
 Furthermore, the procedure to 
be followed when undertaking such investigations and inquiries must be clearly outlined. 
This rule-based form of supervision may serve as a deterrent to the invasion of subnational 
powers by the senior governments. Rule-based supervision provides a basis for judicial 
review of acts undertaken by the executive of senior governments.
113
 The question is whether 
such mechanisms of safeguarding local autonomy exist in the Zimbabwean multilevel system 
of government. 
5.6.1 Provincial and metropolitan councils 
One of the mechanisms used by the Minister to monitor provinces is the appointing of 
investigators to inquire into matters relating to the administration of provinces. If the Minister 
considers it „necessary or desirable in the public interest‟, he or she may appoint members of 
the public service to inquire into „any matter which relates to the good government of a 
province‟.114 The Minister may also appoint investigators to inquire into „any matter‟ which 
relates to the „failure‟ of a provincial council to undertake any of its powers and functions, or 
which arises out of the affairs of a provincial council.
115
 These provisions of the Provincial 
Councils and Administration Act are structured in a way which allows for a liberal 
interpretation. For example, what matters „relate to the „good government‟ of a province? 
Good government of a province encompasses almost „all‟ aspects of provincial governance. 
The same applies to investigations triggered by „failure‟ to undertake any of the powers and 
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responsibilities of a provincial council. The question is failure in what respect? It is submitted 
that these powers of the Minister pose a danger to the autonomy of provincial councils since 
the powers of the Minister are not limited. 
As stated above, the autonomy of provinces is likely to be safeguarded if the grounds upon 
which the Minister may institute an investigation are recognised in the legal framework.
116
 In 
South Africa, for example, section 100 of the Constitution of South Africa states that „when a 
province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or 
legislation, the national government may intervene‟.117 This means that the intervention 
powers of the national government are limited only to cases where a province „cannot or does 
not‟ fulfil an executive obligation. It is submitted that, following the South African approach, 
the Provincial Councils and Administration Act should be reformed to recognise the grounds 
upon which the Minister may institute any form of investigation and the procedure to be 
followed.
118
 Further, intergovernmental checks and balances are vital to check abuse of 
power by the Minister.
119
 For example, the Minister could be required to seek the approval of 
Parliament before appointing investigators to inquire into matters relating to the 
administration of a province. 
 5.6.2 Local authorities 
It has been argued that the „power to monitor the performance of local government must be 
coupled with the power to cause investigations into suspected acts of misconduct and non-
compliance‟.120 In Zimbabwe, the national government has such supervisory powers. The 
Minister may appoint an investigator(s) to inquire into any matter which relates to the „good 
government‟ of an area of a local authority or „failure‟ of a local authority to undertake its 
power and functions, if he or she considers it „necessary or desirable‟ to do so in the „public 
interest‟.121 The Minister may also appoint investigators to inquire into any matter that may 
arise out of the affairs of a council or local authority concerning the exercise of the powers of 
                                                 
116
 See Tarr 2011: 172. 
117
 See also s 139 of the Constitution of South Africa, with respect to local government. 
118
 See s 100 Constitution of South Africa. 
119
 See UN-Habitat 2007: 7. The Provincial and Metropolitan Councils Administration Draft Bill (August 2014) 
has not made provision for such intergovernmental checks and balances allowing the perpetuation of unchecked 
supervisory powers. 
120
 Machingauta 2010: 143. 
121
 S 311(2)(a)(b) UCA and s 154(a)(b) (1) RDCA. 
 
 
 
 
376 
 
Chapter 8: Supervision 
local authorities to enter into cooperative agreements.
122
 These investigations are reactionary 
in nature in that they are prompted by problems in local authorities.
123
 What presents a 
challenge to local autonomy is the discretion which has been afforded to the Minister to 
determine the circumstances upon which investigations can be instituted to safeguard „public 
interest‟ or „good government‟.124 As argued above, these terms are not precisely defined and 
therefore allow liberal interpretation, which may be abused by the incumbent Minister for 
political reasons.
125
 Moreover, there is no oversight on the exercise of such powers. Hence, it 
is submitted that although the legal framework governing the multilevel system of 
government gives the national government the necessary powers to investigate or inquire into 
subnational affairs, the UCA allows unfettered intervention in local authorities and, therefore, 
adversely affects local autonomy.
126
 As argued above, local autonomy may be protected if the 
circumstances upon which the Minister may appoint investigators are clearly, legally 
recognised. In addition, such powers should be reviewable by Parliament, with the legislative 
body having the power to cancel such an investigation if it is not satisfied that due process 
was followed or the investigation was not warranted in the first place.
127
 
5.7 Approval of resolutions of local authorities 
As argued in paragraph 6.1.3.4 of Chapter Two, local authorities may play a role in 
development, democracy and sustainable peace especially if they have final decision-making 
powers over their functions. In other words, once a function has been devolved and a 
regulatory framework has been established, the national government should not make binding 
decisions on that function unless a local authority has failed to deliver on that function. Thus, 
supervision by the national government should not go to the extent of requiring local 
authorities to submit their policy proposals for „approval‟ before they become operational. In 
Zimbabwe, rural local authorities are subjected to such supervisory control by the national 
government. The national government has the power to approve certain resolutions of rural 
local authorities.
128
 Through a notice, the Minister may „direct that any resolution of a council 
dealing with such matters or such class of matters as are specified in the notice shall be 
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submitted to him for approval‟.129 Following that notice, no resolution passed by a rural local 
authority dealing with any matter specified in the notice can be of any force or effect, as a 
resolution of the council, unless approved by the Minister.
130
 There is no corresponding 
provision in the UCA. The rationale of having this form of supervisory control only for rural 
local authorities and not for urban local authorities is questionable. It is further submitted that 
this provision gives the Minister the power to take away final decision-making power of rural 
local authorities over their responsibilities.
131
 These powers of the Minister should be 
reviewed and redefined within the new constitutional paradigm which has devolution of 
power as one of its core tenets.
132
 
As stated in paragraph 3.1.8.1 of Chapter Seven, the UCA and RDCA gives local authorities 
the power to engage in income-generating projects but only if the Minister allows them to do 
so and they have complied with any conditions the Minister may impose.
133
 Other powers of 
the Minister relate to the power to approve establishment of cooperative and joint committees 
(or boards)
134
 in both urban and rural local authorities.
135
 The overall effect of these 
provisions on local authorities will be to reduce their ability to decide their own priorities. 
Yet it is this ability which is at the heart of local governments that deliver on development, 
democracy and sustainable peace.
136
 In this kind of legal environment, local authorities are 
likely to play a minimal role in pursing development goals. It is submitted that the nature of 
these powers of the Minister are at odds with the 2013 Constitution, which gives local 
authorities the „right to govern‟ their areas with limited control from the national 
government.
137
 Thus, it is further submitted that these powers of the Minister should be 
abolished so that local authorities have final decision-making over their responsibilities 
within a national framework set by the national government.
138
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 S 53(2) RDCA. 
131
 See Combined Harare Residents Association 2014: 16, Madhekani &Zhou 2012: 22. 
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5.8 Monitoring visits 
One of the mechanisms used by the ministry to monitor the activities of local authorities is by 
carrying out what are called monitoring visits.
139
 This involves ministry officials physically 
visiting local authorities to evaluate compliance with legislation, policies and performance 
targets. The performance of a local authority against set targets is evaluated on the basis of a 
performance checklist, whilst compliance with legislation and policies is evaluated using a 
systems audit. These two monitoring tools are examined below. 
5.8.1 Performance ‘Barometer’ 
The Ministry of Local Government has developed a Performance Checklist, a barometer 
which measures the performance of a local authority within a stipulated period. As shown in 
the table below, the performance of a local authority is measured on five core areas, namely: 
service delivery, budgets, compliance, corporate governance and capacity to generate and 
utilise revenue. A local authority is given a performance rating out of 100 spread over the 
five areas. It is submitted that monitoring visits to assess the performance of local authorities 
are an effective way of monitoring the activities of local authorities, especially if they are 
carried out regularly. The only challenge to their effectiveness is the availability of resources 
to enable officials of the ministry to visit every local authority, which determines the 
regularity of these monitoring visits. 
Table 11: Local Authorities Performance Checklist (2011 version) 
Performance Area Weighti
ng 
Description Performan
ce rating 
1. General Service 
Delivery 
35 (a) Roads and Street lighting 
(b) Water demand and supply 
(c) Refuse Collection 
(d) Health (number of hospitals, 
clinics and drugs availability) 
(e) Education and Social Amenities 
(number of schools and recreation 
facilities) 
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(f) Functionality of sanitation facilities 
(Other (specific), e.g., grass cutting 
2. Budgets 25 (a) Performance (level of creditors and 
debtors) 
(b) Compliance on consultation 
process 
(c) Salary schedule (30-70 
employment cost/service delivery 
ratio) 
(d) Salary arrears and statutory 
remittances 
(e) Submission deadlines 
 
3. Compliance 20 (a) Circulars and Statutory provisions 
(b) Adherence to tender procedures 
(c) Audited accounts 
(d) Submission of minutes within six 
weeks 
 
 
4. Corporate 
Governance 
10 (a) Functionality of committee system 
(b) Working relations with clients, 
stakeholders and government 
 
5. Capacity to generate 
revenue and deploy such 
revenue in development 
programmes 
10 (a) Recapitalisation 
(b) Maintenance and rehabilitation 
works 
 
Total  100   
Source: Ministry of Local Government 2011. 
5.8.2 Systems audit 
The Ministry of Local Government also monitors the activities of local authorities by 
conducting what is referred to as a systems audit. A systems audit is an annual monitoring 
tool which assesses the operations of a local authority. The audit is carried out annually by 
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officials of the Ministry, among them PAs and DAs.
140
 It seeks to establish whether a local 
authority is complying with legislative prescriptions and performing to the prescribed 
standards. The audit covers a number of areas, including finance, human resources, corporate 
governance and meetings of the council.
141
 It is submitted that the system audit covers a 
variety of areas which gives a „good‟ reflection of the ability of each local authority to 
comply with legislative and performance frameworks. They provide a base upon which the 
national government can make a decision to determine the kind of supervision required, 
whether regulation, support or intervention. The performance and systems audits determine 
whether it is necessary for the Ministry to make use of other monitoring tools such as 
inquiries and investigations. 
5.9 Financial monitoring 
The „final stop on the pathway through raising, allocating, budgeting and spending public 
funds is monitoring, withholding and regulating the use of public funds‟.142 A number of 
institutions have been established to, among other responsibilities, monitor the financial 
affairs of provincial and local governments. The oversight role of Parliament over 
subnational finances has already been discussed above.
143
 Besides Parliament, as will be 
examined below, the Auditor General and the Ministry of Local Government also monitor the 
finances of provincial and local governments.
144
 This section examines the various 
mechanisms of monitoring the financial affairs of provincial and local governments. Primary 
attention is given to financial reporting, auditing and inquiries. It is also important to note 
that, as highlighted in paragraph 5.8.2 above, a system audit also encompasses an assessment 
of the financial affairs of a local authority. The audit can be an effective tool of monitoring 
the financial affairs of local authorities (and also provincial and metropolitan councils). 
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5.9.1 Financial reporting 
It is often argued that decentralisation promotes corruption, resource wastage and abuse of 
power at local level, in the process undermining the achievement of development, democracy 
and sustainable peace.
145
 It was contended in paragraph 5 of Chapter Two, however, that the 
potential of a multilevel system of government to promote corruption and resource wastage 
should not be the sole reason for centralising power. The answer lies in putting in place 
mechanisms to promote transparency, citizen participation and accountability. One of the 
mechanisms of promoting transparency, citizen participation and accountability is to require 
subnational governments to regularly report on their financial status. 
The 2013 Constitution requires clear fiscal reporting at all levels of government.
146
 The 
national government has the necessary powers to ensure that there is a clear fiscal report at 
subnational level. The Minister may regulate the form of accounts, statements and reports to 
be prepared by local authorities and the manner in which information is set out in such 
accounts, statements and reports.
147
 Further, the Minister may issue regulations requiring a 
local authority to inform the public of its annual expenditure and specifying the manner and 
nature of information to be made public.
148
 Senior officials of a local authority (town clerks, 
secretaries and head of departments) are required to submit monthly and quarterly financial 
reports (statements) to the finance committee and full council.
149
 Further, the officials must 
present schedules of payments to the finance committee.
150
 Within 120 days of the end of the 
financial year, every local authority must submit to the Minister: 
a) an annual report on the activities of the local authority, 
b) audited financial statements, and 
c) the audit report on the audited financial statements.151 
It is submitted that the power of the national government to regulate and require local 
authorities to report regularly on their financial status is necessary to detect whether public 
resources are being used for the benefit of the public, for example, through responsive service 
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delivery.
152
 However, the burden of complying with the fiscal reporting regime should be 
taken into account when determining fiscal reporting rules. It is further submitted that 
legislation should prescribe that all financial statements of all local authorities (and provincial 
and metropolitan councils) should be made public so as to enhance transparency and enable 
the public to hold public officials accountable.
153
 In practice, financial reporting by local 
authorities is very poor.
154
 The challenge is more acute in rural local authorities which 
usually lack key skilled personnel such as accountants.
155
 As a result of poor financial 
reporting regimes, most local authorities are characterised by weak control systems, many 
cases of fraud, theft of public property and abuse of public assets.
156
 It is submitted that the 
national government should provide the necessary support to local authorities to improve 
their capacity to report on fiscal issues. In addition, there may be need to establish different 
fiscal reporting rules for local authorities depending on the category or class of local authority 
as a way of responding to different capacity levels. 
5.9.2 Auditing 
5.9.2.1 Role of the Auditor-General 
The Constitution provides for the establishment of the office of the Auditor-General (AG) to 
audit the accounts, financial systems and financial management of government, including all 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
157
 The AG has the authority to 
order the taking of measures to rectify any defects in the management and safeguarding of 
public funds and public property.
158
 It is not clear if the AG can enforce such orders. It is 
submitted that the AG is unlikely to enforce the implementation of the orders and will rely on 
institutions such as Parliament and councils for enforcement. Parliament is advised to utilise 
its oversight role over public finances at all levels of government to ensure the 
implementation of audit recommendations and orders of the AG.
159
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The Constitution requires public officials to comply with orders made by the AG to rectify 
any defects in the management and safeguarding of public funds and property.
160
 This 
constitutional requirement seeks to ensure the implementation of orders of the AG. The 
Constitution does not provide penalties in cases where public officials fail to implement such 
orders.
161
 In practice, some local authorities have failed to implement audit 
recommendations.
162
 The non-implementation of audit recommendations has meant that 
financial problems persist. Thus, it is submitted that legislation should provide for the 
implementation of audit recommendations and orders. Furthermore, legislation should 
provide for sanctions in cases where public officials fail to implement the orders and 
recommendations of the AG. The auditing of financial statements, fiscal systems and 
financial management by the AG provides the necessary external oversight required by the 
Constitution.
163
 It is recommended that audited financial statements from the AG should be 
widely publicised to allow the public and other stakeholders to hold provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities accountable for their financial decisions. 
5.9.2.2 Requirement for submission of financial statements for auditing 
Local authorities are required to balance their accounts by not later than 120 days after the 
end of each financial year or such date as the Minister may approve.
164
 After balancing the 
accounts, every local authority must submit its income and expenditure accounts, balance 
sheets and other accounts to the AG by not later than 120 days after the end of each financial 
year or such date as the Minister may approve.
165
 Following auditing of its accounts, every 
local authority must submit its final accounts, auditor‟s report and related documents166 to the 
Minister, within fourteen days after the certification of the final accounts by the council.
167
 
Auditing is an effective tool of monitoring the financial affairs of local authorities especially 
if all local authorities are able to provide financial statements before the legislated date. 
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While legislation provides that local authorities should submit audited financial statements to 
the Minister not more than six months after the end of each financial year, some local 
authorities have gone for several years without submitting financial statements for 
auditing.
168
 This can be attributed to the absence of sanctions for failure to submit financial 
statements for auditing.
169
 Moreover, the national government has done very little to ensure 
that all local authorities submit their financial statements for auditing on time.
170
 It is 
submitted that legislation should impose sanctions on local authorities (and provincial and 
metropolitan councils) which fail to submit their financial statements to the AG for auditing 
on time. For example, failure to submit financial statements on the legislated date could be 
made a ground upon which the national government may intervene in local affairs and take 
necessary action. It is further submitted that legislation should provide for intergovernmental 
oversight on the preparation and submission of financial statements for auditing. For 
example, in South Africa if a municipality fails to submit financial statements on the 
legislated date, the mayor must promptly report the failure to the council.
171
 The AG is 
required to promptly notify the council, the National Treasury, Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Finance of the failure, and further issue a special report to 
the provincial legislature.
172
 In such event, the council and other spheres of government are 
required to remedy the failure. Such oversight mechanisms are required in Zimbabwe. 
5.9.3 Financial inquiries 
One of the mechanisms through which the national government monitors the financial affairs 
of rural local authorities is by conducting a financial inquiry. The Minister may appoint any 
person to examine the accounts and records of a rural local authority.
173
 The RDCA does not 
state the grounds upon which the Minister may institute a financial inquiry in a rural local 
authority. This means that the Minister has wide discretion to determine the grounds of 
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conducting a financial inquiry.
174
 When exercising these powers, the Minister is not required 
to report to Parliament or to any other institution. This means that there is no oversight on the 
exercise of the powers to conduct a financial inquiry, thus creating room for abuse of power. 
It is submitted that the grounds upon which the Minister may institute a financial inquiry 
should be recognised in legislation. Providing the grounds upon which the Minister may 
institute a financial inquiry will enable local authorities and other interested institutions to 
seek judicial review of the decision of the Minister in cases where inappropriate grounds are 
relied upon or if the required procedure is not followed. With respect to urban local 
authorities, there is no specific provision in the UCA which gives the national government 
the power to conduct a financial inquiry. Financial inquiries in urban local authorities are 
carried out in terms of the general provisions of the UCA, which empowers the Minister to 
institute investigations and inquiries.
175
 It is submitted that this is another area where there is 
inconsistency in the supervisory framework governing rural and urban local authorities which 
the envisaged new Act on local government should address. 
5.9.4 Challenges to effective monitoring of finances 
While the departments of the Ministry of Local Government responsible for supervising local 
authorities seem to have skilled personnel, they have limited resources to effectively monitor 
the financial affairs of local authorities. The Portfolio Committee on Local Government, 
Rural and Urban Development noted that the departments failed to monitor US$16 160 000 
which was allocated to local authorities, under the PSIP, for the rehabilitation of water and 
sewer infrastructure.
176
 The reason cited is that the departments did not have suitable vehicles 
to undertake the monitoring. Consequently, the departments could not ensure that the money 
was used for the purposes intended. The Portfolio Committee highlighted that the lack of 
resources to support the role of the departments is a „recipe for financial improprieties‟ and 
may lead to cases of misappropriation of money at local level going undetected for a long 
time.
177
 Thus, it is submitted that the departments should be resourced so that they can 
effectively monitor the financial affairs of not only local authorities but also provincial and 
metropolitan councils. It is suggested that the national government should develop an 
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extensive data system that will allow quantitative monitoring and evaluation of the financial 
performance of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
178
 
This section discussed the monitoring of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities by the national government. It was argued that majority of the monitoring tools at 
the disposal of the national government are too intrusive on local autonomy and undermine 
the institutional integrity of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. It was 
further argued that some of the monitoring mechanisms such as systems audits are very 
effective especially if they are carried out regularly. Hence, it is suggested that such measures 
should be legally recognised to remove the ad hoc nature that characterises them. It is 
however important to ensure that reporting and compliance requirements placed on provincial 
and local governments are reasonable, especially in light of administrative costs.
179
 The 
section also established that there are a number of mechanisms established to monitor the 
financial affairs of subnational governments. It was submitted that these mechanisms are 
effective ways of monitoring the financial affairs of the subnational governments. What is 
required is the capacitation of relevant institutions which are charged with monitoring the 
financial affairs of subnational governments so that they are able to carry out this task 
effectively. 
6. Support  
It was contended in Chapter Two that the effective functioning of a multilevel system of 
government relies in part on the support which senior governments render to junior 
governments.
180
 Support refers to measures of assistance to ensure that junior governments 
are able to perform their functions adequately.
181
 In the South African context, support is 
understood to take two forms, namely, supervisory and cooperative support.
182
 Supervisory 
support is carried out „to prevent a decline or degeneration of structures, powers and 
functions‟,183 whereas cooperative support is not aimed at preventing decline but rather at 
supporting lower tier(s) of government in the achievement of common goals.
184
 Support may 
be general in nature or specific, where it is used to resolve specific problems identified 
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through monitoring.
185
 It is particularly important for the institutional development of local 
government which usually lacks the capacity to deliver on its often demanding obligations. In 
this section, the chapter examines the ways in which the national government supports 
provincial and metropolitan councils. It seeks to establish whether there is an obligation for 
senior governments to support junior governments. 
6.1 Constitutional framework 
The Constitution does not explicitly require national government to provide general support 
to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities, nor does it require provincial 
and metropolitan councils to support local authorities. The Constitution nonetheless 
establishes a multilevel system of government with government organised at the national, 
provincial and local levels.
186
 Implied in this hierarchical organisation of government is the 
obligation which higher tiers of government have to support lower tiers of government. The 
argument is that the national government‟s responsibility to monitor and regulate lower tiers 
of government goes hand in hand with the corresponding obligation to support these lower 
tiers of government. This argument is supported by the economic blueprint of the 
government, ZimAsset. The plan provides for the provision of finance, equipment and human 
resources support to local authorities to improve their capacity to deliver on their 
obligations.
187
 
Unlike the position in respect of general support, the Constitution explicitly requires the 
national government to provide financial support to provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities.
188
 As highlighted in the previous chapter, the Constitution provides for 
transfer of conditional and non-conditional grants to provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities.
189
 Such intergovernmental grants will complement local resource-raising 
efforts and enable provincial and metropolitan councils to deliver on their obligations. In this 
section, the study will not dwell much on financial support offered to provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities since it was discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter. 
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6.2 Statutory framework 
Financial support to provincial and local governments by itself is likely not to be enough for 
these governments to deliver effectively on their mandate. Other forms of support, including 
technical, human resources and cooperative support,
190
 are essential. The Ministry of Local 
Government has the primary responsibility to support provincial and metropolitan councils 
and local authorities.
191
 It provides technical, human resource and financial support.
192
 The 
Ministry also coordinates the technical support offered to provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities by other sectoral ministries.
193
 For example, under ZimAsset 
the Ministry responsible for environment is required to provide support to local authorities so 
as to enhance their capacity to manage pollution and waste.
194
 This form of support will be 
coordinated by the Ministry of Local Government. In this section, the chapter will discuss the 
manner in which the national government has supported local authorities. Support to 
provincial councils is not given attention as it mainly took the form of human resource 
support, which was discussed in Chapter Five. 
6.3 Land use planning and development control 
The national government does not only regulate and monitor local authorities in the areas of 
land use planning and development control, but also provides support to local authorities. The 
Department of Physical Planning provides technical support in the area of land use planning 
and development control to local authorities. The technical support is usually given to low 
capacity local authorities such as rural local authorities and local boards.
195
 A significant 
number of rural local authorities have always relied on the technical support of the 
Department of Physical Planning for land use-related responsibilities. 
6.4 Disaster management 
The Department of Civil Protection, which also falls under the Ministry of Local 
Government, provides material and non-material support to local authorities. The main 
functions of the Department are to „ensure the attainment of optimal capacity for disaster risk 
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management and integration of disaster risk reduction into development for sustainability‟.196 
The Department has played an important role in supporting local authorities to manage 
disasters. For example, over the years, the Department has assisted Muzarabani Rural Local 
Authority in managing floods in the Muzarabani communal area. The Department has also 
been instrumental in sourcing equipment for managing disasters such as fire engines and 
ambulances for local authorities.
197
 
6.5 Other forms of support 
Support from the national government to local authorities also took the form of capacity-
building.
198
 The nature of this support is directed at developing the knowledge and skills of 
employees of local authorities so that they can have the capability to undertake their duties. 
Since independence, the national government embarked on capacity-building programs in 
local authorities, the notable one being the capacity-building program in rural local 
authorities undertaken in the 1990s. However, this form of support has not been sustainable. 
Like many other support initiatives the capacity-building program ended as a „white elephant‟ 
project due to lack of resources, among other reasons. The internal audit unit of the Ministry 
used to provide technical assistance in the preparation of financial statements especially to 
rural local authorities.
199
 After this form of support was withdrawn a significant number of 
rural local authorities have struggled to produce financial statements on the required dates.
200
 
This section discussed some of the ways in which the national government have supported 
local authorities. A major observation is that general support is not structured and depends on 
the goodwill of national ministries and departments. These ministries and departments are 
often reluctant to provide support to local authorities. Given that national ministries and 
agencies are usually reluctant to support junior governments, it may be necessary to impose a 
statutory obligation for them to support junior governments. Such an obligation can force the 
national government and its agencies to provide support to junior governments. Hence, it is 
submitted that Parliament should consider imposing such an obligation on national 
departments and ministries.
201
 Support is especially critical in the delivery of core public 
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services, such as water, health and sanitation. The national government must provide general 
and specific support to junior governments to prevent the degeneration of a council or local 
authority which will warrant an intervention.
202
 Thus, the absence of capacity at the 
subnational level should not be used as an excuse by the national government not to devolve 
power.
203
 
7. Intervention  
Supervision may be carried out through intervention. Intervention refers to the competence, 
and sometimes obligation, of senior governments to direct activities and outcomes of junior 
governments so as to remedy an „unacceptable situation‟.204 An „unacceptable situation‟ may 
arise when a junior government fails to deliver on its legislative obligations or perform to the 
standards set by senior governments. Intervention is particularly necessary if the monitoring 
mechanisms reveal serious shortcomings and support mechanisms have been unable to 
remedy these shortcomings.
205
 The aim of an intervention is not merely the fulfilment of an 
obligation that a junior government failed to fulfil but to ensure that such an obligation will 
be fulfilled in the future.
206
 Interventions intrude into the autonomy of a government. It was 
contended in Chapter Two that interventions should therefore be taken as a measure of last 
resort and subject to specific procedures.
207
 Further, it was submitted that the right of senior 
governments to intervene in subnational affairs should be coupled with mechanisms to 
protect the autonomy of junior governments. The autonomy of junior governments is mostly 
secured if the Constitution imposes limitations and provides oversight mechanisms on the use 
of powers to intervene by senior governments.
208
 The question is whether the constitutional 
and statutory framework for multilevel governance in Zimbabwe provides for such 
safeguards to local autonomy. 
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7.1 Constitutional framework 
Like other forms of supervision, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the role of 
senior governments to intervene in the affairs of junior governments. The implication of this 
is that the national government determines the intervention rules. Unregulated interventions 
present a danger to local autonomy.
209
 It may be argued that there are no limits to the use of 
intervention powers.
210
 The absence of constitutional limitations on intervention powers 
means that there are no checks and balances on the exercise of such powers. Under such a 
multilevel system of government, intervention powers may be used to achieve selfish 
political ends, for instance, to undermine the authority of a provincial council, metropolitan 
council or local authority under the control of an opposition political party.
211
 It is however 
submitted that while the Constitution is silent about the intervention powers of the national 
government, it provides a set of values and principles which should shape the development of 
intervention rules. These key values and principles include: 
a) the objective of giving power to the people to make decisions that affect them;212 
b) the devolution of power to lower governments;213 
c) the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their own 
development;214 
d) the geographical, functional and institutional integrity of provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities;215 and 
e) cooperative governance.216 
Thus, the development of a statutory framework providing for intervention should be 
informed by these values and principles, which suggest a rule-based form of supervision 
exercised within limits and subject to oversight. 
7.2 Statutory framework 
The national government has enacted various acts of Parliament which give the Minister the 
right to intervene at provincial and local levels.
217
 The main pieces of legislation which give 
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the Minister the power to intervene in local authorities are the UCA, RDCA and Regional 
Town and Country Planning Act. The Provincial Councils and Administration Act empowers 
the Minister to intervene in provincial affairs. Other sectoral legislation provides for various 
forms of intervention in local affairs. Interventions mainly take the form of directives; 
assumption of responsibility; suspension and dismissal of officials; suspension, reversal and 
rescinding of council resolutions; rectification of „omitted acts‟; assumption of legislative 
powers; assumption of a financial duty; and elimination of budget deficits.
218
 These 
interventions will be examined in this section. The section seeks to establish whether these 
interventions present an appropriate balance between the need for intervention and the 
requirement for local discretion, a key attribute if provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities are to assist in the realisation of development, democracy and sustainable 
peace.
219
 
7.3 Directives 
Intervention into subnational affairs takes the form of directives which are issued by the 
national government. Directives have been the most common intervention form, especially at 
local level. 
7.3.1 Provincial and Metropolitan Councils 
The Minister may direct a provincial council to take such action as he or she „considers 
necessary‟ if in his or her opinion the provincial council has failed to carry out any legislative 
obligation.
220
 While the powers of the Minister to direct certain actions may be necessary, the 
above provision gives the Minister wide discretion and unfettered powers. The Minister does 
not only have the power to issue directives but to decide whether a provincial council has 
failed to fulfil a statutory obligation. Such wide discretion is prone to abuse for political ends 
at the expense of local autonomy. It is proposed that the South African form of rule-based 
supervision of discussed in paragraph 5.6.1 above be adopted as it provides adequate 
intergovernmental checks and balances to safeguard local autonomy.
221
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7.3.2 Rural Local authorities 
The Minister may direct a rural local authority when constructing or repairing roads, dams 
and waterworks, or when carrying out any other activity, to make use of services provided by 
the national government.
222
 Further, the Minister may issue directives to a rural local 
authority „if in his opinion‟ it has failed to carry out a statutory obligation.223 Before issuing 
such directives, the Minister must give the concerned rural local authority an opportunity to 
submit any representations it may wish to make in connection therewith.
224
 The Minister also 
has the power to direct rural local authorities to establish joint committees (and boards)
225
 if 
„it appears to the Minister that it would be of advantage‟ to do so.226 In practice, the directives 
take the form of circulars which are sent to local authorities.
227
 
It is submitted that the above-described powers allow the Minister to direct a rural local 
authority on how it must exercise its executive powers. Thus, the Minister is empowered to 
usurp the power of rural local authorities to exercise executive powers.
228
 The difficulty with 
this kind of power arises when there is no shared vision between the Minister and a rural 
local authority, especially those local authorities which are controlled by political parties 
other than the one which the Minister belongs to.
229
 Furthermore, the Minister is not required 
to report to Parliament or any other body when issuing such directives. This means that there 
is no oversight of the power of the Minister to issue directives to rural local authorities. 
Therefore, there are no measures to counter possible abuse of power by the Minister.
230
 
7.3.3 Urban Local Authorities  
The Minister has the power to issue policy directives of a „general character‟ to local 
authorities „as appear to the Minister to be requisite in the national interest‟.231 Where the 
Minister is proposing to issue a directive to a local authority, he or she is required to give the 
local authority concerned 30 days or such period he or she may determine to comment on the 
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proposal.
232
 In particular, the concerned local authorities should comment on the possible 
implications of the proposed directive on its financial and other resources. Such consultative 
requirements are commendable as they promote cooperative governance required by the 2013 
Constitution.
233
 However, this provision still presents a threat to local autonomy due to the 
way it is phrased. The liberal interpretation allowed by the term „national interests‟ has been 
addressed earlier in the chapter.
234
 It is nevertheless important to note that unlike any other 
supervisory powers, the power of the Minister is limited to issuing policy directives which 
are general in character. 
It is submitted that policy directives of a general character mean directives which set out the 
national framework within which local authorities operate. The Minister may not, for 
example, direct a local authority to employ a particular person as opposed to another. In this 
particular instance, what the Minister may do is set the minimum qualifications for 
employment. To the contrary, in practice the Minister has issued some directives which may 
not be considered to be of a general character, as required by the UCA. For instance, in a 
directive dated 29 September 2010, the Minister directed that „no local authority may employ 
any staff member at any level or grade, including casual or contract workers‟, without his 
written permission.
235
 The directive further provided that „where compelling reasons exist for 
recruitment, these should be submitted, together with details of employment costs and the 
relevant revenue source, to the Minister for his consideration‟.236 The Minister justified the 
directive based on what he called the need to „rationalise employment costs and the need to 
clear salary and statutory obligations arrears‟. What this directive means in essence is that 
local authorities may not recruit without the approval of the Minister. 
It is submitted that this directive is not a directive of a „general character‟ as it requires a 
specific act, that is, approval of the Minister before a local authority may employ staff.
237 
This directive takes away the powers of local authorities to hire and fire their own staff which 
are necessary for local authorities to fully exercise their „right to govern‟ their areas, as 
provided in the 2013 Constitution.
238
 It is just one example of many directives which have 
been issued by the Minister that go beyond general policy-setting. The other example relates 
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to the directive to write off of debts, discussed in Chapter Seven.
239
 It can be argued that in 
such cases the power to issue policy directives have been incorrectly exercised by the 
Minister. Thus, it is submitted that the power of the Minister to issue directives should be 
reformed in line with the 2013 Constitution.
240
 In particular, there is need for a clear 
distinction between regulatory and intervention powers, with the latter requiring oversight 
mechanisms.
241
 
7.4 Power to suspend and dismiss councillors and members of provincial and 
metropolitan councils 
It was contended in Chapter Two that once public officials at subnational level have been 
elected into office, officials of senior governments should not be empowered to arbitrarily 
remove locally elected officials.
242
 It was further argued that locally elected officials should 
only be removed from office after following due process of the law or through democratic 
means such as elections. Nonetheless, this should not be interpreted to mean that corrupt and 
incompetent public officials should not be removed from their positions. Rather there should 
be checks and balances in the exercise of the power to remove locally elected officials from 
office. Such checks and balances in the removal of locally elected officials from office did 
not exist under the Lancaster House Constitution but have been provided for in the 2013 
Constitution. This democratic improvement will be discussed in this section. 
7.4.1 Lancaster House Constitution 
Under the Lancaster House Constitution the President had the power to suspend and dismiss 
any councillor in a rural local authority from exercising all or any of their functions if he 
„considers it necessary or desirable to do so in the public interest or in the interest of the 
inhabitants of a council area‟.243 In urban local authorities, the Minister could suspend and 
dismiss councillors on a number of grounds, including corruption or misconduct.
244
 The 
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powers of the President and the Minister to suspend and dismiss councillors raised certain 
interpretive challenges. For instance, it was difficult to establish when it becomes „necessary‟ 
or „desirable‟ to suspend a councillor to protect or promote „public interests‟ or the „interests 
of the inhabitants of a council area‟. It could be argued that the President and the Minister 
enjoyed wide powers simply because terms such as „public interest‟ or „interest of the 
inhabitants of the council area‟ cannot be precisely defined.245 In practice, the exercise of the 
power to suspend and dismiss councillors was controversial, especially in urban local 
authorities.
246
 Between 1999 and 2008, the Minister suspended and/or dismissed a number of 
councillors and/or councils on varying allegations of poor performance, „shady‟ tendering 
procedures, corruption, mismanagement and incompetence.
247
 Most of the councillors or 
councils that were suspended and/or dismissed were aligned to the MDC, while the 
incumbent Minister was aligned to ZANU-PF.
248
 For instance, between 2000 and 2005, the 
Minister suspended and/or dismissed the Mayors of the City of Harare, Chitungwiza 
Municipal Council, Kariba Town Council and City of Mutare.
249
 Of the four mayors, three 
were aligned to the MDC, while the one of Kariba was aligned to ZANU-PF. 
In the case of the City of Harare, despite the fact that the High Court exonerated Councillor 
Machetu and other councillors from charges of dishonesty, abuse of office and 
mismanagement which were being leveled against them, the Minister dismissed them from 
their positions.
250
 The court later ordered their reinstatement as councillors, stating that the 
decision by the Minister to dismiss them was grossly unreasonable.
251
 On the other hand, in 
Manyame Rural District Council, Councillor Manhambo was dismissed by the Minister on 
the grounds of abusing funds. Councillor Manhambo, who is aligned to ZANU-PF, was later 
reinstated by the Minister under unclear circumstances.
252
 The Portfolio Committee on Local 
Government raised concerns about this „selective application of the law‟ where ZANU-PF 
aligned councillors were pardoned by the Minister while those councillors aligned to MDC 
were suspended and dismissed.
253
 Arbitrary though the suspensions and dismissals may seem 
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to be, the Minister relied on his powers under the UCA.
254
 The suspensions and dismissals 
were a major challenge to not only local democracy but also negatively affected the ability of 
local authorities to deliver on their responsibilities.
255
 It is as a result of these challenges that 
the 2013 Constitution reformed the supervisory mechanism in relation to the suspension and 
dismissal of councillors. 
7.4.2 2013 Constitution 
Prior to the adoption of the 2013 Constitution there were no constitutional limitations on the 
power of the Minister or the President to suspend and/or dismiss councillors, chairpersons 
and mayors of local authorities.
256
 The 2013 Constitution has reformed the supervisory 
mechanisms in this respect. First, the Minister or President no longer has the power to 
suspend or dismiss mayors, chairpersons and councillors.
257
 That role has been assigned to an 
independent tribunal.
258
 Unlike under the Lancaster House Constitution, which allowed the 
President to remove members of provincial councils from office, the 2013 makes provision 
for the role of an independent tribunal to exercise that responsibility.
259
 Secondly, the 
grounds upon which mayors, chairpersons and councillors may be removed from office by 
the tribunal have been limited to: 
a) the inability to perform the functions of their office due to mental or physical 
incapacity; 
b) gross incompetence; 
c) conviction of an offence involving dishonesty, corruption or abuse of office; or 
d) wilful violation of the law, including a local authority by-law.260 
Similar grounds are provided for the removal of members of provincial and metropolitan 
councils from office by the independent tribunal.
261
 
The constitutional recognition of the grounds upon which locally elected officials may be 
removed from office is commendable.
262
 The grounds are however broadly framed and this 
may reduce the level of protection offered to councillors, mayors, chairpersons and members 
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of provincial and metropolitan councils.
263
 For example, what constitutes gross incompetence 
and misconduct? The removal from office on the ground of „willful violation‟ of law 
including a by-law encompasses a variety of aspects from serious crimes to minor breaches of 
by-laws. This makes it almost unreasonable to remove officials on the basis of minor law 
transgressions.
264
 For instance, can a councillor be dismissed from office for violating 
parking by-laws? Hence, it is suggested that national legislation should specify the nature of 
the violations which warrant removal from office of an official. As of July 2014, the relevant 
tribunal(s) had not been established, as the new acts on provincial and local government were 
yet to be passed. This has created a vacuum in terms of disciplining councillors. It is 
suggested that instead of establishing different tribunals for local authorities, on one hand, 
and provincial and metropolitan councils, on the other, legislation should make provision for 
the establishment of a single independent tribunal which can exercise a disciplinary role at 
both provincial and local levels. This will not only reduce costs but assist in developing a 
single supervisory mechanism. 
7.5 Power to assume local responsibilities 
It was contended in paragraph 6.4.3.3 of Chapter Two that following the suspension or 
dissolution of a locally elected body or local executives, the law should determine the 
resumption of their duties in as short a period of time as possible.
265
 It was further argued that 
a similar requirement should apply in cases where a senior government has assumed a local 
responsibility. The chapter also stressed that the guiding principle of intervention into local 
affairs is that interventions must be constructive and not driven by the motive to penalise or 
to score political goals.
266
 The extent to which the Zimbabwean multilevel system of 
government complies with this normative framework becomes important to safeguard local 
autonomy. The national government has the power to assume the responsibilities of local 
authorities. The Minister may appoint commissioners or caretakers to act as the council. In 
rural local authorities, the national government can assume the estate development function 
and responsibilities related to public infrastructure and cooperation agreements on behalf of 
the council. These supervisory powers are examined below. 
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7.5.1 Role of caretakers and commissioners 
7.5.1.1 Appointment, functions and term of office 
The power to appoint caretakers or commissioners to act as the council is perhaps one of the 
most significant powers of the Minister.
267
 The Minister may appoint caretaker(s) or 
commissioner(s) to assume the responsibilities of a local authority if there are no councillors 
in an urban and rural local authority, respectively.
268
 The Minister may also appoint 
caretaker(s) or commissioner(s) in urban and rural local authorities to act as the council if all 
councillors are suspended or imprisoned or are otherwise unable to exercise all or some of 
their functions.
269
 The functions and term of office of the caretaker(s) or commissioner(s) are 
determined by the Minister.
270
 In urban local authorities, the term of office of caretakers 
expires as soon as there are elected councillors for the local authority or 90 days after the date 
of their appointment.
271
 In rural local authorities, the term of office expires as soon as there 
are elected councillors or six months after the date of their appointment, whichever occurs 
sooner.
272
 This means that the term of office of caretakers may not go beyond 90 days, whilst 
that of commissioners may go up to six months. There is no rational justification for this 
difference. This reflects another case of inconsistency in the supervisory framework which 
the envisaged new Act on local government should address. Further, it is submitted that the 
term of office of commissioners should be limited as far as possible to allow for the 
resumption of responsibilities by the (new) council in as short a period of time as possible.
273
 
7.5.1.2 Role of caretakers and commissioners in practice 
The appointment of caretakers and commissions has been a contentious issue, especially in 
urban local authorities.
274
 Since independence, a number of caretakers or commissioners have 
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been appointed, mostly in urban local authorities, following the dismissal or suspension of 
councillors. Although commissioners or caretakers are not meant to be permanent features in 
a local authority, the terms of office of some commissioners have been continuously renewed 
and general elections of councillors postponed against legislative prescriptions.
275
 Kamete 
argues that the nature of individuals who have been appointed as caretakers or commissioners 
suggest that the Minister was pursuing hidden political agendas to regain control of local 
authorities which were run by MDC-dominated councils.
276
 Some scholars have argued in 
support by claiming that commissioners or caretakers who were appointed to administer local 
authorities were known „supporters‟ and „sympathisers‟ of ZANU-PF.277 
The legitimacy of commissioners and caretakers, as local decision-makers, has not gone 
unquestioned by citizens. In 2002, the citizens of Harare approached the courts questioning 
the continual reappointment of commissioners by the Minister. In Stevenson v Minister of 
Local Government and National Housing and Others,
278
 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
declared that it is illegal for the Minister to renew the term of office of commissioners. The 
court stated that the Minister could not avoid causing a general election of councils to be 
organised by continually extending the term of office of the commissioners.
279
 The Court 
further reasoned that section 80(5) of the UCA, which was the basis upon which the Minister 
continually reappointed commissioners, „was not meant to be a vehicle for the postponement 
of general elections of councillors‟.280 Thus, the Minister by continually reappointing 
commissioners was actually usurping the right of the electorate to elect councillors who 
would govern their affairs.
281
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It is submitted that although the power of the national government to remove officials who 
defy legislative obligations and the subsequent appointment of caretakers is essential,
282
 such 
powers should not be exercised without limitations. As argued in paragraph 6.4.3.2 of chapter 
Two, the exercise of this kind of supervisory power should be checked by adequate oversight 
mechanisms to counter abuse of such powers.
283
 The UCA and RDCA do not provide such 
checks and balances in the appointment and role of caretakers or commissioners.
284
 This 
presents a danger to local democracy. Thus, it is submitted that the power of the Minister to 
appoint caretakers should be reviewed by Parliament so as to provide the necessary checks 
and balances.
285
 Parliament should determine whether the appointment of a caretaker (or 
commissioner) is necessary. If necessary, it should approve the terms of reference of the 
caretaker. 
7.5.2 Assumption of responsibilities 
7.5.2.1 Public infrastructure 
The national government has the power to assume responsibilities of rural local authorities 
relating to public infrastructure and estate development. For instance, the Minister may direct 
a rural local authority when constructing or repairing roads, dams, waterworks, or carrying 
out any other activity, to make use of services provided by the national government.
286
 This 
could include services
287
 provided by the Zimbabwe National Road Agency, District 
Development Fund and National Public Works Department. If the concerned rural local 
authority fails to follow the directives of the Minister, the Minister may take appropriate 
action on behalf of the council and recover the expenses incurred in connection therewith 
from the local authority.
288
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7.5.2.2 Estate development 
While the power to assume responsibilities relating to public infrastructure may only be used 
in rural local authorities, the Minister has the power to assume estate development in all local 
authorities. The Minister may direct both urban and rural local authorities to undertake estate 
development, including provision of serviced stands, land and buildings.
289
 If the concerned 
local authority fails to comply with such a directive, the Minister may undertake estate 
development on behalf of the local authority.
290
 
7.5.2.3 Cooperative agreements 
The Minister has the power to enter into a cooperative government agreement on behalf of a 
local authority. The Minister may direct a local authority to enter into a cooperative 
agreement with the national government, local authority, or private person, if in his „opinion‟ 
such an agreement would be of „public or local advantage.‟291 If the local authority concerned 
fails or refuses to implement the directive within the period directed by the Minister, the 
Minister may enter into such an agreement on behalf of the rural local authority.
292
 Such an 
agreement entered into by the Minister is binding on the rural local authority. 
It is submitted that the provisions of the UCA and RDCA described above give the Minister 
„unlimited‟ powers and treat local authorities as „appendages‟ of the national government.293 
Bland argues that the power of the Minister to direct a rural local authority to use services 
provided by the national government constitutes excessive intervention powers.
294
 The same 
can be said of the powers of the Minister to act on behalf of local authorities with regard to 
estate development and cooperative agreements.
295
 It is submitted that such intervention 
powers are not consistent with the spirit of the 2013 Constitution which defines local 
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authorities as tiers of government.
296
 Hence, it is argued that such powers of the Minister 
should be abolished.
297
 
7.6 Power to suspend, reverse, alter and rescind resolutions and decisions 
It was contended in paragraph 6.1.3.4 of Chapter Two that when responsibilities are 
decentralised to the subnational level senior governments should make decisions on those 
functions only in cases were a junior government has failed to deliver on those 
responsibilities.
298
 The argument is that significant involvement of senior governments in 
local decision-making processes constrains the overall process of decentralisation.
299 
The 
question of how much the national government should be involved in local decision-making 
processes is one of the most contested issues in discussions around multilevel governance in 
Zimbabwe. The national government has the power to suspend, reverse and rescind 
resolutions or any other decision of a council. The Minister may direct a council to reverse, 
suspend or rescind a resolution or decision or to reverse or suspend such action if he is of the 
view that the resolution, decision or action is not in the „public interest‟ or in the „interest of 
the inhabitants of the council area‟.300 In rural local authorities, the Minister may only direct a 
council to rescind or alter its resolutions and not suspend any of decisions or actions.
301
 This 
is another area where there is inconsistency in the supervisory framework which the 
envisaged new Act on local government should address. 
The Minister has exercised this form of intervention on a number of occasions, both in rural 
and urban local authorities. For instance in 2011, the Minister directed the council of 
Chitungwiza Municipality to rescind its resolution to purchase a motor vehicle for the Deputy 
Mayor.
302
 In the same letter, the Minister directed the council to rescind the resolutions which 
resulted in the change of use of stand number 12082 in Zengeza 4 and stand number 8161 in 
Zengeza 3 meant for a school and police post, respectively. In another local authority, 
Chinhoyi Municipality, the Minister directed the council to rescind the resolution to re-tender 
the Emergency Rehabilitation Project of the Municipality.
303
 Thus, these intervention powers 
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of the Minister have far-reaching implications on local authorities.
304
 Two challenges can be 
identified in relation to the power of the Minister to reverse, suspend, alter or rescind 
resolutions of a council or to reverse or suspend any action taken by a council. These are 
discussed below. 
7.6.1 Limited room for local discretion 
The first challenge identified with the power of the Minister to nullify, reverse, suspend or 
alter decisions, resolutions and actions of a local authority is that it undermines local 
autonomy. The argument is that the council, as the governing body of a local authority, does 
not have power to make binding decisions on their affairs since the Minister may rescind, 
reverse, suspend or alter such decisions, resolutions or actions. Machingauta contends that the 
supervisory powers of the Minister, such as the power to alter, reverse, suspend or rescind 
council, present a good example of an imbalance which exists between supervision and local 
discretion in the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government.
305
 It is submitted that this 
form of intervention is contrary to the 2013 Constitution, which gives local authorities the 
„right to govern‟.306 The enhanced status which local authorities enjoy under the new 
constitutional order requires that such powers of the Minister be reformed to safeguard local 
discretion, as discussed below.
307
 
7.6.2 Absence of oversight mechanisms 
The second challenge identified with the power of the Minister to nullify, reverse, suspend or 
alter decisions, resolutions and actions of a local authority is that there is no oversight on the 
exercise of these powers.
308
 In urban local authorities, the Minister may direct a council to 
reverse, suspend or rescind its resolution or decision or to reverse or suspend its action if it is 
in the „public interest‟ or „interest of the inhabitants of the council area‟ to do so. As argued 
above, terms such as „public interests or „interest of the inhabitants of the council area‟ do not 
have a clear meaning.
309
 In rural local authorities, the Minister has the discretion to determine 
the circumstances under which a resolution of the council has to be rescinded or altered. In 
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both urban and rural local authorities, the Minister does not have an obligation to an 
independent body such as Parliament, for example, to justify why a resolution of a council 
must be reversed. 
The Minister clearly has wide discretionary powers which are unchecked by any other body 
to prevent or detect potential abuse of these supervisory powers.
310
 Some scholars claim that 
due to unfettered powers and absence of oversight mechanisms, the Minister has used the 
power to reverse, suspend and rescind council resolutions to gain political advantage.
311
 It 
should be noted nonetheless that the power to reverse, suspend and rescind resolutions and 
actions of local authorities may be necessary to protect the achievement of certain national 
and local goals. If a local authority undertakes an unreasonable action that undermines other 
neighbouring local authorities, for instance, the Minister should have the power to reverse 
such an action. To protect local autonomy, however, it is suggested that there is a need to 
legally recognise the exact circumstances under which the Minister may exercise the powers 
to nullify, reverse, suspend or alter decisions, resolutions and actions of a local authority. 
Further, the exercise of these intervention powers should be approved or reviewed by 
Parliament for checks and balances.
312
 
7.7 Rectifying ‘omitted acts’ 
Interventions in subnational affairs by the national government also take the form of 
rectification of „omitted acts‟.313 If a provincial council fails to carry out any „act or thing‟ 
required by legislation, the Minister may „order all such steps to be taken which in his 
opinion are necessary or desirable to rectify such act or thing‟.314 The Minister has similar 
powers in relation to local authorities.
315
 It is submitted that even though the powers of the 
Minister to rectify a failure by a provincial council or local authority to undertake a 
legislative obligation are necessary, the statutory framework gives the Minister wide 
discretion and unfettered powers.
316
 There is no limitation to the exercise of powers by the 
Minister since he or she can „order all such steps‟ which in his or her opinion are necessary to 
rectify „omitted acts‟. It is further submitted that the basis for intervention, that of failure to 
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undertake an „act or thing‟, is too wide. It is difficult to establish the meaning of an „act or 
thing‟. As a result, the Minister has an unfettered power to determine the „omitted act or 
thing‟ upon which he or she can make a decision to intervene.317 Moreover, there are no 
oversight mechanisms to check potential abuse of these intervention powers.
318
 The Minister 
is not required to report to other arms of government when undertaking this form of 
supervision. The absence of oversight mechanisms presents a danger to local autonomy. It is 
submitted that these powers of the Minister are no longer consistent with the 2013 
Constitution, which guaranteed a certain measure of autonomy to provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities.
319
 
7.8 Assumption of law-making powers 
It is argued that the exercise of legislative powers by junior governments is an important 
expression of local autonomy.
320
 It is further argued that laws made by junior governments 
are important tools through which local citizens, via democratically elected councils or 
assemblies, express their interests and preferences.
321
 It is therefore crucial that the 
supervisory powers of senior governments do not encroach on the law-making terrain of 
junior governments.
322
 The national government in Zimbabwe has the power to encroach on 
the law-making terrain of local authorities. As argued in Chapter Six, the Minister has the 
power to make by-laws or adopt model by-laws on behalf of the local authorities.
323
 This is 
perhaps the most far-reaching intervention power of the national government.
324
 
It is submitted that even though the national government should have the right to intervene in 
local affairs, the right of the Minister to make by-laws or adopt model by-laws on behalf of 
local authorities goes beyond supervision.
325
 Such powers allow the Minister to usurp the 
legislative authority of local authorities. These powers defy the rationale behind establishing 
a multilevel system of government which is to allow lower governments to respond to the 
needs of citizens, among other mechanisms, by making and implementing laws. As 
contended in Chapter Six the powers of the Minister to assume legislative powers of local 
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authorities are contrary to the principles, values and objectives of devolution in the 2013 
Constitution.
326
 Thus, such powers should be abolished as they represent an imbalance 
between need for supervision and the requirement of local autonomy.
327
 It is submitted that 
the role of the national government should be limited to regulation of the framework (which 
does not extend to approving by-laws) within which local authorities exercise their legislative 
powers. 
7.9 Financial interventions 
As argued above, it is important that there is explicit legal recognition of the conditions under 
which senior government may intervene at subnational level.
328
 This is important because, 
among other advantages, it creates predictability in the supervisory framework. It was also 
contended that an intervention into subnational affairs ought to be subjected to independent 
reviews for checks and balances.
329
 Local autonomy may be protected if the supervisory 
powers are exercised in such a way as to ensure that the intervention of the senior 
government is kept in proportion to the importance of the interests which it is intended to 
protect.
330
 The national government in Zimbabwe may intervene in local authorities to 
address finance-related problems.
331
 The Minister may issue financial directives, assume a 
financial duty or undertake any action to eliminate budget deficits.
332
 This section analyses 
these three forms of financial interventions. 
7.9.1 Financial directives 
The Minister may issue directives to a local authority to undertake certain actions relating to 
its finances and financial management.
333
 There are two instances where the Minister may 
issue financial directives to an urban local authority. First, when an urban local authority has 
„failed to give effect to any of the duties imposed upon it‟ by legislation.334 Second, when the 
„final accounts of a local authority for any financial year reveal an accumulated deficit on the 
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consolidated revenue account and the [local authority] has not provided to the satisfaction of 
the Minister for the elimination or reduction of such deficit‟.335 In rural local authorities, the 
Minister may only issue directives in the second instance.
336
 There is no justification for such 
differences. Hence, it is submitted that the envisaged new local government Act should 
address these differences so as to establish a consistent local government supervisory 
framework. In both urban and local authorities, the Minister is required to give the concerned 
local authority an opportunity to submit any representations it may wish to make before 
issuing any directives.
337
 This requirement is commendable in light of the need to promote 
cooperative governance among different tiers of government. 
It is submitted however that the provisions of the UCA and RDCA described above gives the 
Minister too-wide powers. In the first instance where the Minister may issue financial 
directives, the UCA does not explicitly recognise the failure which may warrant the issuance 
of a directive. The UCA only provides that the Minister may issue directives when an urban 
local authority has „failed to give effect to any of the duties imposed upon it‟ by 
legislation.
338
 Thus the Act gives the Minister wide discretion to determine the duties which 
the local authority would have failed to undertake. To protect local autonomy, it is suggested 
that there is need to recognise the financial problems (failures or obligations) which warrant 
an intervention. In the second instance, the Minister is also given wide discretion to 
determine whether any deficit elimination strategy is satisfactory.
339
 Hence, the Minister has 
unlimited powers to issue financial directives, presenting a threat to local autonomy.
340
 
Moreover, there are no oversight mechanisms on the use of such supervisory powers. 
7.9.2 Assumption of a financial duty 
The national government has the power to assume responsibilities of urban local authorities 
in relation to financial issues.
341
 As discussed above, if an urban local authority fails to 
undertake a statutory obligation related to its finances, the Minister may issue financial 
directives to such a local authority to rectify financial problems. If the concerned urban local 
authority fails to comply with such directives, the Minister may act on behalf of the 
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concerned local authority and recover any expenses incurred from that urban local 
authority.
342
 In the RDCA, there is no specific provision which empowers the Minister to 
assume a financial duty, unlike in urban local authorities. It can be argued that there is no 
justification for the differences in the supervisory regime in this regard. Thus, it is submitted 
that the Minister should also have the power to assume financial duties in rural local 
authorities in cases where a rural local authority has failed to carry out those duties. The UCA 
does not provide for oversight mechanisms in cases where the Minister would have assumed 
a financial duty at the local level.
343
 It is submitted that the legislation should be reformed to 
provide for oversight mechanisms in the use of any intervention powers, including the power 
to assume a financial duty.
344
 Parliament could play that oversight role in each case involving 
any form of financial intervention.
345
 
7.9.3 Elimination of budget deficits 
The national government has the power to address budget-related problems in both urban and 
rural local authorities. The Minister may direct certain actions so as to eliminate or reduce 
any budget deficit of a local authority.
346
 If a local authority fails to act in accordance with 
the directives of the Minister, the Minister may levy a special rate on all rateable property 
within the area of a local authority for the purpose of recovering expenses or eliminating or 
reducing any budget deficit.
347
 It is submitted that these powers of the Minister may be 
necessary to prevent a collapse of a local authority, which may result in that local authority 
failing to provide basic services to the citizens. However, as is the case with most supervisory 
powers, the Minister has unfettered powers in relation to the elimination of a budget deficit in 
a local authority.
348
 Furthermore, there are no oversight mechanisms on the exercise of the 
power to eliminate budget deficit. Thus, it is proposed that „whatever‟ measures of 
eliminating budget deficits (the Minister may direct a local authority to undertake or the 
Minister may undertake on behalf of a local authority) should be approved by Parliament. 
Such a requirement will allow Parliament to exercise oversight in relation to the exercise of 
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the Minister‟s powers to eliminate budget deficits at local level.349 This can go a long way in 
protecting local autonomy. 
This section examined the role of the national government to intervene in the affairs of 
provincial and metropolitan councils, and local authorities. It is submitted that the powers of 
the national government to intervene in subnational affairs represents an imbalance between 
the need for supervision and requirement for local autonomy.
350
 The autonomy of provincial 
and metropolitan councils and local authorities is further undermined by the fact that there are 
no adequate mechanisms to check the use of powers to intervene by the Minister.
351
 In this 
statutory environment, provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities are unlikely 
to play a significant role in the realisation of national and local goals such as development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. 
8. Conclusion 
The effective functioning of a multilevel system of government requires senior governments 
to supervise junior governments. Supervision is important to reduce the dangers of 
decentralisation or of a multilevel system of government such as corruption, macroeconomic 
instability and disparities. It is necessary to ensure that lower governments deliver on both 
local and national goals including effectice and efficient service delivery. Such supervision 
may be exercised through regulation, monitoring, support and intervention. The right to 
supervise nonetheless is not a right which should be exercised without limitations. It should 
not constrain the minimum level of local autonomy which lower tiers of government should 
enjoy in order to undertake an active role in the realisation of development, democracy and 
sustainable peace. It was submitted in this chapter that the 2013 Constitution does not provide 
sufficient safeguards to guarantee the autonomy of provincial and metropolitan councils and 
local authorities. The statutory framework for supervision does not guarantee local autonomy 
either. Instead, the national government, through the Minister, is given wide powers over 
almost all aspects of subnational governance, with no oversight mechanisms to provide 
checks and balances. The overall effect of this is that subnational governments have failed to 
deliver on their service delivery and development mandates. This should not be construed to 
mean that such failure should be attributed solely to the unlimited supervisory powers of the 
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Minister as there are other contributing factors such as the unstable economic environment 
being experienced in Zimbabwe. The Constitution nevertheless provides a foundation upon 
which a statutory framework can be built that not only strives to balance supervision and 
local autonomy but also cooperative relations among tiers of government. The following 
chapter explores opportunities for cooperative relations among tiers of government in 
Zimbabwe under the 2013 Constitution. 
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Chapter 9 
Intergovernmental relations 
1. Introduction 
The ability of a multilevel system of government to realise development, democracy and 
sustainable peace does not only depend on the supervisory relationships discussed in the 
previous chapter. It also requires cooperative relations among different tiers of government in 
addition to other factors such as decentralisation of fiscal resources. This chapter seeks to 
explore the development of these cooperative relations in the Zimbabwean multilevel system 
of government. It will be argued that although sound intergovernmental relations are not a 
„sufficient condition‟ for the achievement of development, democracy and sustainable peace, 
their absence is likely to undermine the achievement of these goals.
1
 Thus, it is important to 
establish an institutional, policy and legal framework that allows the development of an 
effective system of intergovernmental relations. As argued in paragraph 6.5 of Chapter Two, 
there are certain principles which are central to any effective system of intergovernmental 
relations. The principles are participation, consultation, respect, equality, transparency and 
predictability. It is argued these principles should generally inform the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations. 
The chapter begins by providing a background that informs an understanding of 
intergovernmental relations and cooperation in Zimbabwe before analysing the constitutional 
framework for intergovernmental relations in Zimbabwe. It then assesses the relevance under 
the 2013 Constitution of institutions which were established to promote coherent governance 
under the Lancaster House Constitution. The chapter assesses the potential role of provincial 
and metropolitan councils as intergovernmental relations structures before examining 
intergovernmental planning and budgeting as a vehicle of promoting effective governance in 
Zimbabwe. In the last section, the chapter develops a framework of effective 
intergovernmental relations with the intention of providing lessons to inform the development 
of an intergovernmental relations system in Zimbabwe, as required by the Constitution. 
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2. Defining intergovernmental relations and cooperation 
2.1 Intergovernmental relations 
Intergovernmental relations are interactions which develop or exist between governmental 
units of all types and levels in a multilevel system of government.
2
 These interactions are 
significant in a multilevel system of government because it is impossible to distribute powers 
and functions among governments within a nation state into „watertight compartments‟.3 In 
such a system, the overlap of powers and functions across tiers of government is unavoidable. 
Thus, governments are likely to be interdependent and interrelated. Effective governance 
under this system of „interdependence and interrelatedness may require governments 
organised at different levels to cooperate (as opposed to competing) with one another when 
discharging their responsibilities.
4
 Constitutional objectives such as preservation of peace and 
national unity, securing the public welfare of all Zimbabweans and coherent governance are 
more likely to be achieved if tiers of governments cooperate with one another.
5
 
2.2 Cooperation 
Cooperation is the „act of aligning and integrating governance across [tiers] of government so 
as to ensure coherence‟.6 It is different from supervision in that it takes place in a context of 
equality with each tier of government participating in intergovernmental relations as an equal 
partner.
7
 Equality of governments, as actors in intergovernmental relations, depends on a 
number of factors, including political will of officials at the national level to abide by 
decentralisation rules, „genuine interest‟ in pursuing national and local objectives, and the 
quality of human interaction. As will be argued below, in countries where there is no strong 
culture of cooperation among governments situated at different levels, such as Zimbabwe, it 
may be necessary to recognise in the Constitution (or legislation) the obligation for 
governments to cooperate with one another when performing their functions. As contended in 
paragraph 6.5.1 of Chapter Two, recognising in the Constitution (alternatively, in legislation) 
the need for cooperative relations among governments may assist in establishing the 
necessary foundation for a culture of cooperative governance. However, codification of 
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intergovernmental relations should be adopted with caution as it can foreclose options for 
negotiated intergovernmental relations which are more likely to establish lasting mechanisms 
for intergovernmental dispute resolution.
8
 The extent to which intergovernmental relations 
are codified will be examined below, but first a brief background is provided to the nature of 
the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government. The argument is that intergovernmental 
relations should be understood and developed in the context of this system. 
3. Background to intergovernmental relations and cooperative governance in 
Zimbabwe 
Prior to the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, the terms cooperative governance or 
intergovernmental relations were virtually unheard of in Zimbabwe. This can be attributed to 
the nature of the system of government which Zimbabwe had. The national government was 
the only tier of government exercising decision-making powers which it could delegate to 
creations of statutes such as provincial councils and local authorities.
9
 This meant that there 
were no intergovernmental relations to „talk‟ about since intergovernmental relations develop 
out of interactions between more than two governments organised at different levels. The 
situation has changed with the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, which makes provision for 
three tiers of government.
10
 This means that for the first time in the history of Zimbabwe 
there are relations between distinct governments. The major question is what mechanisms 
need to be put in place to ensure the development of constructive relations between the three 
tiers of government
 
to ensure that the multilevel system of government achieves 
development, democracy and sustainable peace, among other goals.
11
 Does the Constitution 
provide the necessary foundation for the development of cooperative relations among the 
three tiers of government? 
4. Constitutional framework 
The importance of cooperative relations among the three tiers of government has been 
recognised in the 2013 Constitution. The Constitution requires tiers of government to 
cooperate with one another when carrying out their responsibilities and obligations.
12
 Such a 
                                                 
8
 Tapscott 1998: 27. 
9
 See the Lancaster House Constitution. 
10
 See s 5 Constitution. 
11
 See the Aberdeen Principles 2005: 6. 
12
 S 194(1)(g) Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
415 
 
Chapter 9: Intergovernmental relations 
requirement extends to their respective institutions and agencies.
13
 The requirement for 
cooperative governance is further buttressed by section 265 of the Constitution which 
provides general principles of provincial and local government. The section provides that 
provincial and metropolitan councils must, within their spheres: 
a) ensure good governance by being effective, transparent, accountable and 
institutionally coherent; 
b) assume only those functions conferred on them by th[e] Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament; 
c) exercise their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, 
functional or institutional integrity of another tier of government; 
d) cooperate with one another, in particular by (i) informing one another of, and 
consulting one another on, matters of common interest (ii) harmonising and 
coordinating their activities; 
e) preserve the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe; 
f) secure the public welfare; and 
g) ensure the fair and equitable representation of people within their areas of jurisdiction. 
The State is required to take measures, including adopting laws, to promote cooperative 
governance.
14
 In addition, section 265(3) of the Constitution requires Parliament to enact a 
law providing for the coordination of activities of the three tiers of governments. The major 
question is what is „cooperative governance‟? What is the significance of cooperative 
governance in the 2013 Constitution? How is cooperation different from coordination? 
4.1 Defining cooperative governance 
The concept of cooperative government was adopted from South Africa where it forms the 
cornerstone of the South African multilevel system of government.
15
 In the South African 
context, Steytler and De Visser state that cooperative governance entails that „the spheres, 
bounded together by a common loyalty to the country, its people and the Constitution, must 
cooperate to “secure the well-being of the people of the Republic”‟.16 Therefore cooperative 
governance relates to the way tiers of government must govern in order to achieve overall 
constitutional objectives. It is different from competitive governance in that it places 
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constraints on tiers of government by imposing positive obligations to cooperate with one 
another.
17
 
Cooperative governance serves as a constraining principle on tiers of government when they 
exercise their powers and functions.
18
 It means that one tier of government or agency of 
government may not use its powers in such a way as to undermine the effective functioning 
of another tier of government or agency of government.
19
 Unlike competitive governance, 
cooperative governance „does not diminish the autonomy of any given [tier] of government‟. 
Cooperative governance „simply recognises the place of each within the whole and need for 
coordination in order to make the whole work‟.20 It has been submitted that the best way to 
realise cooperative governance is to „ensure that all branches do exactly what they are 
empowered to do and no more‟.21 It is this form of governance that the 2013 Constitution 
requires in order for the tiers of government to preserve peace and national unity and secure 
the public welfare, among other goals.
22
 To achieve these objectives the Constitution has 
provided a set of principles to govern the conduct of each tier of government and their 
respective agencies. These are discussed below. 
4.2 Principles of cooperative governance 
As described above, the Constitution provides the general principles of provincial and local 
government which among other objectives seek to promote cooperative governance. While 
section 265(1) of the Constitution seems to suggest that these principles bind only provincial 
and metropolitan councils, it is submitted that a purposive approach to interpretation should 
be adopted. Cooperative relations are not only important at subnational level but also when 
subnational governments interact with the national government.
23
 Thus, there is rationality in 
arguing for the application of these to all tiers of government, including the national 
government, to ensure effective multilevel governance. This is supported by the requirement 
for cooperative governance, not only between provincial and local governments but among 
the three tiers of government and their agencies, captured in section 194(1)(g) of the 
Constitution. 
                                                 
17
 See Steytler & De Visser 2009: 3-16. 
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 See Steytler & De Visser 2011: 22-127. 
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 See Woolman & Roux 2011: 14. 
20
 Woolman & Roux 2011: 14. 
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 Woolman & Roux 2011: 14-16. 
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The South African system of cooperative governance provided lessons in the development of 
the cooperative governance framework in the 2013 Constitution.
24
 In South Africa, the 
principles of cooperative governance were found to represent a statement of intent rather than 
a prescription for action.
25
 Steytler and De Visser highlight that these principles can be 
described as passive obligations of respect for the Constitution and other spheres of 
government.
26
 The principles should not be construed as „hard rules‟ of intergovernmental 
relations and cooperative governance and have to be given „normative content‟.27 It is 
therefore submitted that the national government in Zimbabwe, through policies and 
legislation, should give content to these values to promote effective governance. What 
follows is an in-depth examination of individual principles. 
4.2.1 Duty not to encroach on the geographical, functional and institutional 
integrity of another tier of government 
Section 265(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that tiers of government must „within their 
spheres exercise their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, 
functional or institutional integrity of another tier of government‟. This provision is a replica 
of section 41(1)(g) of the Constitution of South Africa. In Cape Metropolitan Council v 
Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, the Court ruled that section 
41(1)(g) „places a limitation or constraint on the manner in which a sphere of government or 
an organ of State may exercise its powers or perform its functions‟.28 The Court further stated 
that the section „appears to be directed at preventing one sphere of government from 
undermining others thereby preventing them from functioning effectively‟.29 What this means 
in the Zimbabwean context is that tiers of government and their agencies may not exercise 
powers beyond what the Constitution has given them. If they do so, they are likely to 
undermine the ability of other tiers of government or their agencies to deliver effectively on 
their functions. This principle reflects a constitutional protection of subnational governments 
                                                 
24
 See Chapter 4 Constitution of South Africa. 
25
 See Tapscott 1998: 20, Woolman & Roux 2011: 8-14, Steytler & De Visser 2009: 4-16. 
26
 Steytler & De Visser 2009: 4-16. 
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 See Steytler and De Visser 2009: 4-16. 
28
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in that it tends to limit the powers of national government to interfere with subnational 
decision-making processes.
30
 
4.2.2 Duty to cooperate 
Tiers of government „must‟ cooperate with another in particular by informing and consulting 
one another on matters of interest and to harmonise and coordinate their activities.
31
 This is a 
positive obligation that constrains the manner in which tiers of government exercise their 
powers and perform their functions.
32
 What does the duty to inform and consult one another 
entail? What is the meaning of harmonisation and coordination of government activities? 
These questions require interrogation which this section seeks to provide. 
4.2.2.1 Duty to inform one another 
The Constitution imposes an obligation on tiers of government to inform one another on 
matters of common interest.
33
 It is important to note that this duty of informing other tiers or 
agencies of government serves a very different function than that of consultation discussed 
below.
34
 In the case of consultation, the consulting tier or agency of government seeks views 
or information from another tier of government or agency of government to inform its own 
decision-making. With input from other tiers or agencies of government, the concerned tier or 
agency of government is likely to be in a position to make a better decision than if it had not 
sought views of other tiers or agencies of government. With information-sharing the tier or 
agency of government disseminating the information does not seek a response from the 
relevant tier or agency of government.
35
 Instead, the receiving tier or agency of government 
may take such information into consideration if and when it makes a decision on a related 
matter.
36
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4.2.2.2 Duty to consult one another 
Tiers and agencies of government „must‟ consult one another on matters of common 
interest.
37
 Consultation has been defined as „a process whereby the views of another on a 
specific matter are solicited, either orally or in writing, and considered‟.38 This could relate to 
law-making, policy-making and sharing of nationally raised revenue. The principle of 
consultation imposes a duty on each tier of government and their agencies to consider the 
views of other tiers of government and their agencies before they take a decision on the 
relevant matter.
39
 Steytler and De Visser argue that in the context of cooperative governance 
consultation has three basic elements, namely: 
a) an invitation to hear views of a particular party (or public in general) on a specified 
matter; 
b) an adequate opportunity to submit considered views; and 
c) the party inviting views must consider those views in good faith.
40
 
It is submitted that the invitation to hear the views of other parties can take one of two forms. 
In its passive form, „the party consulting extends a general invitation to interested parties or 
the public in general. By setting a closing date for responses, it leaves the addressees to 
decide whether or not to respond. The more active approach is to solicit actively the views of 
particular parties.‟41 It entails putting more effort into securing the views of stakeholders – in 
this context, tiers and agencies of government.
42
 This approach is particularly important when 
the Constitution or legislation imposes a duty to consult. 
It has further been argued that when there is a duty to consult with a particular body, „there 
must be conscious effort, directed to that party to achieve that end‟.43 Moreover, „while the 
consultant‟s decision-making cannot unreasonably be delayed by dilatory conduct by the 
party whose views are being sought, “an engagement to consult” should amount to more than 
a simple invitation to submit views‟.44 For example, when formulating provincial plans, 
provincial and metropolitan councils should not merely require local authorities to submit 
                                                 
37
 S 265(1)(d)(i) Constitution. 
38
 S 1(1) Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, South Africa. 
39
 See Woolman & Roux 2011: 14-17, Steytler & De Visser 2011: 134. 
40
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their plans but go further to consider local plans when formulating the provincial plan. 
However, failure by a provincial council to consult a local authority or to consider its views 
does not invalidate its plan. It nevertheless may undermine the effective functioning of the 
multilevel system of government since effectiveness of the system relies on constant dialogue 
among governmental units.
45
 Hence, it is submitted that tiers of government and their 
agencies should whenever possible take the active approach of consultation even though it 
can be time- and resource-consuming.
46
 
4.2.3 Duty to harmonise and coordinate activities. 
Significant decentralisation requires coordination of government activities between different 
tiers and agencies of government.
47
 The Constitution requires tiers of government to 
harmonise and coordinate their activities.
48
 De Visser argues that coordination signifies an 
effort by the national government to ensure that policies and actions of all governments are 
aligned.
49
 This means that, if circumstances require, the national government may use force 
to achieve intended results.
50
 Watts, on the other hand, defines coordination rather 
generously. He states that coordination occurs „where governments not only consult but 
attempt to develop mutually acceptable common policies and objectives, which they then 
apply and develop within their own jurisdiction‟.51 Thus, the duty to harmonise and 
coordinate activities goes beyond the duty to inform and consult one another discussed above. 
It is a recognition that the achievement of national and local goals is unlikely to occur when 
governments operate in isolation. It is also in line with one of the objectives of devolution in 
the Constitution which is to create coherent government in Zimbabwe as a whole.
52
 To 
achieve coherent government, section 265(3) of the Constitution directs Parliament to enact a 
law providing for „appropriate‟ mechanisms and procedures to facilitate coordination 
between the three tiers of government.
53
 It is submitted that there is an urgent need to enact 
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this piece of legislation given the importance of coordinated governance to the effective 
functioning of the multilevel system of government.
54
 
In this section it was observed that the 2013 Constitution provides an enabling rather than 
prescriptive framework for intergovernmental relations and cooperation.
55
 What is left is for 
the national government to develop content for this framework through legislation and 
policies. However, it should be noted that „codification‟ of intergovernmental relations in and 
of itself will not necessarily result in the development of constructive intergovernmental 
relations.
56
 In addition to codification, there is a need to develop the capacity of each tier of 
government to engage with other tiers. As discussed below, the establishment of institutions 
of intergovernmental relations may provide the much-needed platform for nurturing 
cooperative relations among governments. The role of institutions which were established to 
foster coherence governance since independence will be examined below. 
5. Institutions established to foster coherent governance 
This section assesses the effectiveness of institutions which were established not necessarily 
as institutions of intergovernmental relations but designed to foster coordination of 
government activities to ensure coherent governance in Zimbabwe. The assessment is carried 
out to establish the relevance of these institutions under the new constitutional dispensation 
and to provide lessons for the development of a system of intergovernmental relations. At 
independence, the majority-led government was not only faced with the challenge of doing 
away with the racial system of government. The government also had to deal with the huge 
challenge of ensuring that majority of the citizens who lacked access to basic public services 
under the colonial era had access to such services. Such a challenge could only be addressed 
through effective governance. Through policies and legislation, the national government 
established a number of institutions to promote effective governance, including coordinated 
policy formulation and implementation. The Prime Minister‟s Directives on Decentralisation 
and Development of 1984 and 1985 provide the foundation for post-independence attempts to 
ensure effective governance in Zimbabwe.
57
 As highlighted in Chapter Three, the directives 
were used to create hierarchical structures to coordinate government activities, including 
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development planning and implementation.
58
 The directives received legal recognition 
through the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, RDCA and Traditional Leaders Act, 
which make provision for establishment of structures and procedures to facilitate 
coordination of government activities and bottom-up planning.
59
 Attention is given to the role 
of the Ministry of Local Government, provincial governors and provincial councils, 
provincial development committees and rural district development committees. 
5.1 Ministry of Local Government 
The Ministry of Local Government is a key national institution charged with coordination of 
government activities.
60
 It has offices at the national, provincial and local levels for this 
purpose.
61
 
5.1.1 National level 
At the national level, there is the Minister who is supported by various directorates with a 
responsibility to coordinate government activities countrywide.
62
 Besides coordinating 
government activities, the Minister plays a dispute resolution role. Usually, disputes between 
local authorities or between a local authority and an agent of the national government are 
resolved by the Minister. The role of the Minister as a political figure to resolve disputes 
between various state actors has the advantage of ensuring that disputes between 
governments which usually are of a political nature are resolved using political means.
63
 It is 
a less costly dispute resolution mechanism than alternatives, such as the courts. 
5.1.2 Provincial level 
The Ministry has provincial administrators (PAs) who are stationed at provincial level for the 
purposes of coordinating government activities, among other duties.
64
 This means that there 
are ten PAs, one in each of the ten provinces. As highlighted in paragraph 5.1 of Chapter 
Three, PAs constitute deconcentrated authority of the Ministry.
65
 Other ministries and 
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agencies of the national government have officials placed at the provincial level in line with 
this deconcentration model.
66
 PAs chair provincial development committees which are 
charged with development planning and coordination at the provincial level, as will be 
discussed below.
67
 PAs also supervise district administrators (DAs) at the local level. 
5.1.3 Local level 
The Ministry has DA(s) who are stationed at local level to coordinate government activities, 
in addition to other duties they may carry out.
68
 DAs are the most senior representatives of 
the national government at this level and report to the Minister through PAs.
69
 In some urban 
local authorities, there are more than one DA whereas in rural local authorities, it is usually 
one DA per rural local authority. DAs chair rural district development committees which, as 
discussed below, are charged with coordination of government activities and development 
planning at local level.
70
 Several other ministries and agencies of the national government 
have officials placed at the local level, following the deconcentration model.
71
 This has 
allowed these ministries and agencies to deliver certain public services directly to the 
citizens.
72
 This also means that coordination and alignment of activities at the local level has 
become a necessity due to the involvement of a multitude of governmental actors in the 
delivery of various public services. 
5.1.4 General assessment of the role of provincial and district administrators 
Although their functions are not provided in any legislation, PAs and DAs are in charge of 
most interactions between local officials and the national government at subnational level.
73
 
PAs and DAs serve as communication mediums for information from the national 
government to subnational government as well as from the subnational level to the national 
government. These officials have played an important role in coordinating the 
implementation of government programmes across all sectors, including implementation of 
development projects, poverty alleviation programs, hunger relief programmes and the 
administration of elections. They have largely been effective in carrying out this role. 
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Wekwete argues that there is a need for more cooperation between governments and 
coordination of government activities to complement the role which is being carried out by 
PAs and DAs at subnational level.
74
 This will not only have the advantage of reducing 
conflicts among officials of various governments but can also reduce resource wastage 
through duplication of duties. Thus, it is submitted that PAs and DAs should continue to 
coordinate government activities at subnational levels. They could carry out that role in a 
supporting capacity to political structures established to coordinate government activities. 
5.1.5 Relations between the ministry and local authorities in practice 
The character of relations between the Ministry and local authorities has gradually changed 
since independence. Prior to 1999, relations between the national government and local 
authorities were largely cordial as the ruling ZANU-PF commanded majorities in almost all 
local authorities in Zimbabwe. With the formation of the MDC in 1999 and its subsequent 
hold on power at the local level, central-local relations have not been cordial.
75
 They have 
been strongly driven by political affiliation with local authorities administered by the ruling 
party-led councils enjoying relatively sound relations, while those run by MDC-led councils 
have had sour relations with the national government.
76
 PAs and DAs have been accused of 
adopting a confrontational rather than collaborative approach when dealing with local 
authorities, especially those that are run by opposition-led councils.
77
 Most if not all of these 
officials are generally viewed to be aligned and sympathetic to the ruling ZANU-PF party.
78
 
While there is nothing wrong with being aligned to a certain political party it is submitted that 
PAs and DAs should take a non-political approach when discharging their duties, as required 
by the 2013 Constitution.
79
 If PAs and DAs promote or undermine the interests of political 
parties they will be acting unconstitutionally and warranting disciplinary action, including 
dismissal. 
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5.2 Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils 
As mentioned above, the Prime Minister‟s Directive on Decentralisation of 1984 and 1985 
made provision for the role of provincial governors (PGs).
80
 The Lancaster House 
Constitution was amended to make provision for their role.
81
 The role of PGs is further given 
effect by the Provincial Councils and Administration Act.
82
 Unlike the Lancaster House 
Constitution, the 2013 Constitution does not make provision for the role of PGs. It however 
does not prohibit the establishment of the role of PGs although, as argued below, that will be 
contrary to the „spirit‟ of devolution since the Constitution has established the position of a 
chairperson of provincial or metropolitan council.
83
 It is submitted that these chairpersons 
should carry out the functions which were carried out by PGs rather than creating another 
parallel governance structure at the provincial level. 
In terms of section 4 of the Provincial Councils Administration Act, PGs are appointed by the 
President and practice suggests that such appointment was based on party lines.
84
 PGs 
represented the President at the provincial level and undertook developmental and 
coordinative functions.
85
 They chaired provincial councils, which were charged with 
development planning, implementation and evaluation at the provincial level.
86
 PGs were 
required to have close working relationships with PAs and other provincial heads of 
ministries and agencies of the national government who however did not report to them but 
were expected to inform them of developments in the province.
87
 As in India where the 
national government appoints Governors of States, the appointment of PGs by the President 
in Zimbabwe was one of the mechanisms employed by the national government to ensure the 
effective implementation of national policies at the provincial level.
88
 PGs reported to the 
President through the Minister responsible for local government. They acted as agents of the 
national government and in particular of the ruling ZANU-PF, given that they were appointed 
along party lines.
89
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As shall be discussed later, PGs and the provincial councils they chaired failed to carry out 
effectively the development and planning and coordinative role due to a number of reasons, 
including the fact that they lacked financial resources.
90
 The absence of financial resources 
meant that planning decisions at provincial level were not linked to budgetary allocations at 
the national level.
91
 Thus, structures such as provincial councils acted as forums of mere 
participation without visible consequence since they could not implement their plans. As 
argued below, to be effective, intergovernmental planning has to be matched with resource-
allocating powers at the level where the planning occurs.
92
 However, PGs were very effective 
in ensuring that the national government exercises firm control of the provinces. Thus, the 
abolition of these structures under the 2013 Constitution is commendable. 
5.3 Provincial Development Committees 
The Provincial Councils and Administration Act makes provision for the establishment of 
provincial development committees (PDCs) which are charged with development planning, 
implementation and coordination at the provincial level.
93
 PDCs acted as technical arms of 
provincial councils.
94
 They are composed of the PA; town clerks, secretaries and senior 
officials of local authorities; senior officials of the security services; and provincial heads of 
each Ministry and department in the province.
95
 A PDC is chaired by the PA.
96
 Through PAs, 
PDCs coordinate the activities of departments of the national government stationed at the 
provincial level.
97
 For example, the implementation of programmes such as the construction 
of infrastructural projects by the national government at provincial level is coordinated by 
PDCs. In the case of natural disasters such as droughts, PDCs coordinate the mobilisation of 
state resources towards disaster response. The question is whether PDCs are still relevant 
under the new constitutional dispensation where provincial and metropolitan councils are the 
key governance structure at the provincial level. 
It is submitted that PDCs are still relevant structures under the new constitutional order. They 
provide a platform where administrative officials of the three tiers of government can consult 
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each other on matters of mutual concern and make recommendations to the political 
representatives at their levels. Their composition, which is dominated by officials of the 
national government, nevertheless means that subnational governments have little influence 
on decision-making by PDCs.
98
 This emphasises the argument that PDCs were established to 
spearhead the implementation of national policies at the provincial level and not necessarily 
to promote locally determined development.
99
 It is therefore submitted that PDCs should be 
reformed so as to increase the number of local officials in their membership. This will allow 
subnational governments to have a strong voice in the decision-making processes of the PDC. 
5.4 Rural District Development Committees 
The RDCA requires each rural local authority to establish a rural development committee 
(RDDC) as one of the committees of the council.
100
 The Act provides that an RDDC is 
composed of administrative officials of rural local authorities, and senior officials of various 
ministries and departments of the national government stationed at the local level.
101
 RDDCs 
are tasked with development planning, implementation and coordination of government 
policies at the local level.
102
 For instance, RDDCs coordinate the implementation of national 
programmes such as immunisation and poverty reduction programmes, which usually require 
the involvement of multiple agencies. The question is whether RDDCs are still relevant under 
the new constitutional dispensation. As highlighted above, both the national and local 
governments deliver certain services directly to the people. Mechanisms for the alignment 
and harmonisation of activities by various governments at local level become critical for the 
effective delivery of these services. The RDDCs can provide such a platform for that purpose. 
They may enable officials of both the national and local governments to consult each other on 
matters of common interest, share information and coordinate and align their activities.
103
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It is argued that RDDCs were effective in horizontal coordination of government activities at 
the local level in the 1980s and 1990s.
104
 However, the composition and structure of the 
committee may undermine their effectiveness. First, an RDDC is chaired by the DA who is a 
central government official. This means that the national government through the DA have 
significant influence over decision-making in the RDDC.
105
 Second, the composition of the 
committee is very much in favour of the national government‟s field administration.106 All 
heads of national government ministries and agencies stationed at the local level are members 
of the RDDC. Thus, the national government is unlikely to have not less than ten members on 
the RDDC. A local authority on the other hand is only represented by the Chief Executive 
Officer and the chairman of every committee of the council, which normally do not exceed or 
equal ten. Thus, local officials are usually outnumbered in the RDDC and consequently their 
influence is minimal compared to officials of the national government. It can be argued that a 
coordinative structure does not necessarily have to be composed of equal numbers of officials 
from different governments. Nevertheless, development of cooperative relations among 
governments may require that such structures are characterised by a relationship of equality 
among participants, which may be achieved in part by making provision for equal numbers of 
participants from the tiers of government involved. It is submitted that while the RDDC may 
be an effective tool of coordinating government activities at the local level, there may be need 
to review its membership in favour of local representation. 
5.5 Provincial and Metropolitan Councils 
As discussed above, the 2013 Constitution requires tiers of government to cooperate with one 
another.
107
 It directs the national government to take measures to promote cooperative 
governance and coordination of government activities.
108
 Such mechanisms may include the 
establishment of institutions to facilitate cooperative governance and coordination of 
government activities. As argued in paragraph 3.1.2 of Chapter Six, provincial and 
metropolitan councils may carry an intergovernmental relations role. As observed in Chapter 
Five, provincial and metropolitan councils are composed of members of both the national and 
local governments.
109
 This makes them suitable institutions to foster cooperation and 
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coordination between the national and local governments.
110
 The councils may provide a 
platform where the different tiers of government can consult each other on areas of mutual 
interest, including implementation of national legislation and policies. 
The Constitution has already assigned to these councils the responsibility to coordinate 
government activities and monitor use of public resource tasks which have a direct bearing on 
intergovernmental relations.
111
 It would appear from the composition and responsibilities of 
these councils that the Constitution positions them as institutions of intergovernmental 
relations rather than as a level of government with distinct powers.
112
 Thus, it is 
recommended that national government through legislation should consider assigning to these 
councils additional responsibilities relating to intergovernmental relations. They could 
discuss and consult on implementation in the province of national policies and legislation, 
draft national policies and legislation affecting provinces and local authorities, development 
of provincial policies and consider reports from low level intergovernmental relations 
structures such as RDDCs.
113
 Further, with the participation of the Minister responsible for 
finance, these councils could be used as platforms for discussing sharing of nationally raised 
revenue across the three tiers of government. 
6. Intergovernmental planning 
The achievement of development goals such as universal access to basic services by all 
citizens, reduction of inequalities and elimination of poverty requires coherent and integrated 
governance. Coherent and integrated governance requires alignment of polices and priorities 
across tiers of government. This can be undertaken through intergovernmental planning and 
budgeting. The Prime Minister‟s Directive on Decentralisation (and subsequent policies) 
introduced a five year and annual development planning and budgeting process at subnational 
level. As shown in Figure 23 below, development planning and budgeting is supposed to start 
at the village level through the ward, district and provincial structures feeding into the 
national development planning and budgeting system.
114
 The effectiveness of this planning 
process is examined in this section with the objective of providing lessons for development of 
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an intergovernmental planning and budgeting system which can better achieve the objectives 
of the 2013 Constitution. 
Figure 23: Development planning process 
 
Source: Extracted from Ministry of Local Government 2013 
6.1 Ward, village and neighbourhood development plans 
As highlighted in paragraph 4.3 of Chapter Three, ward and village development committees 
are some of the structures which were created by the Prime Minister‟s Directives on 
Decentralisation of 1984 and 1985.
115
 The committees are responsible for development 
planning, implementation and coordination geared to facilitate bottom-up development. 
Development planning starts at the village and neighbourhood levels, spearheaded by village 
and neighbourhood development committees in urban and rural local authorities, 
respectively.
116
 Citizens identify their priorities which then form the village or neighbourhood 
development plan. The plans are then forward to the ward level where they are consolidated 
to form the ward development plan.
117
 Planning at the ward level is spearheaded by ward 
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assemblies with the assistance of ward development committees. The ward development plan 
is then forwarded to the district or local authority level to form the district development plan. 
In practice, the committees (and their assemblies) have failed to undertake the planning 
function effectively as they usually do not have the necessary skills and are not the dominant 
arenas for development discussions, among other reasons.
118
 PlanAfrica claims that village 
development plans are virtually unheard of and it is doubtful if any were ever produced and 
submitted since 1984 when the Prime‟s Directives on Decentralisation came into operation.119 
Instead, councillors in association with the technical staff of local authorities produce ward 
development plans.
120
 Makumbe argues that both VIDCOs and WADCOs have proved to be 
incapable of producing development plans which have been accepted or utilised by either 
RDDCs or PDCs.
121
 They usually lack the technical expertise to formulate plans. A 
significant number of people who reside in rural areas were said to be unaware of the 
existence of the committees or assemblies.
122
 These institutions require renovation to promote 
effective governance as required by the 2013 Constitution.
123
 
6.2 The District Development Plan 
The District Development Plan (DDP) is designed to serve as a tool for aligning planning and 
the priorities of the tiers of government at local level. Section 60 of the Rural District 
Councils Act requires RDDCs to formulate a DDP.
124
 When formulating the DDP, RDDCs 
are required to consider development plans produced by various wards in the local authority 
area.
125
 The formulation of the DDP is also informed by development plans and priorities of 
agencies of the national government operating at district or local level. The input of the 
agencies of the national government into the RDDC is coordinated through the DA. Upon 
approval by the RDDC, the DDP is forwarded to the council of a rural local authority for 
approval before 31 May in every year.
126
 After approval, the DDP is then forwarded to the 
provincial development committee for inclusion in the Provincial Development Plan. 
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The DDP can be a key tool for integrating the activities of national and local governments. It 
can also be effective in facilitating bottom-up planning as it is informed by development 
plans from the lowest level, ward and village. Practice however suggests that development 
planning at the district or local level has been a highly technical activity largely undertaken 
by national government officials.
127
 These officials tend to dominate the activities of the 
RDDC as they have superior technical competence and resources compared to local 
officials.
128
 It has been argued that a number of projects included in district plans are not 
considered by PDCs when formulating provincial plans as they are considered to be merely 
an aggregated „shopping list‟.129 The effectiveness of the DDP as a tool of aligning priorities 
across levels of government is also questionable given that there seem to be weak linkages 
between RDDCs and PDCs which are tasked with the formulation of provincial development 
plans.
130
 Despite the fact that RDDCs are represented at the provincial level, provincial 
development plans have largely been disjointed from district plans.
131
 It is submitted however 
that the development planning process is still relevant although there is a need to improve the 
communication system and alignment strategies between the provincial and local structures. 
6.3 The Provincial Development Plan 
Section 13 of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act requires provincial councils to 
formulate provincial development plans (PDP).
132
 The formulation of the plan is carried out 
by the council with the assistance of the PDC.
133
 Administrative officials of the national 
government who are stationed at the provincial level and senior officials of local authorities 
in the province participate in the formulation of the PDP.
134
 The PDP is both a long-term and 
short trajectory of development priorities of the province covering a variety of sectors. 
Ideally, the PDP is informed by both national priorities and development plans from various 
local authorities in the province.
135
 Each provincial council is required to submit on an annual 
basis its PDP to the national planning agent for inclusion in the National Development Plan. 
                                                 
127
 PlanAfrica 2000: 57. 
128
 See Chigwata 2012: 39. 
129
 Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990: 432. See also Schou 2000: 134. 
130
 See Makumbe 1996: 53. 
131
 See Makumbe 1996: 53. 
132
 S 13 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. See also s 28 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
133
 See s 28 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
134
 See s 26(2) read together with s 28 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
135
 See Chakaipa 2010: 65. 
 
 
 
 
433 
 
Chapter 9: Intergovernmental relations 
The participation of officials of the national, provincial and local governments in the 
formulation of the PDP means that the PDP could be a useful tool for the alignment of 
priorities across levels of government. The potential of PDPs to act as a tool for alignment of 
policies across levels of government has however been limited by a number of factors. First, 
local authorities, especially urban local authorities, are reluctant to be involved in the 
activities of provincial councils as they consider the councils to lack „real‟ power.136 Instead, 
they consider it more useful to engage directly with the national government through the 
Ministry of Local Government. Hence, there tends to be a lack of alignment between most 
provincial plan(s) and those of local authorities, especially in respect of cities.
137
 As 
discussed below, there is also little evidence to suggest that PDPs are actually considered by 
the national government when determining priorities, including budget allocations. At the end 
of the day, practice seems to suggest that PDPs are formulated merely to comply with the law 
and do not seem to influence what is implemented in practice. The planning process is not 
synchronised with budget prioritisation at all levels of government.
138
 
6.4 The National Development Plan 
6.4.1 Planning process 
The responsibility for national development planning has been assigned to a number of 
institutions, including the Ministry of Finance, Office of the President and the Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe.
139
 These institutions have over the years produced various national 
development plans
140
 which defined short- and long-term development priorities for the 
whole country. When formulating the national development plan (NDP), the national 
planning agent is expected to consider PDPs. The NDP has always been used as one of the 
vehicles for aligning the development plans of the provinces and the priorities of the national 
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government. However, as argued below, the alignment of priorities of different governments 
has been weakened by the lack of participation of provincial and local tiers of government in 
the actual formulation of the NDP. 
While mechanisms were put in place to promote intergovernmental coordination and 
integration of plans at provincial and local levels, Mutizwa-Mangiza argues that very little 
has been done to achieve the same ends at the national level.
141
 There is no evidence to 
suggest that plans from the provincial and local levels were considered when formulating 
national plans or the annual public sector investment programme budgeting process.
142
 This 
nullifies the effort that was put into coordinated planning at subnational levels and ultimately 
popular development priorities are not reflected in most national development plans that have 
been formulated since independence.
143
 That is partially the reason why it has been difficult 
for the national government to mobilise support for the implementation of these NDPs. The 
majority of NPDs were partially implemented and subsequently abandoned. The recent NDP, 
the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), is likely 
to face the same challenges. 
6.4.2 The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
The ZimAsset is the new economic blueprint adopted by the ZANU-PF-led government soon 
after the 2013 elections, covering the term 2013-2018. It seeks to „achieve sustainable 
development and social equity anchored on indigenisation, empowerment and employment 
creation which will be largely propelled by the judicious exploitation of the country‟s 
abundant human and natural resources‟.144 There is no doubt that the ability of the plan to 
achieve desired results depends in part on „sound‟ relations between different tiers of 
government. The plan has significant consequences for subnational governments, especially 
local authorities who under the plan have the important duty to deliver core public and social 
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services.
145
 To improve performance, the plan requires the institutionalisation of performance 
contracts for all senior public sector managers, including parastatals and local authorities.
146
 
The Office of the President and Cabinet is the lead government agency that will provide the 
necessary leadership and guidance in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the 
ZimAsset.
147
 It will also coordinate the implementation of the plan to ensure attainment of set 
goals.
148
 Giving the Office of the President the responsibility to administer implementation of 
the ZimAsset is commendable. This has the advantage of providing a strong political backing 
to the implementation of the plan. However, strong political backing by itself is not enough to 
ensure the successful implementation of the plan. Significant financial resources and the 
general support of other stakeholders such as political parties, civic groups, the private sector 
and the population at large are pivotal. These groups are likely to support the implementation 
of an economic blueprint if they provide input in the planning process. Evidence on the 
ground suggests that ZimAsset was wholly formulated by ZANU-PF and lacks essential 
backing from some local authorities, opposition political parties, and economic groupings 
outside ZANU-PF. Funding has been identified as the major hindrance to the implementation 
of the ZimAsset.
149
 Equally important is the absence of effective intergovernmental relations 
mechanisms. As a result, the prospects of ZimAsset to realise its intended objectives are 
under these circumstances small. The economic blueprint will likely follow the path of 
previous NDPs, which were half-implemented and later abandoned without realising any 
meaningful results. 
6.5 General Assessment 
As argued in Chapter Two, benefits associated with a multilevel system of government are 
likely to be realised when there is effective upward communication of local needs, on one 
hand, and consideration of local priorities by senior governments when determining national 
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priorities, on the other.
150
 Such effective upward communication of local needs has not been 
realised in Zimbabwe. In cases where local priorities have been communicated to the national 
government, such priorities have not received budget prioritisation. This section will provide 
a general analysis on the development planning and budgeting process with particular 
attention to obstacles to effective planning. 
6.5.1 Domination of the planning process by the national government 
It was stated above the intergovernmental planning process was designed to facilitate bottom-
up communication of priorities.
151
 This has not been realised yet in part due to the domination 
of the process by the national government officials.
152
 As noted above, the hierarchical 
institutions (RDDCs and PDCs) which were created for the purposes of facilitating 
development planning are dominated by technical staff of the national government.
153
 There 
is need for a reform of these structures to allow effective representation of subnational 
governments. 
6.5.2 Gap between intergovernmental planning and budgeting 
Another weakness identified with the intergovernmental planning process is that there is a 
gap between intergovernmental planning and budgeting.
154
 While planning at provincial and 
local levels involves officials from the national government and local authorities, budgeting 
and implementation of policies occurs separately.
155
 Officials of the national government 
work along sectoral lines whilst local officials implement their own policies determined by 
their respective councils.
156
 As a result, the production of short- and long-term plans is 
considered to be a „barren ritual‟ as very few of the proposed projects in any year are funded 
and subsequently implemented.
157
 
6.5.3 Non-inclusion of subnational governments in the budgeting process 
The allocation of funds to various sector ministries and agencies of the national government 
as well as to subnational governments has largely been influenced by priorities in the national 
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development plan. The Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) has been the main 
vehicle for financing projects which are prioritised in the NDP.
158
 While sector ministries and 
agencies of the national government are represented in the annual PSIP budget meeting, 
where the final national priorities are set, provinces and local authorities lack 
representation.
159
 This means that provincial and local governments have limited 
opportunities to influence the national budgeting process. Even though some initiatives have 
been embarked upon to involve local authorities through organised local government, these 
have so far not been effective in providing local governments with an opportunity to 
influence the budgeting process.
160
 Hence, it was submitted in Chapter Seven that provincial 
and metropolitan councils and local authorities should be involved in the national budget and 
fiscal system.
161
 
7. Towards an intergovernmental relations framework for Zimbabwe 
From the discussion above it can be observed that the system of government under the 
Lancaster House Constitution was designed to promote coordination of government 
activities.
162
 Unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, the 2013 Constitution requires the 
establishment of mechanisms not only to promote coordination of government activities but 
also cooperative relations among the three tiers of governments.
163
 Thus, under the new 
constitutional dispensation, the Ministry of Local Government has an important role of 
guiding the evolution of intergovernmental relations in Zimbabwe by developing relevant 
policies and legislation.
164
 In this section, the chapter discusses important features and aspects 
of an effective system of intergovernmental relations framework with guidance from design 
features put forward in paragraph 6.5 of Chapter Two. The purpose of the section is to 
provide proposals which may be considered when developing a framework of 
intergovernmental relations in Zimbabwe. As shown in Figure 24 below, the framework 
comprises the recognition of core principles of a system of intergovernmental relations, 
institutionalisation of intergovernmental relations, recognising the role of organised local 
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government and establishing dispute resolution mechanisms.
165
 The chapter appreciates that 
intergovernmental institutions and processes discussed in Chapter Two will have to be 
adapted to meet the constitutional, political, economic and social conditions of the 
Zimbabwean polity.
166
 
Figure 24: Components of an effective framework of intergovernmental relations 
 
7.1 Legal and institutional recognition of core principles of intergovernmental 
relations framework 
As highlighted above, principles which are central to any effective system of 
intergovernmental relations include participation, consultation, respect, equality, transparency 
and predictability.
167
 It was contended in Chapter Two that these principles should generally 
inform the conduct of intergovernmental relations.
168
 The Constitution has recognised the 
importance of these principles by indirectly referring to some of them.
169
 For instance, as 
discussed above, the Constitution requires tiers to inform and consult one another on matters 
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of common interest.
170
 Thus, the Constitution has provided a framework for 
intergovernmental relations and cooperation. As argued in this chapter, what is left is for the 
national government to provide content to this framework by formulating relevant policies 
and legislation to promote cooperative governance.
171
 
7.2 Institutionalisation of intergovernmental relations 
It was contended in paragraph 6.5.2 of Chapter Two that an effective system of 
intergovernmental relations may require the establishment of institutions or forums where the 
executive and/or the administrative officials of governments at various levels meet to discuss 
issues of common interest.
172
 These institutions of intergovernmental relations may be 
established to promote vertical and horizontal integration. 
7.2.1 Mechanisms to promote vertical integration 
Vertical integration may be realised by establishing hierarchical institutions placed at 
different levels where government is organised. These hierarchical institutions may provide a 
platform to ensure that there is regular dialogue and cooperation among different tiers of 
government.
173
 Further, these institutions can be charged with overall coordination at 
different levels of government.
174
 In Zimbabwe, it is suggested that the institutions to 
promote vertical integration may be established at national, provincial and local levels. 
7.2.1.1 National forums 
At the national level, the President could chair a forum (President‟s forum) composed of the 
Minister responsible for local government, chairpersons of provincial and metropolitan 
councils from the ten provinces, representatives from organised local government and other 
persons invited by the President.
175
 The President‟s forum could be a central forum to which 
other intergovernmental relations forums could be linked, forming channels of 
communication across sectors and spheres.
176
 At the time of writing, there is a platform 
where provincial ministers of state meet regularly with the President to discuss provincial 
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matters.
177
 Such a platform could be extended to chairpersons of provincial and metropolitan 
councils and representatives of organised local government. The purpose of the President‟s 
forum will be to allow the President 
a) to raise matters of national interest with provincial and metropolitan councils and 
organised local government and to hear their views on those matters; 
b) to consult provincial and metropolitan councils and organised local government on 
the implementation of national policy and legislation in provinces and local 
authorities; 
c) to consult provincial and metropolitan councils and organised local government on 
the co-ordination and alignment of priorities, objectives and strategies across 
national, provincial and local governments; 
d) to discuss performance in the provision of services in order to detect failures and to 
initiate preventive or corrective action when necessary; 
e) to consider reports from other intergovernmental forums on matters affecting the 
national interest; and 
f) to consider any other matters of strategic importance that affect the interests of other 
governments.178 
7.2.1.2 Provincial forums 
Provincial and metropolitan councils can serve at intergovernmental relations forum at the 
provincial level especially given that the Constitution assigns to them the responsibility to 
coordinate and implementing governmental programmes.
179
 These councils could feed into 
the President‟s forum and Parliament, since some members of the councils are also Members 
of Parliament.
180
 The potential role of provincial and metropolitan councils as 
intergovernmental relations forums was explored in paragraph 5.5 above, but it is important 
to stress that these councils can serve as central structures of intergovernmental in each 
province. It is however submitted that this role does not mean that other intergovernmental 
relations may not be established at the provincial level.
181
 For example, the chairperson of the 
provincial or metropolitan council could establish a forum composed of mayors and 
chairpersons in the province as well as chairpersons of committees of the provincial or 
metropolitan council.
182
 Besides these political structures, other forums can be established at 
the national and provincial levels which will be composed by administrative officials of the 
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various governments involved. These structures can act as technical committees of political 
structures.
183
 
7.2.1.3 Local forums 
At local level, the mayor or town clerk could chair a forum composed of officials of the 
councils and those of the national government stationed at the local level.
184
 The forum feeds 
into intergovernmental relations structure(s) at the provincial level.
185
 It can serve as a forum 
where officials of local authorities and officials of the national government stationed at the 
local level could discuss and consult on matters of mutual interests, including: 
a) draft national and provincial policy and legislation relating to matters affecting local 
government; 
b) the implementation of national and provincial policy and legislation in the area under 
the jurisdiction of the local authority; 
c) matters arising in the provincial or metropolitan councils or any other forums at the 
provincial level; 
d)  the provision of services in the local authority; 
e) coherent planning and development in the local authority; and 
f) the coordination and alignment of the strategic and performance plans and priorities, 
objectives and strategies of the local authority and the national (or provincial) 
agencies operating in the local authority area.186 
7.2.1.4 Sectoral forums 
Hierarchical institutions may be complemented by sectoral institutions of intergovernmental 
relations designed to promote intergovernmental cooperation within a specific function or 
sectoral area (such as water, finance and energy) that transcend the jurisdiction of two more 
tiers of government.
187
 Sectoral institutions of intergovernmental relations may take the form 
of cluster committees led by officials of the national government and comprising officials of 
the provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
188
 For example, a committee 
may be established with particular a focus on finance, economy and social matters. In these 
forums, issues of national interest can be discussed, views and requests from provincial and 
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metropolitan councils and local authorities can be heard, policy and legislative 
recommendations can be developed, service delivery can be monitored, and strategies 
(including policies and objectives) as well as priorities in that functional area across all tiers 
of government can be aligned.
189
 A finance forum is particularly important to provide a 
platform where the Minister responsible for finance can meet with representatives of 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities to consult on fiscal, budgetary and 
financial matters affecting lower tiers of government.
190
 Such a forum could also provide a 
platform where officials of the three tiers of government can consult on revenue-sharing 
before enactment of the relevant legislation.
191
 While it is appreciated that lower governments 
may not necessarily participate in these institutions of fostering vertical integration as equal 
partners with those of higher governments, it is submitted that they should be given a certain 
measure of respect. 
7.2.2 Mechanisms to promote horizontal integration 
It is argued that the institutionalisation of horizontal integration may not be necessary, unlike 
at the vertical level.
192
 Horizontal integration may be promoted by establishing a legal and 
institutional framework that allows and encourages governments within the same level to 
integrate their policies and actions.
193
 For instance, the delivery of health services by the City 
of Harare affects citizens from the neighbouring local authorities of Norton, Epworth and 
Ruwa as they rely on the City for the delivery of this important service. There is therefore 
need for legislation which provides for how governments in the same level can deal with 
matters such as spillover effects of policies, joint planning and partnerships in delivering of 
public services. It is submitted that governments within the same level should be allowed to 
establish forums to promote cooperative relations between them, including coordination of 
the provision of public services. This could take the form of inter-provincial or inter-
municipal forums. For example, the Metropolitan Council of Harare Province could establish 
a forum with the Provincial Council of Mashonaland Central Province.
194
 The forum may 
undertake a number of roles, including information-sharing, sharing best practices, capacity-
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building and cooperating on provincial developmental challenges affecting the two 
provinces.
195
 
7.3 The role of organised local government 
It was contended in paragraph 6.5.4 of Chapter Two that local governments are unlikely to 
engage meaningfully with higher tiers of government as single units except for large or 
metropolitan cities which might have that capability.
196
 Effective engagement with other tiers 
of government requires that local government acts as a collective through organised local 
government structures.
197
 Hence, an argument was made for the right of local authorities to 
associate so that they are in a better position to promote and protect their interests when 
engaging with senior governments or any other parties.
198
 Against this background, what is 
the place of organised local government in Zimbabwe? 
7.3.1 Status of organised local government 
Organised local government has never received constitutional or statutory recognition both in 
the pre- and post-colonial eras. It has always taken the form of voluntary associations of local 
authorities established to promote and protect the interests of local government despite its 
long existence since 1923, when the Local Government Association of Southern Rhodesia 
was formed.
199
 The UCA and RDCA implicitly recognise the right of local authorities to 
form associations by giving them the power to pay subscription fees to such associations.
200
 
There are two associations of local authorities. The Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe 
(UCAZ) represents and promotes the interests of urban local authorities, while the Rural 
District Councils Association represents and promotes the interests of rural local 
authorities.
201
 The two associations functioned on parallel tracks for many years.
202
 In 2006, 
there were attempts to merge them to form the Zimbabwe Local Government Association 
(ZILGA), but that has not materialised in practice. The merger was promoted by the Rural 
District Council Association and strongly supported by the Ministry of Local Government. 
Some scholars argue that the merger was driven to achieve political reasons rather than to 
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strengthen organised local government as UCAZ is seen to be sympathetic to MDC while the 
Rural District Council Association is argued to be aligned to ZANU-PF.
203
 It was believed 
that a merger of the two associations would neutralise the influence of urban local authorities, 
driven by UCAZ, since they are less than half the number of rural local authorities.
204
 
Pasipanodya et al claim that the merger was hailed as a turning point in local government in 
Zimbabwe as it effectively signalled the demise of the anachronistic dual perception of local 
government in terms of rural and urban.
205
 The merger nonetheless failed to work properly as 
the two associations continued to run parallel programmes and fundraised separately. This 
has been met with increasing pressure from the national government for the two associations 
to merge. 
The Herald newspaper of 3 April 2011 reported that the Minister ordered the immediate 
merger of all associations representing local authorities to form a single association.
206
 The 
Minister is reported to have stated that the „prevailing set up where urban local authorities fall 
under [UCAZ] and the rural councils report to the Rural District Council Association was 
untenable‟. 207 He was quoted by the newspaper as having said that, „Come June 1 2011 there 
should only be one local government association so that the disjointed manner of operations 
does not exist‟.208 As of July 2014, the two associations have not fully merged and continue 
to run parallel programs. This has had the disadvantage of dividing the „voice‟ of local 
government and its ability to engage meaningfully with other tiers of government. 
7.3.2 Role of organised local government in intergovernmental relations 
Both the UCAZ and Rural District Council Associations have not been able to represent, 
promote and protect the interest of local authorities especially when engaging with senior 
governments. This can be attributed to a number of causes, including the lack of 
constitutional and/or statutory recognition, fragmented bodies representing local governments 
and the absence of a guaranteed source of funding.
209
 This section will analyse the lack of 
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constitutional or statutory recognition and absence of adequate financial resources, since the 
impact of fragmented representation has already been discussed above. 
7.3.2.1 Lack of constitutional and/or statutory recognition 
As highlighted above, the role of organised local government is not recognised in the 
Constitution and is only implied in UCA and RDCA.
210
 The lack of explicit constitutional 
and statutory recognition has meant that the participation of organised local government in 
intergovernmental relations depends on the „goodwill‟ of officials of the national 
government. These officials of the national government are usually reluctant to consult 
organised local government when formulating and implementing policies. As a result, the 
voice of local government has been weak in the development of national policies, even when 
these affect local government. To strengthen the role of organised local government it is 
suggested that Parliament should consider giving statutory recognition to the role of 
organised local government.
211
 In particular, the requirement for consultation of organised 
local government on any issue which directly affects the institutional integrity and powers 
and functions of local authorities should be recognised in legislation.
212
 Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that statutory recognition of the role of organised local government by itself 
is not enough to enhance the potential of local government to engage with other tiers of 
government.
213
 Other mechanisms of strengthening organised local government such as 
stable financial resources are equally important. 
7.3.2.2 Financing organised local government 
The role of organised local government in Zimbabwe to represent and promote the interest of 
local government has been undermined by the absence of stable financial resources. 
Organised local government relies on voluntary contributions from their members as well as 
donor contributions to finance their operations.
214
 Large local authorities tend to contribute 
more than smaller local authorities. For example, the City of Harare is reported to pay US$35 
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000 in subscriptions to UCAZ every year, while some smaller local authorities pay 
subscription fees under US$1000.
215
 Such a funding model for organised local government, 
which is characterised by greater reliance on voluntary subscriptions, is not sustainable. 
It is suggested that in addition to subscriptions from their members, organised local 
government should receive financial support from the national government. The funds can be 
provided through the budget of the Ministry of Local Government, since it seems unrealistic 
that provision for financing of organised local government can be made when sharing 
nationally raised revenue.
216
 Financial support from the national government however is 
likely to undermine the independence of organised local government which is an essential 
feature for the effective representation of local government. It is submitted that, in 
Zimbabwe, whether organised local government finance their operations from subscriptions 
or are funded by the national government they are not immune from political influence from 
the national government.
217
 As observed above, the national government has directed 
organised local government to undertake certain actions even though the national government 
does not fund its operations. Thus, in the Zimbabwean context and at the expense of 
independence, what may be important is the provision of adequate resources to organised 
local government so that it has enhanced capacity to engage with senior governments. 
7.4 Dispute resolution mechanisms 
Disputes between governments are inevitable in any multilevel system of government due to 
„overlapping areas of jurisdiction or constitutional language that encourages divergent 
interpretations of the respective limits of national, provincial and local powers‟.218 Thus, 
mechanisms to avoid or resolve these disputes are required to ensure effective governance. 
Dispute resolution mechanisms strive to eliminate or reduce the costs to the public
219
 which 
may arise due to protracted disputes between governments. This is important to ensure that 
no government, at any level, is hindered from delivering on its mandate by another 
government. Disputes between governments may be resolved by way of intergovernmental 
negotiation culminating in an agreement resolving the issue or by appeal to courts to 
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adjudicate the dispute.
220
 This section discusses these two methods of resolving disputes 
between governments and how they can be applied in the Zimbabwean context. The presence 
of dispute resolution mechanisms however does not mean that governments should not have a 
duty to avoid intergovernmental disputes. Governments at all levels should always strive to 
avoid disputes with other governments.
221
 One of the ways of avoiding disputes recognised in 
the 2013 Constitution is the requirement that tiers of governments should „assume only those 
functions‟ conferred on them by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.222 Further, tiers of 
government are must from „exercise their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of another tier of government‟.223 
7.4.1 Intergovernmental negotiation 
In the event that intergovernmental disputes arise they may be resolved at the political level 
through intergovernmental negotiation in intergovernmental relations forums or through use 
of an intermediary.
224
 Intergovernmental negotiation is an effective dispute resolution 
mechanism especially given that contentious issues in intergovernmental relations are 
generally of a political and not technical nature.
225
 It provides an „opportunity to reach a 
compromise in which each bargaining government is able to protect those interests which it 
considers vital‟.226 This mechanism of dispute resolution is more effective if it is given legal 
recognition so that agreements bind the parties concerned. Hence, it is recommended that the 
national government should consider giving legal recognition to intergovernmental 
negotiation. Besides intergovernmental relations forums, the political party in power at both 
levels may also play some mediating role over intergovernmental policy differences. Where 
that is not the case, as is the scenario in Zimbabwe as of July 2014, the possibility of inter-
party conflict sharpening intergovernmental conflict is very high. As discussed below, in such 
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cases, the courts may be the only option available for resolution of intergovernmental 
disputes.
227
 
7.4.2 Role of the courts 
In a number of countries which have adopted multilevel systems of government, the courts 
have played an important role in adjudicating disputes between governments. Countries such 
as Germany, South Africa, Canada and Kenya have established constitutional courts whose 
function it is to interpret the Constitution, including constitutional allocation of powers and 
functions to various spheres of governments. In these countries, the courts have been relied 
upon to resolve intergovernmental disputes only as a last resort.
228
 South Africa and Kenya 
have gone a step further than other countries by providing in their Constitution the 
requirement that spheres of government and organs of state must „exhaust all other remedies‟ 
before approaching the courts for adjudication of disputes.
229
 The Constitution of South 
Africa goes even further to empower the courts to refer an intergovernmental dispute for 
resolution by the parties involved if it is satisfied that the parties did not exhaust all other 
remedies before approaching the court.
230
 The courts in South Africa have exercised these 
powers in practice.
231
 In South Africa, public officials of any government may also be held 
individually liable for pursuing unnecessary intergovernmental relations litigation. For 
example, the Division of Revenue Act of 2014 provides that if a dispute is referred back by a 
court due to the court not being satisfied that the organ of state approaching the court has not 
exhausted available dispute resolution mechanisms, the litigation costs must be regarded as 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure.
232
 The Act further requires that such expenditure must be 
recovered from the public official who caused the litigation.
233
 Such legal liability can be 
effective in reducing unnecessary intergovernmental litigation. 
The newly established Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe has a key role to play in 
adjudicating intergovernmental disputes. The role of the Constitutional Court is however 
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likely to be minimal given that there is limited constitutional allocation of distinct powers and 
functions to provincial and local governments. Under the Lancaster House Constitution, the 
courts played little or no role in the adjudication of intergovernmental disputes, partly 
because the powers of subnational governments were determined by the national government. 
Thus, technically an intergovernmental dispute could not arise as the national government 
had legitimate claim to any governmental power. Similarly under the 2013 Constitution, the 
majority of powers and functions of provincial and local governments are assigned by acts of 
Parliament. The effect of this is that the role of the courts is likely to be limited as the 
national government determines what subnational governments may do. 
The 2013 Constitution nonetheless requires devolution of power and responsibilities to 
provincial and local governments.
234
 As argued in Chapter Six, the Constitution further 
provides various principles and objectives of devolution which, if given effect through 
legislation, may result in the creation of strong provincial and local governments.
235
 This 
constitutional recognition of devolution has provided a claim to power for provincial and 
local governments which was not available to them.
236
 Thus, potentially a significant number 
of disputes may arise relating to the distribution of powers and functions across the three tiers 
of government. For example, the courts may be called upon to decide on who has the final 
powers to appoint senior officials of local authorities given that local authorities now have the 
„right to govern‟ their areas which could mean also the right to appoint their own 
personnel.
237
 Thus, the Constitutional Court is likely to be faced with a number of disputes 
relating to the distribution of powers across tiers of government and devolution in general. 
8. Conclusion 
The Lancaster House constitutional order did not provide a framework for intergovernmental 
relations and cooperative governance. It emphasised coordination of government activities 
through structures such as the Ministry of Local Government, provincial governors, 
provincial councils, PDCs and RDDCs. Under the new Zimbabwean multilevel system of 
government, the achievement of national and local objectives requires the development of a 
system of intergovernmental relations which is not only geared towards coordination of 
government activities but cooperation among tiers of governments. The realisation of 
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objectives such as development, democracy and sustainable peace requires effective and 
coherent governance by the three tiers of government. It was argued in this chapter that the 
2013 Constitution provides the necessary framework upon which an effective system of 
intergovernmental relations and cooperative governance can be built. What is required is the 
development of appropriate policies, legislation and institutions to give effect to this 
framework. This chapter provided some core attributes of an effective system of 
intergovernmental relations and cooperation which may be useful in this regard. It was 
submitted that the principles of participation, consultation, respect, equality, transparency and 
predictability should inform the development and conduct of this system. A case was also 
made for the codification of intergovernmental relations and cooperation as well as 
institutionalisation of vertical and horizontal integration. It was submitted however that the 
codification of intergovernmental relations and cooperation itself is not enough to promote 
the development of constructive relations among governments. Political will and the 
development of capacity of each government to engage with other governments is pivotal. 
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Chapter 10 
Concluding analysis 
1. Introduction 
This study is an examination of the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government with 
particular focus on the ability of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities to 
assist in the realisation of development, democracy and sustainable peace. The examination 
focused on the law, institutions and practice under the Lancaster House Constitution and 
2013 Constitution. An argument was made in Chapter Two for the role of subnational 
governments in development, democracy and sustainable peace. Design features which are 
necessary for that role were also proposed, against which the Zimbabwean multilevel system 
of government was measured in the rest of the study. In this chapter, the study provides the 
concluding analysis and offers recommendations to improve the ability of subnational 
governments to deliver on development, democracy and sustainable peace objectives. The 
chapter will provide major findings of the study before presenting recommendations. It 
concludes with an answer to the research question presented in Chapter One. 
2. Political autonomy 
It was contended in Chapter Two that political autonomy is perhaps one of the most critical 
elements of a multilevel system of government.
1
 A multilevel system of government ought to 
promote political autonomy at subnational level if it is to realise development, democracy and 
sustainable peace. Political autonomy requires that subnational governments should be 
recognised in national legislation and where possible in the Constitution as autonomous 
subnational units.
2
 It has various dimensions, which the Zimbabwean multilevel system of 
government was measured against. The findings are discussed below. 
2.1 Elected subnational governments 
2.1.1 Election of members of provincial and local governments 
Subnational governments should be composed of leaders who are directly elected by the 
citizens under an electoral system which guarantees regular, free, fair and inclusive 
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elections.
3
 To be politically significant and to allow local concerns to dominate the local 
electoral cycle, national and local elections should be separated. The electoral system should 
also require a minimum level of qualifications for one to be elected into office so that capable 
individuals are elected into office. In Chapter Five it was observed that local authorities in 
Zimbabwe are only composed of directly elected officials, whereas provincial and 
metropolitan councils are composed of a majority of indirectly elected officials. Thus 
councils of local authorities are more democratic than councils at the provincial level. 
It was highlighted in Chapter Five that the Constitution of Zimbabwe makes provision for 
harmonised elections for national, provincial and local offices.
4
 Under such an electoral 
system national factors will influence local voting behaviour. Voters are likely to respond to 
the performance of the political party rather than that of individuals. It was contended in 
Chapter Two that the implication of this is that electoral accountability, which is key to 
responsive local government, will be undermined. It was further observed that the legal 
framework does not provide minimum educational qualifications for both provincial and 
local levels. This brings into question the quality of representatives elected into office, 
especially at the local level. The majority of councillors in Zimbabwe lack the necessary 
skills required to effectively represent their constituencies. Hence, there may be a need to 
stipulate in legislation the minimum educational qualifications for election to the position of a 
councillor. 
2.1.2 Removal of members of provincial and local governments from office 
Once officials at subnational level have been elected into office, higher levels of government 
should not be empowered to arbitrarily remove them.
5
 Elected officials should be removed 
from office only after following due process of the law or through democratic means such as 
elections. The term of office of locally elected leaders should also be limited to reduce 
chances of local authoritarianism.
6
 The discussion in Chapter Eight showed that in Zimbabwe 
senior governments do not have the power to remove from office officials of provincial and 
local governments. Unlike the Lancaster House Constitution, the 2013 Constitution has 
assigned that duty to an independent tribunal. It is submitted that the 2013 Constitution has 
provided the necessary safeguards for the tenure of office of officials at subnational level, 
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which was lacking under the Lancaster House Constitution. As at July 2014, the tribunal(s) 
had not been established and was awaiting enactment of the relevant Act. It is important that 
the tribunal is established as soon as possible to address the vacuum (in terms of disciplining 
at local level) that exists at the time of writing. When it comes to the term of office of local 
officials, it was observed that the Constitution has not limited the term of office of officials 
occupying key positions at subnational level as it does for the President and other senior 
public servants at national level.
7
 To reduce chances of local authoritarianism it is suggested 
national legislation should limit the term of office for mayors, chairpersons, town clerks, and 
clerks of provincial or metropolitan councils to a term of five years, renewable once. 
2.2 Inclusive provincial and local governments 
It was contended in Chapter Two that decision-making structures at all levels of government 
should be as inclusive as possible. One way of ensuring that decision-making structures are 
as inclusive as possible is by establishing an electoral system which guarantees the 
representation of marginalised groups such as minority ethnic groups, youths, women and 
people with disabilities. The 2013 Constitution provides mechanisms to guarantee the 
representation of marginalised groups, especially women. It was observed in Chapter Five 
that for the first two terms of Parliament, the Constitution guarantees 60 seats for women in 
the National Assembly who have automatic membership on the provincial or metropolitan 
council.
8
 Further, the election of 10 councillors in provincial councils guarantees the 
representation of women, which otherwise would not be available through the ballot.
9
 When 
it comes to people with disabilities, the Constitution makes provision for the election of two 
individuals to represent people with disabilities in the Senate.
10
 Unlike at the national and 
provincial levels, there are no mechanisms to guarantee the representation of women and 
people with disabilities on local councils. It is thus submitted that legislation should provide 
for mechanisms to guarantee the representation of marginalised groups on councils, in the 
leadership of committees and in mayoral positions. Further, there may be a need to reform the 
electoral system of Zimbabwe to guarantee the representation of minority ethnic groups and 
youths as they might not be effectively represented through the ballot. 
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2.3 Decentralisation of powers and functions to provincial and local governments 
Political autonomy entails elected subnational governments with distinct powers and 
functions.
11
 It is contended that these powers and functions ought to be original, relevant and 
clearly demarcated. Further, subnational governments should have the power to make final 
decisions on these functions. Moreover, the decentralisation of powers and functions should 
take into account differences at subnational levels. 
2.3.1 Original powers and functions 
It was argued that subnational governments should have original powers. It was observed in 
Chapter Six that provincial and metropolitan councils have original powers in that their 
powers and functions are recognised in the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
12
 The same 
cannot be said for local authorities whose powers and functions are determined by national 
legislation. This means that the extent to which the Constitution may be relied upon to 
prevent recentralisation of local powers and function is limited. However, it was established 
that the national government is not entirely free when determining powers and functions of 
local authorities, as the Constitution has given local authorities the „right to govern‟ their 
areas with „all‟ the necessary powers to do so.13 This implies that the national government 
should decentralise to local authorities significant powers and functions which allow these 
lower governments to fully exercise their „right to govern‟ the areas for which they have been 
established. 
2.3.2 Relevant powers and functions 
The powers and functions of subnational governments ought to be relevant for development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. This is because what subnational governments can achieve 
depends on the responsibilities they are granted.
14
 It was observed in Chapter Six that 
provincial and metropolitan councils are responsible for socio-economic development of their 
respective provinces.
15
 Socio-economic development is geared towards improving people‟s 
socio-economic welfare both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Thus, provincial and 
metropolitan councils have responsibilities with a direct relationship to the realisation of 
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development, democracy and sustainable peace. The responsibility of socio-economic 
development however is only relevant for development, democracy and sustainable peace 
depends on whether councils are allowed to carry our substantive functions and not merely 
oversee the implementation and coordination of national programmes. Moreover, without 
law-making powers, the councils are unlikely to be significant as a tier of government 
capable of realising socio-economic development. Hence, it is submitted that provincial and 
metropolitan councils should be allowed to carry out „real‟ responsibilities pertaining to 
socio-development development.
16
 For example, the councils should be allowed to adopt and 
implement policies and laws on tourism and conservation of the environment. The national 
government is advised to devolve more responsibilities to these councils in line with the spirit 
of devolution in the 2013 Constitution.
17
 
As for local authorities, it was argued that they are in charge of a wide variety of 
responsibilities, including water supply, health and education, which are relevant for the 
realisation of development, democracy and sustainable peace. With the „right to govern‟ 
which local authorities enjoy under the 2013 Constitution, it is submitted that the national 
government should consider devolving more relevant powers to local authorities, especially 
to cities which have the capacity to carry out decentralised responsibilities.
18
 For example, 
cities can be assigned the power to establish a police force with arresting powers. This will 
ensure that cities are in a position to effectively implement their by-laws, especially those 
relating to traffic, parking, environmental conservation and public health. 
2.3.3 Clearly demarcated powers and functions 
The effective performance of decentralised functions by subnational governments requires 
clear demarcation of powers and functions of each level of government.
19
 In Chapter Six it 
was observed that the powers and functions of provincial and metropolitan councils are not 
clearly demarcated. It was contended that the responsibility of provincial and metropolitan 
councils for socio-economic development covers a variety of sectoral areas. This makes it 
difficult to delineate the boundaries of the competencies of provincial and metropolitan 
councils. It is submitted that legislation should clarify the competence boundaries of 
provincial and metropolitan councils to reduce ambiguity in the performance of the 
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responsibility for socio-economic development. At local level, it was contended that a 
majority of the powers and functions of local authorities are clearly demarcated. However, 
responsibilities such as education, health and land use planning should be clearly demarcated 
by identifying competence boundaries for each tier of government. Clarification of the 
division of responsibilities between rural local authorities and chiefs is also required. 
2.3.4 Final decision-making over decentralised functions 
It was contended in Chapter Two that subnational governments should have final decision-
making powers over their functions.
20
 In Chapter Six it was observed that provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities do not have final decision-making powers over 
their functions. The financial decision-making powers of provincial and metropolitan 
councils are limited by the fact that these councils do not have law-making and resource-
raising powers. This means that the councils have to rely on other tiers of government to 
implement their decisions. The decentralisation of these powers will improve the extent to 
which councils may make final decisions on their functions. The final decision-making 
powers of local authorities are limited by requirements for approval of certain decisions by 
the national government. For example, the Minister has the power to approve by-laws, 
resolutions and income-generating projects at local level. Thus the national government is 
heavily involved in the local decision-making process. It is submitted that such unlimited 
involvement in local affairs undermines the autonomy of local authorities and constrains the 
overall process of decentralisation, in contravention with the principle of devolution which is 
one of the founding principles of the 2013 Constitution.
21
 Thus, the powers of the Minister 
which unjustifiably limit the final decision-making power of provincial and local 
governments should be abolished. 
2.3.5 Asymmetric distribution of power and functions 
A one-size-fits-all approach when decentralising powers and functions may not be 
appropriate for a coherent multilevel system of government, given that subnational 
governments are unlikely to have equal capabilities to deliver and finance services.
22
 It may 
be useful to have a multilevel system of government that is sensitive to these differences with 
a clear set of rules about when a subnational government graduates from one status to 
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another.
23
 The study showed that asymmetric decentralisation is one of the key aspects of the 
2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. The Constitution provides for the establishment of 
provincial and metropolitan councils to govern provinces that are partly urban and rural, on 
the one hand, and those that are wholly urban, on the other hand. It recognises different types 
of local authorities to manage rural and urban areas.
24
 The Constitution further allows the 
devolution of powers and functions to each provincial council, metropolitan council or local 
authority, depending on capacity.
25
 The UCA provides rules for the graduation of local 
authorities from one category to another.
26
 It was however argued in Chapter Four that such 
rules have to be reformed to create transparency and to promote participatory democracy in 
governance processes relating to change of local authority status. 
2.4 Security of existence of provincial and local governments 
Security of existence of subnational governments is a key component of political autonomy.
27
 
It can be provided through constitutional and statutory entrenchment of subnational 
governments as an order or tier of government.
28
 It was observed in Chapter Four that 
provincial and metropolitan councils have constitutional recognition. The number and names 
of provinces is also recognised. Such recognition has provided the highest level of security of 
existence to each province, provincial council or metropolitan council.
29
 On the contrary, the 
2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe only recognises local authorities as tiers of government but 
does not go further to safeguard the existence of each local unit. Hence, there will always be 
the threat of abolition or the merging of local authorities. To provide some form of security of 
existence to each individual local authority, it is submitted that national legislation should 
require the consultation of the concerned local authority before it can be abolished or have its 
boundary, status or name changed. 
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2.5 Citizen participation in governance processes 
It was contended in Chapter Two that the ability of a multilevel system of government to 
realise development, democracy and sustainable peace relies in part on opportunities 
available for citizen participation. Hence, citizens should be given the opportunity to 
participate actively in local democratic processes, including budget formulation, planning, 
establishment of new local governments and alteration of local government boundaries.
30
 It 
was also argued that public information should be made easily accessible and available so 
that the citizens can make informed decisions.
31
 The study in various chapters showed that 
citizens have limited opportunities to participate in local governance processes. For example, 
there are no legal requirements for consultation of citizens in the drafting of budgets, 
establishment of urban local authorities and determination of local boundaries. It was 
observed that public information is not easily accessible. The implication has been that 
citizens do not participate in governance processes because they are not aware of council 
proceedings. If they do participate, their contributions often do not bring much value to better 
local decision-making as they do not have the necessary information to make an informed 
contribution. Hence, it is submitted that the envisaged local government Act should provide 
for mechanisms for citizen participation in local decision-making processes. It should further 
mandate councils to make key documents such as budgets and plans easily accessible to the 
public. Councils should also advertise notices of the time and venue of its meetings within 
reasonable time periods. 
2.6 Accountable governments 
Accountability is the cornerstone of democracy and a prerequisite for responsive 
governance.
32
 Thus, when designing a multilevel system of government it is vital to ensure 
that there are specific rules, mechanisms and institutions to promote the accountability of 
various governments to the citizens as well as to other governments placed at other levels.
33
 
This study showed that in Zimbabwe there are various mechanisms which have been put in 
place to promote accountability at all levels of government. The organisation of regular 
elections in Zimbabwe at all levels of government may promote local accountability. The 
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Constitution has established independent institutions including Parliament, Judiciary and 
Office of the Auditor-General to undertake an oversight role. It was observed in this study 
however that the ability of these institutions to exercise their duties has been undermined by a 
number of challenges, including lack of adequate resources. 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe makes provision for a 
multilevel system of government allowing governments organised at various levels to hold 
each other accountable for their actions or lack thereof.
34
 It was observed nevertheless that 
this form of intergovernmental accountability is weak given that provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities do not have distinct constitutionally assigned powers and 
functions. This therefore weakens the extent to which they can counterbalance the national 
government. The UCA and RDCA make provision for various standing and audit committees 
to enforce horizontal accountability.
35
 It was also noted that the public has not been able to 
effectively hold the government accountable due to government information which is not 
easily accessible and lack of effective participatory mechanisms, among other reasons. 
3. Fiscal and budget autonomy at provincial and local levels 
What subnational governments can achieve depends in part on the resources they have and 
the discretion they have to spend those resources.
36
 Thus it is important that subnational 
governments have adequate resources and budget autonomy. Do provincial and local 
governments in Zimbabwe have fiscal and budget autonomy? 
3.1 Resource-raising powers 
It was submitted in Chapter Two that subnational governments should be given the power to 
mobilise sufficient revenue to finance their expenditure and development needs.
37
 Revenue 
can be mobilised through imposing taxes and borrowing. It was observed in Chapter Seven 
that provincial and metropolitan councils do not have constitutionally assigned taxing or 
borrowing powers. This brings into question the extent to which they can be classified as a 
tier of government since a government usually has the power to impose taxes. The 2013 
Constitution of Zimbabwe however allows the national government to devolve revenue-
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raising powers to provincial and metropolitan councils.
38
 It is suggested that national 
government should give these councils some resource-raising powers to promote local 
accountability and efficient spending of public resources at the provincial level, among other 
benefits. 
Unlike provinces, the 2013 Constitution envisages local authorities exercising some resource-
raising powers. The Constitution provides that an Act of Parliament may confer on local 
authorities the power to levy rates and taxes.
39
 In terms of the UCA and RDCA, local 
authorities have various taxing powers, ranging from the power to impose user-charges and 
property rates to imposing licencing fees. It was established in Chapter Seven that while local 
authorities have these resource-raising powers they have not been able to raise sufficient 
revenue to meet their obligations and development needs. This is attributed in part to the 
economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. The other reason is that local authorities are in possession 
of the majority of resource-raising powers which have weak resource-raising potential. The 
control of tax rates by the national government has also undermined the local resource-raising 
effort. It is suggested that the national government should devolve more resource-raising 
powers to local authorities, such as business licensing, land taxes and vehicles taxes. Further, 
the exemption of certain property from property rates should be abolished to improve the 
local tax base. It was also observed that local authorities may mobilise fiscal resources 
through borrowing from internal and external bases. However, the discussion in Chapter 
Seven showed that borrowing is highly regulated. It is submitted that such a form of 
regulation is necessary given the unstable economic environment being experienced in 
Zimbabwe, which requires careful macro-economic management.
40
 
3.2 Right to set tax rates 
The assignment of taxing powers to subnational governments is likely to be of little relevance 
for revenue mobilisation and fiscal autonomy if not accompanied by the right to set tax rates. 
Effective revenue mobilisation requires that subnational governments have some control over 
tax rates or user tariffs or the definition of those revenues.
41
 It was observed in Chapter Seven 
that local authorities in Zimbabwe do not have the right to set tax rates for the majority of 
their taxing powers. The national government determines rates applicable to user-charges, 
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property rates and fees, among other local taxes. This has negatively affected revenue 
mobilisation at the local level. To improve local resource mobilisation, it was submitted that 
the national government should relinquish control of the determination of rates applicable to 
local taxes and user-charges to local authorities. However, the national government should 
retain the power to set the national framework within which local authorities may determine 
tax rates to promote equity, among other local and national goals. 
3.3 ‘Real’ tax base 
The decentralisation of taxing powers is likely to be ineffective for local resource-raising if 
there is no „real‟ tax base.42 It was observed in Chapter Seven that the majority of urban local 
authorities have a „real‟ tax base, unlike their rural counterparts. There is a high level of 
economic activity in urban areas which implies that urban local authorities may derive 
significant revenue from property rates, user-charges and taxes due to the wide tax base. On 
the other hand, in rural areas there are little or no economic activities, which implies that 
there is no „real‟ tax base. Thus, rural local authorities are not in a position to raise significant 
revenue like their urban counterparts. The assignment of power to impose land tax on rural 
local authorities may allow the raising of significant resources in rural areas given that most 
rural local authorities have abundant land under their jurisdiction. Thus, the tax base is „real‟ 
in as far as land tax is concerned. There is a need to develop a clear legal framework on how 
rural local authorities can benefit from the exploitation of natural resources in their 
jurisdictions. It is further submitted that intergovernmental grants should be provided to 
complement locally raised revenue in rural local authorities. This is necessary to ensure that 
all local authorities are in a position to provide public services that meet the minimum 
standards set by the national government. 
3.4 Budget autonomy 
It was contended in Chapter Two that subnational governments should have a certain 
measure of discretion to determine expenditure choices.
43
 It was further contended that the 
degree to which subnational governments have control over their own revenues is important 
for development and, in particular, for adjusting the mixture of services to closely match local 
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preferences.
44
 In Chapter Seven it was observed that in Zimbabwe provincial and local 
governments do not have budget autonomy. The national government does not only set 
expenditure frameworks at the local level but also approves the budgets of local authorities. 
While the setting of expenditure frameworks is necessary to protect the realisation of certain 
goals, it is submitted that the requirement for the approval of budgets by the national 
government undermines the institutional integrity of local authorities, which is recognised in 
the Constitution.
45
 Hence, the requirement for approval of local budgets should be abolished 
but the national government should retain the power to set expenditure frameworks to 
influence local prioritisation. 
3.5 Equalisation and redistribution 
An argument was made in Chapter Two for a balanced system of intergovernmental transfers 
for equalisation and redistribution purposes.
46
 It was further argued that the equalisation and 
redistributive potential of an intergovernmental fiscal system is likely to be enhanced if it is 
transparent, predictable, equitable, flexible and participatory. Chapter Seven sought in part to 
establish the extent to which the Zimbabwe intergovernmental fiscal system complies with 
this normative framework. 
3.5.1 Transparency 
It was observed in Chapter Seven that the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local 
authorities under the Lancaster House Constitutional order was not transparent.
47
 
Intergovernmental grants were transferred to subnational governments at the discretion of the 
national government. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe seeks to change this practice. It 
provides general criteria to guide the sharing of nationally raised revenue among the three 
tiers of government. This implies that nationally raised revenues will not be allocated to 
provincial and local governments arbitrarily. Any allocations to provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities have to be based on the criteria set in the Constitution. To 
enhance transparency, as argued below, provincial and local governments should be involved 
in national decision-making processes relating to sharing of nationally raised revenue. 
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3.5.2 Predictable and flexible 
As argued in Chapter Two, a system of fiscal intergovernmental relations should be 
predictable and flexible.
48
 In Chapter Seven it was observed that the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants under the Lancaster House Constitution of Zimbabwe was highly 
unpredictable. This affected multi-year planning and budgeting at local level.
49
 It is suggested 
that the national government should adopt mechanisms which provide some predictability in 
the allocation of intergovernmental grants to provincial and metropolitan councils. This could 
include adopting a system of publishing multi-year projections of future allocations to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. Intergovernmental grants could 
also be kept reasonably stable from year to year. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe can be 
commended for providing only basic components of an intergovernmental fiscal system. The 
Constitution leaves the detail of the intergovernmental fiscal system, such as the formula of 
the actual sharing of nationally raised revenue among tiers of government, to the 
determination of the national government through legislation and policies. This creates 
flexibility by allowing the continual adjustment of the intergovernmental fiscal system in 
response to the changing political, social and economic environment, unlike if the detailed 
provisions of the intergovernmental fiscal systems were captured in the Constitution. 
3.5.3 Equitable 
The design of the intergovernmental fiscal system should ensure that nationally raised 
revenue is shared among tiers of government, depending on the responsibilities which they 
have. Furthermore, the allocation of intergovernmental grants to subnational government 
should advance equity by ensuring that poor jurisdictions receive more intergovernmental 
grants, both in terms of amount and variety of grants, relative to rich regions.
50
 It was 
observed in Chapter Seven that under the 2013 Constitution provincial and metropolitan 
councils and local authorities are entitled to not less than five per cent of nationally raised 
revenue in each financial year.
51
 It was contended that five per cent is not enough considering 
the huge service delivery obligations which these subnational governments have, especially 
local authorities. Thus, it is submitted that provincial and local governments should be given 
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more than five per cent. A share of not less than 15 per cent of nationally raised revenue will 
go a long way in complementing the local resource-raising effort. The horizontal sharing of 
nationally raised revenue should also be equitable. It was observed in Chapter Seven that the 
allocation of intergovernmental grants to subnational governments under the Lancaster House 
Constitution was not equitable. Some subnational governments received from the national 
government larger and more various grants than others without any justifiable ground. It is 
submitted that formula-based allocations may be an effective way of ensuring equitable 
sharing of revenue between provincial and metropolitan councils as well as among local 
authorities. 
3.5.4 Participatory 
The sharing of nationally raised revenue among tiers of government has a direct impact on 
the financial sustainability of subnational governments.
52
 Thus, subnational governments 
should have mechanisms for influencing the sharing of nationally raised revenue.
53
 It was 
observed in Chapter Seven that neither the Constitution nor national legislation explicitly 
provides for the participation of provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities in 
the sharing of nationally raised revenue. Furthermore, practice does not suggest that these 
subnational governments influence the sharing of nationally raised revenue and the allocation 
of intergovernmental grants to subnational level. It is submitted that legislation should make 
provision for the involvement of subnational governments in the decision-making processes 
that decide revenue sharing. This is in line with the constitutional principle of cooperative 
governance, which in part means that tiers of government must consult each other on matters 
of common interest such as revenue sharing.
54
 For example, before the sharing of nationally 
raised revenue among tiers of government, the Minister of Finance could be obliged to 
consult representatives of organised local government and provincial and metropolitan 
councils. Specific forums can be established at various levels where tiers of government may 
consult on matters around revenue sharing and general financial matters. 
4. Administrative autonomy of provincial and local governments 
Political and fiscal autonomy is not enough for subnational governments to contribute 
meaningfully to the realisation of development, democracy and sustainable peace, if not 
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accompanied by administrative autonomy.
55
 Administrative autonomy entails the discretion 
which subnational governments have in relation to appointment, remuneration, disciplining 
and dismissal of their staff as well as the determination of internal administrative 
procedures.
56
 The question which Chapter Six in part sought to answer was whether 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities have administrative autonomy. It 
was observed that provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities do not have 
authority over their personnel issues. Although the UCA and RDCA give local authorities 
power to hire and fire staff, such power has been taken away by the Minister‟s directive 
which requires each local authority to seek the approval of the national government before it 
can hire staff. Further, the Local Government Board has to approve the appointment and 
dismissal of senior officials in urban local authorities. It was further observed in Chapter Six 
that local authorities do not have full control over the determination of conditions of 
employment of senior employees. These are determined by the council but have to be 
approved by the Local Government Board. When it comes to other employees, the UCA and 
RDCA suggest that council has the power to determine their salaries. Practice suggests 
however that the national government influences the determination of salaries of local 
authorities. 
It was also observed in Chapter Six that provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities do not have autonomy to determine their internal procedures. The establishment 
and role of committees at both the provincial and local levels is highly regulated. The 
Provincial Councils and Administration Act, RDCA and UCA give these subnational 
governments little local discretion to establish committees and to determine their functions. It 
is submitted that the „right to govern‟ which local authorities enjoy under the 2013 
Constitution arguably includes the right to appoint, dismiss and remunerate their own staff.
57
 
It also includes the right to exercise a certain measure of discretion to determine internal 
procedures. Thus it is submitted that legislation should give local authorities the power to 
hire, remunerate and fire staff as well as to determine their internal procedures. Such 
authority however should be exercised within a framework determined by the national 
government. For example, the framework may comprise minimum qualifications for 
appointment into certain key positions, salary scales and broad internal organisation. 
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5. Supervision of provincial and local governments 
Supervision is one of the core elements of a multilevel system of government that can realise 
development, democracy and sustainable peace. Thus it was contended in Chapter Two that 
senior governments should have the power and obligation to supervise junior governments. It 
was further submitted that such supervision should take the form of regulation, monitoring, 
support and intervention.
58
 
5.1 Regulation 
National government should have the power to regulate the activities of subnational 
governments by setting national frameworks within which subnational governments 
operate.
59
 In Chapter Eight the study established that the national government in Zimbabwe 
has the relevant powers to regulate the institutions, finances and functions of provincial and 
local governments. The discussion in Chapter Eight however showed that the powers of the 
national government under the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, RDCA and UCA 
go beyond the setting of national framework. These laws give the Minister unlimited powers 
to regulate the activities of provincial and local governments. In some cases, the Minister has 
discretion to determine what has to be regulated and when such regulation should take place. 
Under this legal arrangement, the autonomy of local government depends entirely on the 
ability of the incumbent Minister to exercise restraint. Sectoral regulation on the other hand 
tends to give subnational governments some measure of discretion when undertaking their 
functions. It is submitted that the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, UCA and 
RDCA should be reformed by limiting the role of the Minister to setting the national 
framework within which subnational governments operate. 
It was contended in Chapter Two that the decentralisation of fiscal resources should be 
carried out simultaneously with measures to promote better financial management at 
subnational level to safeguard and ensure effective use of public finances.
60
 It was observed 
in Chapter Seven that in Zimbabwe the national government has the necessary powers to 
regulate the financial affairs of provincial councils and local authorities. Nonetheless, the 
study noted that in some cases the UCA and RDCA provides different financial rules for rural 
and urban local authorities without any justifiable ground for such differences. This means 
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that in such cases the national government oversees the implementation of almost two 
separate regulatory regimes in urban and rural local authorities. It is suggested that where 
differentiation is not required the regulatory framework should provide for a single 
framework within which all local authorities are required to operate. 
5.2 Monitoring 
It was contended in Chapter Two that the legal and institutional design of a multilevel system 
of government should enable higher levels of government to monitor the activities of junior 
governments. Monitoring is necessary to detect non-compliance with legal and policy 
frameworks, gaps or capacity constraints at subnational level that may undermine the 
performance of subnational governments. In Chapter Eight the study found that the national 
government has the necessary power to monitor the activities of provincial and local 
governments. The study however established that some of the monitoring mechanisms relied 
upon by the national government are „too‟ intrusive on local autonomy. These include the 
power of the Minister to approve certain resolutions and by-laws of local authorities, as well 
as the requirement for rural local authorities to submit council and committee minutes to the 
Minister. It is submitted that such monitoring mechanisms should be reformed to be in line 
with the 2013 Constitution which requires that local authorities exercise a certain measure of 
local discretion.
61
 
Concerning finances, Chapter Eight found that a number of mechanisms have been put in 
place to allow the financial monitoring of provincial and local governments. Such 
mechanisms include the requirement for regular financial reporting, the auditing of financial 
statements by the AG, and the appointment of investigators to inquire into financial problems 
at local level. A number of challenges which undermine effective monitoring of financial 
affairs were also identified. Chief among them is the failure by local authorities to submit 
financial statements on time. It is suggested that legislation should provide for sanctions in 
cases involving failure by a subnational government to submit financial statements on time. 
This could take the form of intervention. The study also established that the national 
departments of local authorities charged with direct supervision of provincial and local 
governments lack the necessary resources to effectively monitor local authorities. Thus, there 
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is need to adequately resource national institutions so that they are in a position to carry out 
their mandate effectively. 
5.3 Support 
It was contended in Chapter Two that senior governments should support junior 
governments, particularly low level (or poor) subnational governments, which usually lack 
the capacity to raise revenue, administer programmes and comply with financial rules.
62
 To 
ensure that such support is given to junior governments, it was submitted that it may be 
necessary to compel the national government to support subnational governments before it 
can exercise its powers to intervene.
63
 The study in Chapter Eight found that there is no 
explicit constitutional or legislative obligation on the national government to provide general 
support to provincial and local governments. General support to provincial and local 
governments depends on „goodwill‟ of national ministries and departments. This is in part the 
reason why general support to subnational governments has been sporadic. It is submitted 
that Parliament, through legislation, should consider imposing an obligation on the national 
executive to provide general support to local authorities, especially before exercising the 
power to intervene in subnational affairs. 
Like general support, there is no obligation on the national government to provide support to 
provincial and local governments to improve financial management. The study found that 
although the national government used to provide technical support to rural local authorities 
in the preparation of financial statements, such support has been withdrawn. It established 
that a significant number of local authorities, particularly rural local authorities, have 
struggled to comply with the required accounting, auditing and financial reporting standards. 
It is submitted that such technical support should be reintroduced to support struggling local 
authorities, especially rural ones. 
5.4 Intervention 
If monitoring and support mechanisms suggest persistent problems at the subnational level 
that threaten the attainment of national and/or local objectives, it may be necessary for the 
national government to intervene. This means that the national government ought to have the 
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power to intervene in subnational affairs to protect local and national interests. It was argued 
that because intervention is the form of supervision which has most the significant impact on 
local autonomy, it must be exercised within certain confines. 
5.4.1 Explicit legal recognition of grounds of intervention 
Legislation should specify the conditions upon which a senior government can intervene in 
subnational affairs.
64
 The discussion in Chapter Eight showed that in Zimbabwe the 
Provincial Councils and Administration Act, UCA and RDCA give the Minister unfettered 
power to determine when an intervention should take place. The conditions under which the 
Minister may intervene are not explicitly listed in legislation. This allows liberal 
interpretation of the intervention powers which can be used to achieve selfish ends, such as 
undermining the authority of a subnational government administered by an opposition 
political party. Thus, it is submitted that these laws should be reformed by providing in 
explicit terms the circumstances in which the Minister may intervene at subnational level. 
5.4.2 Oversight on intervention powers 
The exercise of intervention powers should be subjected to oversight mechanisms for checks 
and balances.
65
 The argument is that there is always a threat of intervention powers being 
used for what they were not intended for. Thus, oversight of the use of intervention powers is 
necessary to protect the autonomy of subnational governments. It was observed in Chapter 
Eight that the Minister has a variety of intervention powers which are exercised without any 
form of oversight. For example, when directing a council to reverse its resolution the Minister 
is not required to report to any other body. The powers of the Minister to adopt budget deficit 
mechanisms at local level are also exercised without any form of oversight. Under such a 
system, there are no means to check whether the intervention powers are being exercised for 
the purposes for which they were intended. Thus, it is submitted that Parliament, in particular 
the Portfolio Committee on Local Government, should have the responsibility to exercise 
oversight of the use of intervention powers. For instance, before the Minister may reverse a 
council resolution, he or she should seek the approval of the Portfolio Committee. If 
Parliament is not in session, the Portfolio Committee can review the decision to reverse the 
council resolution once Parliament resumes sitting. 
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5.4.3 Proportionate intervention measures 
The powers to intervene should be „exercised in such a way as to ensure that the intervention 
by the senior government is kept in proportion to the importance of the interests which it 
intends to protect.
66
 It was observed in Chapter Eight that in Zimbabwe the Minister may 
intervene in subnational affairs in a variety of ways. It was also shown that the Minister has 
the discretion to choose the manner of intervening at subnational level because he or she has 
unfettered powers. Thus, under this arrangement the use of proportionate intervention 
measures is not guaranteed. Hence, it is submitted that legislation should provide for the 
nature of interventions measures which can be utilised to address certain problems. For 
example, if a council fails to supply water the Minister should not assume other local 
responsibilities such as provision of health services. The guiding principle of intervention is 
that it should not be punitive but corrective in nature. 
5.4.4 Resumption of duty by a subnational government after intervention 
Following the suspension or dissolution of a local elected body or local executives, the law 
should determine the resumption of their duties in as short a period of time as possible.
67
 The 
same should apply in cases where a senior government will have assumed a local function or 
responsibility.
68
 The discussion in Chapter Eight showed that assumption of local 
responsibilities has been one of the most controversial issues in local government in 
Zimbabwe. After dismissing the entire council in some local authorities, the Minister has 
continuously renewed the term of office of caretakers. For example, the City of Harare was 
administered by caretakers for several years even though the UCA is explicit about the role of 
caretakers being temporary and abolished as soon as the council is able to carry out its 
mandate or when a new council is elected.
69
 Such cases present a clear violation of legal 
prescriptions, which brings into question the application of the rule of law.
70
 This has 
negatively affected local democracy since citizens are deprived of democratic representation 
in cases where a local authority is under administration by the national government. While 
legislation provides for immediate resumption of responsibility by a subnational government 
after intervention, there is a need for a change of culture on the part of national government 
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officials by complying with legislative prescriptions. Subnational governments are also 
advised to make use of the courts to protect and promote their right to govern which they 
enjoy under the 2013 Constitution.
71
 
6. Intergovernmental cooperation 
Intergovernmental cooperation was identified as one of the core aspects of a multilevel 
system of government than can deliver on national and local goals such as development, 
democracy and sustainable peace.
72
 The basic components of an effective intergovernmental 
cooperation were identified as an enabling legal framework, appropriate institutional 
framework and nurturing a political culture of cooperation.
73
 
6.1 Enabling legal environment 
Written rules of intergovernmental relations in the constitution or legislation can provide a 
foundation for nurturing a culture of cooperation in countries which have recently adopted 
multilevel systems of government where such culture might not exist because of a history of 
domination by the centre.
74
 The study found that the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe 
provides the necessary enabling framework for intergovernmental relations and cooperation. 
What is required is for the national government to provide content to this framework by 
developing appropriate policies and legislation. Such policies and legislation should make 
provision for the establishment of mechanisms to foster intergovernmental cooperation. 
These could include establishing intergovernmental planning and budgeting procedures, 
dispute resolution mechanisms, coordination mechanisms and the requirement for 
consultation among tiers of government on matters of common interests. Provision can be 
made for the establishment of institutions of intergovernmental relations and also assignment 
of an intergovernmental relations role to institutions such as the provincial and metropolitan 
councils and Parliament. 
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6.2 Enabling institutional environment 
The development of constructive relations among tiers of government requires 
institutionalisation of vertical and horizontal integration.
75
 Institutionalisation involves 
designing appropriate institutional arrangements to channel the participation of various tiers 
of governments in decision-making processes at various levels of government, and defining 
the procedures through which such involvement is structured.
76
 Such institutionalisation can 
be established so that subnational governments can influence law-making, policy-making and 
fiscal matters at national level. Subnational governments should be given the platform to 
participate in the national legislative processes.
77
 Other mechanisms of enabling subnational 
governments to influence national law-making process include requiring the national 
government to consult subnational governments on any constitutional and legislative changes 
which affect their status, institution, powers and functions.
78
 In Chapter Five it was observed 
that in Zimbabwe some members of provincial and metropolitan councils are also members 
of the National Parliament. Such dual membership allows the representation of subnational 
interest at the national level. Local authorities on the other hand do not have the means of 
influencing national law-making process. It may be necessary for legislation to provide for 
the consultation of organised local government before enactment of legislation with a direct 
impact on local authorities. 
Subnational governments should also have the platform and mechanisms to influence policy 
formulation at the national level. In Chapter Nine it was established that in Zimbabwe 
although intergovernmental planning and budgeting was established to allow provincial and 
local governments to influence national policy-making, these lower governments have not 
been able to effectively influence national policy-making. This can be attributed to 
committees, organised at various levels and designed to promote coordination and 
development planning processes, being dominated by officials of the national government. 
Thus, provincial and local governments have little influence over decision-making in these 
structures. A further reason is that the policy-making structures of the national government 
give little or no consideration to input made by subnational governments. To address this 
challenge, it was submitted that there is a need to establish intergovernmental relations 
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structures with balanced representation of all tiers of government while also encouraging the 
national government to consider input from subnational governments. 
6.3 Nurturing a culture of cooperation 
Even if the legal and institutional environment is conducive to intergovernmental 
cooperation, in practice, effective intergovernmental relations requires considerable time, 
effort and will.
79
 Thus, it was argued in Chapter Two that a political culture of mutual 
respect, tolerance and equality among tiers of government is vital for nurturing constructive 
relations.
80
 The discussion in the previous chapter showed that such a culture does not exist in 
Zimbabwe primarily because intergovernmental relations are new phenomena, born out of the 
2013 Constitution. What is required for that culture to develop is for officials of the national 
government to accept that the system of government has changed. They should recognise that 
not all relationships under the new multilevel system of government are supervisory in 
nature, others are cooperative in nature. In order to nurture a culture of cooperation, officials 
at higher levels of government are encouraged to engage officials of junior governments from 
a point of equality, mutual respect and tolerance. 
6.4 The role of organised local government 
Local governments are unlikely to engage meaningfully with senior governments as separate 
units except for a few large local units.
81
 Hence, it was contended in Chapter Two that for 
effective engagement with senior governments it may be necessary to recognise the role of 
and provide support to organised local government.
82
 In the previous chapter it was observed 
that the role of organised local government is not recognised in the Constitution or 
legislation. This has meant that the participation of organised local government when 
engaging with senior governments relies on the goodwill of officials of senior governments. 
It was submitted that the lack of constitutional or legal recognition is in part the reason why 
organised local government has not been able to effectively represent, promote and protect 
the interests of their members. Further reasons relate to the absence of adequate financial 
resources and fragmented bodies representing local authorities. Hence, it is submitted that 
legislation should recognise the role of organised local authorities, including participation in 
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intergovernmental relations structures. The national government is advised to give organised 
local government financial support so that it can effectively represent and promote the 
interests of its members. Financial support could be provided from the budget of the Ministry 
of Local Government. Alternatively and preferably, funds could be appropriated directly by 
Parliament with the Ministry only required to transfer the funds to organised local 
government. 
7. Recommendations 
In the preceding sections the chapter provided major conclusions or findings of this study. In 
this section the chapter provides proposals which can be considered when reforming the 
multilevel system of government, especially given that legislative and institutional reform is 
on the agenda of government in the election term 2013 to 2018.
83
 The study established that a 
significant number of provisions of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, UCA 
and RDCA are inconsistent with the 2013 Constitution. The question is whether the 
alignment of these provisions with the Constitution is enough to adequately give effect to the 
multilevel system of government provided in the 2013 Constitution. Can the constitutional 
requirement for devolution be given full effect by mere alignment of legislation with the 
Constitution? It is submitted that alignment is likely not going to be enough. What is required 
is the development of a new statutory framework that reflects the constitutional „spirit‟ of 
multilevel governance and devolution of power. Some of the issues which may be considered 
when developing a new statutory framework are provided below. 
7.1 Single piece legislation 
The study identified a number of inconsistencies in the UCA and RDCA, which govern the 
activities of urban and rural local authorities, respectively. The UCA provides rules for urban 
local authorities which are different from those provided by RDCA for rural local authorities. 
For example, there are different quorum requirements in urban and rural local authorities. 
The maximum period of time which caretakers or commissioners can administer a local 
authority is different in urban and rural local authorities. It was argued that there is no 
justification for some of the different rules. Thus, it is submitted that where differences in the 
regulation of local authorities are not necessary, uniform rules should govern both urban and 
local authorities. What may be required is a single piece legislation which governs both urban 
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and rural local authorities. Thus, the national government has taken the right direction by 
harmonising the UCA and RDCA in the expected new local government Act. Such 
harmonisation should eliminate the inconsistencies but, as suggested below, maintain 
asymmetric decentralisation. 
7.2 Asymmetric decentralisation 
A single piece local government legislation should not be construed to mean elimination of 
the asymmetric mode of decentralisation. The study showed that there are huge differences 
between urban and rural local authorities with respect to resource mobilisation, population 
size and capacity to carry out tasks. It is submitted that while both urban and rural local 
authorities can be governed by a single piece legislation, there is need to recognise 
differences between urban and rural local authorities. For example, large urban local 
authorities should have the power to carry out more responsibilities than do rural local 
authorities because they have capacity to undertake such responsibilities relative to rural local 
authorities. This implies that the two categories of local authorities should not be given equal 
powers and functions. 
7.3 The role of the Minister 
It was observed that the Minister has unlimited supervisory powers over provincial and local 
governments. Such powers include the power to approve resolutions, by-laws, budgets, 
income-generating projects, cooperative agreements, rates and user-charges. Further, the 
Minister may issue directives, assume local responsibilities, implement measures to eliminate 
budget deficits and make laws on behalf of local authorities. While some of these powers fall 
within the confines of supervision set out in Chapter Two, it was argued that a majority of 
these powers goes beyond supervision. They are a significant threat to the autonomy of 
provincial and local governments which is necessary if these subnational governments are to 
play a role in democracy, development and sustainable peace. Thus, it is submitted that there 
is a need to redefine the role of the Minister so as to establish an appropriate balance between 
the requirement for supervision and the need for local autonomy, as put forward below. 
7.4 Towards balancing local autonomy, cooperation and supervision 
The study established that while the 2013 Constitution does not explicitly provide distinct 
powers of provincial and local governments, it is laden with values, principles and objectives 
especially relating to devolution. For example, devolution is identified as one of the founding 
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principles of the Constitution.
84
 The preamble of Chapter 14 of the Constitution carries in 
itself a constitutional instruction for the national government to devolve power to provincial 
and metropolitan councils and local authorities to achieve, among other goals, development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. Chapter 14 also provides values, principles and objectives 
of devolution as well as provincial and local governments.
85
 What this means is that the 
nature of the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government is rooted in these values, 
objectives and principles. The determination of local autonomy, supervisory powers and 
cooperation should be informed by these values, principles and objectives. The allocation of 
responsibilities across tiers of government should further be informed by international 
principles such as the principle of subsidiarity and UN International Guidelines on 
Decentralisation and the Strengthening of Local Authorities discussed in Chapter Two. 
8. Answering the research question 
The overall question of this thesis was whether the legal and institutional framework of 
multilevel governance in Zimbabwe has potential to promote the role of subnational 
governments in development, democracy and sustainable peace. In Chapter Two design 
features of a multilevel system of government that promotes the role of subnational 
governments in development, democracy and sustainable peace were put forward. The study 
established that the Zimbabwean multilevel system of government lacks the key design 
features which are necessary if subnational governments are to play a role in development, 
democracy and sustainable peace. Thus, the overall conclusion of this study is that the 
multilevel system of government is less likely to realise development, democracy and 
sustainable peace. However, the 2013 Constitution provides a foundation upon which a 
multilevel system of government that can respond to development, democracy and 
sustainable peace goals can be built. What is required is the full implementation of this 
Constitution by enacting relevant pieices of legislation and establishing relevant institutions. 
The national government government „must‟ devolve power to lower governments as 
required by the Constitution. The right of communities to manage their own affairs at 
subnational levels „must‟ be respected, protected and promoted. It is hoped that the national 
government, in particular Parliament, will be supportive of the idea of a non-centralised 
system of government by decentralising powers and responsibilities to the provincial and 
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local levels. Provincial and local governments should be given adequate resource-raising 
powers, significant expenditure responsibilities and some measure of discretion when 
undertaking decentralised functions. The achievement of both national and local goals will 
require the higher governments to supervise lower governments. Such supervision however 
should be regulated and exercised within certain limits. The development of mechanisms of 
promoting intergovernmental cooperation should be underscored. 
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